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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Restructuring. Deregulation. Direct Access. Retail Wheeling. Customer Choice. 
What does it all mean? How will Montana’s families, small businesses, and natural 
environment fare in the move toward a competitive electricity market? In the spring of 1997, 
the Montana legislature passed Senate Bill 390, the “Electric Industry Restructuring and
Customer Choice Act.’’! SB 390, signed by Governor Marc Racicot on May 2, puts
Montana at the forefront of a national movement to introduce competition into the 
generation of electricity and the sale of that electricity to retail customers. The policy 
statement of this 48-page bill proclaimed that “Montana customers should have the 
freedom to choose their supplier of electricity” and that “affording this opportunity serves
the public interest.”^ Others were less certain, as evidenced by strong opposition testimony
from low-income, environmental, and consumer organizations.
The Basics
The changes contained in SB 390 herald a fundamental shift in the way electric 
companies and customers do business. Previously, residential customers and small 
businesses were divided between utilities according to location alone. Each utility had its 
own geographic district, or service territory, in which it was the only provider of electricity. 
This monopoly arrangement was protected by Montana’s Territorial Integrity Act (MCA 
69-5-102) which forbids utilities from stringing distribution lines into neighboring service 
areas.3 All of the customers in the district were automatically assigned
1 The bill, and a summary of the bill, can be found at 
http://www.psc.state.mt.us/gaselec/gaselec.htm
See also http://statedocs.msl.state.mt.us/
2 MCA 69-8-102.
3 DEQ, "Restructuring the Electric Utility Industry in Montana,” executive summary.
1
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to that utility, and the utility had an obligation to serve them. As the sole provider of 
electricity in its franchised district, each utility acted as a monopoly, but not without 
controls. The type of control depended on the type of utility.
In Montana, most electrical utilities fall under two categories. Historically, urban 
areas were served by investor-owned utilities (lOU) and mral areas were served 
predominantly by rural electric cooperatives (REC), or “co-ops.” Most of M ontana’s 
major cities — Billings, Butte, Bozeman, Great Falls, Helena, and Missoula — lie in Montana 
Power Co.’s (MPC) service territory. Montana’s largest utility, MPC is also the only lOU 
that sells all of its power to Montanans. With 290,000 customers in all, it also happens to 
be the only Montana company that is publicly traded on the NY stock exchange, the state’s 
only Fortune 500 firm, and the state’s largest private-sector employer with 3000 workers 
including 2500 in Montana.^ A second investor-owned utility, PacifiCorp, historically
supplied power to 35,000 customers in northwestern Montana including Kalispell, 
Whitefish, and Libby, but announced in July 1998 that it intended to withdraw from
Montana.^ In November of that year, the PSC approved the sale of its facilities to the
Flathead Electric Cooperative. A subsidiary corporation. Energy Northwest Inc., was later
formed by Flathead to serve PacifiCorp’s former urban customers.^ Finally, urban areas of
eastern Montana are served by Montana-Dakota Utilities (MDU), an electric and natural gas 
utility with headquarters in Bismark, North Dakota. M DU’s 260,000 customers include
92,000 residential accounts in Montana.^
To prevent lOUs from abusing their status as monopoly providers, and to ensure a 
fair price and quality service, they were subject to regulation by the popularly-elected, five-
4 John Stucke, “MPC pulls plug,” Montana Standard. 10 December 1997. Malone, 
Montana: A Contemporary Profile. 20. Charles S. Johnson, “MPC exec defends strategy 
changes,” IR, 12 September 1998. IR State Bureau, “Baucus to meet with MPC chair,” 
IR, 31 March 2000.
5 AP, “Pacific Power to sell Montana operation,” GET, 10 July 1998.
^ AP, “Public Service Commission OKs PacifiCorp deal,” Missoulian. 3 November 1998. 
Charles S. Johnson, “Bill would require profits to go to customers,” IR, 24 September
1998.
7 Mike Dennison, “Co-ops preparing bid for MPC properties; MDU shows interest too,” 
GFT. 20 April 2000.
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member public service commission (PSC). The system by which the business interests of 
the lOUs and the public interest of customers were balanced against each other was 
informally known as the “regulatory compact.”^ Under this arrangement, lOUs were
granted; 1) a unique service territory with exclusive rights to the customers within it, and 2) 
the ability to recover from these customers their operating costs and a profit they could 
return to their investors. Customers, on the other hand, were protected by their elected 
officials (the PSC) from arbitrary rate increases and fraudulent behavior. Costs were not 
eligible for recovery until reviewed by the PSC. Finally, customers were allowed to observe 
the proceedings of the PSC and, to some degree, participate in them. According to the 
Washington, DC-based Resources for the Future, “The basic goal o f regulation is 
deceptively simple: set prices as low as possible, consistent with raising enough revenue to
cover the utility’s costs, including a fair return on its investment.”^
So what, then, is the basic goal of deregulation? According to proponents, 
deregulation will open the generation and sale of electricity to competition, allowing people 
to shop for the company and product that best meet their needs. The transportation of that 
electricity over transmission and distribution wires would remain regulated monopolies. 
Deregulation promises two principal benefits for consumers: lower prices and increased 
choices. As we will see, both claims have been seriously contested.
Before new companies can compete for the business of customers, the former 
system must first be dismantled. Specifically, the regulatory authority of the PSC 
(particularly over prices) must be diminished and the system of exclusive service territories 
must be dissolved. Once these barriers have been removed, proponents claim that a 
competitive market will develop that will keep prices low, improve efficiency, and deliver 
new and innovative products to consumers.
Having never been under PSC authority, the co-ops occupy a somewhat different, 
although no less significant, position with respect to deregulation. Collectively, the co-ops 
are a political force to be reckoned with in Montana. While most Montanans buy their 
power from lOUs, most of Montana’s area is served by the state’s 26 co-ops.
8 Drummond, "The Small Customer Buying Cooperative," 6.
9 Brennan, 67.
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Traditionally, these businesses have ranged in size from 800 to about 10,000 customer 
households. A total o f about 90,000 Montana households (or 330,000 people — about half
of the state’s electricity customers) buy co-op power. The 1939 Montana legislature
authorized the creation of cooperatives “for the purpose of supplying electric energy and
promoting and extending the use of electric energy in rural areas which might otherwise
have been neglected (customer density in co-op country averages only about two customers
per mile of power line, compared with 40-60 for the urban areas served by lOUs).  ̂  ̂ The
co-ops differ in several important ways from their for-profit, publicly-traded lOU 
counterparts. In place of shareholders, these non-profit corporations are owned and 
controlled by their “customer-members,” i.e., all of the residents living in that service 
territory. As such, the co-ops are self-regulated and “exempt in all respects from the
jurisdiction and control of the public service commission of this state.” For co-ops, then,
the term “deregulation” is somewhat meaningless — you can’t deregulate what was never 
regulated. But co-ops are nonetheless involved in the move toward competition that was 
initiated by SB 390. As was the case for the lOUs, SB 390 envisions co-ops opening their 
service areas to competition, giving their customers a choice of electric supply companies 
(“escos”). But unlike lOUs, co-ops are not compelled to do so under SB 390. Each co­
op can choose to “opt out” of competition and maintain its traditional role as the monopoly 
provider within its service area.
It is important to recognize that the restructuring of the electric utility industry 
applies only to certain aspects of the electricity business. Broadly speaking, that business 
can be divided into two primary activities. The first deals with the generation or acquisition 
of the electrical energy itself, what some call the “commodity component” or simply the 
“juice.” This is the piece that is being deregulated. Competition is authorized for retail
With the PacifiCorp sale, these numbers have recently increased. The Flathead Electric 
Cooperative now has 48,500 customers. Dave Wheelihan, “Testimony of the Montana 
Electric Cooperatives’ Association before the Senate Taxation Committee - SB 390,” 13 
March 1997. Mike Dennison, “Rural co-ops adopt ‘wait and see’ attitude,” GFT. 6 June
1999.
11 MCA 35-18-105. Guest opinion by Gary Wiens, “Joining forces to buy electricity not 
exactly a new idea,” GFT. 30 April 1998.
12 MCA 35-18-105.
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suppliers wanting to sell customers the “juice” that runs their appliances. These suppliers 
may include a host of entities such as utility subsidiaries, nonutility generators, and energy 
marketers. By comparison, the delivery of that energy over the “poles and wires” that 
make up the electrical grid will continue to be a monopoly function regulated by the PSC
(or, in the case of co-ops, by their governing boards) and federal a g e n c i e s .  13 Customers
will continue to purchase delivery service from their former utility leaving the service 
territory boundaries intact. For the first time, then, customers will have separate electricity 
companies performing separate functions. It will be these local distribution companies, not 
the competitive energy supply companies, that will inherit the term “utility.” Other 
functions, such as metering (measuring the energy usage) and billing, may remain with the
distribution utility, or they too may become eligible for competition. 14 Previously, all of
these functions were performed by each “vertically integrated” utility in its respective
service te r r ito ry . 13 In some instances (such as with M PC’s eastern Montana coal mines),
these utilities also owned the fuel sources for the generation plants.
The reason for limiting deregulation to the generation side of the business is simply 
that it would be enormously inefficient, redundant, and expensive for each competing 
company to construct its own set of power lines to carry its product to its customers. 1^ To
prevent this scenario and to encourage competition, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) (which performs a role similar to the PSC’s, but on the national level) 
issued a pair of orders (888 and 889) in 1996 that did two important things. First, they 
authorized “wholesale wheeling,” allowing for competition in the sale o f electricity to
 ̂3 The delivery of power is further divided between “transmission,” which is the transport 
of power over long distances using high-voltage lines, and “distribution,” which is the 
transport of power to the end-use customers using lower-voltage lines. The former is 
regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and the latter by the 
PSC. Unfortunately the distinction between transmission and distribution is not always 
clear, Brennan, 8.
14 Mike Dennison, “Top adviser to Racicot warns MPC sale could hurt consumers,” GET. 
19 M arch 1998.
13 In the world of electric utilities, the use of Jargon abounds. I have tried to present and 
define the most important terms in the introduction. Time constraints did not allow for the 
creation of a glossary for this document. See http://eia.doe.gov/oiaf/elepri97/glossary.html
16 Large fixed costs associated with securing rights-of-way and building a transmission 
system are a strong disincentive to would-be competitors. Brennan, 18.
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Wholesale customers (a wholesale customer is an entity such as a utility that purchases a 
block of power that it in turn sells to retail end-use customers), and second, they guaranteed 
power companies “open access” to the transmission lines owned by other utilities for
wholesale transactions.!^
But how might the changes initiated by SB 390 play out for residential customers, 
small-business owners, low-income families, and the natural environment? Unfortunately, 
no one can predict the exact course that deregulation will ultimately take in Montana, 
especially as it applies to small customers. But these constituents have access to some good 
navigational aids, and some important opportunities to help steer that course in a sustainable 
and equitable direction. What is certain is that the implications of restructuring are bound to 
be numerous, complex, and significant. The intent of this professional paper is to 
familiarize citizens with the changes being made in the industry and to help empower them 
to proteet themselves, their communities, and their environment in the midst of tremendous 
upheaval.
The Issues
If deregulation were to work according to plan, the dissolution of serviee territories 
would immediately be followed by the entrance of multiple electricity companies vying for 
the business of Montana’s businesses and residences. Customers would peruse marketing 
materials scrutinizing factors such as price, environmental impact, service options, and 
incentives in order to select the company and the plan that best meet their needs and desires. 
Customers might choose between variable rates which track market prices (with or without 
collars to control the risk), or fixed rates which would be more dependable but also 
probably more expensive. Or they might “diversify their portfolio,” with percentages of
each. Some customers may opt for a discounted rate in exchange for interruptible 
service, or for service at off-peak hours (hours of low demand). Other customers may 
choose to pay extra for greater reliability. To many, greater choice means greater freedom.
Electricity companies too will share in this freedom, having shed the constraints of their 
Brennan, 62.
Drummond, "The Small Customer Buying Cooperative," 13. John Stucke, “Power 
surges: Industry feels early pains of electric deregulation,” Missoulian. 9 July 2000.
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Electricity companies too will share in this freedom, having shed the constraints of their 
traditional geographic service areas.
But these new choices and freedoms also carry risks and responsibilities. Utilities 
and customers alike lose many of the protections to which they are accustomed. For a 
utility, moving to a competitive environment is a two-edged sword that can just as easily 
mean losing its formerly captive customers as picking up new customers. With the very 
real potential for a net loss of customers (especially at first) and the absence of a guaranteed 
rate of return on their investments, utilities face the possibilities of bankruptcy and takeover 
along with the possibility for growth. Depending on the details of the proposed changes, 
utilities have acted as both strong proponents and strong opponents to deregulation 
measures around the country.
For customers, the freedom to choose (if one is to choose wisely) implies the 
responsibility of becoming informed. This inevitably requires some investment of time and 
energy. A Missoulian editorial commented on how we are already “juggling with complex 
information and decisions” with regard to telephone service and health care. “Almost 
everything we do these days — from 401(k)s to service contracts on cars to life insurance — 
takes hours and hours of study, monitoring funds and investments, comparison shopping, 
meeting deadlines to submit forms, and careful attention to billings. It provides more 
choice, and more headaches too.” 19 Not everyone was looking forward to becoming an 
electricity shopper, especially considering that Montanans could formerly rely on elected 
officials to do this for them. And in Montana, with some of the cheapest electricity in the 
nation, there was a general feeling that the PSC was a doing a relatively good job ensuring 
that quality service was provided at a reasonable price. There was also a sense of security in 
numbers, with all of your neighbors getting the same deal as you. In short, sifting through 
complex flyers and fielding dinnertime solicitation calls will strike some customers as 
burdensome rather than liberating. To others, it could be downright frightening as they are 
accosted by potentially fraudulent telemarketers.
But at an even deeper level, there are serious questions as to whether or not
consumers will actually have any choices. While most agree that workable competition is
Missoulian editorial, “Consumers uneasy as state dives into deregulation,” M issoulian. 
4 November 1998.
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likely to develop for the state’s large industrial customers (because of the sheer quantities of 
power they purchase), it is less certain whether competitive energy supply companies will 
come looking for the business of Montana’s residential and small-business customers. 
Many argue that Montana’s small population and rural character make it unattractive to 
energy suppliers. The most pressing concern for small consumers is not the specter of 
annoying solicitors asking them to change their electricity provider, but the opposite — that 
no one will call wanting to serve them. The worst case scenario is that customers will be left 
in a vacuum with only one or a few companies, no real competition, and no regulation of 
prices. This possibility of an “unregulated monopoly” was a cornerstone issue for 
opponents of SB 390. More than an idle fear, a regional study commissioned by the 
governors of the four Northwest states concluded that while direct access should be 
implemented.
There are risks inherent in the transition to more competitive electricity services. 
Merely declaring that a market should become competitive will not necessarily 
achieve the full benefits of competition or ensure that they will be broadly shared. It 
is entirely possible to have deregulation without true competition. Similarly, the 
reliability of our power supply could be compromised if care is not taken to ensure
that competitive pressures do not override the incentives for reliable operation.^®
Small customers may be further handicapped in their ability to secure reasonably 
priced electricity by the transition timeline outlined by SB 390. Under the law, large 
industrial customers were guaranteed the ability to begin purchasing power from 
competitive suppliers beginning July 1, 1998. While pilot programs for small customers 
were supposed to begin on that same day (but in fact arguably did not begin until June 1999 
when the first residential customer switched to Energy West), these customers were not
guaranteed “choice” until July 1, 2002.21 This head start gives large customers a “first
come, first served” advantage in obtaining the most affordable power on the market. Large 
customers will already be in a position, because of their larger demand, to attract better 
offers from supply companies. Consumer advocates worry that deregulation will lead to 
“cost-shifting” between customer classes, whereby energy suppliers will offer “artificially
20 Collins, "Comprehensive Review," 1.
21 Personal telephone conversation with Jim Morin, Energy West, 2 September 1999. 
MCA 69-8-201.
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low prices to attractive (industrial) customers financed on the backs of smaller (residential, 
commercial) customers.”22
Another highly contentious and complicated issue created by deregulation was that 
of “stranded costs.” Stranded costs are utility assets rendered uneconomical by the move 
to a competitive environment. Consider a utility that borrows money to build a power plant. 
Traditionally, the utility pays off that loan through rates charged to customers. Following 
deregulation, however, customers are no longer captive to that utility and may leave in search 
of cheaper power, perhaps from a company that has no such debt. This decreases the size 
of the body of customers that the utility draws upon to pay its debts, which then become 
“stranded.” Or let’s say the utility owns power plants that are inefficient and expensive to 
operate (usually old and “dirty” plants). If, upon deregulation, the market price for power 
is 3 cents per kilowatt-hour and it costs the utility 5 cents to produce a kilowatt-hour of 
energy from that plant, the utility is stranded with the 2-cent difference.
Wherever and whenever deregulation is discussed (including the 1997 Montana 
legislature), utilities argue that they are entitled to recover these costs from their former 
customers. And the Montana legislature agreed, awarding utilities most of their stranded 
costs, which at the time were expected to approach a billion dollars for MPC alone. The 
public interest community criticized this “billion dollar bailout” as an inexcusable example 
o f corporate welfare. They pointed out that other states had achieved a better solution that 
more equitably balanced the interests of consumers with the interests of utilities -  for 
example, by providing customers with guaranteed rate reductions in exchange for stranded 
cost recovery for utilities. While Montana does have a temporary rate moratorium (with
some exceptions), there are no rate reduction provisions.23 in general, the stranded cost
issue is pivotal, and it is not unfair to describe it as “the highest priority issue for
utilities.”24
22 Patrick Judge, “Legislature Leaves Energy Road-map at Home,” Down to Earth: A 
membership publication of the Montana Environmental Information Center. June 1997.
23 MCA 69-8-211.
24 Mazza, “How the Northwest Can Lead a Clean Energy Revolution,” An Atmosphere 
Alliance Special Report, 18.
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In many ways, the concerns of environmentalists mirrored those of consumer 
groups. With regard to stranded costs, environmentalists argued that recovery would 
subsidize dirty and inefficient power plants that would otherwise rightly succumb to 
competitive pressure from cleaner alternatives. Furthermore, grandfather exemptions to 
emission standards under the 1977 Clean Air Act already give these plants an unfair
advantage over plants with more advanced (and costly) environmental controls. With a 
genuine level playing field, deregulation could lead to improvements in the overall efficiency 
of the nation’s power plant fleet. Competition from newer, cheaper, and more efficient 
power plants could accelerate the decommissioning of older plants.
While competitive pressure may help retire environmentally offensive nuclear, coal- 
fired, and even certain hydroelectric plants, deregulation will likely bring about a greater 
dependence on natural gas-fired generation. Combined-cycle combustion turbine 
technology and low prices in the 1990s made this fuel an attractive source of energy.
Cleaner burning than coal, natural gas (which is a mixture of methane and other 
hydrocarbons) still has significant environmental impacts associated with both extraction 
and combustion. In addition to the carbon dioxide it produces when burned, methane is 
itself a powerful greenhouse gas. An overdependence on this fuel (which is often imported) 
is risky both ecologically and economically, as it is certain that the recent supply glut will
eventually tap out and that prices will i n c r e a s e . 26 While natural gas may be an important 
bridge fuel, it is undeniably in our nation’s best interest to cultivate a diverse resource mix 
relying principally on sustainable energy sources rather than fossil f u e l s . 27
One of the most troubling environmental consequences of deregulation began taking 
shape a couple of years prior to the enactment of SB 390. In the past, regulation provided a
mechanism by which government (in this case the PSC) required utilities to invest in energy
25 Thompson, "Poisoned Power," A Clean Air Network Report, 18.
26 Indeed, natural gas prices in the year 2000 were nearly double what they were a year 
prior (partly due to increased demand from new combustion turbines). Analysts expect 
prices to stay high for some time. Mark Clyde, ‘“ Perfect Storm’ Jolts Northwest Power 
Grid,” Northwest Energy Coalition Report. July 2000. One newspaper article reported that 
wholesale natural gas prices in the Fall of 2000 were $5 per thousand cubic feet, compared 
to the normal $2. AP, “Governors huddle amid predictions for winter’s higher home 
heating bills,” IR, 21 September 2000.
22 Northwest Conservation Act Coalition (NCAC), 30.
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conservation, renewable energy, and low-income programs. Utilities often resisted these 
programs partly out of principle and partly because they added to the cost of electricity 
which in turn caused consumers to buy less. While such “cost-induced conservation” can 
magnify the environmental benefit of these programs (by decreasing the need for new 
power plants and by allowing existing power plants to operate below capacity), it can also
decrease utility r e v e n u e s . 2 8  Nevertheless, utilities limited their objections in light of
assurances that the direct costs of administering these programs could be recovered.
In a competitive environment, however, utilities are even more antagonistic to these 
programs, which are seen as liabilities inhibiting their ability to survive and grow.
Regulators no longer have the authority to require such investments, and the utilities 
themselves can no longer depend on “captive” customers to pay for them. Following 
deregulation, the size of a utility’s base of customers will in all probability suffer an initial 
decline reducing the company’s ability to fund such programs. Fearing an additional 
exodus of customers looking for cheaper power (from companies “unencumbered” by 
equivalent public benefit programs), utilities may adopt fairly radical cost-cutting measures. 
Environmental and low-income programs are usually among the first casualties, and can
suffer even before formal proposals to deregulate the industry have been considered.^^ For
example, in 1996 MPC slashed its conservation budget by 70% (see figure 1, page 19). 
Such anticipatory effects of deregulation are known as “virtual deregulation,” and can also 
adversely affect employees and safety. According to a Montana Standard article, between
1990 and 1997, MPC cut 600 jobs in Montana “to prepare for deregulation.’’̂ ^ Such 
layoffs have been described by some as the “stranded human costs” o f restructuring.^!
MPC has also struggled with safety violations recently, with two fines from the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration in excess of $100,000 in less than a six-
28 Attempts have been made to sever the relationship between utility sales and utility 
revenues which otherwise act as a disincentive for energy conservation. This approach is 
known as “decoupling,” and is discussed in Chapter 5.
29 Smeloff, 123, 126.
20 John Stucke, “MPC officials readying for stiffer competition,” Montana Standard. 18 
March 1997.
2! Mary O ’Driscoll, “Labor Union Raises New Restructuring Issue; Stranded Human 
Costs.” The Energy Daily. 13 February 1997.
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month period. While these incidents probably have little to do with deregulation, cost- 
cutting could increase the frequency of future accidents.32 In January 1998, PacifiCorp
also announced the layoff of 600 workers, including its 50 Montana employees.^^
To provide for the continued support of these programs, many states (Montana 
included) have adopted a “universal system benefits charge” (USBC) as part o f their 
deregulation law. Montana’s USBC was established at 2.4% of each utility’s 1995 retail 
sales. Less than the 3% recommended by a regional agreement (the Comprehensive Review 
of the Northwest Energy System), Montana’s USBC only lasts for a four-year period 
(unless renewed by the legislature) and is limited by a series o f qualifying clauses and
exemptions. ̂ 4
Finally, environmentalists were concerned that passage of SB 390 would signal an 
increase in the development of generation and transmission facilities in Montana. Montana 
is already a net exporter of electrical energy. Its low-cost energy resources (hydro, natural 
gas, high-energy coal) will continue to be highly valued in national energy markets. SB 
224, also passed by the 1997 legislature to amend the Major Facility Siting Act, eased the 
construction of new facilities and increased the possibility that power plants and
transmission lines would be located in sensitive a r e a s . 2 5  Environmentalists consider the 
comprehensive weakening of environmental laws and the loss of regulatory control through 
the deregulation of various industries as synergistically dangerous phenomena.
On the positive side, some environmentalists are optimistic that deregulation will 
create a market for “green power.” For the first time, Montanans may be able to select a 
power company that offers a strong portfolio of renewable energy resources, but only if 
opportunities for fraudulent “greenwashing” (where companies offer a not-so-green 
“green” product) are guarded against. The PSC could require meaningful disclosure and 
labeling of utility fuel sources as a condition of doing business in Montana.
32 Jan Falstad, “MPC fined for safety violations,” IR, 6 June 1997.
33 AP, “PacifiCorp to cut 600 jobs,” Missoulian. 13 January 1998.
34 Collins, "Comprehensive Review," 6. MCA 69-8-402.
35 The siting act is found in title 75, chapter 20 of the Montana Code Annotated.
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These are just some of the many ripples set in motion by deregulation — ripples that 
may be felt profoundly or imperceptibly by small customers (including homeowners, small 
businesses, senior citizens, etc.) and the natural environment. It is important to note that 
these two interest groups (which along with low-income form the “public interest” 
triumvirate in the world of Montana energy policy, occasionally supplemented by labor) 
have shared an historic alliance. This not only reflects a desire to coalesce their own 
individually limited political power into a formidable presence, but also a recognition that 
environmental and social Justice issues should not, and cannot ever, fully be divorced from
one another.
Why Electricity Matters
In the legislative debate over SB 390, one thing that proponents and opponents 
managed to agree upon was the importance of the issue. “I don’t know that I ’ll ever carry 
legislation that is more significant,” reflected Senator Fred Thomas (R-Stevensville), the
lead sponsor. And the lead opponent. Rep. David Ewer (D-Helena), commented quite
plainly, “This bill is the most economically significant bill of the session and one of the
most economically significant of our history
The significance of the changes being made to the electricity industry, in Montana 
and elsewhere, stems partly from the significance of the industry itself. As a nation, we 
spend roughly $220 billion on electricity each year, which is more than we spend on 
telecommunications, more than we spend on automobiles, and more than we spend even on 
secondary education. As one of the most frequently purchased commodities, electricity is 
of obvious concern to American consumers and their advocates. For years, public utility 
commissions (like Montana’s PSC), citizen utility boards, and citizen watchdog groups 
have wrestled with utilities over rate increases, customer service, and consumer protection 
policies. The central and growing role that electricity plays in our economy also means that
36 See Appendix D - Exploring the Conservation Consumer Alliance.
37 Kathleen McLaughlin, “Low-key Thomas carries weighty issues,” IR, 24 March 1997.
38 Charles S. Johnson, “Utility-bill amendments defeated,” IR, 11 April 1997.
13
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
such changes will also affect the ability of U.S. firms to compete in international markets.
Commissioner Bob Anderson of the PSC observes that in Montana “there is a rough 
equivalent between the money the utilities take in and the entire state budget, so it’s big 
money.” According to him, “the transition to competition is probably the most important 
phase in the commission’s history.”40
But more than just a key component of our economy, electricity should be seen as a 
basic necessity of life, especially for those with medical conditions or who live in harsh 
climates such as Montana’s. Low-income customers are particularly vulnerable to changes 
in electricity prices and services, with a greater percentage of their income dedicated to 
heating and lighting.41 Low-income housing is often poorly insulated, and low-income 
families have fewer resources to invest in conservation upgrades meaning “higher electricity 
bills for those who can least afford them.”42 One particularly disturbing trend revealed by
a 1992 Boston City Hospital study found a 30% increase in emergency underweight 
children cases at the close of Boston’s cold season. The result was attributed to a “heat or 
eat dilemma,” in which extreme poverty forced families to choose between adequate 
nutrition and heat for their h o m e s . 4 3  Should deregulation raise prices, the type of 
“choices” being made by these customers may be at a far more basic level than comparison 
shopping for an energy supply c o m p a n y . 4 4
In addition to the economic and social impacts of the electricity industry, its 
environmental impacts are truly staggering. In the 1970s, concern over the environmental 
and social impacts of coal-fired power plants (which account for 58% of Montana’s 
electrical generation) led to the enactment of a 30% coal-severence tax, a strip-mining
39 Brennan, xi. AP, “Hot spell could pull plug on nation’s electricity,” IR, 6 July 2000.
40 Mike Dennison, “Political balance of PSC up for grabs,” G FT. 5 October 1998.
41 Column by Molly Ivins, “Deregulating natural monopolies,” IR, 17 August 2000.
42 According to the Comprehensive Review, the Pacific Northwest has about 540,000 
households (about 14%) with incomes below 125% of the federal poverty level. Collins, 
"Comprehensive Review," 21.
43 NCAC, "Plugging People into Power," 36.
44 Relying on natural gas may be an ineffective way to skirt the implications of 
deregulation. In 1997, companion legislation which mirrored SB 390 was passed to 
deregulate the natural gas industry (SB 396).
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reclamation act, and the Major Facility Siting Act.45 Nationwide, the process of burning
fossil fuels to make steam, turn turbines, and create power is the leading source of industrial 
air pollution. Power plants account for two-thirds of all sulfur dioxide emissions, over one- 
third of the carbon dioxide (the largest single source), 29% of the nitrogen oxides, and 1/5
of the air toxics.'^^ In addition to making utilities the largest single source of U.S.
greenhouse gases, the combustion of fossil fuels to produce electricity depends on the 
extraction of coal and natural gas which also causes significant environmental impacts.
Montana’s other primary source of electricity is hydropower generated on both 
sides o f the Continental Divide from the Columbia and Missouri River basins. 
Environmental impacts of dams include impaired fish and wildlife habitat, the disruption of 
natural flooding cycles, the collection of sediment, and impacts on water quality and 
quantity. Large-scale hydro projects in the Pacific Northwest have had a devastating impact 
on wild salmon populations and the people and communities that depend upon them.
Montana remains free of nuclear power generation, which must in part be 
attributable to a citizens’ initiative passed in 1978 requiring public approval of any nuclear 
power plant. The production of energy through nuclear fission has proven economically 
and environmentally disastrous. Crises such as Brown’s Ferry (1975), Three Mile Island 
(1979), and Chernobyl (1986) have financial counterparts in the Trojan, Watts Bar, Rancho 
Seco, and Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) plants. Even smoothly 
operating nuclear plants require a continual supply of uranium and add to the 22,000 ton 
national stockpile of high-level radioactive waste for which there is still no permanent
disposal site."^^ Generating electricity through nuclear fission also carries the potential for
nuclear weapons proliferation.
45 Alan Davis, DEQ, “Electricity in Montana — an Overview,’’ T.A.C. Report. November 
1997. Malone, Montana: A History of Two Centuries. 394-397.
46 Thompson, "Poisoned Power," A Clean Air Network Report, 1, 4. NCAC, "Plugging 
People into Power," 4. IR State Bureau, “Study: Montana sizable contributor to global 
warming,’’ IE, 11 November 1998. See also:
http ://w ww.citizen. org/CMEP/RAGE/index. html
47 Kraushaar, 136. NCAC, "Plugging People into Power," 6.
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Purpose
Given the pervasive and profound environmental and consumer issues associated 
with the electric utility industry, monumental changes such as those contained in SB 390 are 
bound to have an effect. Inevitably, such sweeping changes will present both risks and 
opportunities, a constellation of both positive and negative repercussions. Deregulation 
should, therefore, be neither blindly embraced nor dismissed out of hand as a matter of 
ideology. Whether the consequences prove, on balance, to be a boon or a bust depends 
largely on perspective, and will be determined by numerous events and variables still 
impossible to predict. A central point of departure for the various camps involved in the 
debate over restructuring is simply a matter of what to do in the face of such uncertainty.
The public interest community urges caution, in recognition of the high stakes involved. 
Environmental and consumer groups argue that important values must be secured before 
moving forward. Others are more optimistic, believing that deregulation poses no 
significant dangers and that any problems that arise can be dealt with as we go. They find a 
greater risk in waiting for the rest of the nation to catch up, and letting attractive 
opportunities slip by.
In the time since SB 390 became law, some middle ground has emerged between the 
worst fears of opponents and the wildest fantasies of proponents. The stranded cost issue, 
for example, looks like it will be largely resolved by the sale of M FC’s generating facilities 
to Pennsylvania Power and Light at a price higher than many expected. And yet, more than 
two years into the transition period, small consumers are still waiting for meaningful choices 
between multiple companies offering them energy supply service.
But for better or for worse, Montana has decidedly set the deregulation ball in 
motion. All efforts to oppose or reverse deregulation (including two separate attempts to 
call the legislature back into special session and a citizens’ initiative to repeal the law) have 
failed. On the other hand, it should be emphasized that citizens still have a number of 
venues available to them in which they might help steer the final course of deregulation. 
These include future sessions of the legislature, PSC transition plan hearings, transition 
advisory committee meetings, and congressional deliberations concerning restructuring at
16
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the federal level.'^^ While deregulation diminishes citizens’ ability to influence policy
through the direct avenue of PSC rate cases, it amplifies their ability to do so indirectly, 
through market pressure. As mentioned above, for the first time citizens may have the 
opportunity to select a power provider based on its commitment to environmental and social 
values. Such choices will help alternative energy sources become more competitive. The 
formation of “buying co-ops’’ and a renewed interest in municipal utilities and other 
manifestations of public power can help promote such choices and offer further venues for 
citizens to influence policies. And as always, customers continue to have the ability to 
reduce their electricity consumption through conservation and energy efficiency measures. 
This paper rests on the premise that an active citizenry can and must play a central role in 
the unfolding drama of electric deregulation. Montanans must act creatively and decisively 
to secure the potential benefits of deregulation while sidestepping the pitfalls.
But in order to effectively influence either markets or decision-makers, citizens must 
first become well informed. It is hoped that this document will prove useful as a general 
primer on the consumer and environmental dimensions o f deregulation and as a reference 
that will point citizens in the direction of additional information and resources.
Scope
The process of replacing 90 years worth of regulation with competitive markets is 
enormously complex, with ramifications for all classes o f customers, for investors, and for 
the utilities themselves. As we will see, the spectrum of related issues is broad — taxation, 
employment, public benefits programs, and industry infrastructure will all be dramatically 
affected. A full discussion of the potential impacts of deregulation on Montana’s small 
consumers and natural environment would be unmanageable. Utility policy is always 
complex, and the pace of change continues to be rapid. Therefore, a number of steps have 
been taken to narrow the scope of this study. Most importantly, the document focuses on 
events transpiring immediately prior to, during, and after the 1997 legislature. The 1999
48 For example, continuation of Universal System Benefits funding past the year 2003 
requires further legislative action.
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legislature is also discussed briefly, as are developments leading up to the 2001 session.'^^
While such a work might be rendered quickly obsolete, the truly historic aspect of the
changes enacted in 1997 might impart greater relevance to this s n a p s h o t . A t  a minimum,
a guide to the jungle of obscure jargon words that has cropped up should be useful for 
some time.
As the state’s largest utility and also the central player in the push for deregulation, 
the MPC will occupy a central role in this paper, providing most of the examples. Not only 
did SB 390 give co-ops the ability to “opt out’’ of competition, it allows MDU to defer 
choice until 2006. Like MDU, the other utilities in the state serve relatively small portions 
of M ontana’s electricity customers and will not be examined in depth.
Finally, the paper will adopt a “surface-map” or survey approach to acquaint the 
reader with the environmental and social impacts of restructuring. As mentioned earlier, 
many of the concerns initially voiced during the legislature have been adequately addressed 
or have disappeared as the result of unexpected developments. Likewise, new formerly 
unanticipated concerns have arisen. In light of such uncertainty, the paper will not attempt 
to analyze the likelihood of any particular scenario. Instead this paper is meant to impart a 
general understanding of the terms and issues surrounding deregulation. With this 
knowledge, it is hoped that consumers and conservationists will have a greater ability to 
monitor developments, prepare for changes, and effectively influence the course of energy 
policy in Montana.
49 A timeline of important dates pertaining to the deregulation of Montana’s electric utilities 
is provided in Appendix C.
^0 However, the two most significant developments since January 1, 2000 serve only to 
further confirm the fears of consumer and environmental advocates and the trends analyzed 
in Chapter 6. In March, MPC abandoned its involvement in electricity entirely by 
announcing plans to sell off its distribution system. And by mid-summer, national power 
shortages caused reliability problems and dramatically increased competitive electricity 
prices, even for Montana’s large industrial customers.
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FIGURE 1
MPC S  HISTORIC & PROPOSED "PUBLIC PURPOSES ' SPENDING
M 9
1 9 9 0  1991 1 9 9 2  1 9 9 3  1 9 9 4  1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6  1 9 9 7  1 9 9 8
YEAR
1 9 9 9  2 0 0 0  2 0 0 1  2 0 0 2  2 0 0 3
Dala provided by MPC, 1997.
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CHAPTER 2 
SB 390 BACKGROUND
Deregulation -  A National Perspective 
A number of circumstances contributed to the deregulation of the electric utility 
industry in Montana. Technological, economic, and political forces at the local, regional, 
and national level all played a role. Similar forces also spurred deregulation of other 
industries in recent years, and some comparisons can be drawn. In many ways, the 
reshaping of electric utilities parallels changes in telecommunications, transportation, and 
banking.
Important is the argument that such industries are no longer the “natural
monopolies” they once were. 1 In the case of electricity, technological advances have made
the model of an integrated utility supplying power from large centralized plants somewhat 
obsolete. In the past, such an arrangement was virtually necessitated by the economies of 
scale that could be achieved. Expensive duplication of capital-intensive equipment could be
avoided, and prices could be kept low.2 But the advent of highly efficient combined-cycle
natural gas combustion turbines (NGCT) (essentially jet engines anchored to the ground), 
has made the entrance of new competitors economically feasible. The effect that NGCTs 
are having on electric utilities is historically analogous to the advent of microwave
communication technology, and its role in breaking up AT&T.^
1 Note that while the production of electricity may no longer be a natural monopoly, the 
delivery of electricity is. Brennan, 4.
2 Jan Falstad, “Electric-utility deregulation bill sparking controversy,” IR, 13 April 1997.
3 Smeloff, 2.
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Because NGCTs are efficient, easy to build, and economical at small capacities, 
independent power producers (non-utility generators) can enter the market with relatively
low capital costs.^ In order for traditional coal-fired generating plants to be profitable, they
need to be at least 300-600 MW. Gas turbines, by comparison, can be economical below
100 MW, and possibly down to 20 MW.^ The cheapest energy source is no longer a
conventional 1000 MW plant, but a 250 MW gas turbine.^ Furthermore, NGCTs pose low 
risk because they can be built incrementally to closely match load growth, and because they 
operate much cleaner than their counterparts.^ Adding to the cost-effectiveness of such
technology is the low and stable price of natural gas which has resulted from the 
(comparatively straightforward) deregulation of that industry. Large natural gas supplies 
have been discovered in Canada, and domestic exploration has been aggressive since 
passage of the Natural Gas Policy Act in the 1970s.^ In addition, prices have been kept low 
by improved recovery technologies and an oversupply of pipeline capacity (although this 
appears to have reached at least a temporary limit as of 2000, with prices rising rapidly).^
New power generating technologies are also able to respond to variable power 
demands more effectively, which enables companies to economically serve smaller numbers 
of customers. The more variable demand curves encountered when supplying local 
neighborhoods (as opposed to the larger geographical areas traditionally served by
4 “Today, the most efficient commercial power plant is a 40-Megawatt combustion turbine 
that was originally developed for a Boeing 747 airplane. When used in a cogeneration 
plant, 75% or more of the energy contained in the natural gas fuel can be captured for 
productive uses.” Smeloff, 19. Note that all heat engines are governed by thermodynamic 
constraints which severely limit their theoretical potential maximum efficiency.
Kraushaar, 75.
5 Brennan, 16-17.
6 Mazza, “How the Northwest Can Lead a Clean Energy Revolution,” An Atmosphere 
Alliance Special Report, 17.
^ Cleaner plants have lower fuel requirements and environmental compliance costs. Natural 
gas produces less sulfur and carbon than coal, and until 2000 was a cheap fuel source. But 
natural gas plants have historically been less efficient than their coal-fired counterparts in 
converting fuel energy into electricity. However, in the last ten years significant efficiency 
improvements have been made lowering the heat rate of gas plants from about 9,000 BTU 
per kilowatt-hour to about 7,000 BTU per kilowatt-hour. Smeloff, 19.
^ NCAC, "Plugging People into Power," 30. Smeloff, 2.
9 Smeloff, 61.
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integrated utilities) are also more easily served because of recent improvements in energy 
storage technologies (see Chapters 4 and 5 for further discussion). Finally, larger volume 
transmission lines and the move toward a connected national grid also allowed for the 
movement o f electricity over long distances, facilitating the creation of a national market for 
electricity.
In addition to technology’s role in making competition possible, deregulation could 
in turn spur technological innovation giving customers additional products and services (as 
well as suppliers) to choose from. Certainly this has been the case with 
telecommunications. A recent advertisement from US West offered 17 different telephone 
features, such as call waiting, caller ID, three-way calling, call forwarding, custom ringing,
last call return, call rejection, and continuous redial. Whether or not such a diversity of
options will present itself in the area of electricity (and whether that would be desirable) can 
be debated.
While technological changes have made deregulation both possible and economical 
(at least for some customers), equally important has been the political will to deregulate. In 
recent years, that will has been present in strong measure both nationally and in Montana. 
Deregulation can be seen as part of a broader trend (by no means limited to our borders, 
and by no means limited to electricity) favoring free markets over government regulation. 
With respect to electrical utilities, the United Kingdom, Norway, Argentina, Chile and New 
Zealand have all seen developments favoring competition over regulated monopoly
service.  ̂  ̂ Between nations, free-trade initiatives such as NAFTA and GATT underscore a
similar “laissez-faire” philosophy. And over the past twenty years, deregulation has visited 
our nation’s airline, banking, insurance, communications (both long-distance and local 
telephone service, as well as cable television), trucking, and railroad industries in accordance 
with this ideological shift toward a diminished role of government in commerce. In
10 See http://www.uswest.com/customchoice
11 Brennan, 8.
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Montana, words such as “decontrol” and “privatization” pepper the speech of politicians 
with startling regularity. ̂  2
Unfortunately, the benefits of this philosophy are not uniformly distributed. Too 
often small customers in sparsely populated areas are left out. In Montana, objections to 
deregulation have a familiar ring: “No kind of deregulation has been good for average 
Montanans,” according to a press release written by Ken Maki of the Montana Farmers 
Union. “Railroad deregulation has made almost every shipper in the state a captive to 
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway. Telephone deregulation continues to be a hassle 
as people are hustled incessantly by the various long-distance providers. We all know what 
happened when the savings-and-loan industry was deregulated. Airline deregulation has 
brought us fewer flights.” 13
Representative Bob Raney (D-Livingston) also places electric deregulation in a 
larger context: “It appears we Montanans once again fail to learn from history -  even 
recent history. All we got out of deregulating the rail industry was the loss o f the 
Milwaukee Road and numerous branch lines while receiving higher freight rates in return. 
Deregulating airlines got us a $400 ticket to fly to Salt Lake City and back. And, with 
deregulated phone service, we can’t even get a simple service like caller ID in much of
M ontana.” 14
The Great Falls Tribune also took up the theme, expressing disappointment in how 
the 1996 telecommunications bill has affected the cable television industry: “Instead of 
lower prices and a rich range of competitors from which to choose, consumers see higher 
prices and, for a variety of reasons, almost no new competition.... And as essential as call-
12 It might be noted that the public seems less enthused about this philosophy than their 
elected officials, at least in its application to mental health care, corrections, and 
environmental protection, all of which have been the subject of significant and lasting 
controversy in Montana.
13 Ken Maki, Montana Farmers Union, news release announcing support for a special 
session to reconsider electric deregulation, 27 February 1998.
14 Guest editorial by Bob Raney, “W haf s the rush with deregulating electricity?” BG, 29 
April 1998.
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waiting and the History Channel might be, they’re pure luxuries compared with 
electricity.”
On the other hand, Rep. Bill Ryan (D-Great Falls), who carried SB 390 in the
Montana House of Representatives, feels that there is a distinction:
Why is deregulation of electricity supply going to be any better than deregulation of 
airplanes or railroads was? I think we learned something important from those 
earlier events: When outsiders make decisions for us, Montana’s best interests are 
not considered, Montanans didn’t write those laws.
That’s why it was important to get ahead of the others and create a 
framework for electricity choice that was designed for us, and by us.” l^
While it is true that Montana was one of the first states to pass comprehensive 
deregulation legislation, it was not done in isolation. Instead, SB 390 grew out of recent 
policy initiatives undertaken at the federal level. These, in turn, were the culmination of a 
century’s worth of law pertaining to electric utilities. Between 1882 (when Thomas Edison 
opened the Pearl Street Station) and 1907, utilities were unregulated by state or federal 
government (note that MPC was formed in 1912, and has been regulated since its
inception). Private ownership soon gave way to public companies, which in turn were 
rapidly consolidated into multistate holding companies. In such a climate, many utilities 
were eager for the protection afforded by regulation. To meet this concern and to combat 
rampant corruption, the Public Utilities Holding Company Act (PUHCA) was passed in 
1935 reformulating utilities into the vertically integrated and state regulated companies of 
today. At the same time, the Federal Power Act was passed giving the direct ancestor of
FERC the regulatory powers it enjoys today.
This trend toward greater regulation began to reverse itself in 1978, with passage of 
the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA). Among other reforms, PURPA 
required utilities to purchase power from qualifying facilities (QF), which were small
OFT editorial. “Dereg? Been there, done that,” GFT, 13 February 1998. “Promises 
unfulfilled two years after big telecommunications bill,” GFT, 20 January 1998.
Guest editorial by William M. Ryan, “Electricity deregulation by Montanans, for 
Montanans,” GFT. 30 April 1998.
17 Brennan, 21-24. Guest editorial by Bob Gannon, “All Montanans benefit from utility 
competition.” Missoulian. 14 April 1997.
1^ Brennan, 21-24.
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cogeneration and renewable energy plants. In other words, for the first time new players 
were allowed to sell their product into existing power grids, an important step toward 
reintroducing competition. At the same time, the Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act 
created a strong market for such newcomers by forbidding new oil- and natural gas-fired 
power plants. And it was also in 1978 that MIT researchers developed the first models for 
deregulated power supply. In 1979, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down the Otter Tail 
decision recognizing the right of a power company to transmit power through a neighboring 
utility’s electrical grid. 19
The 1992 Energy Policy Act (EPACT) confirmed and extended this move toward 
greater competition by mandating open, nondiscriminatory, and reasonably-priced access to 
transmission facilities for wholesale transactions. In April 1996, FERC issued orders 888 
and 889 to implement EPACT and to foster a national wholesale electricity market. Each 
utility that owned transmission equipment was henceforth required to “wheel” other 
companies’ power through its lines in order to facilitate competition. In other words, no 
longer would a utility have exclusive access to its own power lines. Instead, anyone who 
wished to use those lines to send power to a wholesale customer could now do so, and at a 
reasonable price. EPACT also created the new category of Exempt Wholesale Generators 
(EWG). EWGs are allowed to compete without meeting either the definition of qualifying 
facility or the constraints imposed by PUHCA regarding corporate structure. But neither
are they assured guaranteed buyers, as are QFs. Instead they must compete on their own.^O
“Wholesale wheeling” is widely regarded as an improvement over the previous 
system, even by critics of Montana’s deregulation law. According to Tom Power, chair of 
the University of Montana’s Economics Department, wholesale competition “has already 
driven electric prices in the region to record lows and led to an effective expansion in the 
size of the electric supply available. That is one of the reasons that no new electric 
generation has had to be constructed despite the ongoing economic growth in the 
region.”21 And there is evidence that the benefits of wholesale competition can be felt even
^9 Brennan, 28-30.
20 Brennan, 30.
21 Guest editorial by Thomas M. Power, “Put brakes on MPC, ” GFT. 5 February 1998.
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by Montana’s small rural customers. In 1998, Gary Wiens of the Montana Electric 
Cooperatives’ Association wrote that wholesale deregulation had already allowed Montana 
co-ops to secure cheaper electricity for their m e m b e r s . 2 2
EPACT did not, however, require utilities to open their lines for “retail 
w h e e l i n g . ’ ’2 3  i n  other words, a utility could still prevent other companies from accessing
its end-use customers through its distribution network. Instead, these customers, whether 
large industrial or small residential, would continue to belong to their traditional utility. To 
qualify as a wholesale customer, you needed to either resell the power or self-generate 
power. An important exception in the Pacific Northwest pertains to a special class of BPA 
customers known as “direct services industries’’ or DSIs. DSIs, which include more than 
a dozen aluminum smelters (all with massive electrical demands), enjoy the privilege of 
being able to contract directly with BPA, “despite a DOE policy of not granting end-use
customers the equivalent of wholesale power purchase r i g h t s . ’ ’2 4  For the first time, these
companies were finding that they could buy cheaper power elsewhere and began doing so,
but not without c o n t r o v e r s y . 2 5  Most troubling was that the DSIs were allowed to switch to
alternate suppliers without paying off their share of BPA’s nuclear debt (all the while 
continuing to make use of BPA transmission lines). The ensuing protests helped initiate the
Comprehensive Review of the Northwest Energy System, which is discussed b e l o w . 26
Retail wheeling is more contentious and complicated than wholesale wheeling.
While EPACT prevents FERC from ordering direct access, it does allow individual states to 
proceed/ Since the passage of EPACT, numerous bills to deregulate the industry on the 
national level for retail customers have come before Congress (from all points on the
22 Guest editorial by Gary Wiens, “Joining forces to buy electricity not exactly a new 
idea,” GFT. 30 April 1998.
23 Brennan, 7.
24 Smeloff 118, 144.
25 Proponents of deregulation use just such an example to illustrate how deregulation can 
work in Montana. “Montana saw the biggest customer switch in the country when the 
Columbia Falls Aluminum Plant switched from the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) 
to service from the Flathead Electric Coop, PacifiCorp and Enron.” DEQ, "Restructuring 
the Electric Utility Industry in Montana,” 1.
26 Smeloff, 125.
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ideological spectrum), but none have gathered much momentum. To a point, the potential 
benefits of retail access mirror those of wholesale competition. First, lower cost electricity 
would become available to many customers, especially those in high-cost states or with large 
power demands (two groups that happen to carry a fairly high degree of influence).
Second, greater efficiencies could be achieved as utilities scrutinize their operations to 
eliminate waste. A competitive retail market might also help avoid the overbuilding that
plagued a system in which cost recovery was all but guaranteed.^^ Customized services
would likely be offered by companies endeavoring to stake out their niche. Finally, state-to- 
state (or even utility-to-utility) price variability would be substantially reduced. And all 
these benefits, proponents argued, could begin to materialize even prior to passage of 
deregulation legislation, in a positive manifestation of “virtual deregulation.” PSC 
commissioners Dave Fisher and Danny Oberg pointed to changes made within MFC long 
before the drafting of SB 390: “With just the threat of competition on the horizon, it 
voluntarily began to do what we as regulators had only been marginally successful at getting 
them to do — cutting costs, rather than continually coming back to the regulator for higher 
rates.
Such benefits, however, rest primarily in the eye of the beneficiary. Customers in 
lower cost states or with small power demands may encounter higher prices and reduced 
service. Others may be subjected to annoying, confusing, or fraudulent marketing tactics. 
“Trimming the fat” may indeed lower prices, but it can also threaten jobs, compromise 
maintenance, safety, and reliability, and eviscerate environmental and social programs. The 
cost-cutting praised by commissioners Fisher and Oberg included the elimination of 
hundreds o f jobs and a drastic curtailing of conservation programs. Opponents argue that 
wholesale deregulation delivers most of the benefits small customers are likely to see, with 
none of the risk. At the very least, it would be prudent to see how far wholesale
deregulation can take us before embarking on the next s t e p . 2 9
27 But the extent to which these advantages can be augmented by retail competition over 
wholesale competition may be nominal. See Chapters 4 and 5, in particular the discussion 
of the W PPSS fiasco.
28 Guest editorial by Dave Fisher and Danny Oberg, “Experts agree on power 
restructuring bill,” GFT. 8 April 1997.
29 Guest editorial by Thomas M. Power, “Put brakes on MPC,” GFT, 5 February 1998.
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In short, the greatest push for deregulation has come (predictably) from those who 
stand to benefit most, i.e., the large industrial customers and high-cost states that will likely 
see reduced energy bills. Industrial customers expect that more accurate cost-of-service 
pricing will translate into lower energy bills. They believe that industrial prices have been 
artificially inflated in order to subsidize the residential sector, and that cost-shifting between
customer classes is not so much a threat of deregulation as a symptom of regulation.30 If
true, this prediction represents yet another “benefit” that will not be universally enjoyed.
So while deregulation may decrease regional price variability, it could increase customer- 
class price variability (as large customers already pay lower, quantity-discounted rates).
Joining with large customers in supporting retail competition are the independent 
power producers, energy marketers, and utilities that wish to serve these loads — in 
particular, the energy providers that feel confident that their low-cost resources or unique 
service options will make them competitive in the new environment. 31 Many high-cost 
utilities fear the loss of security provided by protected franchises and (in some cases) 
compliant commissioners. Yet, deregulation can present attractive opportunities to get out 
from under old debt, assuming the utilities can negotiate a generous stranded cost package. 
Additionally, they may choose to get out of the electricity business altogether by tapping 
into the consolidation frenzy which is yielding handsome prices for utility properties around 
the country.
Examples o f deregulation’s double-bladed sword abound. In an effort to eliminate 
out-of-market power purchase contracts with qualifying facilities, some of the restructuring 
bills before Congress contemplate the repeal of PURPA. Many consider these contracts to 
be an impediment to competition and a source of unreasonably high prices. Others point 
out that such reasoning neglects the environmental and national security benefits of 
PURPA, which though difficult to quantify, are real and substantial. In any event, the repeal 
of PURPA would represent a major blow to the renewable energy industry. The loss of the 
guaranteed income from utilities could also jeopardize other sources of financing for 
renewable energy firms: without the stability of these contracts, investors could become
30 DEQ, "Restructuring the Electric Utility Industry in Montana,” 3, 4, 12. Smeloff, 57.
31 Collins, "Comprehensive Review," 30.
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s k i t t i s h . 3 2  Certainly some irony could be found if PURPA were to succumb to the same 
forces of competition it had helped create.
In short, the issues are of such number and importance that federal restructuring 
legislation will probably be some time in coming. While such a “top down” approach to 
deregulation offers advantages in terms of consistency (sidestepping the difficult question
of “reciprocity”),^) it is easier to address the concerns of individual stakeholders on the
regional or state level, where they have more in c o m m o n . ) ^  Such was the reasoning behind 
the Comprehensive Review of the Northwest Energy System.
Deregulation in the Pacific Northwest
Because of the low-cost hydropower produced in the Columbia River basin, the 
Pacific Northwest enjoys the nation’s most affordable electricity. As can be seen in 
Appendix B, Washington, Idaho, and Oregon have the three lowest residential electricity 
rates in the nation, with Montana not far behind. In a nationally deregulated market, this low 
cost power would be highly valued and sought after. Hoping to work together to preserve 
these resources, the governors of the four Northwest states initiated a region-wide study in 
January 1996. They appointed a 20-member Steering Committee to conduct the study and 
to represent a broad array of interests (utilities, small and large customers, and 
environmental groups). The result was the "Comprehensive Review of the Northwest 
Energy System,” often referred to simply as "regional review." The goal was to develop 
recommendations that would “protect the region’s natural resources and distribute
Brennan, 38.
) )  Electricity, like wildlife, air, and water resources, knows no state boundaries. Brennan, 8. 
A patchwork of deregulation laws creates some difficult questions of interstate commerce.
It seems unfair for Utility A in a regulated state to raid customers from Utility B in a 
deregulated state, because Utility B is prevented from picking up any of Utility A ’s 
customers. Reciprocity provisions seek to avoid such imbalances, but can raise 
jurisdictional and interstate commerce issues. Montana’s, found at MCA 69-8-411, was 
amended in 1999 to apply only to in-state companies.
)4  Restructuring has, in fact, proceeded on a state-by-state basis, either by administrative 
rule or legislation. Appendix B shows the striking correlation between the average 
residential price of electricity in a state and that state’s willingness to pursue deregulation. 
Montana is clearly anomalous.
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equitably the costs and benefits of a more competitive marketplace, while at the same time
assuring the region of an adequate, efficient, economical and reliable power system.”^^
In the fall of 1996, the committee held hearings to gather public input on their draft 
report. These hearings were heavily attended, with many participants expressing displeasure
in the draft p r o p o s a l . 36 While the report touched on numerous issues related to
restructuring in the Northwest, language concerning the maintenance of environmental and 
social programs drew the greatest attention from the public. An overwhelming number of 
participants indicated their desire for stronger environmental and consumer provisions, a 
concern which had a significant impact on the final report.
Whereas the draft report contained only voluntary funding mechanisms for 
conservation and renewable resources, the revised report made them mandatory.
The final recommendation was to “provide for maximum local control in the 
implementation of conservation, renewables and low-income energy services, while 
establishing an effective minimum standard that ensures stable funding for these 
purposes.”37 The committee proposed that the regional minimum standard “for cost-
effective conservation, renewable resource development and low-income weatherization” 
should be equivalent to 3% of the annual revenues raised from the sale of electricity ($210 
million, based on 1995 figures), with additional money directed toward low-income bill
a s s i s t a n c e . 38 it i s  important to realize that the 3% figure was a compromise.
Environmentalists wanted significantly more. The Washington-based Atmosphere Alliance 
(now Climate Solutions) argued that, “The Northwest has invested up to five percent of
35 Collins, "Comprehensive Review," 3.
36 The hearing in Missoula (Montana’s only) had the highest per-capita attendance of any 
in the Northwest, with approximately 125 people.
37 Collins, "Comprehensive Review," 6.
38 Note that this figure is rather modest, representing only about 65% of what BPA and 
Northwest utilities spent on these programs in 1995. Still, the 3% figure would later 
develop into a major point of contention in the development of Montana’s deregulation bill. 
Collins, "Comprehensive Review," 6.
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power revenues in these areas in the past, and SBCs should hit at least that p o i n t . " 3 9  xhe
term “minimum” used above is also important in suggesting that 3% was intended as a 
floor.
Also strengthened in the final report is the commitment to low-income bill 
assistance, with a recommendation for funding over and above the 3% figure.*^^ Similarly, 
fish and wildlife fared better under the final report, but this was an area that 
environmentalists still considered seriously flawed. In fact, the lone dissenting member on 
the steering committee was the representative of Trout Unlimited.41 Environmentalists were 
also disappointed that language from the draft report regarding subsidies had been stripped 
out. The draft report had called for a congressional study to assess and reevaluate 
Columbia River subsidies (totaling an estimated $ 1 billion per year) such as those given to
aluminum companies, the shipping industry, and agricultural i n t e r e s t s . ' ^ ^
While the report was considered a vast improvement over earlier drafts, opponents to 
deregulation were still confronted with a “go-forward” document. The report’s underlying 
message is a hearty endorsement of customer choice, with a specific target date of July 1, 
1999 by which time direct access should have been extended to all interested customers.
The governors and the steering committee both adopted the premise that “the electricity 
industry is changing, whether we like it or not.”43 The report argues, “The
Comprehensive Review is not an initiation of change, but a response to change. It is an 
effort to shape that change, to the extent shaping is possible, to ensure that the potential 
benefits of competition are achieved and equitably shared, environmental goals are met, and
39 “SBC” is an abbreviation for “System Benefits Charge.” Mazza, “How the 
Northwest Can Lead a Clean Energy Revolution,” An Atmosphere Alliance Special Report, 
17. The Eugene Water and Electric Board received a Conservation Eagle Award in the year 
2000, because of its commitment to invest 5% of its gross revenues in energy efficiency. 
“Clean, Affordable Energy Leaders Receive Eagle Awards,” Northwest Energy Coalition 
Report. June 2000.
40 The 3% includes money for low-income weatherization, but not for direct energy bill 
assistance. Collins, "Comprehensive Review," 25.
41 Collins, "Comprehensive Review," Appendix A.
42 Patrick Judge, “Testimony of MontPIRG on the Draft Plan of the Comprehensive 
Review of the Northwest Energy System,” Missoula public meeting, 6 November 1996.
43 Collins, "Comprehensive Review," 2.
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the benefits of the hydroelectric system are preserved for the Northwest.”“̂ 4 The goals o f
this section are “a more efficient power system, lower electricity costs, increased product 
choice and greater product innovation . . .  subject to a commitment to maintain the reliability 
and safety of the electrical power system.” However, the report recognizes that “the 
benefits of a competitive market may flow unevenly to different classes o f consumers and 
that some small consumers may even suffer harm.”'^^
Deregulation in Montana — Senate Bill 390 
Shortly after the review was published, Montana Power Co. (MFC) came to the 
1997 Montana legislature with an ambitious plan to deregulate the state’s electric utilities. 
The 1997 session was the first in Montana in which bills pertaining to electric industry 
restructuring were introduced, but talks had been underway for some time. In July 1995, 
the Montana Public Service Commission (PSC) had begun an inquiry into the topic, and by 
December o f that year, MPC had filed a restructuring proposal which would consolidate its 
three subsidiaries into two divisions; a regulated customer service and delivery division and
a competitive energy supply d i v i s i o n . 4 6  After two days of roundtable discussions in early
1996 (attended by representatives of most of the potentially affected constituencies), the 
PSC issued ten principles that it felt should guide electric restructuring in Montana. 
Additionally, the PSC felt that Montana’s lOUs were sufficiently different from each other 
to warrant individual treatment, deciding to focus first on MPC. The PSC developed an 
outline of issues for the company to address in its restructuring filing, which the
commission received in December 1996.^^ This filing, after numerous iterations, became
the working draft of the company’s proposed legislation. Leading into the legislature, the 
company enjoyed general support from other investor-owned utilities, large industrial 
customers, M ontana’s executive branch, and the PSC.
______ By contrast, the state’s electric cooperatives originally approached the 1997
44 Collins, "Comprehensive Review," 2.
45 Collins, "Comprehensive Review," 7.
46 Kathleen McLaughlin, “MPC plans restructuring,” IR, 12 December 1995.
47 Guest editorial by Bob Anderson and Bob Rowe, “Consumers must be protected,” IR,
6 April 1997.
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By contrast, the state’s electric cooperatives originally approached the 1997
legislature advocating a more conservative plan. They proposed a task force to study the
issue and to report back to the 1999 legislature. In a briefing packet sent to legislators prior
to the session, the Montana Electric Cooperatives’ Association (MECA) argued:
A cautious approach is needed because of past and current experiences. 
Restructuring of other industries such as natural gas, airlines, motor carriers, 
railroads and telephones have historically resulted in higher prices and reduced 
services to some residential and small-commercial customers, particularly those in 
rural a reas .. .  . The risks are enormous if policy decisions on electric industry 
restructuring are arrived at within the limitations of a 90-day legislative session.. .  . 
Industry restructuring policies should be developed in public processes with
participation open to all and accessible to all.'^^
Environmental and consumer groups were somewhat tom between the two camps. 
On the one hand, they felt that the regional review had generated a lot of positive momentum 
for incorporating environmental and broader public interest values into restructuring 
legislation. Groups such as Montana Environmental Information Center (MEIC),
Northwest Conservation Act Coalition (NCAC), and Renewable Northwest Project (RNP) 
were prepared to embrace the recommendations of the regional review, including its 
endorsement of deregulation so long as its consumer and environmental safeguards were 
honored. It was thought that the consensus document represented by the regional review 
would carry significant political weight (especially since it was signed by M PC’s president. 
Bob Gannon, and both chartered and endorsed by Governor Racicot).
On the other hand, the composition of the legislature (with strong Republican 
majorities in both houses, as well as control of the executive) made these groups inherently 
nervous, fearing that whatever environmental provisions the bill might have could easily be 
stripped away in committee. In other words, given the political climate, most of these 
groups felt that this was not the ideal time to try to enact such sweeping changes. 
Furthermore, at least some representatives of the “public interest lobby’’ were ideologically 
uncomfortable with the notion of deregulation itself, and naturally suspicious of the ability 
o f markets to deliver the environmental and social benefits of regulation. Finally, groups 
like MEIC and Northern Plains Resource Council were skeptical that their interests would
be met working side-by-side with their corporate counterparts, who happened to be holding
48 Montana Electric Cooperatives’ Association, “Talking Points: Customer Choice and 
Electric Industry Restructuring in Montana,’’ Legislative Briefing Packet, 1996.
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almost all of the cards. This attitude was partly the result of having recently endured a long, 
painful, and unsuccessful attempt to find consensus regarding changes to the Major Facility 
Siting Act, a process that had eroded what little trust existed between these camps.
However, activists realized that if the bill could escape tampering, joining forces with such 
politically powerful interests had greater chances for success than trying to oppose them.
But the pro-deregulation forces did not hold every card. Together, the co-ops 
present a formidable political presence in Montana, especially in a legislature sympathetic to 
rural interests. The co-ops also had the natural advantage of defending the status quo (as it 
is theoretically easier to kill a bill, especially a large and complicated one with its immediate 
need in dispute, than it is to pass a bill). The co-ops had what seemed an eminently 
reasonable position — not to reject deregulation outright, but merely to go about it cautiously 
and deliberately. MECA argued that its study-bill “does not stall the decision-making 
process, but simply moves it forward in a precise, well-reasoned manner.” It still allowed 
“for the possibility of full implementation of retail customer choice well within the time 
frames sought by most supporters of retail competition,” even with Montana’s two-year 
legislative c y c l e . 4 9  MECA affirmed that its concerns were primarily about process; “We
absolutely support customer choice. W e’re just concerned that if you try to steamroll 
legislation in a 90-day whirlwind of legislative activity, we think that is a recipe for
disaster.”^^
Despite such arguments, and even assuming a unified coalition of co-ops, MDU 
(Montana-Dakota Utilities, the eastern Montana lOU that also originally supported a go- 
slow approach), environmentalists, senior citizens, low income and other small consumers, 
there was still a good chance that the forces for deregulation would prevail.^ 1 And in the 
process, these groups would have alienated themselves from their opponents and lost 
whatever influence they might have had in shaping the bill. The resulting legislation would 
likely have little or no regard for environmental or other “public interest” values.
Furthermore, so long as there was a chance that the “dereg bill” would genuinely reflect the
49 MECA, “Talking Points: Customer Choice and Electric Industry Restructuring in 
M ontana.”
50 Bob Anez, “MPC sketches plan for era of competition,” GFT. 24 December 1996.
51 Charles S. Johnson, “MPC proposes ‘shopping around,” ’ IR, 24 December 1996.
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recommendations of the regional review, these groups felt some moral obligation to support 
it. Finally, despite whatever positive connotations environmentalists might harbor for the 
“cooperative” model, in Montana, at least, the co-ops are hardly their ideological brethren. 
While cooperatives sound like a progressive force, culturally and historically they have 
played a pro-development and often anti-environment role. A look at MECA’s resolutions 
on hydropower, wilderness, endangered species, environmental externalities, environmental 
mandates, demand side management, and global climate change gives ample evidence of this
philosophy.^2 other words, working with the co-ops could prove equally challenging to 
environmentalists as working with MPC and its large customers.
In the beginning weeks of the legislature, numerous meetings took place among 
interested stakeholders to try to forge a compromise bill. For a time, the negotiations 
looked promising to environmental and small customer advocates. A January 30 draft 
prepared by MFC specifically referenced the regional review, and included a mandatory six- 
year 3% - 3.37% funding level for public purposes. However, this proposal was quickly
rejected by MECA.^^ Shortly thereafter. Republican leadership in the legislature
determined that a dereg bill would be passed that session, with or without the support of
potential critics.^^ In response, the Administration initiated a new set of negotiations, to
which environmental and other public interest groups (and even the PSC) were not
invited.^5 The spirit of productive collaboration involving all perspectives had dissolved.
Having learned of the meetings from a tip, groups such as MEIC and MontPIRG attended 
anyway. After many hours of continued deliberations, these groups dropped out.
^2 http://www.mcn.net/-mtcoop/
52 Most of M ECA’s members are located east of the Continental Divide and outside of the 
Columbia River Basin. MECA argued fairly convincingly that, as such, they should not be 
bound by the recommendations of the regional review.
54 Guest editorial by Sen. Greg Jergeson (D-Chinook), “Report from the Senate,” Havre 
Dailv News. 10 March 1997. Montana Electric Cooperatives’ Association, “Legislature 
moves toward electric industry restructuring,” Rural Montana. March 1997.
55 Guest editorial by Dave Fisher and Danny Oberg, “Experts agree on power 
restructuring bill,” GFT. 8 April 1997. Charles S. Johnson, “The passing of SB 390: One 
year after enactment, sparks still fly over utility act,” IR, 3 May 1998. Guest editorial by 
Patrick Judge, “Legislators listened to MPC, but not to consumers,” GFT. 11 May 1997.
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recognizing that the bill was not going to be one they could support and frustrated that their 
concerns were falling on what seemed to them to be deaf ears.
In the meantime, the rural electric cooperatives had taken an abrupt about-face. They 
abandoned their plea for a slow, methodical, and open process, and instead began 
trumpeting the benefits of the deregulation bill. In part, this reflected the political reality 
described above -  either joining the losing effort to oppose a bill (in which they would get 
nothing), or embracing the bill and getting a few concessions in return. Opting for the latter 
approach, the co-ops obtained desired changes to the Territorial Integrity Act (which they 
had brought to the legislature as a separate bill) and the ability to “opt out” of deregulation
which would allow them to maintain their traditional inviolate service areas.^^ Like other 
utilities, co-ops are authorized to collect stranded costs should they decide to open their 
territories to competition. SB 390 also preserved the co-ops’ non-profit status and 
independence from PSC control. Finally, co-ops are granted the ability to “collectively 
pool their statewide credits to satisfy their annual funding requirements for universal system
benefits programs and low-income energy assistance.”^^ Co-op support of SB 390, then,
is seen by some as a desire to achieve what benefits and protections they could, rather than a 
genuine endorsement of deregulation itself. This contention is bolstered by the co-ops’ 
subsequent unwillingness to join the competitive fray, with only 2 of 26 having done so at 
the time of this writing.
Montana-Dakota Utilities (MDU) followed the co-ops’ example, supporting the bill 
after having secured special language pertaining to “a public utility currently doing 
business in Montana as part of a single integrated multistate operation, no portion of which
lies within the basin of the Columbia River.”^^ MDU was allowed to postpone customer
choice in its territory until July 1, 2006 (versus July 1, 2002 for other lOUs).
Without the help of the co-ops and MDU, efforts to oppose the bill became 
essentially futile. Nevertheless, a coalition of low-income, senior citizen, consumer, and 
environmental groups organized a strong campaign, inside and out of the statehouse, to
^6 The Territorial Integrity Act is found at MCA 69-5-101.
57 MCA 68-8-402.
58 MCA 69-8-201.
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protest what they felt to be an unconscionable bill. It was hoped that by bringing their 
message to the public, they could rally sufficient grassroots opposition to influence the 
outcome (or to at least create pressure for key amendments) — a daunting task given the 
complexity of the bill and a public which was caught largely unaware.
Arguments in Support of SB 390 
Meanwhile, proponents of deregulation orchestrated a strong campaign of their own. 
Nothing short of a masterful lobbying effort was required to pass this complex and lengthy
bill under enormous time constraints.^^ Normally, in order to stay alive, all bills must pass
out of the house in which they were introduced prior to the transmittal deadline.
But owing to the size and complexity of SB 390, and the lengthy negotiating process by 
which it was formed, SB 390 wasn’t even introduced until March 8, more than a week after 
the February 26 transmittal. Even so, the bill still needed to make it through committee and 
floor hearings in both houses (and subcommittee hearings in the House, as it turned out), all 
before adjournment. All told, dozens of votes would be taken on the bill and its 
amendments. Once introduced, intensive lobbying quickly yielded 58 cosigners (although 
several would ultimately vote against it) along with the primary sponsor. Sen. Fred Thomas 
(R-Stevensville). In committee, proponents ostensibly had the task of establishing not only 
the need for such a massive bill but its immediate need, especially in light of MECA’s 
previous arguments as to the prudence of a “go slow” approach. In essence, their case was 
as.followsi^O
The opposing view was that with the firm commitment of the Republican legislative 
leadership (and with the power of having such strong majorities in both houses), the bill was 
“greased” from the beginning, a foregone conclusion regardless of the apparent hurdles. 
Likewise Butte Democrats, as a matter of record, often vote in parallel with the interests of 
the Butte-based company. The deregulation bill was no exception, with every Butte-area 
Democrat (and the single Butte Republican) voting for it. Incidentally, MPC executive vice 
president and chief operating officer Jack Haffey was a Senator representing Anaconda 
from 1981-1987. Many Great Falls Democrats also voted for the bill, following the lead of 
Bill Ryan (a former MPC employee) who carried SB 390 in the House.
60 Note that the “pro and con” arguments which follow are presented from the perspective 
of those making them at the time of the 1997 session, and do not represent the views of the 
author.
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1) “There is no reason to regulate a truly competitive market.”^^ Deregulation is
already a reality in the wholesale industry and is inevitable at the retail level as well. Even 
PSC commissioner Bob Anderson who opposes the bill has said “It’s not a matter of
whether, but when and how to have customer c h o i c e . xhe question, then, comes down
to whether we proceed with a Montana-crafted solution or wait and let the federal 
government control our destiny for us (with a law that would more likely cater to the
influential eastern states than to states like M o n t a n a ) . “jt is too late to ‘just say no.’ . . .
Congress has seen five bills on restructuring that affect the states this session, and if
Montana takes no action. Congress will decide the i s s u e . W h i l e  SB 390 acts
responsibly by addressing this issue now, it is by no means rash or hasty. It was developed 
as the result of a collaborative effort involving more than 100 meetings and the participation
of a broad array of interests.^^ It represents a “seamless,” orderly, and gradual transition
to choice thereby avoiding the disruptions of “flash-cutting on day one.”^^
2) If we do choose to wait, large industrial customers might take advantage of the 
new wholesale rules to go ahead and “leave the system” anyway, by switching to alternate 
energy suppliers. If they do go before Montana has a deregulation law in place, the utility 
will have to recoup its fixed costs from the remaining captive customers. In other words, 
large customers could effectively dump their share of stranded costs on the rest o f us.
3) And not only can large customers leave, they likely will leave (if not figuratively,
then literally). Although electricity prices in Montana are relatively low, cheaper prices
Mike Dennison “MPC president expects good price for facilities,” GET. 11 March 
1998.
62 Charles S. Johnson, “MPC proposes ‘shopping around,” ’ IR, 24 December 1996.
63 DEQ, "Restructuring the Electric Utility Industry in Montana,” 5.
64 In retrospect, of course, this turned out not to be the case. DEQ, "Restructuring the 
Electric Utility Industry in Montana,” 2.
65 Guest editorial by Bob Gannon, “Power restructuring bill doesn’t rip off consumers,” 
GET. 20 April 1997.
66 Bob Anez, “MPC sketches plan for era of competition: If customers switch to other 
electric providers, move will have to be gradual, company warns,” GET. 24 December 1996. 
Charles S. Johnson, “MPC proposes ‘shopping around,” ’ IR, 24 December 1996. 
Montana Power Company, “Customer-choice transition plan presented to PSC,” Montana 
Energy. August 1997.
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abound in other Pacific Northwest states, particularly for these attractive customers. Also, 
other low-cost opportunities are being made available nationally, by abundant natural gas 
and low-cost energy conversion technologies.^^ Deregulation would facilitate such
opportunities and continue to provide a mechanism for collecting fixed costs from these 
industries. The alternative is to let out-of-state suppliers “cherry pick” the large industrials, 
in which case Montana would lose these customers’ energy business and also their 
stranded cost payments. Before passage of SB 390, many of M FC’s large customers had
already been approached.^^ Without offering access to the competitive electricity market, it
will be difficult for the state to attract new industry, let alone to retain existing industry. 
Relocating is a surefire way for these industries to escape M FC’s stranded costs. Exported 
industries also take with them much needed jobs and tax dollars, a price Montana can ill 
afford to pay given its current economy.
4) In addition to being protected from the cost-shifting and other impacts that 
would result from large customers leaving, small customers will themselves benefit directly 
from competition. Improvements in system efficiency and reductions in regulatory costs
will lower prices for all customers.^9 As M FC’s Jack Haffey noted, “After the transition,
consumers would be no worse off, and actually under the rate freeze for the next four years,
better off, than if the bill didn’t pass.”^® Furthermore, small customers will benefit from
innovation and customized services. It is simply not fair to deprive them of the freedom to 
choose and the benefits that will flow from that choice.
5) Any problems that develop can be dealt with as we go, by the legislature, the 
FSC, or the Transition Advisoiy Committee (TAC).^l As M FC’s Ferry Cole said, “We
Jan Falstad, “Enron competes with MFC, ” BG, 17 April 1997.
Jan Falstad, “Electric-utility deregulation bill sparking controversy,” IR, 13 April 1997.
69 Bob Miller, “House approves deregulation bill,” IR, 16 April 1997.
70 Jan Falstad, “Utility choice bill debated,” BG. 5 April 1997. Guest editorial by Bob 
Gannon, “MFC has a right to sell; legislators shouldn’t meddle,” GFT. 15 February 1998.
71 Jan Falstad, “Utility choice bill debated,” BG, 5 April 1997. AF, “FSC commissioners 
disagree on effects of electrical deregulation,” GFT, 9 April 1998.
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think it’s better to learn by doing than by studying. W e’ve already been through the study
process.”^2
Arguments in Opposition to SB 390 
Opponents to deregulation presented a somewhat different picture, and offered
specific rebuttals to the aforementioned arguments.
1) While it may be true that “there is no reason to regulate a truly competitive 
market,’’ the converse is also true: that “there is no reason to deregulate a truly
noncompetitive market,” at least until such time as it becomes competitive. While retail 
wheeling may in fact be inevitable and even desirable, that day has not yet arrived — markets 
for small customers have simply not yet matured. And as David Ewer pointed out to the 
Senate Taxation committee, we are not being left behind; “regional choice is not the law of
the land.”^3 p s c  commissioners Anderson and Rowe say that “the wholesale power
market (sales to utilities or very large customers) is now starting, but has taken 20 years to 
develop. Workable competition for retail customers, small businesses, and residential 
customers is a long way ofk”?^ And Montana may have some time yet before the “self-
determination” window closes. The likelihood for quick action at the federal level is 
diminishing rapidly, as is some of the enthusiasm at the state level (thanks in part to early 
disappointments in California’s implementation).^^ Montana’s own Senator Conrad 
Bums, a member of the Senate Energy Committee, indicated the wisdom and likelihood of 
Congress moving slowly:
^2 Mike Dennison, “Utility reform ‘97 session’s 800 lb. gorilla,” GFT. 13 January 1997.
Charles S. Johnson, “Utility bill sparks debate,” IR, 14 March 1997.
Guest editorial by Bob Anderson and Bob Rowe, “Consumers must be protected,” IR, 
6 April 1997.
Missoulian editorial, “No need for haste in power deregulation,” 3 December 1996. 
Missoulian editorial, “Utility deregulation will drag on,” 1 April 1997.
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In the minds of many, whether to deregulate is a foregone conclusion. But to those 
who are already on that track, I would say “whoa.” . . .  If we determine that 
deregulation is in the best interest of the public and our economy, then we can focus
on how to proceed. But it could take a great deal of time.^^
If Congress does eventually decide to deregulate, its decisions on how to do so would have 
preemptive authority over state laws anyway. And only four states have enacted 
comprehensive restructuring laws (California, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and New 
Hampshire). And as high-cost states, they all have more to gain from deregulation than has 
Montana. Nor is it a decision that is reversible, as emphasized in committee by Sen. Fred 
Van Valkenburg (D-Missoula), who said, “W e’re being asked to put in place an economic 
earthquake that will ripple across Montana. . . . you can regret in your leisure what you 
engaged in at such a rapid pace now.”^^
2) The threat of large customers leaving the system prematurely is overstated. In 
fact, as end-use customers, it is at this time illegal for them to do so. And to reformulate 
themselves as “wholesalers” is not as trivial a task as it might sound. Even assuming that 
this threat is a legitimate concern, the remedy is just as easily found in the imposition of exit 
fees for companies that leave the regulated system, as it is in complex and sweeping
deregulation proposals.^^ As PSC Commissioner Bob Anderson put it, “we’ve got a 40-
page solution when a couple-of-page bill would do.”^^ Exit fees have already been shown 
to work. University of Montana professor Tom Power notes that in the natural gas 
industry, we have managed to rely on that mechanism for half a d e c a d e . E v e n  if
“choice” makes sense for large customers, that does not imply that all customers should be
Senator Bums did not, however, oppose faster action at the state level and later endorsed 
M ontana’s law. Daniel Meisler, “Group urges lawmakers to oppose electric-utility 
deregulation measure,” IR, 7 May 1997. The quoted remarks were taken from an address 
given to the 1997 Montana legislature.
77 Mike Dennison, “Panel amends, endorses utility bill,” GFT. 22 March 1997.
78 Hardly a new or exotic idea, exit fees had been discussed in Montana since at least 
December 1995. Kathleen McLaughlin, “MPC plans restructuring,” IR, 12 December
1995. Smeloff, 126.
79 Mike Dennison, “Consumer advocates to line up against utility restructuring bill,” GFT. 
13 March 1997.
80 Later, this approach would also be used as part of the repealer initiative discussed in 
Chapter 6. Guest editorial by Thomas M. Power, “Put brakes on MPC,” GFT, 5 Febmary 
1998.
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dragged into a competitive environment before market adequately developed. Other options
should be explored that might better address the concerns o f both types of customer.^ 1
3) The relocation argument is really just a time-worn scare tactic. Throughout 
Montana’s history, industries have repeatedly threatened to leave the state if various 
environmental laws were enacted, but have rarely done so. In this instance, the argument 
neglects the costs associated with relocation and the reality that Montana is already a low- 
cost region which limits the potential savings that could be achieved by moving.
One example proponents use to illustrate the reality of competition in the state is the 
Advanced Silicon Materials, Inc. plant in Butte. ASiMI, as it is known, will eventually be a 
$500 million manufacturing plant that produces silicon chips for computers. When 
finished, the plant will employ 275 workers and will be M FC’s largest customer, using 
about 100 MW (roughly twice as large as its former top account, the 48-MW Stone
Container facility in M i s s o u l a ) . B u t  the ASiMI plant just as easily serves as an example
of why SB 390 is not needed. It is true that MFC’s competitive electricity rates were a 
major drawing point when ASiMI was deciding where to locate. But it is also true that these
rates were arranged under the current system of regulation — a testimony to its flexibility.^^
And because the competitive rate offered by MFC depended upon FSC approval, the 
commission was able to review it to make sure it was not being subsidized by other MFC 
customers. Similarly, the example of the Columbia Falls Aluminum Company (CFAC) 
switching from BFA to the Flathead Electric Co-op is a special case because of CFAC’s 
distinction as the state’s only DSL And in this case, the company switched to a Montana 
utility, not from one (which is the primary concern). In both instances, the companies ended
See the discussion of the portfolio model (“dereg lite”) in Chapter 6, under “The Small 
Customer Buying Cooperative.”
^2 Guest editorial by Fred Thomas, “State proactive in electric restructuring,” BG. 9 April 
1998. Malone, Montana: A Contemporarv Frofile. 20. John Stucke and Charles S. 
Johnson, “State’s largest power users researching costs before switching,” IR, 5 July 
1998. Fersonal telephone conversation with Will Rosquist, FSC, 4 August 2000.
Mike Dennison,“Critics say MFC ad is misleading,” GFT. 18 June 1998.
In fact, some contend that without the financial assurances enjoyed by utilities under 
regulation, subsidized rates aimed at attracting industiy will be jettisoned just as subsidized 
rates for low-income customers are threatened. Brennan, 131.
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up being served by the utility that they would have been based on geographic service 
territories.
4) The “clamoring for choice” that deregulation proponents talk about is really 
only coming from large customers. David Ewer captured the sentiments of many legislators
in observing, “Nobody in my district is asking for c h o i c e . ” ^ ^  All told, there is very little
evidence that ordinary Montanans are demanding the opportunity to choose — a 
fundamental piece of the puzzle which seems to be missing. It seems equally plausible that 
Montana’s small customers are in fact quite satisfied with the status quo, which happens to 
be low-cost, reliable power. Tom Power attested, “I haven’t seen one shred of evidence that 
small customers want [choice] or that it would be particularly good for them. So why do we 
want to force them to spend more time and energy on this [decision], rather than spending 
their time fishing or hunting or reading to their children?”^^
5) While there may be occasion to alter the course of deregulation in the future, 
many decisions in the bill simply cannot be revisited; you cannot simply “put the genie
back in the bottle once you pass this bill,” as David Ewer said.^^ The issue demands that 
we get it right the first time.^^
Another Opposition Argument — Stranded Benefits
In addition to these rebuttals, one area in particular stood out as a central rallying 
point for opponents to SB 390, that being the issue of stranded benefits (treated in Section
22 of the b i l l ) . S t r a n d e d  benefits are environmental and low-income assistance programs
(also known as public purposes) “that were funded and operated by regulated utilities but 
which are likely to be abandoned to make the supporting utilities more competitive with
84 Jan Falstad, “Utility overhaul is goal,” BG. 12 March 1997.
85 Mike Dennison, “Critics slam company for quitting sale of electricity,” GFT. 28 August 
1998.
86 Bob Miller, “House approves deregulation bill,” IR, 16 April 1997.
87 Even M FC’s Perry Cole said, “It’s like landing an airplane — you can’t make 
mistakes.” Bob Anez, “MPC sketches plan for era of competition,” GFT. 24 December
1996.
88 MCA 69-8-402.
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other market participants that have no such r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . ” ^ ^  Because of the diversity of 
interests affected by these programs, this issue helped unify the opposition. And as one of 
the bill’s more controversial (and comprehensible, as it turned out) sections, it provided an 
effective tool for galvanizing public sentiment. It is appropriate to examine this section here, 
because it bridges the consumer and environmental concerns discussed in later chapters.
The term “stranded benefits” should not be confused with the terms “stranded costs” or 
“stranded assets” (which are synonymous).
While programs supporting energy conservation, renewable energy, low-income 
weatherization, and low-income bill assistance were traditionally required under regulation, 
they may well be “stranded” by the move to competition. This move has led some utilities 
to abandon or significantly curtail their commitment to these public benefit programs (also 
known as “public purposes”), despite their long-term economic, social, and environmental 
benefits. In a deregulated environment, utilities place a greater emphasis on short-term 
financial considerations as they attempt to be as lean and competitive as possible. Drastic 
cutbacks in environmental and low-income programs can occur even prior to the passage of 
restructuring laws, a process known as “virtual deregulation.” In 1996, for example, the 
Montana Power Company reduced its conservation budget by 70% (see figure 1, page 19).
Acknowledging the threat that competition poses to these programs, SB 390 
established a “universal system benefits charge” (USBC), equal to 2.4% of each utility’s 
1995 annual retail sales in Montana. The charge (which would be collected by the 
distribution utility) was to appear on consumers’ bills beginning January 1, 1999 and
DEQ, "Restructuring the Electric Utility Industry in Montana,” executive summary. In 
Montana, these programs include demand-side management (DSM - see “Conservation” 
in Chapter 4 and “Conservation / DSM — Public Puipose Funding” in Chapter 5), 
renewable energy supports, and the “inclusion of environmental costs in utility resource 
decisions,” which is known as integrated resource planning or IRP (see Chapter 5 for a 
more thorough discussion of these programs). Low-income programs include not only 
direct bill assistance and weatherization, but discounts and “prohibitions against winter 
service cutoffs.” DEQ, "Restructuring the Electric Utility Industry in Montana,” 8. MPC 
programs include: Efficiency Plus Home Energy Audit, Free Weatherization (for 
customers below 150% of Federal Poverty Guidelines), and a 15% low-income discount 
federally funded by the Low Income Energy Assistance Program (LIEAP). Montana 
Power Company, “Explaining the Universal Systems Benefit Charge (USBC),” Montana 
Energy. June 1999.
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continuing until July 1, 2 0 0 3  (4.5 y e a r s ) . 9 0  The rationale behind a sunset date is that such
benefits may one day flow from the market itself, becoming “free-standing, self-sustaining
and self-financing.’’91 In the case of renewable energy, declining prices may reach the
point where such subsidies are no longer needed.
While supportive of the USBC concept, environmentalists criticized this section of 
the bill on several grounds. They urged a funding level greater than 3% and for a longer 
duration, in accordance with the regional review’s recommendations. And whereas the 
regional review’s funding level was established as a constant percentage, able to grow with
increases in regional retail sales, Montana’s was a frozen dollar amount.^^ Note too that
the region’s 3% figure does not include direct low-income energy bill assistance, while 
M ontana’s 2.4% does. The regional review separated this category out, and called for 
additional funds to continue “the energy system’s historic role in providing energy bill 
assistance,” thereby maintaining current l e v e l s . 9 3  According to the regional review, $39 
million was spent on bill assistance in the Northwest in 1995, $16 million of which came 
from utilities (representing 0.23% of retail s a l e s ) . T h e  report recommended that the 3%+
standard should be met by July 1 1997 and for ten years thereafter, at which time it would 
be reevaluated. Each of the four states (Montana, Washington, Oregon, and Idaho) was to 
pass legislation by July 1, 1999 requiring its electric utilities to meet the standard. It is
As a “nonbypassable lines charge,” the charge could not be avoided by simply 
switching suppliers. All electricity customers in the state would pay it, regardless of 
whether or not their utility had entered the competitive arena. This arrangement (versus a 
charge collected by the supply companies) makes sense, as it might prove difficult to require 
non-utility generators to collect and remit these funds. Regulator-mandated DSM creates a 
patchwork system of funding that is inappropriate in a competitive environment as it would 
grant an advantage to those energy suppliers that do not support these activities. DEQ, 
"Restructuring the Electric Utility Industry in Montana,” 8-9. Another advantage of 
designating the USBC a “lines company charge” is that the distribution utility is 
guaranteed recovery from a captive customer base, and is not in the position of having to cut 
costs in order to be competitive.
DEQ, "Restructuring the Electric Utility Industry in Montana,” 9.
92 The regional review translated the 3% into a dollar figure for 1995 only for the sake of 
comparison. Montana’s law, in contrast, firmly established its funding level as a percentage 
of 1995 sales with no adjustments for inflation or increased sales.
93 Collins, "Comprehensive Review," 25.
94 Collins, "Comprehensive Review," 21.
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feared that the effect of Montana’s shortfall will be magnified if the other states o f the
Northwest follow suit.^^ Nonetheless, environmentalists found themselves in the
uncomfortable position of advocating a figure which they had only agreed to as part of a 
grudging compromise. Suddenly, what was to them the floor funding level had somehow 
been transformed into a ceiling, the highest figure they had any chance of getting. Arguing 
from a position of political weakness, their goal was to defend the 3% and the good faith 
process that had produced it. But any further weakening became wholly unpalatable. And, 
as they learned, there was a great deal of difference between a solid 3% and a “swiss 
cheesed” 3%, hollowed out by qualifications. The fierce controversy over the regional 
review’s recommendations was somewhat baffling to environmentalists, because of the 
relatively small amounts of money involved. According to an MPC bill insert, of the $47 
the typical residential customer pays each month, only $1.05 would go to USB programs,
whereas $11.50 would go to stranded costs.^^
Representatives of the public interest community took strong exception to a series of 
provisions limiting the universal system benefits obligations of large industrial customers, 
provisions they maintained were emblematic of the bill’s overall bias in favor of big 
business (see “Preferential Treatment” in Chapter 3). The first such objectionable 
provision is the exceptionally vague statement that “(6) An individual customer may not 
bear a disproportionate share of the local utility’s funding requirements, and a sliding scale 
must be implemented to provide a more equitable distribution of program costs.” The next 
provision reads as follows:
95 At the time of this writing, it appears that Washington and Oregon may indeed move 
forward with 3% funding levels. Danielle Dixon, “WA Considers System Benefits 
Standard,” and Steven Weiss, “Oregon Presents Draft Restructuring Rules,” Northwest 
Energy Coalition Report. February 20(X).
96 Montana Power Company, “What effect will customer choice have in the years to come 
— Expected Breakdown of a Typical Unbundled Bill,” Montana Energv. June 1997.
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(7) (a) A customer with loads greater than 1,000 kilowatts shall:
(i) pay a universal system benefits program charge equal to the lesser of:
(A) $500,000 less the customer credits provided for in this subsection (7); or
(B) the product o f 0.9 mills per kilowatt hour multiplied by the customer’s kilowatt 
hour purchases, less customer credits provided for in this subsection (7);
(ii) receive credit toward that customer’s annual universal system benefits charge 
for internal expenditures and activities that qualify as a universal system benefits 
program expenditure and these internal expenditures must include but not be limited 
to:
(A) expenditures that result in a reduction in the consumption of electrical energy in 
the customer’s facility; and
(B) those portions of expenditures for the purchase of power at retail or wholesale 
that are for the acquisition or support of renewable energy or conservation-related 
activities.
(b) Customers making these expenditures must receive a credit against the 
customer’s annual universal system benefits charge, except that any of those 
amounts expended in a calendar year that exceed that customer’s universal system 
benefits charge for the calendar year must be used as a credit against those charges 
in future years until the total amount of those expenditures has been credited against
that customer’s universal system benefits charges.^^
The first thing to note is that SB 390, here and elsewhere, distinguishes between 
ordinary customers and customers that have “loads greater than 1,000 kilowatts,’’ which
serves as an effective definition for “large industrial customer.”^® The perks that such
customers enjoy under this section are several. First, there is a two-tiered rate cap. In no 
instance can any customer pay more than $500,000 in a year. And in no instance can the 
customer pay more than 0.9 mills per kilowatt hour. The 0.9 mill standard would apply to 
customers using between 1 Megawatt and 63.4 Megawatts (in other words all large 
customers in the state other than CFAC and eventually ASiMI— see Chapter 5, 
“Deregulation Stalls’’). Therefore, the $500,000 limit would apply only to CFAC (where it
would work out to 0.165 mills) and ASiMI (where it would be equivalent to 0.571 mills).99
It is useful to contrast these figures with the USB obligation of residential 
customers. In September 1999, when M FC’s bills were first itemized (or “unbundled’’) to 
show individual charges, the USBC was 1.334 mills per kilowatt hour (about 50% higher
97 MCA 69-8-402.
98 By contrast, the average Montana family uses about 1 average kilowatt of power. A 
kilowatt is a rate o f energy consumption, whereas a kilowatt-hour is a quantity of energy. 
Therefore, a home which uses 1 kilowatt of power, consumes about 9000 kilowatt-hours per 
year (because there are 8760 hours in a year). Energy = Power * Time
99 $500,000 / (345,000 kw * 8760 hours) = 0.165 mills.
$500,000 / (100,000 kw * 8760 hours) = 0.571 mills.
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than industry’s 0.9 mills, and more than eight times the “rate” paid by CFAC). For the 
average residential customer, who uses 750 kwh and pays approximately $50 per month, 
this comes out to exactly $1 per month (or about 2% of the customer’s total bill, close to 
the 2.4% suggested by the standard). A basic inequity arises for a commercial customer 
using, for example, one Megawatt of power. If charged the 1.334-mill rate, the obligation 
would be about $11,686, the same as a customer using 1.482 Megawatts and paying the 
0.9-mill rate! Similarly a 1.001 Megawatt customer would pay the same as a 675 kwh 
customer ($7,892).
Subsection (7) also grants large customers credits for their internal expenditures. 
This credit, which was later predicted to consume approximately 30% of USB funds, was
opposed on a number of grounds. 100 First, it did not seem fair that a factory could skate
on a portion of its USB obligation by means of an internal efficiency improvement while a 
residential customer could receive no such credit for, say, buying a compact-fluorescent 
bulb. Second, internal investments in energy efficiency pay for themselves over time and 
are sound business decisions already. As such, companies are allowed to waive their USB 
contributions because of actions that make sense anyway, and which need no subsidy. 
Third, low-income interests opposed the credit because this use of USB funds is 100% 
allocated to conservation. Fourth, with the ability to roll funds forward, a company could 
conceivably opt out of this charge for a decade or more with a one-time retrofitting 
investment. Finally, the credit system poses significant verification issues.
On the other hand, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) pointed out 
that from an environmental perspective the credit represents a legitimate use o f USB funds. 
It is with these large industries that the greatest opportunity for conservation gains can be 
had, and at the least cost. And environmentalists had agreed to the general concept of
credits as part of the regional review compromise. ̂ ^1
M FC’s Perry Cole said that without these various exemptions, the funding levels 
would be too burdensome for businesses that operate in “a very competitive marketplace.”
Consumer advocates were perplexed as to how such industries could have a more difficult
100 Jan Falstad, “Changes urged to aid small electricity users,” BG, 16 November 1997.
101 Rachel Shimshak and Peter West, “Testimony of the Renewable Northwest Project to 
the Montana Senate Taxation Committee,” 13 Maich, 1997.
48
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
time paying their share than ordinary Montanans. Nor were their sympathies stirred by the 
recollection of group agreement held by Mr. Cole: “We thought we heard the group say,
‘Yeah, Columbia Falls, you should be treated differently.” 102 Even NRDC (which was
probably the most conciliatory environmental group involved) was adamant on this point, 
including as an explanation to a proposed amendment language reading in all caps, “NRDC 
DOES NOT SUPPORT LEGISLATIVELY SPECIFYING CAPS ON LARGE 
CUSTOM ER PUBLIC-PURPOSE CONTRIBUTIONS.” 103
In defense of the standard, proponents of SB 390 noted that the 2.4% USBC 
represents an increase over current funding levels. For MPC, 2.4% is equivalent to $8.6 
million annually, which exceeds the 1996 ($4.4 million), 1997 ($5.7 million), and 1998 ($7 
million) levels. In 1995, however, the utility spent $11.5 million, the culmination of a build­
up lasting at least five years (see figure 1, page 1 9 ). 104 2.4% represents an increase in
funding levels for many if not most co-ops. SB 390’s supporters contended that 
opportunities for cost-effective conservation and renewables are currently limited 
(particularly for many co-ops), because of the low prices generated by natural gas 
combustion turbines and low-cost power surpluses. Cost-effective options will continue to
102 Charles S. Johnson, “Enviros say new utility law ‘sweetheart’ deal for MPC, ” IR, 14 
February 1997.
103 n RDC’s proposed amendments to SB 390 written by Deborah Smith, 3rd reading 
copy, 10 April 1997.
104 A report issued in the year 2000 by MPC showed that of the $7.8 million collected, 
$2.7 million (35%) was used by large customers for efficiency improvements in their own 
facilities, $1.7 million (23%) went to low income bill assistance and weatherization, 
$800,000 went to the Northwest Energy Efficiency Alliance for market transformation, $2.1 
million was spent on conservation and renewables, and $500,000 was retained by the 
company for administrative costs. “Around the Region,” Northwest Energy Coalition 
Report. June 2000.
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diminish if competition further lowers prices. 1^5 Co-ops also resisted the regional
review’s proposed funding level on the grounds that most Montana co-ops do not even fall 
within the geographic boundaries of the Pacific Northwest region (which is thought o f as 
encompassing the Columbia River Basin and therefore only the portion of Montana west of 
the Continental Divide). Finally, they wished to maintain their strong tradition of 
democratic self-reliance and self-governance. If co-op customer-members feel that 
additional conservation funds are warranted, they can always express that desire through 
their elected boards of directors. ̂ 06
The USBC was also heralded for its ability to bring greater consistency to public 
benefits programs. DEQ observed that under regulation, “coverage is incomplete (e.g. low- 
income co-op members do not receive the same programs or benefits under those 
programs) and the costs are not spread evenly or equitably (electricity bills are not 
necessarily correlated with ability to pay).’’107 other words, both benefits and costs
depend upon geography.
Beyond Montana’s USBC, broader implications of virtual deregulation and 
stranded benefits have been pointed out. The effects of cost-cutting, for example, can
105 DEQ, "Restructuring the Electric Utility Industry in Montana,’’ 9. Charles S. Johnson, 
“Enviros say new utility law ‘sweetheart’ deal for MPC, ” IR, 14 February 1997.
Note that by the summer of 2000, such surpluses no longer existed in the Pacific 
Northwest. In fact, there was a 3000-Megawatt deficit due to a number of long-term and 
short-term factors which together have increased demand, reduced supply, and increased 
price. Population growth and unusually warm weather this year have increased demand 
while a late runoff and drought conditions have limited hydroelectric capacity. Furthermore, 
several major coal-fired plants have been out of commission due to routine maintenance and 
break downs. And conditions in the Northwest usually intensify, not improve, during the 
winter months due to higher heating and lighting demands and declining power production 
from hydroelectric dams. High natural gas prices also contributed to the price spikes. Bob 
Anez (AP), “Experts to meet over soaring rates: Escalating electricity rates attributed to hot 
weather, no rain and plant failures,’’ IR, 1 July 2000. AP, “Northwest may experience 
energy shortage this summer,” IR, 1 March 2000. Bob Anez (AP), “Experts to meet over 
soaring rates: Escalating electricity rates attributed to hot weather, no rain and plant 
failures,” IR, 1 July 2000. AP, “High demand, low supply mean astronomical prices for 
energy,” GFT. 30 June 2000. AP, “Utilities scrambling for power: Last week’s power 
shortage that hindered the Northwest calling attention to region’s potential for major 
blackout,” IR, 3 July 2000. Mark Clyde, “ ’Perfect Storm’ Jolts Northwest Power Grid,” 
Northwest Energv Coalition Report. July 2000.
106 d EQ, "Restructuring the Electric Utility Industry in Montana,” 5.
107 DEQ, "Restructuring the Electric Utility Industry in Montana,” 9.
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extend far beyond environmental and low-income programs. Between 1988 and 1997, 
Montana witnessed the first “stranded human costs” of deregulation as MPC reduced its 
workforce by 700 employees, down to 1925.^®^ According to Amory Lovins, such layoffs 
are the inevitable result of a tendency, created by deregulation, to “treat employees as 
liabilities rather than assets.” 109 Equally distressing is the possibility that safety will be 
compromised (perhaps a greater concern outside Montana at the nation’s 112 nuclear 
power plants). ̂  Cost-cutting under a competitive regime may also take its toll on 
research and development programs, including cooperative ventures like the Electric Power 
Research Institute (EPRI). 111 Social and environmental programs, employment, safety, and 
research — all may be sacrificed to some extent by the transition to a competitive 
environment. The emerging short-term focus causes Peter West of the Renewable 
Northwest Project to worry that “restructuring will mean a race to the bottom, the cheapest 
price and nothing more.” ! ^2
Another Opposition Argument — Process
Perhaps most frustrating to opponents of SB 390 was the political process that led 
to its passage. Montana would become the first, and perhaps only, state to pass such a bill 
in a single session of the legislature, without having first formally studied it.! One
Associated Press article described a Senate floor debate in which opponents “chided the
GOP majority for embracing an industry-written bill and rushing it through the Legislature
!ü^ Jan Falstad, “Electric-utility deregulation bill sparking controversy,” IR, 13 April 
1997. Three years later, an article reported “At present, Montana Power has 2,500 
employees, including 934 in Butte, down from its peak of 4,000 workers. Touch America 
has 200 employees. . .” Charles S. Johnson, “MPC to sell all remaining energy assets,” 
IR, 29 March 2000.
!09 Smeloff, xi.
! !® Kraushaar, 107.
! ! !  Brennan, 131.
! !2 Mazza, “How the Northwest Can Lead a Clean Energy Revolution,” An Atmosphere 
Alliance Special Report, 17.
! !3 Incidentally, Montana is also thought to be the first state to deregulate both electric and 
gas, which is thought by many to be an advantage over other states. Personal conversation 
with Jim Morin, Energy West, 2 September 1999.
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GOP majority for embracing an industry-written bill and rushing it through the Legislature 
in a matter o f weeks. The Democrats argued that such complex issues deserve longer, more
thoughtful study and a legitimate opportunity for the public to get involved.”  ̂ Another 
columnist put it more bluntly, “No legislator supporting the deregulation bill could explain 
anything about it without help from the Montana Power Company. The debate on the 
Senate floor was pure ventriloquism. The simplest question would send a supportive 
senator scurrying to the gaggle of MPC lobbyists outside the chamber to get the next piece 
of script to recite.” !
These quotes touch on a number of important themes regarding process. The first
pertains to the development of the bill itself — that is, whether SB 390 was a “power
company bill” or a “consensus bill.” l 1^ On one occasion M PC’s Jack Haffey argued,
“it’s not appropriate to characterize it as something that is other than a balanced, equitable
bill that was reached by a consensus group.” This statement, ironically, came as a response
to a press conference condemning SB 390 as “M PC’s sweetheart deal for industry” —
hardly the stuff of which consensus is made. M PC’s April 1997 bill insert similarly
confuses participation with support:
The restructuring bill reflects a product that involved participation by electric 
providers like Montana Power, rural electric cooperatives, Pacific Power and Light, 
Montana-Dakota Utilities, as well as customer groups, several environmental and 
low-income groups, state policy leaders and others. The Montana Public Service
Commission (PSC) also supports the (Emphasis added.)
In light of their strong protests against the bill, opposition groups (including the 
environmental, consumer, low-income, senior citizen, and other groups listed in Appendix 
A) felt that this use of the word “consensus” was a gross abuse of language. They
114 Len Iwanski, “Senate advances bill to deregulate electric utilities,” GFT. 26 March 
1997.
115 Column by Mary Sheehy Moe, “A study in organized hypocrisy,” IR, 8 July 1998.
116 Mike Dennison, “Utility restructuring bills expected to spark fight,” GFT. 14 
February 1997. Kathleen McLaughlin, “Low-key Thomas carries weighty issues,” IR, 24 
March 1997. Bob Miller, “Utilities urge passage of electric industry changes,” GFT. 14 
March 1997. Jan Falstad, “Enron competes with MPC, ” BG, 17 April 1997.
117 Montana Power Company, “Legislature considers electric restructuring bill,” Montana 
Energy. April 1997.
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maintained that you either have consensus or you do not, that you cannot have “pretty much 
o f a consensus.” ! !8
While it is true that the bill was primarily drafted by MPC lawyers, it is also true that 
there was considerable input from other sources. And while many different perspectives 
were represented at various stages of the process, the degree of influence these voices had 
varied greatly, as a function of their current political and economic clout. Therefore, while it 
is certainly fair to say that MFC collaborated with other groups, it is wholly unfair to declare 
the result a consensus product. A related concern held by opponents was the incredible 
disparity in resources between those lobbying for and those lobbying against SB 390.
MEIC charged that MFC had won the “triple crown of corporate influence” at the 1997 
legislature, “with the most lobbyists, the greatest lobbying expenses, and the biggest 
contributions to legislative candidates” (see Appendix A ).Ü 9 Opposition groups also felt
that parties which ought to have been strong allies had failed them, again because of 
reigning political forces (various charges of conflict of interest also arose during the
session, because of key legislators’ business ties with M FC).!20 pgr example, initially it
looked as if the Montana Consumer Counsel would oppose a deregulation bill at the 1997 
legislature. MCC had participated in the FSC’s inquiry into restructuring in 1996. At that 
time, MCC (as paraphrased by the FSC) was not convinced “that retail direct access will 
produce significant benefits for Montana consumers. MCC asserts that most of the 
efficiency gains will come from competition in wholesale markets. MCC agrees that there 
are benefits from greater customer choice, but asserts that the level of consumer choice
could be greatly increased with the present regulatory s t r u c t u r e . ” !21 Also, prior to the
! Charles S. Johnson, “Enviros say new utility law ‘sweetheart’ deal for MFC,” IR, 14 
February 1997. MFC would again encounter similar criticism for the inappropriate use of 
the term “consensus” in describing the FSC’s jurisdiction over the sale of M FC’s 
regulated delivery business. Mike Dennison, “FSC: Law change needed to monitor MFC 
sale,” GET. 28 April 2000.
! !9 Patrick Judge, Montana Environmental Information Center, “The Human Rights Hour 
with Albert Niccolucci,” Carroll College Radio, 14 April 1998.
!20 BG editorial, “Legislators cannot serve dual masters,” BG, 8 March 1998. Mike 
Dennison, “Who is watching watchdog?” GFT. 21 March 1997.
!21 Department of Fublic Service Regulation before the Fublic Service Commission of the 
State o f Montana, “Notice of Commission Action,” Docket No. D95.7.96, 21 May 1996, 
6-7.
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PSC’s narrow endorsement of SB 390, its restructuring staff had unanimously urged the 
commission to “recommend to the 97 legislature that it pass a study bill on restructuring,’’ 
with the intent of moving to customer choice by December 31, 1999.122
Undoubtedly, the most frustrating aspect of the passage of SB 390 to environmental 
and consumer groups was the mischaracterization of their position. Early in the session, 
meetings between MFC and newspaper editorial boards generated a number o f unqualified, 
glowing e n d o r s e m e n t s .  123 An editorial by the Bozeman Daily Chronicle read, “The lack 
of any significant opposition to SB 390 so far indicates the [bill] may in fact address most 
o f the potential c o n c e r n s . ’’ 124 While more effective media relations on the part of 
opposition groups prevented further such statements by the press, proponents never 
abandoned their strategy of portraying the bill as “ c o n s e n s u s . ”  125
A second issue, mentioned earlier, was that of speed. The Great Falls Tribune was
sharply critical of this aspect, going so far as to warn (prophetically) o f the possibility of a
citizen backlash in the form of initiative campaigns;
This bill may not get adequate scrutiny. And legislators should have learned in the 
1995 session that they must understand the issues they are voting on. Their 
changes in the water quality laws were responsible for the introduction of Initiative- 
122 and the multi-million-dollar battle between miners and environmentalists last 
year. A poor decision on power deregulation this session could be nearly as
t r a u m a t i c .  ^ 2 6
122 PSC Electric and Gas Restructuring Staff, “Memorandum to Commissioners,” 19 
December 1996, 1.
123 Bob Anez, “Bill shields electricity users,” Montana Standard. 11 March 1997.
Bob Anez, “Measure intended to protect electrical consumers,” GFT. 11 March 1997.
Bob Anez, “Bill protects customers from unfair utility costs during deregulation,” IR, 11 
March 1997. IR editorial, “Deregulation bill needed,” IR, 12 March 1997.
BG editorial, “Montana Power looks to the future,” BG, 16 March 1997.
124 b DC editorial, “Open market for electricity is in consumers’ best interest,” BDC. 13 
March 1997.
125 Dave Fisher and Danny Oberg, “Experts agree on power restructuring bill,” GFT. 8 
April 1997. Rep. Bill Ryan (D-Great Falls), Floor debate in Montana House of 
Representatives, 15 April 1997.
126 GFT editorial, “Power deregulation bill comes too late this year,” GFT. 9 March 1997. 
GFT editorial, “Power play: Take time to study utility deregulation,” GFT. 26 March
1997.
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The Missoulian had a similar take, before, during, and after the legislature. 1^7
390 did not represent the slow and deliberate approach the editorial board had urged. In
March 1998, the paper wrote;
[W]hat is good in concept may be wretched in detail. How and when you 
deregulate matters a great deal. The Montana Legislature, not generally known for 
its radical innovation, chose, for reasons that defy comprehension, to be among the
first states in the nation to deregulate the electricity business. 1^8
For ammunition on this issue, both sides drew comparisons to other states. While
proponents were emphasizing the number of states considering deregulation (and their
populations, as most of the activity was occurring in populous states), opponents stressed
the caution exhibited by Montana’s neighbors. Thomas Power wrote in a guest editorial:
The adventuristic nature of this legislation is made clear by the refusal of the other 
states in the Pacific Northwest, the Rocky Mountains, and the Great Plains to follow 
suit. . . . The approach being taken in other states has been to first assure that all of 
the benefits for customers are wrung from wholesale competition. This has 
included finding ways of providing access for large industrial and commercial 
customers, who are more like wholesale customers anyway. ̂ ^9
The speed issue represented two conflicting philosophies. One camp believed that the risks 
of going slow exceeded the risks of embracing change. They believed that fundamentally, 
deregulation would work, and that problems and kinks could be addressed as they arose. 
The other camp believed that the risks of moving too quickly were substantial enough to 
postpone action, at least until adequate safeguards were in place, that “the time to protect 
Montanans from the uncertainties of electric deregulation is before, not after, 
deregulation.’’130 This approach would later be taken by the State of Washington, which
put consumer and environmental protections in place before ever passing a deregulation law. 
Unlike his Montana counterparts, a spokesman for a Washington utility captured this more
127 Missoulian editorial, “No need for haste in power deregulation,” Missoulian. 3 
December 1996. Missoulian editorial, “Utility deregulation: sooner or later?” Missoulian. 
16 March 1997. Missoulian editorial, “State, communities should sort our power plays,” 
Missoulian. 13 January 1998. Missoulian editorial, “Point of no return approaching for 
deregulation,” Missoulian. 22 March 1998.
128 Missoulian editorial, “Point of no return approaching for deregulation,” Missoulian.
22 March 1998.
129 Guest editorial by Thomas M. Power, “Put brakes on MPC,” GFT. 5 February 1998.
130 Letter from legislators to Cooney asking for a special session, 23 April 1998.
AP, “Deregulation foes again push for special session,” BG. 23 April 1998.
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conservative approach: “W e’re a little disappointed that it hasn’t been moving forward 
more quickly. But, in the same respect, we don’t want to make mistakes. We want to do it 
correctly. These are huge questions.’’
One final objection, brought by commissioners Anderson and Rowe, was that the 
bill “locks in place too many detailed decisions,’’ not allowing the PSC enough flexibility
to deal with changing, unforeseeable conditions. 1^2 On the other hand, critics claimed that
while the bill may be too prescriptive, it also leaves too many unanswered questions (which 
is not as paradoxical as it might sound — an obvious result of attempting to lay out too 
many details in too short a time). The legislature delegated major unresolved issues to the 
existing Revenue Oversight Committee (which was to perform a study of the tax impacts 
and make recommendations to the 1999 legislature) and the newly created Transition 
Advisory Committee (TAC).^^^
The TAC is an interim legislative committee charged with studying and reporting on 
the status of electric utility restructuring. Among its most important tasks is to determine 
(near the end of the four-year transition period) whether or not effective competition exists 
for small customers and to make recommendations regarding the need for additional 
consumer protections. The TAC is also empowered to make recommendations regarding 
the universal system benefits program.
The TAC consists of eight legislators (balanced by house and party, but selected by 
Republican leadership), seven gubernatorial appointees, and five others. In addition to 
meetings of the full TAC, several subcommittees (USBP, education, PSC liaison, etc.) 
formed and met throughout the first interim. The TAC has fallen under criticism as a venue 
for resolving issues of concern to opponents of deregulation. They charge that the TAC: 1) 
is powerless in that it can only make recommendations, 2) performs functions more 
properly carried out by the PSC, and 3) is biased, as all of its voting members (the eight
131 Mike Dennison, “Is Montana a bold pioneer or guinea pig?” GFT. 22 February 1998.
132 Guest editorial by Bob Anderson and Bob Rowe, “Consumers must be protected,” IR, 
6 April 1997.
133 MCA 69-8-501.
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legislators) voted in favor of SB 390. Based on these points, environmental, senior citizen, 
and labor groups staged a walk-out of the TAC in April 1998 (see Chapter 6).
SB 390 Amendments and Passage 
In the end, despite the tight time schedule, proponents succeeded in ushering their 
bill through the statehouse, but not without first undergoing a lengthy amendment process. 
Before passing out of the Senate Tax Committee on March 21, approximately 75 changes 
were approved, including an extension of the rate moratorium from 2 to 4 years which was 
one of the amendments Governor Racicot had made a condition for his support. ̂  34 
another amendment, universities succeeded in getting special language to combine their 
loads to qualify as a large customer. 135 this committee, only Republican amendments
passed. 136
On the Senate Floor, one important amendment, which was offered by Sen. Barry 
Stang (D-St. Regis), would have established a range for the USBC between 2.4 and 3%, to 
be determined by the PSC (in the case of lOUs) or by a co-op’s governing board. 137 a
slight improvement, this amendment made it conceivable that utilities like MPC would 
support public benefits programs more generously. After failing in the Senate, this 
amendment was later offered by Rep. Joe Quilici (D-Butte) in an effort to gain 
environmental support for the bill. Yet because of the bill’s other flaws, and the failure of
134 See MCA 69-8-211. While in general the amendment strengthened the rate 
moratorium, it also added a number of exceptions to it. The first two years of the rate 
moratorium applies to all charges, while the second two years applies to energy supply costs 
only. Rate increases were in fact filed in 2000 for energy deliveiy costs. An MPC official 
described the increase as a “catch-up filing.” Presumably this did not mean that the 
company was recouping all the savings customers acquired under the rate moratorium over 
the preceding two years, a situation which would run seriously counter to the spirit o f the 
rate moratorium. Charles S. Johnson, “MPC requests rate hike,” IR, 12 August 2000. 
Mike Dennison, “Panel amends, endorses utility bill,” GFT. 22 March 1997.
Charles S. Johnson, “Utility bill sparks debate,” IR, 14 March 1997.
135 MCA 69-8-103 (6). Jan Falstad, “Utility choice bill debated,” BG, 5 April 1997.
136 Charles S. Johnson, “Panel clears utility deregulation,” IR, 22 March 1997.
137 Guest editorial by Bob Anderson and Bob Rowe, “Consumers must be protected,” IR, 
6 April 1997.
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this amendment to create a solid 3%, environmental interests were unswayed When
these interests honestly told the committee that although they supported the amendment it
was not enough to gain their endorsement of the bill, the amendment promptly failed J  39
In a disingenuous political move, environmentalists were later accused of killing the 
amendment.
The House Appropriations subcommittee considered an additional battery of 
amendments, rejecting dozens of consumer-oriented changes proposed by Representatives 
David Ewer and John Cobb (R-Augusta), One exception was a change (that was approved) 
to remove a possible barrier to aggregators. Another amendment (one of the few that MPC 
indicated it could live with) to eliminate the open-ended definition of transition costs (“costs
that include but are not limited to”) failed on a tie vote. All in all, 51 of 216 drafted 
changes were adopted.
One amendment that did pass changed the low-income USB allocation from an 
exact value of 17% (of the 2.4%) to a minimum of 17% (although low-income 
weatherization was brought under this category). Environmentalists were concerned that a 
utility could conceivably spend all of its USB monies on low-income, and none on 
conservation (other than the conservation represented by low-income weatherization) or 
renewables. In response to this concern. Representative Ewer attempted to amend the bill, in 
both the Senate and the House, to designate specific allocations for the different categories 
of public purposes (as had the regional review), thereby preventing infighting between these
interests.
138 Note too that this amendment would have perpetuated the patchwork system of costs 
and benefits that currently characterizes public benefits programs.
139 In an earlier press conference, they had opposed the bill even when the figure was still 
at 3%. Charles S. Johnson, “Enviros say new utility law ‘sweetheart’ deal for MPC, ” IR, 
14 February 1997.
140 MCA 69-8-103.
141 Many of the unsuccessful amendments were tried again on the House Floor on April 
15, all with the same result.
142 MCA 69-8-402. Collins, "Comprehensive Review," 23.
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The final legislative history of the major votes taken on SB 390 is as follows;
Date Action For Votes Against Votes
March 8, 1997 Introduced
March 26, 1997 Passes Senate 36 (32 R, 4 D) 14 (2 R, 12 D)
April 16, 1997 Passes House amended 78 (63 R, 15 D) 21 (1 R, 20 D)
April 18, 1997 Senate approves changes 35 (31 R ,4 D ) 15(3 R, 12 D)
May 2, 1997 Signed into law 143
143 The legislative journals can be found on-line at; http;//statedocs.msl.state.mt.us/ 
Charles S. Johnson, “The passing of SB 390; One year after enactment, sparks still fly 
over utility act,” IR, 3 May 1998.
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CHAPTER 3 
CONSUMER ISSUES
The question of how Montana’s move to deregulate its electric utilities will affect 
small business and residential customers is enormously complex, and controversial. The 
range of potential consequences is staggering. While changes in price, customer service, 
and reliability might be expected (whether positive or negative), other implications are less 
obvious. Consumer advocates have expressed concern over a host of issues including 
impacts on privacy, taxes, customer education, economic development, and the potential for 
fraud. In addition, low-income customers have special concerns regarding universal service
and disconnection policies. 1 When Montana Power Company announced that it planned to
sell its generation properties, the debate further expanded to include questions of local 
control, water rights, and recreational opportunities (see Chapter 6).
As discussed in earlier chapters, deregulation holds the promise of lower rates, 
increased service options, spurred innovation, and increased system efficiency. But whether 
these benefits will in fact materialize for small or rural customers is a valid and important 
question, and one that critics argue should have been definitively answered before plunging 
forward. Part of their hesitancy was a natural suspicion toward any proposal championed 
principally by MPC and its large industrial customers. But their concern was also based on 
parallels drawn from other industries, where deregulation has failed to deliver (or to deliver 
in an equitable fashion) benefits promised to consumers. The central problem, they pointed 
out, is that deregulation does not necessarily lead to meaningful competition. Mergers and 
acquisitions can lead to a few large, powerful players that effectively control the market 
despite the best intentions of antitrust laws. Even if markets do develop for some customers 
in some areas, others (often those that live in less populated areas) may be deprived o f any
* Unfortunately, the scope of this paper did not allow a full treatment of many of these 
worthy topics, particularly low-income issues. Tax impacts are discussed in Chapter 6, 
under “HB 174 — Revise Taxation of Utilities.”
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real benefits. Even assuming that these markets do become generally accessible, the ability 
of M ontana’s residential customers to save money on their energy bills (especially in the 
short term) remains a subject o f fierce debate. Concerns over “slamming” and other types 
of fraudulent behavior, as well as objections to dinnertime solicitation phone calls, also
pervade the discussion.^ While deregulation will likely present consumers with new
opportunities, it will also bring new risks and responsibilities that deserve at least as much 
consideration.
Existence of Markets 
The most pressing concern from the small-customer perspective is that deregulation 
will lead not to robust competition, but instead, to an unregulated monopoly (or its oligopoly 
equivalent). A common comment overheard at the legislature was that “you can deregulate 
an industry, but you can’t legislate the growth of a market.” Or in other words, “You can 
build it, but they won’t necessarily come — there’s a fundamental difference between a 
marketplace and a market.” More than just pessimistic nay-saying, such comments 
reflected an attitude of genuine concern. Unfortunately, specific circumstances in Montana 
make such less-than-ideal scenarios plausible, if not likely. Montana’s low population and 
rural character render it fundamentally less attractive to energy providers than other potential 
markets. Low volume and high transaction costs that characterize the residential customer
business make for small profits.^ Bill Drummond of Western Montana G&T put it this 
way, “Given the meager margins associated with selling power to small users of electricity 
and the experience in other states where residential customers have had limited, if any, 
choices, it is not clear that the benefits of retail competition will filter down to these 
customers. Add the high cost of marketing in a largely rural state like Montana and it [is]
hard to see how any competitors can beat the existing incumbent u t i l i t y T h i s  is in
2 AP, “PSC commissioners disagree on effects of electrical deregulation,” GFT. 9 April
1998.
3 Mike Dennison, “Montana observers weigh impact of power marketer’s failure to lure 
Californians,” GFT. 23 April 1998. Mike Dennison, “Critics slam company for quitting 
sale of electricity,” GFT, 28 August 1998. Smeloff, 160, 164.
Drummond, "The Small Customer Buying Cooperative," 23.
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addition to the standard market barriers that must always be overcome whenever 
deregulating an industry. Incumbent utilities, for example, enjoy many advantages over 
would-be competitors, including name recognition and market share if they remain the 
default provider. If a competitive market fails to develop for these smaller customers, they 
could end up purchasing power from a monopoly provider, but without the protections of 
the PSC. In the absence of vigorous competition, none of the promised benefits of 
deregulation will appear. Instead, prices, inefficiencies, and fraudulent activity could all 
increase.
During the 1997 legislative session, a major criticism of SB 390 was that it 
contained no “off-ramp” mechanism in the event markets failed to develop. Consumer 
advocates argued for a market test -  a trial period to see if companies would in fact offer 
their services to small customers. In fact, MFC’s working draft did contain such a 
provision as late as January 20 (1997), but it was stripped out and converted to a pilot 
program using language provided by the Large Customer Group (LCG) representing the
state’s large industrial c o n s u m e rs .^  At that point, deregulation under SB 390 became a
foregone conclusion. No longer was the bill interested in determining “whether sufficient 
markets and bargaining power exist to the benefit of smaller customers” but only “the best 
means to encourage and support the development of sufficient markets and bargaining
power for the benefit of smaller customers.”^ If it is found that viable markets do not exist,
customers are not to be returned to the protections offered by regulation. Instead, the 
interim committee is to recommend “the best means to further encourage the development
of customer choice and meaningful market access for the benefit of smaller customers.”^ 
The argument was that failing to commit wholeheartedly to competition would in fact 
discourage businesses from setting up shop here, leading to the very situation opponents
5 Pilot programs are discussed in MCA 69-8-104.
6 Don Quander, “Proposed Revisions / Comments to the 1/20/97 DRAFT by LCG,” 23 
January 1997, 6.
^ Don Quander, “Proposed Revisions / Comments to the 1/20/97 DRAFT by LCG,” 23 
January 1997, 33. MCA 69-8-501.
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feared — the absence of robust markets.^ An amendment to grant the PSC continued 
authority for small-customer rate regulation in the absence of competition was offered, but 
rejected.^ The final version of SB 390 allows the PSC to postpone deregulation for small
customers if there is no workable competition, but only for two additional years. The 
PSC cannot break up a utility, or return customers to a regulated environment.
Aggregation
Proponents of deregulation argue that even if such worst-case scenarios — in which 
small customers have little or no market clout — come to pass, the market may itself deliver 
an adequate remedy. A niche will have developed for a new service to be performed -- that 
of assembling (or “aggregating”) small customers into larger buying groups that can act 
more effectively in the market. Aggregators will be able to save customers money by
pooling their purchasing power together and tapping into various economies of scale. ̂  ^
Not only will they have access to wholesale power rates and a greater variety of sellers, they
will potentially see reduced transaction costs and a simplified buying process. 12 a  single
trustworthy and knowledgeable aggregator can take the guesswork out of complicated 
purchasing decisions for thousands of customers, while providing them with a ready 
response to any unwanted telephone solicitors. Ironically, aggregation can be just as useful 
in a highly competitive retail market as in a stagnant one, although the benefits may differ.
8 A similar argument is also used against what industry representatives consider to be 
excessive and burdensome proposals for customer protection and environmental disclosure 
rules. They contend that labeling and other requirements would discourage companies that 
would otherwise be interested in serving Montanans. See Chapter 5.
^ Mike Dennison, “Senate [sic] panel powers up electric deregulation bill,” GFT. 11 April 
1997.
According to PSC commissioners Anderson and Rowe, “economists say at least five 
companies, with no one company having the lion’s share of the market,” are required for 
workable competition. Guest editorial by Bob Anderson and Bob Rowe, “Consumers must 
be protected,” IR, 6 April 1997. Elsewhere, Bob Rowe has defined effective competition as 
“multiple firms with no firm or group of firms having significant market power, resulting in 
a market structure that does not produce an upward effect on prices.” Bob Rowe, 
“Comments on DEQ draft electric paper,” 3 December 1996, 2.
11 Smeloff, 91, 160.
12 Smeloff, 159.
63
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Aggregation provides protection from nonexistent markets, ease of mind in frenzied 
markets, and cost savings in both.
Aggregators may appear in many different forms, from local governments to private 
businesses. Ironically, small customers may encounter the same frustrations attracting the 
interest of private aggregators as they do with energy supply companies. Aggregators 
interested in making a profit will initially direct their attention to larger customers who want 
to acquire still greater market presence. Local governments have several advantages. They 
can combine their own load (street lighting, water treatment, government buildings, etc.) with 
those of their citizens. They are also “publicly accountable, non-discriminatory, non-profit, 
subject to open meeting and ethics laws, and oriented toward advancing economic 
development and the public interest." In short, they are a known quantity which, at least
in theory, is already working on behalf of its would-be electricity customers. In Montana, 
the League of Cities and Towns and the Montana Association of Counties have both taken
steps to play this role. 14 Montanans are also trying to establish a “Small Customer 
Buying Cooperative,” a novel concept discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
Some consumer advocates argue that aggregation is nothing new, that in fact all we 
are doing is reassembling what we Just took apart. And why should customers carry the 
burden of piecing back together what already existed, an aggregated load? “After all, it was 
the benefits of load aggregation that led to the utility monopoly service territories in the first
place.” 1^ And for the customers who were historically left out of that process, the rural
electric cooperatives performed a similar function. Hence, some consumer advocates insist 
that aggregation be recognized as a partial remedy of deregulation’s impact on small 
customers, rather than a newfound benefit. MPC itself acknowledged that small customers 
will have to band together to increase their market clout and “achieve sufficient electricity
13 Mazza, “How the Northwest Can Lead a Clean Energy Revolution,” An Atmosphere 
Alliance Special Report, 17.
14 Guest editorial by Gordon Morris of the Montana Association of Counties, “Giving 
consumers collective clout,” GFT. 21 November 1997.
15 Smeloff, 158.
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supply savings.” !^  In other words, aggregation should be seen more as a necessity than a 
perk.
Mergers
Because SB 390 looked like it would give MPC a continued strong customer base 
in Montana while getting out from under its debt, commissioner Anderson worried about 
the possibility of a corporate takeover. “Montana Power would become a prime target for a
large, multinational company to buy it out.” l^  There was little reason to imagine that
Montana would somehow be insulated from the rising tide of utility mergers that began
around 1 9 9 4 .
Mergers are portrayed by corporate executives as a means to increase efficiencies 
and reduce costs to the consumer. But this assumes that our antitrust laws’ safeguards 
against concentration of market power work perfectly. In reality, forecasting future market 
conditions, as conducted by FERC, the U.S. Justice Department, and the FTC, is an inexact
science. 1^ Their battle against the “fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, dishonesty, breach of
trust and oppression” discovered in this industry by the FTC during the Great Depression
is unfortunately far from over.^O Collusion, predatory pricing, and other anti-competitive
behaviors are always a threat. In recent times, lessons can be learned from other industries 
where “the urge to merge has overwhelmed the compulsion to compete.” Resources for 
the Future asserts that “most people are still waiting for lower phone rates and better
16 P. R. Corcoran of Montana Power Company, “Docket No. D97.7.90: Electric 
Restructuring Transition Plan Filing,” 1 July 1997, PRC 22.
1^ Mike Dennison, “Is SB 390 bonding plan boon to consumers or MPC?” GFT. 7 April 
1997.
18 Smeloff, 4, 150. One industry observer, Larry Geske of Energy West, later predicted 
that the U.S. would eventually be left with a mere 10 to 12 massive utilities. Wendy Raney, 
“MPC will need seed money to underwrite newest venture,” GFT. 29 March 2000.
1^ Brennan, 130.
Brennan, 23.
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service, while the nation’s telephone giants seem intent on trying to see which one can 
become the biggest the fastest.’’̂ !
Self-Dealing
Serious conflicts of interest can arise when a formerly vertically integrated utility 
wishes to participate in the energy commodity business (generation and retail sale) while 
still providing the regulated energy delivery service (transmission and distribution). This 
arrangement (designated by various terms such as “self-dealing,” “affiliate transactions,” 
and “favoritism”), gives the company’s energy supply arm a distinct advantage over its 
competitors. Even if a utility complies with the law by charging a competitor the same rate it 
charges itself for the use of its lines, it could extend preferential access to its affiliate in 
subtle ways. In addition to having to deal with the line losses associated with transmitting 
its power over a greater distance, it could face delays and interruptions.^^ A utility might 
service the transmission lines connecting to its own generators more regularly and 
competently than those connecting to competing facilities. Or the utility may be in a 
position to “preferentially dispatch” power generated by its own plants ahead o f that 
produced by its r i v a l s . I f  a company is involved in both regulated and unregulated
businesses, it could potentially (through creative accounting) cross-subsidize its competitive 
business by charging costs to its regulated business. In addition to the unfair advantage it 
creates on the competitive side, cross-subsidization burdens captive customers on the 
regulated side with phantom c o s t s . 2 4  Or maybe the unregulated division just has exclusive
access to certain types of market information held by its affiliate distribution company.
Such practices, although illegal, may be difficult to prevent. In addition to overt and illegal 
anticompetitive business practices, the deregulated utility will enjoy the “advantages of
21 Wall Street Journal, as quoted in an article by Mike Dennison, “Socialism at MPC? 
Well, sort o f ...,” GFT. 17 May 1998.
22 Brennan, 82.
22 Brennan, 92.
24 Smeloff, 98.
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incumbency” such as name recognition. Self-dealing and these other advantages are o f real
concern to both consumer advocates and to nonincumbent energy supply c o m p a n i e s . ^5
A number of possible remedies exist. First, laws can be passed and orders issued to 
establish ‘‘codes of conduct.” The effectiveness of this approach necessarily depends (as it 
does with all governmental regulation) on both the specifics of the provisions enacted 
(including the penalties for violations), and the specific agency’s ability and determination
to monitor and enforce the law.26 Second, the utility can be restructured to separate the
generation and delivery operations (a process known as “functional separation,”
“functional unbundling,” or “structural separation”) or required to choose which side of 
the business it wants to be in and sell off all unrelated assets (a process known as
“divestiture”).^^ An example of this latter, more aggressive approach was the breakup of 
AT&T in 1984.28 gg  390 required investor-owned utilities to functionally separate and 
also proclaimed that federal standards of conduct be complied with and that rules be issued 
by the P S C . 2 9  During the session, public interest groups unsuccessfully pushed for an 
amendment allowing the PSC to order divestiture “if the commission determines that the 
divestiture is necessary to avoid anticompetitive behavior.”20 The final version of the
legislation specifically denies that power.21 Co-ops deciding to enter the market have to set 
up separate for-profit corporations.22
25 Incidentally, it was to combat this same situation — the potential corruption that can result 
from companies participating in both regulated and unregulated businesses — that PUHCA 
was passed in 1935. Brennan, 82.
26 Smeloff, 145.
22 “The fact that ‘restructuring’ has come to be synonymous with expanding competition 
in the electricity industry underscores the prominence of these considerations.” Brennan, 
82.
28 Brennan, 82.
29 MCA 69-8-204.
20 Amendment offered to House Appropriations Committee by Rep. David Ewer, prepared 
by Larry Mitchell, 9 April 1997.
21 MCA 69-8-204.
22 MCA 69-8-309.
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Services
Although the electricity commodity market will likely be characterized by low 
growth and low profit margins, the energy services market could well experience significant 
growth and vibrant competition. Because companies may find it difficult to distinguish 
themselves on the basis of price, customer service and bundled services may attain greater 
relative importance.^3 “One nice thing about open access (to power) is it gives people the
chance to work with a supplier and be a little more customer focused.”34 Special products
for niche markets (such as a green power option or the sale of photovoltaic or fuel cell
systems) will likely become more common.35 Customers might choose between variable
rates, which track market prices, or fixed rates which would be more dependable but also 
probably more expensive over time. On the other side of the transaction, generation 
companies might desire more dependable income, and offer cheaper rates to customers who 
pay fixed amounts and to those who have longer-term contracts. Or companies and 
customers may wish to bracket prices, allowing for some variability within preestablished
limits.36 Other options may include price breaks for less reliable, off-peak, or interruptible
service; premiums for locally-generated power (supporting local industry and jobs); or
“community options” that donate proceeds to charitable causes.37 All one has to do is
look to long-distance to imagine the unending array of plans, services, incentives, and 
outright gimmicks that may soon descend upon the electricity business. Carving out a niche 
will become a key strategy in the survival of energy supply companies, as companies will 
likely not be able to offer price savings sufficient to get small customers to switch. 
Unfortunately, because of virtual deregulation, companies have been cutting the very
33 James E. Larcombe, “MPC plans for competition with customer service,” GFT. 16 July 
1997. Smeloff, 164.
34 Mike Dennison, “Energy ‘choice’ working for business and suppliers: Residential 
customers waiting, but it’s still not certain they won’t pay more,” GFT. 6 June 1999.
35 For a further discussion, see “Green Power” in Chapter 5. Smeloff, 164.
36 Brennan, 54, 57, 72.
37 Note that time-of-use rates (such as off-peak) can apply to time of year, time of day, 
weather conditions, economic business cycles, etc. Brennan, 56,71.
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programs that might have distinguished them from their competitors and ensured their 
survival.^S
Price
Consolidation of economic power, whether it be through a lack of competitors or 
through consolidation of competitors through mergers, can negatively impact consumers in 
a number of ways, frustrating most of the touted advantages of deregulation. Innovation 
could be stifled rather than fostered, customer service compromised, and reliability 
diminished. But the most commonly thought-of impact, and the most fiercely debated, is 
that on price.
The price question is, in many ways, the crux of the issue. Both sides rely heavily 
on price arguments to make their case and present widely varying predictions of 
deregulation’s impact. Supporters of deregulation contend that market forces will improve 
system efficiency, bringing about savings for all customers. Furthermore, regulatory costs 
will be lessened and companies will be subject to stronger incentives for cost-cutting (in 
addition to the less-tangible but nevertheless valuable benefits o f consumer choice,
innovation, etc.)39 Opponents commonly argue that Montana’s circumstances almost
guarantee price increases for small customers and businesses (which will in turn discourage 
economic development, reduce the tax base, etc.).
Under traditional “rate of return” regulation (also known as “cost-of-service” or 
“cost-plus” regulation), a utility commission sets prices to compensate the utility for all of 
its costs (provided they were determined to be prudent and “used and useful”), and to
provide a fair rate of return on invested capital -  the utility’s proft.^O With prices based
on utility costs, the only incentive to run an efficient operation comes from the oversight by 
the public utility commission. Any cost savings associated with an increase in efficiency are 
ultimately passed on to consumers and the utility gets no reward.*^ 1 Nor does the utility
38 Smeloff, 159-160, 164.
39 DEQ, "Restructuring the Electric Utility Industry in Montana,” 3.
40 DEQ, "Restructuring the Electric Utility Industry in Montana,” 7. Brennan, 34, 101.
41 Brennan, 4 ,43.
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always get penalized for inefficiencies, the costs of which are too often passed along by 
regulators either unwilling or unable to effectively do their job. But “doing a good job” 
incurs costs of its own, as “effective rate-of-return regulation requires that regulators exert 
considerable micromanagement of the operations of the utilities they regulate. It commits 
the government to a continuing need to investigate and audit the cost data reported by 
utilities, creating the potential for disallowances and protracted legal disputes.”42 While
there are alternative, incentive-based forms of regulation which can be implemented to 
address these concerns (by implementing profit-sharing plans or cost ceilings, for example), 
many look to competition as the most effective avenue for eliminating waste and reducing
prices.43 Competition can be too effective, however, when cost-cutting goes too far.
Utilities may sacrifice programs valuable to the public (as discussed under “Stranded
Benefits” in Chapter 2), pare down workforces, or cut comers on safety and re liab ility .^
To bolster the vision of deregulation’s price benefits, proponents of deregulation 
drew on comparisons with other industries. Fred Thomas, SB 390’s principal sponsor, 
argued, “There has not been an industry that has been deregulated or restructured where the
prices have not gone down.”45 M FC’s Jack Haffey agreed: “The likelihood is that as
competition blossoms, the prices are likely to go down. That’s happened in the railroad 
industry. That’s happened in the airline industry. That’s happened in all the industries that
have deregulated.”^^
But Don Judge of the AFL-CIO pointed out that even if deregulation brings about 
price reductions (or savings in the form of slower rate increases) “on average,” that doesn’t
necessarily translate into price reductions for homeowners or small businesses.47 In fact, it 
is widely accepted that whatever the benefits of deregulation, large customers will be in the
42 Brennan, 68.
43 Brennan, 9, 34,43, 69.
44 Smeloff, 96.
45 Mike Dennison, “Consumer advocates to line up against utility restructuring bill,” GFT. 
13 March 1997.
46 Jan Falstad, “Utility choice bill debated,” BG, 5 April 1997.
47 Mike Dennison, “Future cost of power still in the dark,” GFT, 14 March 1998.
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best position to take advantage of them. Conversely, whatever the drawbacks of 
deregulation, small and rural customers will in all likelihood suffer disproportionately. This 
situation poses a serious equity question, one recognized by both the PSC and the Racicot 
Administration in their separate Electricity Restructuring Principles. Among the 
administration’s three governing principles (which were issued on January 15, 1997), was 
the statement, “Legislation should provide that all electricity customers in Montana share in 
the benefits from a restructured industry.” The PSC had virtually identical language, and 
both parties were apparently of the opinion that SB 390 ultimately satisfied that goal, a level 
o f confidence not universally shared.
Opponents feared that deregulation would result in higher electricity bills for 
Montana’s small customers.'^^ In addition to the concern over markets developing, they 
predicted that under deregulation Montana would lose control of its low-cost power. At the 
time of SB 390’s passage, Montana’s residential rates were the sixth lowest in the nation, 
thanks to abundant and affordable native energy resources (hydro and coal).49 The fear is
that as a national marketplace develops, the resulting price of electricity will gravitate 
somewhere between the current high and the current low — a process known as
homogenization.50 That deregulation more clearly benefits the citizens of high-cost states
is evidenced by the enthusiasm with which states have embraced these changes. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, a fairly strong correlation (with the notable exception of Montana) 
between state residential prices and date of legislative or administrative action can be seen in 
Appendix B. Because of this potential for what one consultant termed “a massive shifting
48 In recognition of these concerns, SB 390 did include a rate moratorium consisting of a 
two year freeze on customers’ power bills (July 1, 1998 - June 30, 2000), and an additional 
two year freeze on the energy commodity portion of customers’ bills (July 1, 2000 - June 
30,2002). MCA 69-8-211.
49 At the time of the legislature, the most recent Energy Information Administration (U.S. 
Department of Energy) price data was from 1995. That price data is included in Appendix 
B, and shows Montana to have the sixth cheapest residential rates (tied with Wyoming).
50 While the resulting commodity price may well be below the current average (because of 
increased system efficiencies and the removal of “historic sunk costs” to other areas of 
customers’ bills), it could still be higher than what Montanans are used to paying. DEQ 
writes that “all states, including Montana, could see lower power costs if the cost of new 
gas fired generation stays around 20-25 mills.” But this is an assumption environmental 
and consumer advocates are not at all comfortable accepting. DEQ, "Restructuring the 
Electric Utility Industry in Montana,” 12.
71
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of costs from high-cost areas to low-cost areas,” some feel that direct access in states like 
Montana should be limited to the large customers for whom it makes sense (even though
this reasoning controverts the restructuring principle mentioned above).^ ̂
In the paper it presented to the 1997 legislature, the Department o f Environmental 
Quality pointed out that while “some fear that the value of low-cost power generated in 
Montana will be ‘bid up’ by larger markets elsewhere in the region . . . current market 
prices in the Northwest are well below the cost of ‘low-cost’ Montana electricity 
s u p p l i e s . ” 5 2  The argument here is that homogenization, to the extent that it is a real effect,
works in favor of Montanans who otherwise would be locked out of cheaper regional 
power. This point is well taken, as the Pacific Northwest included three of the five states 
with lower rates than Montana in 1995 (Washington, Oregon, and Idaho), which makes it 
the lowest-cost region in the nation.^2 Incidentally, a fourth neighbor, Wyoming, was listed
as having the same price as Montana.^4 However, direct access would plug Montana into
yet larger regional or even national markets that do in fact have higher prices.^^
Another way to look at this potential dilemma is that Montana’s energy resources 
can be sold at a greater profit in higher priced markets characterized by larger and more 
influential populations who are accustomed and able to pay more than Montanans for their
electricity.56 Representatives Bob Raney (D-Livingston) and Jon Ellingson (D-Missoula)
saw deregulation (and M FC’s subsequent sale announcement) in terms of M ontana’s 
historic role as a resource colony; “Once again, Montana will be selling its exports cheap
AP, “Consultant: No question electric deregulation will raise rates,” GFT. 8 May 1998.
52 DEQ, "Restructuring the Electric Utility Industry in Montana,” 3.
53 Smeloff, 79, 144.
54 Again, see Appendix B.
55 Robert G. Miller (AP), “State taking the slow approach,” Missoulian. 6 October 1996.
56 The likelihood that this scenario will occur is potentially increased by the sale o f M FC’s 
generation facilities to an out-of-state company (see Chapter 6). Before the sale was 
finalized, one consultant estimated the chance for rate increases if the properties were sold to 
outside interests at 95%. AP, “Engineer: Electric rates likely to go up with MFC plants 
sale,” IR, 20 February 1998.
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and paying dearly for its imports. Choice under these circumstances is hardly a benefit.”^^
But Judi Johansen of Avista Energy (and now BPA Administrator) argued that Montana 
will always be somewhat isolated from higher energy prices. Transmission costs and
bottlenecks place a limit on the quantity of Montana power that can be exported.^^
In an attempt to resolve these differences. Commissioner Bob Rowe, a nationally
recognized utility expert, had the following to say on homogenization:
Here’s how I summarize the dispute: A fundamental disagreement in the 
restructuring debate concerns whether merging a low cost state into a higher cost 
region will produce lower or higher prices for in-state customers, especially core 
customers. An economically sound view is that if the regional marginal price is even 
lower than the jurisdictional price, and if jurisdictional customers have access to the 
regional market, jurisdictional customers will benefit from lower prices. The 
opposing view is that the combination of demand-elasticity bidding up the maiginal 
price, transition costs associated with moving to competition, transaction costs, 
market imperfections and the opportunity for cost-shifts will result in higher prices
for at least some customers.^9
With deregulation, the market price is predicted to move toward the marginal price, 
or the price of producing one extra unit of power (the extra fuel required, for example). In 
other words, fixed costs which cover the up-front capital expenditures of power plant 
construction will no longer be included in the price of the electricity commodity (instead 
appearing as transition charges for “stranded costs’’ — see below for a further discussion). 
And new power plants, such as combined cycle gas turbines, have much lower initial start­
up costs than traditional fossil, hydro, or nuclear plants.^O
This marginal price, however, can be “bid up” for small customers by a process
known as Ramsey pricing. Small customers generally have a lesser ability than their
57 Guest editorial by Bob Raney, “W hat’s the rush with deregulating electricity?” BG. 29 
April 1998. Guest editorial by Jon Ellingson, “Power deregulation: Montanans losing 
their livelihood to benefit a few wealthy executives,” Missoulian. 28 April 1998.
Indeed, history has a way of repeating itself, at least when it comes to arguments over the 
destiny of Montana’s energy resources. In the 1970s, Montanans were attacked as “blue­
eyed Arabs” for depriving the rest of the nation cheap access to its coal. Malone, Montana: 
A Historv of Two Centuries. 397.
58 Mike Dennison, “Future cost of power still in the dark,” GFT. 14 March 1998.
59 Bob Rowe, “Comments on DEQ draft electric paper,” 3 December 1996, 5.
60 On the other hand, start-up companies must be able to recoup all of their costs 
eventually. Hence, their marginal price must be at least somewhat below market price if they 
are to make it, an unfortunate situation which could end up limiting competition. Brennan, 
101.
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industrial counterparts to adjust their consumption in response to price changes — their 
demand is relatively inelastic. If an energy supply company wishes to increase its profits, it 
is more efficient to do so by raising prices for those customers less able to curtail their
demand in response.^ ̂  Some predict that while such effects may indeed lead to price
increases in the short term, over time savings will be had by all customers.
Other arguments, predicting either price increases or decreases, are also commonly 
made. In its report to the legislature, DEQ tried to identify some of the potential risks, as 
well as benefits. The first concern was that of homogenization. The second, discussed at 
the outset of this chapter, was the observation that “if the Montana market is not attractive to 
marketers and aggregators, utility retail marketing subsidiaries will not face competition, and 
residential and small commercial consumers may see higher prices reflecting abusive market 
power.” Moreover, “if competitive markets are significantly riskier for investors than the 
traditional utility arrangements, the cost of capital will rise, investors will want shorter 
payback periods, and the cost of power from new power plants will go up.” Finally, small 
customers could see rate increases resulting from the elimination of what some consider 
historic subsidies from large customers (that even though prices have been lower for large 
customers, they have not been low enough to reflect the full discrepancy in cost-of-service 
between these customer classes).
Some supporters of deregulation concede that because of such factors the potential 
savings for small customers may be modest. M FC’s Perry Cole and Flathead Electric’s 
Warren McConkey, for example, both acknowledged that deregulation may only lessen the 
size or frequency of rate increases for Montana’s small customers rather than produce 
actual rate cuts. John Bushnell of the Montana Consumer Counsel said that some industry
61 Personal telephone conversation with Commissioner Bob Rowe, PSC, 10 July 2000. It 
should be noted that this phenomenon is not a new one, having long been attempted by 
regulated utilities. This strategy would only be effective under a zero- or limited- 
competition scenario.
62 d EQ, "Restructuring the Electric Utility Industry in Montana,” 3.
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experts expect rate hikes as power surpluses in the Northwest to evaporate (a prediction 
which was proven correct in the Sununer of 2 0 0 0 ) . 6 3
It is also important to note that there is a significant difference between bills and 
rates. The price of the electricity commodity (or the “rate”) may only account for a third or 
less of a customer’s bill (in which case a promised savings o f 30% by an energy supply 
company may really only save you 10% off your total bill). So even if deregulation ends up 
reducing rates, bills could remain constant, or potentially even increase due to other charges, 
such as those for stranded costs (see below).^4
So for small customers in the Pacific Northwest including Montana, the chances for 
significant price savings under deregulation appear slim. And few customers are likely to 
switch suppliers without some kind of real price incentive. To establish a foothold, energy 
supply companies must overcome a certain amount of inertia. Matching the price eurrently 
paid by customers is not good enough. Instead, they must be able to beat it by a significant 
margin, not an easy task in low-cost states like Montana. Few companies are likely to try, 
and without a vigorous market prices are not likely to drop. This reality underscores the 
fact that in the Northwest, the push to deregulate has come not from small business and 
residential customers, but instead from the only likely recipients of reduced prices, the large
industrial c u s t o m e r s . 6 5  For the rest of us, the words of Congressman Jim McDermott (D-
Washington) may well be prophetic: “Every analysis I’ve seen so far shows our costs are
going to go up. Every analysis I ’ve seen shows that we lose.”^^
Cost-Shifting
Central in the discussion of the price impacts of deregulation is the term “cost- 
shifting,” which can refer to a number of different situations under which restructuring
63 Bob Anez (AP), “Deregulation’s impact on rates cloudy,” IR, 14 March 1998.
DEQ, "Restructuring the Electric Utility Industry in Montana,” 4, 9. Smeloff, 151, 164.
AP, “High demand, low supply mean astronomical prices for energy,” GFT. 30 June 2000.
64 Bob Anez (AP), “Deregulation’s impact on rates cloudy,” IR, 14 March 1998.
Smeloff 78, 83, 93. The distinction between bills and rates is also important when 
considering investments in conservation, as discussed under “Decoupling” in Chapter 5.
65 Smeloff, 125.
66 AP, “Action on deregulation likely won’t happen this year,” IR, 16 January 1998.
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leads to a new (and not always intentional) allocation of costs. One example, already 
discussed above, is the geographic shifting of costs from high to low-cost states as regional 
price variability diminishes.
Perhaps the most commonly thought-of example is cost-shifting between customer 
classes. As mentioned above, under regulation industrial customers claimed to have partly 
subsidized rates for small commercial and residential customers. Deregulation would tend 
to eliminate any such subsidies, thereby entailing a shifting of costs from large customers to 
small customers (however justifiable this may be). On the other hand, with increasing 
frequency utilities have been granting special deals to large customers in anticipation of 
deregulation. High-cost utilities in particular have used this strategy to obtain long-term 
contracts with these valued customers before the onset of deregulation (making this 
phenomenon yet another instance of virtual deregulation). “What these exclusive and 
sometimes undisclosed bilateral contracts have done is shift costs from the large energy
users to other customer classes that don’t have as much political or market leverage.”^^
The competitive electricity package offered by MFC to ASiMI (as discussed in Chapter 2) 
is a good example. It should be noted, however, that such deals still required the approval of 
the public utility commission. Once deregulation hits, many fear that large customers with 
their superior buying power will essentially have first access to the nation’s low-cost power, 
leaving small customers with the remaining more expensive power. Energy supply 
companies may be so interested in landing those accounts that they will offer them below- 
cost power, financed on the backs of their smaller customers — either directly through 
expensive power, or indirectly, through diminished quality of service.
DEQ also reported that “utilities are worried about shifting of cost responsibility 
for the sunk costs of the existing transmission system. . . . Utilities are trying to come up 
with pricing methods to avoid the costs of other utilities being shifted to their own 
customers. Nevertheless, in the long run it probably is not possible to protect against some 
degree of differential cost increases.”^^ The question is how to ensure that the companies
67 Smeloff, 151.
68 DEQ, "Restructuring the Electric Utility Industry in Montana,” 11-12.
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that make use of the transmission lines adequately compensate those who originally paid for 
them.
A final manifestation might be termed environmental cost-shifting.^^ For example, 
if Montana were to increase its production at its coal-fired power plants in order to sell low- 
cost electricity to out-of-state markets, the resulting environmental impacts would all be 
borne locally while the benefits of the electricity would principally flow elsewhere.
Stranded Costs
A full understanding of the economic impact of deregulation on consumers is 
incomplete without a discussion of stranded costs. The stranded cost issue is at once
important (with an estimated $200 billion at stake nationally), and mystifying.^^ Getting a 
sense of what stranded costs are, let alone what to do with them, is something of a challenge. 
In general, the term “stranded costs” refers to any of a utility’s past investments that are 
rendered uneconomic by the move to competition. These investments can take a number of 
different forms. In the past, utilities paid for capital-intensive projects such as the 
construction of power plants over time, using funds collected from customers’ electricity 
bills. But with deregulation, customers might escape their share of these charges by simply 
choosing an alternate energy supplier. Upon opening their service areas to competition, 
utilities will experience an initial decline in customer numbers, leaving the utility at least 
partially “stranded” with its own debt. Stranded cost recovery is the mechanism by which 
utilities would continue to collect these costs from their historic customers, independent o f a 
consumer’s choice of energy company. In other words, regardless of whether customers 
stay with their traditional utility or choose an alternate supplier, they will continue to pay for 
their former utility’s historic costs unless they physically move out of its service area — of 
course, they will continue to pay the utility anyway for energy delivery services. These 
costs will be paid off over the course of a few decades.
Stranded costs can also arise from utility-owned generation assets (even those
69 A section devoted to this topic, “Regional Environmental Cost-Shifting,” is found in 
Chapter 5.
^0 Brennan, 13.
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already paid for) that simply cannot compete on the open market.^ ̂  As mentioned earlier,
under “cost-plus” regulation, rate recovery for utility construction projects included: 1) 
cost of labor and supplies, 2) debt service, and 3) a profit for the company (a return on 
shareholders' investment). In other words, utilities could be confident not only that their 
costs would be met, but that they would receive a profit. Under true competition, no such 
guarantees exist. If a company produces power at a cost greater than market price, it will 
lose customers and potentially be forced to decommission its inefficient power plants. This 
scenario, if realized, could present an important environmental benefit of deregulation since 
inefficient plants are also generally heavily polluting plants (see “Decommissioning” in 
Chapter 5). But utilities argue that such plant closures would be economically disastrous 
and that they should receive external support to keep these plants competitive. Stranded 
cost recovery can therefore also be thought of as a subsidy amounting to the difference 
between power production costs and market price (assuming the former is greater than the 
latter).
Unlike such subsidies, other categories of stranded costs receive support from the 
environmental community as legitimate candidates for recovery. Under PURPA, passed by 
Congress in 1978, utilities are required to purchase what usually turns out to be relatively
expensive power from “qualifying facilities” -  small alternative energy generators.^^ The
federal government forced utilities to enter into these contracts as a matter of public policy, 
to encourage domestic alternative energy sources. Utilities make a strong argument to be 
compensated for their unfulfilled contractual obligations with such companies.
Many utilities have themselves invested in conservation measures for their 
customers. For example, a utility might have purchased an energy-efficient appliance for a 
customer with the expectation that the customer would pay the utility back over time with the 
savings achieved on his or her energy bill. Again, the utility was acting in the public interest 
and deserves compensation for the unpaid portion of its investment.
71 For example, in many parts of the country the term “stranded costs” is virtually 
synonymous with nuclear power plants (accounting for $70 billion of the nation’s $200 
billion in costs). In addition to the large unpaid debt resulting from the ubiquitous cost 
overruns during construction, utilities claim stranded costs from “above-market operating 
and maintenance costs.” Smeloff, 107, 171.
72 PURPA is also discussed in Chapter 5.
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National Perspective and General Theory 
The issue of stranded costs has assumed a great deal of prominence in the national 
debate over utility restructuring. In addition to the profound economic implications for both 
power companies and consumers, decisions regarding stranded cost valuation and recovery 
will hold important repercussions for other industries grappling with similar questions in 
the future. Similarly, participants in the stranded cost debate draw on parallels with other 
industries to illustrate their point through precedence, or the lack thereof. Opponents, for 
example, argue that the appeal for stranded costs in the electric utility industry is both 
unique and unfair. After all, stranded costs are really just “mon[ies] that ha[ve] been
invested that cannot be recovered” due to changes in the i n d u s t r y . I n  other sectors of the
economy, losses that come as a result of innovation and obsolescence are commonplace, and 
companies who suffer them are not compensated by their customers. It is this kind of 
argument, coupled with the sheer magnitude of costs involved, that leads some activists to 
consider cost recovery for electric companies “the most egregious example of ‘corporate
welfare’ in history.”^^
On the other hand, some argue that special circumstances were created by the 
history o f regulation that make a stronger case for stranded cost recovery in the case of 
electric utilities. The first argument is that utilities have not been adequately compensated 
for their risks. Regulated prices, the theory goes, do not respond as well to changes in risk
as market prices.^^ It is important to remember, however, that deregulation might have been
a foreseeable risk, and “to the extent that expansion of competition has been driven by 
changes in technology and demand, the utilities may have been in a better position to
forecast and insure against competitive risk than their regulators.”^^
Brennan, 97.
74 Charles Higley o f Public Citizen’s Critical Mass Energy Project, “Stop the Bailout; 
D on’t Charge Consumers for Utilities’ Past Mistakes,” 7 August 1997. A copy of this 
news release can be found at: http://www.citizen.org/CMEP/restructuring/Stop-bailout.html
75 Brennan, 98.
76 Recall from Chapter 2 that the trend toward increased competition really began more 
than 20 years ago with the passage of PURPA. Brennan, 104.
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The second major argument, according to the Washington, D C-based Resources 
for the Future, is that many of today’s stranded costs are grounded in policy initiatives 
imposed on utilities by legislative and regulatory mandates in years past, starting with the 
obligation to serve all customers, and continuing with “explicit decisions by state and 
federal regulators -  to discourage energy demand, to encourage renewable forms of 
electricity production, and to permit entry and competition.” But the group argues that 
these actions are still “not sufficient to warrant special policies to protect electric utilities.
Government programs routinely result in stranding costs throughout the economy.
Regulatorv Compact
And proponents of recovery insist that electric utilities are unique. The argument 
over whether governmental actions have entitled utilities to stranded costs hinges on another 
difficult question concerning the existence and nature of a “regulatory compact” between 
regulators and utilities. The idea behind this term is that federal and state governments have 
an obligation to ensure that utilities are compensated for their legitimate costs, in return for 
the utilities’ submission to regulation and their obligation to serve the customers in their 
territories. Opponents to recovery argue that even if such a compact existed, utilities long 
ago forfeited these rights through irresponsible investments in unneeded or over-priced
power plants.^^ After deregulation many of these assets will no longer be “used and
useful” (whether or not they ever were), and should therefore no longer be paid for by
c o n s u m e r s . ^ 9  The counter-argument, of course, is that the people already had their chance
to object to such expenditures through their public utility commission (which is an elected
body in Montana), and that approval of the projects implied full cost recovery for them.^O
And yet the situation becomes more subtle still. While a 1944 Supreme Court 
decision ruled that prices must be set to allow utilities a “just and reasonable return,” it can
Brennan, 98.
Brennan, 96, 102, 103.
Brennan, 101.
Brennan, 99.
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be argued the utilities have already been compensated for their risk.^l As the Montana
DEQ noted, “There are legal precedents that indicate the regulatory compact was not
intended to shield utilities from market risk.”^^ There were never any guarantees that the
regulatory system would endure forever, and it would have been foolish to assume so. 
Shareholders have already been handsomely rewarded — overly so, had their investments
been simply no-risk l o a n s .^3 stranded cost recovery shifts all the risk that investors
were compensated for to rate payers. Finally, the argument that utilities must be protected 
from decisions by the government which changed the rules on them rings rather hollow in
Montana, where it was the utilities themselves that championed the le g is la t io n .^ " ^
Ultimately, a satisfying resolution of the issue cannot be found in such debates: “Neither 
the implicit compacts between utilities and regulators nor explicit rules set by regulators
address directly the question of stranded-cost recovery.
Precedence
Just as important as the question of “fairness” when determining the amount and 
allocation of stranded costs are the economic implications of any proposed settlement. On 
the one hand, an overly generous award for utilities may set us up for similar future disputes 
in other industries, sending a message that companies “need not worry about the prospect
of future competition when planning and advocating investments.”^^ In many ways, 
stranded costs can be considered “a measure of inefficiency.” Allowing utilities to recover 
these costs rewards the companies with the greatest inefficiencies, giving them an unfair
advantage in the emerging competitive environment.^^ On the other hand, regulated
industries that require “large, fixed, irreversible, and long-lived investments” depend upon 
Brennan, 102.
82 DEQ, "Restructuring the Electric Utility Industry in Montana,” 7. Guest editorial by 
Bob Anderson and Bob Rowe, “Consumers must be protected,” IE, 6 April 1997.
83 Brennan, 104.
84 See Appendix A.
85 Brennan, 102.
86 Brennan, 104.
87 Smeloff, 107.
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industries that require “large, fixed, irreversible, and long-lived investments” depend upon 
capital from investors. Denying all cost recovery could set a similarly dangerous precedent 
which discourages investment in such enterprises. It is, however, difficult to imagine a 
future regulated industry (and certainly not the electricity industry) demanding the kind of
funds that have been absorbed by electric utilities in the past hundred years.^^
Technological and regulatory changes are freeing the electricity industry from its
dependence on such large-scale and long-term investments.^^
Size and Allocation
Most industry observers agree that there should be some sharing of stranded costs 
between rate payers and shareholders. It is not in the public interest for power companies to 
be run out of business (certainly not from the perspective of trying to foster competition), 
but neither should they receive a windfall.^® This still leaves a rather large gray area.
W hich categories of costs should be included? How should they be valued? Should the 
money that utilities collect be limited to their past costs, or should it also include costs plus 
profit? One area of agreement among consumer groups is that future costs, such as those 
associated with safety and environmental programs, should not be included. They are 
particularly insistent that utilities not be subsidized for conforming to the law. They argue 
that “treating future cost obligations, including capital upgrades, as stranded costs will only
delay a competitive market and create barriers for new market entrants.”^ 1
Another important question is what to do with positive stranded assets. If utilities 
are to be compensated for the uneconomic costs they were left with by regulation, should 
they not in turn compensate the rate payers for their economic assets? This approach of 
looking at both sides of the ledger is known as “netting,” and is an important consideration 
in Montana where low-cost power (particularly from dams) will prove highly valuable in a
88 Few if any industries are as capital intensive, with a single nuclear reactor costing as 
much as $5 billion. Smeloff, 2.
89 Brennan, 104.
90 Smeloff, 93.
91 Mazza, “How the Northwest Can Lead a Clean Energy Revolution,” An Atmosphere 
Alliance Special Report, 18.
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competitive market. One author writing about California put it this way; “For each utility, 
the transition costs are the combined above-market costs of all its assets, both economic and
u n e c o n o m i c . ”92 Another explained “Some utility assets may be worth more in an
increasingly competitive environment, and these gains should be counted against any
stranded-cost liability.”93
Although there is widespread agreement on the principle of sharing risk between 
shareholders and customers, there is no simple formula for striking this balance.
M ontana’s DEQ suggested that “utilities should try to mitigate stranded costs by 
renegotiating contracts, cost control, marketing efforts and other means. Recovery of 
stranded costs should be conditioned upon demonstration that such means were 
e x h a u s t e d . ” 9 4  While this is a fairly good description for the approach ultimately taken in
Montana, consumer advocates argued that it did not go far enough, that even though the 
costs had to be mitigated the utilities were still granted essentially full cost recovery. Had 
there been a more explicit sharing of costs (even if utilities only absorbed a small, but 
specific percentage), they would have had a stronger financial incentive to effectively 
mitigate those costs.95
Elsewhere, other attempts at a fair resolution of the stranded cost question have been 
made. In some states, cost-recovery is balanced with guaranteed rate reductions for
consumers.96 In Texas, a tradeoff was proposed whereby utilities could qualify for a
higher level of stranded cost recovery if they voluntarily divested their energy commodity
business from their energy delivery business.97
92 Smeloff, 94.
93 Brennan, 101.
94 DEQ, "Restructuring the Electric Utility Industry in Montana,” 7.
93 Jan Falstad, “Enron competes with MPC,” BG, 17 April 1997.
96 Bob M iller (AP), “House approves deregulation bill,” IR, 16 April 1997.
97 Smeloff, 137.
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Montana Perspective
To a large degree, the arguments made in Montana paralleled those made as part of 
the broader national debate. Here, as elsewhere, the stakes were incredibly large. MFC 
came to the session looking for roughly $1 billion in stranded costs, although the figure
was later reduced to around $800 million.^^ Consumer advocates (including large 
industrial customers) vigorously objected to such large figures, and argued that MFC had in 
fact little or no legitimate stranded costs if the positive value of their assets was taken into 
consideration. Montana’s low cost (and relatively environmentally benign) hydropower 
would certainly be of great value in a national marketplace.
MFC lobbyists employed essentially a three-pronged strategy in promoting SB 
390’s stranded cost recovery provisions. The first was that these costs were not new 
charges, but were old costs associated with projects already approved for recovery by
M ontana’s regulatory body and already in rates.^^ As such, they cannot increase bills for 
c o n s u m e r s .  100 This point was not disputed, nor did it imply any particular recovery
package. Mike Dennison of the Great Falls Tribune wrote, “Montana Power Co. 
spokespeople say the ‘transition charge’ will pay for assets that rate payers already pay for 
now, and that’s true. But the exact amount of this charge into the future remains to be seen,
for many variables come into p l a y . ’’ 1 0 1  i n  fact, no costs are stranded until restructuring
legislation is passed and until customers begin to leave the u t i l i t y .  1 0 2  in order to determine
stranded costs at the front end, as proposed by the legislation, future conditions such as the 
price of electricity must be estimated. Consumer advocates feared that by doing so, we 
would lock in a value for stranded costs based on erroneous predictions. If electricity prices 
rise faster than anticipated, assets that were forecast to become stranded may in fact turn out
Bob Miller, “Utilities urge passage of electric industry changes,’’ GFT. 14 March 1997.
99 Guest editorial by Bob Gannon, “All Montanans benefit from utility competition,’’ 
Missoulian. 14 April 1997.
100 GFT editorial, “W ho’ll pay M FC’s stranded costs?” GFT. 27 March 1997.
101 Mike Dennison, “Utility deregulation marches on, but some questions remain,” GFT. 
30 M arch 1997.
102 Note that the longer the move to competition is delayed, the longer we pay down past 
debts under regulation leaving fewer costs that could ultimately be considered stranded.
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to be quite valuable The utility would have been compensated for losses it never 
incurred. Similarly, if the utility enjoys a high level of customer retention (which may be 
likely due to the various “advantages of incumbency” and the possibility o f relatively
sparse competition), the stranding of costs is a somewhat curious n o t io n .  1^5 if  customers
theoretically have “choice” but in reality do not (through lack of competition), then there 
really are no costs that have been stranded — the utility still has all of its historic customers. 
It could well be a wash for consumers if the money they saved by going to market-based 
rates goes back to the utility as a separate stranded costs charge. Utilities, on the other hand,
would receive a distinct benefit — a lump sum, up-front payment covering all the costs.
Consumer advocates objected that giving the incumbent utility such a huge infusion of cash 
with essentially no strings attached could have severe negative consequences. For one, the 
utility could gain an unfair advantage in the energy supply business, perhaps acquiring the
means to buy up other potential competitors. 107 Furthermore, awarding the utility at the
outset makes it difficult or impossible to adjust stranded costs later on. So while stranded 
costs mostly reflect charges already seen in rates (although some are new, such as sizable 
legal costs associated with the process of restructuring), there is significant dispute over the
103 Certainly, there is precedence for incorrect price forecasts. The QF stranded costs exist 
partly because avoided costs set in the early 1980s were based on estimates of oil prices that 
were too high. See Chapter 5 for a discussion of avoided costs. Smeloff, 80.
104 Utilities that continue to operate in the competitive energy supply business as well as 
the regulated energy delivery business enjoy a number of advantages over would-be 
competitors. These can include name recognition, one-stop shopping, and designation as 
the default supplier — the supplier for those who “choose not to choose.”
105 It is true, however, that MFC’s large customers were in fact eager and willing to leave, 
and to take with them their equally large share of sunk costs.
106 See the section below on transition cost financing.
107 Charles Higley of Public Citizen’s Critical Mass Energy Project, “Stop the Bailout: 
D on’t Charge Consumers for Utilities’ Past Mistakes,” 7 August 1997. A copy of this 
news release can be found at: http://www.citizen.org/CMEP/restructuring/Stop-bailout.html
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wisdom and fairness of automatically allocating these costs to customers in a competitive 
environment. 108
The second argument used to bolster stranded cost recovery as laid out by SB 390 
had to do with government mandates. According to the utilities, not only were their past 
investments made in good faith with a reasonable expectation for a return, some of them 
were made simply to comply with laws and regulations. In other words, not only did the 
government approve these costs, it required them. Examples include demand side 
management programs, qualifying facility contracts, and deferred taxes. 109 M FC’s Bob 
Gannon described it as follows: “Federal law required us to purchase power at rates that 
are much higher than would be sustainable in a competitive market. The government made 
us do it — we shouldn’t be forced to write off those costs; we didn’t want them in the first 
place.” ! 10 Many consumer advocates agreed with the Great Falls Tribune, which
considered it “legitimate for Montana consumers to cover stranded costs when utilities can 
show they made particular investments at the behest of regulators. But consumers 
shouldn’t be hit for poor investments that were the result of bad business decisions. The
utilities and their shareholders should be.” l 11 But here again, the distinction can be 
difficult to determine.
The third major argument proved extremely effective in convincing the legislature 
that Montana needed to move forward quickly with deregulation. It involved the fear that 
large customers would leave the system anyway, and without SB 390, there would be no
mechanism in place for capturing their share of stranded costs. 112 These costs would have 
to be shouldered by the remaining Montana customers, in the form of increased electricity 
bills. As a result, additional large customers would be tempted to leave the system, thereby
108 It should be noted that there is a more basic argument against the “already in rates” 
justification. Some costs were historically approved for recovery, but only in the face of 
strong opposition from consumer advocates. In other words, although those costs were 
indeed already in rates, they perhaps never should have been and were in some sense forced 
upon rate payers.
109 DEQ, "Restructuring the Electric Utility Industry in Montana,” 7.
110 Jim Ludwick, “MFC, competitors gear up for deregulation,” IR, 20 April 1997.
111 GFT editorial, “W ho’ll pay M FC’s stranded costs?” GFT. 27 March 1997.
112 Smeloff, 131.
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worsening the problem and creating a circular feedback or “death spiral.” While the 
argument was powerful, it was not entirely genuine, as it portrayed a limited range of 
options. While large customers leaving their stranded costs behind was indeed a potential 
problem, although perhaps a slightly exaggerated one, immediate passage of comprehensive 
deregulation legislation was not the only, nor necessarily the best, solution. As discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 6, opponents to deregulation felt that alternatives to SB 390’s 
comprehensive approach (such as using exit fees to capture large customers’ stranded costs, 
or the “dereg lite” approach ultimately taken by Oregon) were not adequately 
considered. 113
W hat SB 390 Did
The resolution of the stranded cost issue as specified by SB 390 was to grant 
utilities near full recovery of “net verifiable”(non-mitigatable) stranded costs, with the final 
determination of those costs left to the PSC. Critics charged that the legislature had 
abrogated its responsibility to find a fair balance for consumers. While utilities and large 
industrial customers secured tangible and immediate benefits — stranded costs, and access 
to lower prices respectively — benefits for small customers were distant and uncertain.
There are no guarantees that markets will develop, and therefore no guarantees that prices 
will drop, that services will flourish, or that customers will be able to exercise choice. SB 
390 does contain a 4-year rate moratorium and a limit allowing only 4 years’ worth of
generation-related stranded costs to be r e c o v e r e d .  ̂ MPC stressed that that provision
gave them “significant exposure for our generation costs after the year 2002,” estimated by
the company to exceed $300 million. MPC’s Bob Gannon also argued that those
claiming an unfair stranded cost burden for consumers ignored the requirement that costs
113 Guest editorial by Bob Anderson and Bob Rowe, “Consumers must be protected,” IR, 
6 April 1997. See Smeloff, 126, for a discussion of exit fees.
114 MCA 69-8-211.
113 Jan Falstad, “MPC chief fires back at deregulation critic,” BG, 17 April 1997.
MPC, “Legislature considers electric restructuring bill,” Montana Energy. April 1997.
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be legitimate and mitigated. 1 Even so, consumer advocates felt that the company should
have absorbed a definite and greater percentage of these costs, which would spur them to
more effective mitigation. ̂  The cost of the “competitive transition charge” to the
average Montana household was estimated to be $126 per year for the first four years,
falling to $63 afterward for the next sixteen. ̂
Note that the sale of M PC’s generation assets, announced in December 1997, 
largely alleviated concerns over stranded costs and radically altered the terms of the debate. 
These developments are discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
Transition Costs Financing 
In addition to the fierce debate over stranded costs, SB 390’s method of recovering 
those costs (found at MCA 69-8-503) also came under fire. This long and complex section 
describes a process whereby state-issued bonds would be sold and then paid off by 
customers over time. The proceeds would go directly and immediately to the utility. 
Proponents argued that the state-backed bonds would have a high rating that would allow 
consumers access to low interest rates (lower than the utility’s cost of capital), thereby
saving them money just as if they were refinancing their h o u s e .  ^
But opponents led by Rep. David Ewer, a bond officer at the State Board of 
Investments, were not convinced. The concern, as mentioned above, was that costs would be 
awarded before they actually become stranded, and also before we really know what they
116 Guest editorial by Bob Gannon, “All Montanans benefit from utility competition,” 
Missoulian. 14 April 1997.
11^ Jan Falstad, “Enron competes with MPC,” BG. 17 April 1997.
118 The competitive transition charge, or CTC, is the stranded costs charge and is divided 
into three categories. Approximately 25% of MPC’s costs are for obsolete hydro and 
thermal plants (CTC-HT). Another 25% encompasses the “regulatory assets” including 
conservation and deferred taxes (CTC-RA). The remainder accounts for above-market 
contracts with qualifying facilities (CTC-QF). The CTC is collected “at the meter” by the 
regulated distribution utility or “lines company.” Jan Falstad, “Electric-utility deregulation 
bill sparking controversy,” IR, 13 April 1997.
119 Jan Falstad, “Electric-utility deregulation bill sparking controversy,” IR, 13 April 
1997.
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will be. Mike Dennison of the Great Falls Tribune captured the argument using the
following lighthearted, if unflattering, analogy:
Let’s say you own a business that wants to unload $1 billion of debt on equipment 
that soon may be obsolete -  debt that currently is being paid off by your customers.
You’re a pretty smart guy, so you arrange to borrow most of the cash up­
front at a lower interest rate, pay off part of the debt, spend the rest of the money 
how you like, keep some of the equipment for your own use, just in case it’s worth
something — and still have the customers pay off the loan.’’^^®
Another argument was that locking in a value for stranded costs at this time could be 
particularly dangerous because of the current low energy prices. If these are assumed to 
remain low into the future, the stranded cost calculation could be quite high. Multiple 
amendments were offered by David Ewer to address these concerns. And while none of 
them were adopted, it did appear that some progress was made, particularly regarding the 
ability to “true up” the costs to respond to changing conditions.
Reliabilitv
Proponents assured legislators that SB 390 posed no reliability issues. They 
pointed out that reliability problems stem primarily from failures in the transmission or 
distribution systems, and because these functions will continue to be regulated reliability 
will be unaffected. Unfortunately, this argument does not capture the full range of potential 
impacts. With deregulation, the national electricity grid will be used in a radically different 
way. Coordination of power sales will need to take place at a much more sophisticated level 
to handle the complexity of a national retail electricity market and to “maintain the load
balances necessary to preserve the integrity of the nation’s electrical delivery system.” ̂ 21
Greater complexity and increased demand on at least some power lines could increase
congestion and threaten reliability of the s y s te m .  122 power outages around the country had
already been attributed to deregulation. Power “sources are more interdependent, so
120 Mike Dennison, “Is SB 390 bonding plan boon to consumers or MPC? ” GET, 7 
April 1997.
121 Brennan, 59.
122 Transmission lines have a finite capacity to deliver electrical energy. Exceeding this 
capacity results in a thermal breakdown which interrupts the flow of power. Brennan, 75.
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interruptions at pivotal points along the network create cascading blackouts” over greater
areas. 123
Furthermore, even though Montana’s poles and wires will continue to be regulated, 
relaxing governmental oversight on the generation side could increase the possibility for
error. 124 we have seen, cost-cutting as a result of competition can lead to work force
reductions and deferred maintenance which reduces the overall reliability of the system as a 
whole. There is also a concern (based on recent trends) that companies will lose interest in 
the energy supply business because of its low profit margins and high risk, and instead 
divert their attention to telecommunications or other ventures. Other observers fear that 
deregulation will select for generating facilities that are presently cheap to run, but not 
necessarily reliable over the long haul. An overreliance on natural gas combustion turbines, 
for example, could leave customers without power should prices spike, fuel become scarce, 
and companies fold. ̂  25
Another argument concerning reliability has to do with the demise of the vertically 
integrated utility (a single company performs the multiple functions of generation, high- 
voltage transmission, and local distribution). A guest editorial that appeared in the 
Missoulian asked, “What happens when each part of the system is operated by an 
independent company? A seam develops at each step and the seam will become a rift 
whenever there is trouble.” Disputes between the independent companies over 
responsibility for power outages could lead to lawsuits and rate increases. “When an 
electrical delivery problem happens, how long do you think it will take the several 
companies to get into action? That depends on how long it takes for them to agree which 
outfit is liable.” The pressure to minimize costs is a powerful incentive for shifting 
responsibility to another party. Communication and coordination simply cannot be as
efficient as they were within a single company. While it may make sense to clearly separate
123 Benjamin A. Holden, “Did Competition Spark Power Failures?” The Wall Street 
Journal. 19 August 1996.
124 Brennan, 2.
125 Guest editorial by Geoffrey Rothwell For The Los Angeles Times, “Trading reliability 
for low costs,” GEE, 15 July 1997. Already, natural gas prices are increasing over the lows 
seen in the mid-1990s. Mark Glyde, “Aluminum CEO Fueling Rush to Gas,” Northwest 
Energy Coalition Report. June 2000.
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the different functions of the electricity business from the standpoint of preventing anti­
competitive behavior, “that is exactly wrong if there is any intent to provide reliable service 
to the customer and quick response to trouble.”
As a final and interesting note, reliability was of sufficient concern to homeowners 
and businesses to cause a surge in purchases of renewable energy equipment as a protective
measure against power outages associated with the year 2000 “millennium b u g .”   ̂27
Preferential Treatment 
While issues such as stranded costs and reliability affect all consumers, advocates 
for Montana’s small residential and commercial customers took exception to multiple 
provisions in SB 390 which they described as preferential treatment for large customers. In 
addition to the universal system benefits charge exceptions granted to customers “with 
loads greater than 1,000 kilowatts” (discussed in Chapter 2, “Another Opposition 
Argument — Stranded Benefits”), opponents pointed to the transition schedule as violating 
a basic principle of fairness in r e s t r u c tu r in g .  128 The bill grants large industrial customers
the ability to choose an alternate energy supplier “on or before July 1, 1998.” While pilot 
programs were supposed to begin for small customers on that same date, those customers 
are not guaranteed “the opportunity to choose an electricity supplier” until July 1, 2002. 
This four-year headstart may adversely affect the ability of small customers to find 
affordable electricity, much of which may have already been locked up through contracts 
with large industrial customers. “Many may worry that ‘the big dog will eat first,’ 
theoretically leaving them, as small, individual electricity buyers, to scrape up the ‘leftovers’
of the market — higher, less stable prices and an unreliable s u p p l y . ” ^29 Even without such
a delay, small customers would have a difficult time competing with large, easily-served
126 Guest editorial by Donald E. Michels, “Utility Deregulation; Under new system, 
problems will be met with many layers o f bureaucracy,” Missoulian. 10 June 1998.
127 Written testimony of Tom Bishop, sales manager of Sunelco, “Senate/House Debate 
on the Net Metering Bill,” 9 February 1999. AP, “Y2K fears prompt residents to look into 
alternative energy,” GFT. 3 January 1999.
128 MCA 69-8-402.
129 Guest editorial by Gary Wiens, “Joining forces to buy electricity not exactly a new 
idea,” GET, 30 April 1998.
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industrial accounts for the attention of suppliers. According to Mark Palmer, a spokesman
for Enron, a California judge found staggered starting dates illegal. Arguing from a
position of desiring to compete for Montana customers. Palmer not surprisingly objected to 
certain elements o f SB 390:
I can tell you, in general terms, that it’s been our experience that any time a 
utility writes a bill, it’s overly friendly to utilities and not that friendly to consumers. 
Making consumers wait four years is unnecessary. If the consumers are going to 
have to pay for stranded costs, their return is that they get to shop for the best
supplier on day one of this bill going into effect. 130
Seemingly, one solution to the headstart issue is the “dereg lite’’ approach 
discussed in Chapter 6. This model grants “choice’’ to all customers at the same time, yet 
also recognizes that markets for small customers are still undeveloped. These customers 
receive a scaled-down version of choice (a menu with approximately four options), but 
remain aggregated and therefore retain significant buying power and protection from both 
cost-shifting and fraud. Just because direct retail access makes sense for large customers 
does not mean it makes sense for everyone. Dereg lite is the “third solution’’ that 
acknowledges that reality, while still allowing small customers the chance to share in some 
of the benefits of “choice.”
It should be noted that not everyone agrees that small customers would suffer from 
a delayed transition to choice. Roger Davis of the Montana DEQ considered this complaint 
a “red-herring,” particularly in Montana. He felt that because of Montana’s early move to 
deregulate and because of our low population, there would be plenty of cheap energy 
available for e v e r y o n e .  ^31 There are, of course, important considerations which demand a
somewhat conservative pace for introducing small customers to choice. Not only markets, 
but metering and billing technologies need a chance to develop, reliability must be ensured,
and customers need a chance to acclimate to the changes to avoid “ultimate c h a o s . ”  132
But the other option, of course, is to slow the pace of deregulation as a whole (which would
130 Jan Falstad, “Enron competes with MPC,” BG, 17 April 1997.
131 Personal conversation with Alan Davis, DEQ, December 1997.
132 Jim Ludwick, “MPC, competitors gear up for deregulation,” IR, 20 April 1997.
Bob Anez (AP), “MPC sketches plan for era of competition,” GFT. 24 December 1996.
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probably require exit fees, with some kind of true-up mechanism), until markets are proved 
extant for all customers.
A third major area where large customers obtained special language was that of 
stranded costs. One provision prohibits the collection of transition charges from “new or 
additional loads o f 1,000 kilowatts or greater that were first served by the public utility after
December 31, 1 9 9 6 .” 1^3 This language precludes any stranded cost payments by the
Advanced Silicon Materials (ASiMI) plant in Butte. The argument was that Montana 
needed to honor its agreement with ASiMI, which had decided to locate in Butte partially
because of the competitive electricity rates negotiated with MPC.l^*^ Second, businesses
should not be held responsible for past investments and costs that had nothing to do with 
them. Yet, in order to be consistent, this argument would have to be extended to all new 
customers, including residential and small commercial. The Natural Resources Defense 
Council drafted an amendment to strike the provision in its entirety, with the following 
rationale:
To exempt new or additional loads of 1 MW or greater and all self-generator loads 
from transition-cost recovery inappropriately would shift stranded cost recovery 
from intensive users o f electricity to smaller users. Such cost-shifting measures 
would result in a rate structure akin to declining block rates, under which the more 
you use, the less you pay . . .  . The PSC rejected declining block rates long ago as 
grossly inequitable and as a strong disincentive to efficient energy use; the
legislature should not reauthorize them in this bill.^35
In general, environmentalists charged that SB 390’s special treatment of large 
industrial customers created an unlevel playing field — “a peculiar trait for a bill supposedly
about ‘free and fair competition.’” Furthermore, there is the argument that because
industrial customers use the lion’s share of power, they are the ones most responsible for 
past investments in generation and therefore most responsible for paying stranded costs.
133 MCA 69-8-211.
134 Ironically, the competitive rate had been negotiated under the previous regulated system 
with PSC oversight and approval, calling into question the necessity of deregulation for 
economic development.
135 NRDC’s proposed amendments to SB 390 written by Deborah Smith, 3d reading 
copy, 10 April 1997.
136 Patrick Judge, “Legislature Leaves Energy Road-map at Home,” Down to Earth, a 
membership publication of the Montana Environmental Information Center. June 1997.
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CHAPTER 4
THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY
The complexity of electric industry restructuring is rivaled only by its importance — 
economically, environmentally, and socially. Few would dispute the central role that energy, 
particularly electrical energy, plays in the lives of Montanans. We use electricity to light 
and heat our homes, schools, and hospitals, to purify water, to smelt aluminum and refine 
petroleum, and even to write a master’s thesis. But not without costs. The production and 
delivery of electricity hold profound consequences for the quality of our health and of our 
air, water, land, and wildlife — costs that have traditionally been largely excluded, or 
“externalized” from the price per kilowatt-hour shown on electric bills. We have, in effect, 
been subsidizing the electricity industry with our health and natural environment. And such 
subsidies can cancel out potential gains. According to the Washington, D.C. group 
Resources for the Future, “Competition may not be efficient from the standpoint of society 
as a whole if prices do not reflect the environmental costs of electricity generation, 
transmission, and use as well as the more obvious costs associated with labor, equipment,
and raw materials.” 1
Negative externalities associated with the electricity industry take many forms. In 
the 1970s, our increased dependence on imported oil to fuel “peak power plants” (plants
brought online during periods of high demand) became a national security issue.2 The 
production of power from nuclear fission carries the risks of radiation release and weapons 
proliferation, as well as the problems of long-term waste disposal. Questions have been 
raised about the health effects of electromagnetic fields (EMF) from power lines,
Ï Brennan, 110.
2 If the cost of protecting U.S. oil interests in the Persian Gulf — about $50 billion per year 
-  were incorporated into the price of energy, oil would cost more than $100 a barrel, instead 
of the $15 to $25 to which we are accustomed. Mazza, “How the Northwest Can Lead a 
Clean Energy Revolution,” An Atmosphere Alliance Special Report, 5. 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oil_gas/petroleum/info_glance/prices.html
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particularly in relation to childhood le u k e m ia .3 Large hydroelectric dams have had
devastating impacts on wildlife habitat and fisheries. Airsheds have been substantially 
compromised by coal-fired power plants and surface waters degraded through the discharge 
of thermal pollution. The rapid depletion of our finite fossil fuel energy sources is a cost 
that will most heavily be borne by future generations, as will changes in the earth’s climate 
resulting from their combustion. Obtaining these fuels in the first place (through mining or 
drilling), transporting them, and disposing of their waste products also all have substantial 
environmental impacts known as “fuel cycle costs.”4
In fact, every source of electricity has environmental impacts, although widely 
variable in type and magnitude. While the advantages and disadvantages of competing 
technologies inevitably depend on the specifics of the situation, it is possible to construct a 
general ranking of resource options based on their environmental characteristics. This is 
exactly what Congress did in 1980 by passing the Pacific Northwest Power Planning and 
Conservation Act. The “regional act,” as it came to be known, was a response to the 
Northwest’s financially catastrophic and environmentally dubious experiment with nuclear 
power. On the heels of an overzealous regional plan which forecast the need for 26 
additional large coal and nuclear plants, the Washington Public Power Supply System 
(WPPSS, fittingly pronounced “whoops”) aggressively pursued the construction of five 
nuclear power plants. The end result was cost overruns in excess of $10 billion (leading to
the largest public bankruptcy in history) and a single operating plant at Hanford.^ To avoid
such debacles in the future, the regional act specified that power planning would proceed 
according to a hierarchy of resources that would minimize long-term environmental and
financial costs, which gave rise to the new concept of “least-cost planning.”^ Conservation
would be prioritized as the most attractive resource, followed by non-hydro renewables
3 NCAC, "Plugging People into Power," 33.
4 NCAC, "Plugging People into Power," 4.
5 Smeloff, 118-119. The Washington Public Power Supply System is now known as 
Energy Northwest. Mark Glyde, “ ’Perfect Storm’ Jolts Northwest Power Grid,” 
Northwest Energv Coalition Report. July 2000.
6 Mazza, “How the Northwest Can Lead a Clean Energy Revolution,” An Atmosphere 
Alliance Special Report, 11.
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(wind, solar, biomass, and geothermal), low-pollution / high-efficiency resources (gas-fired
cogeneration and fuel cells), and last of all, traditional coal and nuclear power.^
In order to understand the environmental effects of electric utility restructuring, it is 
important to first become familiar with the impacts of each of these resource options, 
starting at the bottom of the hierarchy and moving toward cleaner and more efficient 
options.
Coal-Fired Power Generation 
Conventional thermal power plants convert the energy in a finite fuel source 
(whether it be fossil fuels such as coal, oil, or natural gas or nuclear fuels such as uranium 
and plutonium) into electricity. Burning the fuel releases thermal (heat) energy which is 
used to boil water (or another substance), thereby creating high-pressure steam. The steam 
causes turbines to rotate, and this mechanical energy is transformed into electricity by 
generators. According to the second law of thermodynamics, some energy must always be 
discarded when converting heat into work. As it turns out, the theoretical maximum 
efficiency of a coal-fired power plant is around 63%, whereas the best available technology
yields an efficiency of about 42%.^ As energy is always conserved (by the first law of
thermodynamics), this “lost” energy typically goes into the environment, where it can
become thermal pollution.^ In practice, what happens is that a power plant must cool the
steam in a condenser to return it to liquid form and cycle it back to the boiler. In many 
cases, water from streams or lakes is used to carry the heat away. Increasing the 
temperature of water bodies can have adverse effects on fish and other aquatic organisms. 10 
Coal-fired steam plants account for 56% of the nation’s generating capacity and 
58% of Montana’s. 11 The environmental and human impacts of coal-fired generation are
numerous and legendary, with significant fuel cycle costs associated with mining and 
7 Smeloff, 118-120.
^ DiLavore, 219-220.
0 Smeloff, 13.
10 DiLavore, 216-219.
11 Brennan, 19. Alan Davis, DEQ, “Electricity in Montana -  an Overview,” T.A.C.
Report. November 1997.
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numerous and legendary, with significant fuel cycle costs associated with mining and
transporting the coal before it ever reaches the power plant Chronicling the abominable
practices o f Appalachian coal companies in the early part of the twentieth century, Harry 
Caudill wrote passionately;
Coal has always cursed the land in which it lies. When men begin to wrest it 
from the earth it leaves a legacy of foul streams, hideous slag heaps and polluted air. 
It peoples this transformed land with blind and crippled men and with widows and 
orphans. It is an extractive industry which takes all away and restores nothing. It 
mars but never beautifies. It corrupts but never purifies.
Such comments bode poorly for Montana, which has more minable coal than any
other state (13% of the nation’s reserves). 14 These effects can include a loss of agricultural
lands; destruction of wildlife habitat; erosion; air, soil, and groundwater pollution; large- 
scale waste disposal issues; dewatering of rivers; subsidence of aquifers; and impacts on 
communities and aesthetic values. In Montana alone, 25,000 acres of land have been
disturbed by coal mining with only 9000 having thus far been reclaimed. 1^ In response to 
these concerns, the 1973 Montana legislature passed the Montana Strip Mining and 
Reclamation Act (five years ahead of the federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation 
Act, or SMCRA), the Montana Water Use Act, the Montana Utility Siting Act, and the Strip 
Mine Coal Conservation Act. In 1975, the siting act was updated and a 30% coal-severance 
tax was established — the most stringent in the nation, and, according to Governor Tom
Judge, “the most significant piece of legislation enacted in Montana in this century.” 16
Since that time, however, subsequent legislatures have weakened many of the provisions of 
these laws, most recently in 1997 with the changes to the Major Facility Siting Act (SB 
224).
12 Caudill, 117-121.
13 Caudill, X.
14 Although, it should be noted that differences exist between the underground mining of 
high-sulfur coal that occurred in Appalachia and the strip mining of Montana’s low-sulfur 
coal. Malone, Montana: A History of Two Centuries, 337-338.
1^ Erin P. Billings, IR State Bureau, “Reclamation law changed coal mining’s face,” IR, 18 
August 1997.
16 Malone, Montana: A Historv of Two Centuries, 397.
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But coal-fired power plants are perhaps best known for the atmospheric pollution 
they create (which often provides the textbook example of a negative environmental 
externality). Because power plants produce them so prodigiously, four pollutants are of 
particular concern — carbon dioxide (CO2 ), sulfur dioxide (SO2 ), nitrogen oxides (NOx),
and mercury -  sometimes called the “four horsemen” of coal combustion. Respectively, 
coal-fired power plants account for 35%, 70%, 33%, and 23% of the nation’s production of 
these pollutants (as well as 23% of the nation’s point source particulate matter — what might
be considered the “fifth horseman”).!^ And it is coal-fired plants that account for the 
overwhelming majority of each of these. 18 Measured either in terms of total quantity, or 
normalized per unit energy, burning coal emits more SO2 , NOx, CO2 , and mercury than 
any other fossil fuel or energy source. 19 While the EPA’s Acid Rain Program has
succeeded in reducing sulfur dioxide emissions (at a cost one-tenth what industry estimated 
in the 1980s), emissions of the other three pollutants are expected to rise over the next 15
y ears. 20
Carbon Dioxide and Other Greenhouse Gases 
Greenhouse gases include carbon dioxide (CO2 ), methane (CH4 ), 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFG), both nitrous oxides (N2 O) and nitrogen oxides (NOx), ozone
(O3 ), carbon tetrachloride (CCI4 ), and water vapor (H2 0 ) . 2 1  The burning of any carbon-
based fuel (including coal, natural gas, oil, propane, gasoline, etc.) produces cai'bon dioxide, 
but here again, coal-fired power plants are the primary culprit. The electricity industry is the 
nation’s leading source of carbon dioxide emissions (although vehicles are a close second)
12 Natural Resources Defense Council, “Risky Business,” 1996. The report relies on 
1994 data. It can be found at: http://www.nrdc.org/air/energy/rbr/chap2.asp 
The federal Clean Air Act directs the EPA to regulate particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, 
ozone, nitrogen oxides, lead, and carbon monoxide. Moore, “Dying Needlessly,” REPP 
Issue Brief # 6, 4.
18 Thompson, "Poisoned Power," A Clean Air Network Report, 4.
19 Stadler, "Turn Up the Heat on Dirty Power," A Clean Air Network Report, 21.
20 Thompson, "Poisoned Power," A Clean Air Network Report, 16, 24.
21 Schneider, 20-23.
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and the largest source of greenhouse gases generally.22 While carbon dioxide is not the
most potent greenhouse gas, its sheer volume makes it the most significant.23 An average
coal-fired power plant releases more than 2 pounds of carbon dioxide for each kilowatt- 
hour of energy it produces (by comparison, oil-fired plants produce 16% less carbon and 
natural gas plants 4 4 %  l e s s ) . 2 4  For a typical Montana household using 9000 kilowatt- 
hours o f energy each year, this would mean nearly ten tons of carbon dioxide (about what 
an average sport utility vehicle p r o d u c e s ) . 2 5
In addition to potentially severe economic, social, and political dislocations, global 
warming poses numerous environmental and public health concerns including increases in 
insect populations and the spread of infectious tropical diseases, a greater frequency of El 
Nino and extreme weather events (such as floods, droughts, and fires), the melting of 
glaciers and polar ice caps, rising sea levels, desertification, and general ecosystem 
disruption and extinctions caused by the rapid rate of change.26 Some of these effects,
such as massive cracking of polar ice shelves and the disappearance of glaciers in our own 
Glacier National Park (which may be left “glacierless” in as few as 33 years and which is 
already down to less than a third of the glaciers that were present in 1850), are already
dramatically e v i d e n t . 2 2  Further evidence of anthropogenic global warming includes
atmospheric CO2  concentrations 29% higher than at the beginning of the industrial
22 And the industry’s share is growing. Nagusky, “Global Climate Change,” Regulatory 
Assistance Project, executive summary. NCAC, "Plugging People into Power," 4.
23 Global emissions amount to 6 billion metric tons of carbon a year, 20% of it from the 
United States. (Note: a metric ton is 1000 kg or 2204.6 lbs. To convert from tons of 
carbon to tons of carbon dioxide, multiply by 44/12, the ratio of the mass of a carbon 
dioxide molecule to the mass of a carbon atom.) Roughly half o f all human-caused 
warming is caused by carbon dioxide emissions. National Environmental Trust, “Science: 
Everyone Should Know the Basic Facts About Global Warming,” Climate Countdown 
Factsheet. Thompson, "Poisoned Power," A Clean Air Network Report, 14.
24 Nagusky, “Global Climate Change,” 36.
25 DeCicco, Green Guide to Cars and Trucks. Model Year 1998.
26 Gelbspan, 6, 15,23, 139, 143, 144, 175. National Environmental Trust, “Impacts: 
Global Warming: A Dangerous and Irreversible Global Experiment,” Climate Countdown 
Factsheet.
22 Gelbspan, 1. Mark Downey, “Global warming comes to Glacier . . . And so will vice 
president to raise awareness,” GFT. 2 September 1997. Glacier National Park, 1999 
“Summer Guide to Waterton-Glacier International Peace Park,” obtained in 1998, 7.
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revolution, the ten hottest years on record having occurred since 1 9 8 0 ,  and a rate of 
temperature change greater than any seen in the last 1 0 , 0 0 0  y e a r s . ^ S  Currently there are no 
federal limits on carbon dioxide production, although steps are beginning to be taken at the 
state l e v e l , 2 9  it is important to note that beyond direct CO2  emissions, the mining of coal
releases significant amounts of methane, a gas which, molecule for molecule, has 20 to 60 
times the heat-trapping potential of C02-^^
Particulate Matter (PM -10, PM-2.5)
Particulate matter is referred to by many different terms, including dust (solid 
particles), soot (when comprised mostly of carbon), mist (liquid particles), smoke, smog, 
and aerosol. Regardless of the name, particulates lead to cancer, cause and aggravate 
cardiopulmonary problems, and have been linked to increases in Sudden Infant Death
Syndrome.31 All told, exposure to fine particulates is thought to be responsible for tens of
thousands of premature deaths each year in the United States a l o n e . 3 2  Fine particulates — 
those measuring less than ten microns in diameter (a micron is one-millionth of a meter) — 
are of particular concern because of their ability to penetrate deep into the lungs. Such 
“inhalable” particles can lodge deep in the lungs for months or years and pose “the
greatest danger to human health from air p o l l u t i o n . ” ^ ^  addition to the “PM -10” 
standard which regulates particles of this size, a more stringent standard for ultrafine 
particulates measuring less than 2.5 microns in diameter (PM-2.5) was adopted by EPA in 
1997, but was blocked by a federal appeals court and is now before the U.S. Supreme
28 National Environmental Trust, “Science: Everyone Should Know the Basic Facts About 
Global W arming,” Climate Countdown Factsheet. Gelbspan, 8.
29 In 1997 Oregon enacted a law requiring new fossil fuel plants to achieve lower CO2  
emissions or to mitigate their effects.
30 NCAC, "Plugging People into Power," 4. Schneider, 21. National Environmental Trust, 
“Leadership and Equity," 42.
31 Turk, 605. Brennan, 112.
32 Thompson, "Poisoned Power," A Clean Air Network Report, 7.
33 Moore, “Dying Needlessly,” REPP Issue Brief # 6, 5.
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C o u r t .  34 j j i  addition to their health effects, particulates have aesthetic effects such as
impaired visibility and coating of surfaces. Natural visual ranges of 80 to 100 miles have 
been reduced by pollution to averages of less than 20 miles in the eastern United States and
50 to 70 miles in the w e s t . 3 5  Coal-fired power plants release particulates both directly and
indirectly through precursors such as SO2  and NOx.
Sulfur Dioxide
Sulfur dioxide is a gas principally associated with the combustion of coal. SO% 
contributes to particulate levels through the formation of sulfate particles and acid aerosols 
and is the primary cause of acid precipitation. Acid rain is harmful to both terrestrial and 
aquatic environments (particularly forests, lakes, and streams) and can damage buildings, 
monuments, and other structures as well. In addition to tree and fish mortality, human 
health, livestock, crops, and wildlife can all suffer adverse effects from acid r a i n . 3 6  The 
1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act capped total annual industrial emissions of SO2  (at 
about one-half 1980 emission levels — the cap will be further reduced in 2000 and 2010) 
and created a market for industries to buy and sell S02  pollution c r e d i t s . 3 7  This law has 
been effective in decreasing total SO2  emissions. Low-sulfur coal can also help alleviate 
power plant SO2  production.
Nitrogen Oxides
Nitrogen oxides (NOx) include both nitric oxide (NO) and nitrogen dioxide (N 02). 
N 02  is a brownish gas that reacts with volatile organic compounds (VOC) in the presence 
of sunlight to create photochemical smog (of which the main component is ground-level 
ozone). While ozone is critically important in the upper atmosphere as a shield against the 
sun’s high-energy ultraviolet radiation, it is itself a very reactive and harmful gas, both for
34 AP, “Court blocks EPA ’s standards,’’ IR, 15 May 1999. Carelli, Richard (AP), “Court 
to take second look at air fight,” IR, 31 May 2000.
35 Thompson, "Poisoned Power," A Clean Air Network Report, 13.
36 Turk, 619. See also Moore, “Dying Needlessly,” REPP Issue Brief #  6, 6-7.
3 7  Thompson, "Poisoned Power," A Clean Air Network Report, 1 3 .
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humans and vegetation (including crops).^8 Like ozone, NOx itself destroys organic matter
through oxidation. Unlike other pollutants such as organic compounds resulting from 
incomplete combustion, the formation of NOx is accelerated by greater combustion
temperatures. 39 Therefore, power plant operators must optimize furnace temperatures to
minimize total pollution. While those with respiratory illnesses such as emphysema, 
asthma, and chronic cough are most at risk from ozone pollution, “one study found that 
nonsmoking adults in Los Angeles were as impaired in breathing capacity as pack-a-day
s m o k e r s . W h i l e  EPA’s July 1997 rulemaking included stricter health-based standards 
for ozone, NOx itself is neither regulated nor effectively controlled.^ 1
Like SO2 , NOx leads to higher particulate levels (nitrate particles) and contributes to 
acid rain.42 Also, “nitrogen overload” from deposition of atmospheric NOx can cause
eutrophication of water bodies. Eutrophication occurs when high nutrient levels result in 
algal blooms that monopolize dissolved oxygen and suffocate other organisms. Forests too 
can suffer from “too much of a good thing” when tree growth is slowed by excessive 
nitrogen loading in soils.'^^
Air Toxics
Coal- and oil-fired power plants release some 67 different toxic air pollutants (of 
EPA’s 188 recognized hazardous air pollutants, or HAPs). Power plants are a major source 
for hydrogen chloride and hydrogen fluoride, which cause damage to the respiratory
system.44 But also included are heavy-metal elements such as mercury, arsenic, beryllium.
38 Brennan, 112.
39 Moore, “Dying Needlessly,” REPP Issue Brief # 6, 9.
Thompson, "Poisoned Power," A Clean Air Network Report, 5.
41 Thompson, "Poisoned Power," A Clean Air Network Report, 5. Brennan, 113.
42 NCAC, "Plugging People into Power," 4. Moore, “Dying Needlessly,” REPP Issue 
Brief # 6, 8.
43 Thompson, "Poisoned Power," A Clean Air Network Report, 10.
44 Stadler, "Turn Up the Heat on Dirty Power," A Clean Air Network Report, 16-17.
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cadmium, chromium, lead, manganese, nickel, and vanadium.45 Furthermore, coal contains
radioactive impurities that are released when bumed.^^ Already in an elemental state, toxic 
heavy metals cannot be broken down through high-temperature combustion or natural 
processes. End-of-stack control devices still require disposal of the collected metals, with
some risk of environmental contamination.^^ Of these metals, mercury probably poses the
greatest concern, because of its toxicity and pervasiveness. Warnings have been issued 
concerning mercury-contaminated fish in 39 states including Montana, for over 50,000
bodies of water.*^® Mercury can cause severe and irreversible damage to the human
neurological system, especially in infants and developing fetuses, in addition to impaired 
kidney function, liver degeneration, reproductive problems, and impacts to the 
gastrointestinal and cardiovascular systems.49
Mercury is highly persistent in the environment, accumulates in the tissues o f fish 
and wildlife, and increases in concentration (biomagnifies) as it moves up the food chain. 
For example, birds or mammals that ingest contaminated fish are particularly susceptible to 
mercury’s effects: neurological and reproductive disorders, impaired growth, diminished
resistance to disease, and death.^0
Coal contains more mercury, by far, than any other fossil-fuel used to produce 
power. EPA estimates that coal-fired power plants are the nation’s largest industrial source 
of atmospheric mercury (but because monitoring requirements were only recently passed, 
there remains a degree of uncertainty).^  ̂ And it is thought that this route — atmospheric
deposition -  is responsible for 95% of the mercury in the Great L a k e s . on average, a
45 Brennan, 114. Stadler, "Turn Up the Heat on Dirty Power," A Clean Air Network 
Report, 17.
46 Turk, 398-399.
47 Stadler, "Turn Up the Heat on Dirty Power," A Clean Air Network Report, 2.
48 Stadler, "Turn Up the Heat on Dirty Power," A Clean Air Network Report, 3, 30.
49 Thompson, "Poisoned Power," A Clean Air Network Report, 9.
Stadler, "Turn Up the Heat on Dirty Power," A Clean Air Network Report, 5.
50 Stadler, "Turn Up the Heat on Dirty Power," A Clean Air Network Report, 11.
51 Stadler, "Turn Up the Heat on Dirty Power," A Clean Air Network Report, 13, 20.
52 Thompson, "Poisoned Power," A Clean Air Network Report, 9.
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100-Megawatt coal-fired power plant produces about 23 pounds, or 157 teaspoons, of 
mercury per year. The effect of l/70th of a teaspoon of mercury on a 25-acre lake is 
significant enough to render the fish i n e d i b l e .^ 3
In 1997, the EPA expanded the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) reporting 
requirements under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) 
to include electric utilities (coal- and oil-fired generation only). In the case of mercury, 
however, reporting thresholds were placed so high that utilities remained effectively exempt,
despite their significance as a leading industrial source.^"^ On January 1, 1999, utilities
began some monitoring of mercury emissions as part of an EPA Information Collection 
Request. There remain, however, no regulations governing mercury emissions from power 
plants, the only major source without controls.^^
Hydroelectric Power Generation 
In stark contrast to coal-fired power generation, hydropower (which represents 42% 
of Montana’s generation and 9% of the nation’s) has no atmospheric emissions or other
waste p r o d u c t s . ^ 6  Yet it is not without major environmental impacts. If there was a “poster
child” for the negative environmental externalities of hydroelectric power, it would have to 
be the salmon of the Pacific Northwest. Salmon and steelhead populations have been 
reduced to about 2% of their historic runs in the Columbia / Snake River basin with many 
varieties having been eliminated altogether. Large hydroelectric dams, the primary culprit, 
threaten these fish species in a number of different ways. Most obvious is the trauma 
young salmon experience when passing through the turbine blades. If they are not killed 
outright, stress from turbine pressure can leave them in a weakened condition which renders 
them more susceptible to predation. Predation is also a factor in the slack water behind 
dams, where the young salmon are in greater danger for a longer period of time. In
Stadler, "Turn Up the Heat on Dirty Power," A Clean Air Network Report, 16.
54 Stadler, "Turn Up the Heat on Dirty Power," A Clean Air Network Report, 21.
55 Stadler, "Turn Up the Heat on Dirty Power," A Clean Air Network Report, 20.
56 Alan Davis, DEQ, “Electricity in Montana -  an Overview,” T.A.C. Report, November 
1997 (this article relies on 1995 EIA data). The 9% figure comes from 1998 EIA data: 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str/booklet/fuels.html
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addition, if they fail to make the transition to a salt-water environment within three weeks,
they can die. Unfortunately, that trip can now take over 40 days.^^ According to the
Northwest Energy Coalition, “The combined effects of long, slow-moving reservoirs and 
deadly turbines kill between 5-15% of migrating young fish at each dam. Most Columbia 
and Snake River salmon and steelhead must survive four to eight dams on their trip to the
ocean. The dams will kill 80-95% of the fish which have to face all eight of them.”^^
It is also important to remember the up-front environmental costs of dam 
construction. The massive inundation that results can have social, environmental, and 
aesthetic impacts. In addition to the displacement of human communities and the 
submerging of archaeological sites is the loss of spawning grounds, wetlands, canyonlands, 
and other natural habitats. Meanwhile, downstream flows are interrupted, sometimes for 
decades (Lake Powell took more than 20 years to fill following the construction of Glen
Canyon Dam in A r i z o n a ) . As Bruce Farling of Montana Trout Unlimited puts it.
Hydro dams have drowned thousands of acres in the Northwest, destroying some of 
the region’s best crop and timber growing country, as well as immense sweeps of 
wildlife habitat needed by popular and endangered species. Hydro dams have also 
created huge pollution problems, generating unnatural temperature changes or gas 
supersaturation in trout streams, or by creating toxic sinks in their reservoirs. When 
we embraced dams, we took a lot of bad with the good.
He suggests the removal of both the Milltown (just upstream of Missoula) and Madison 
dams. Milltown obstructs the passage of native bull and cutthroat trout, which isolates their 
populations. It also carries a load of 6.6 million cubic yards of contaminated sediment from 
historic mining -  2100 tons of arsenic, 13,100 tons of copper, 1700 tons of lead, and 
19,000 tons of zinc — all for a mere 3 Megawatts of generating capacity. The Madison dam 
produces similarly small quantities of power (7 Megawatts) and causes devastating thermal
pollution with the “shallow, heat-sink of Ennis Lake.’’̂ ®
57 NCAC, "Plugging People into Power," 5.
58 http://www.nwenergy.org/outreach/fact/dams_whydams.html
59 Brennan, 124. Turk, 496.
60 Bruce Farling of Montana Trout Unlimited, KUFM Editorial, 15 December 1997. 
Sheny Devlin, “PP&L excludes troubled Milltown Dam,’’ IR, 3 November 1998. 
See also AP, “FERC extends MPC license despite protests,’’ IR, 20 June 2000.
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The build-up of sediment behind dams occurs because silt paiticles cannot remain 
suspended in the slower-moving water. By contrast, the water that passes through dams is
cotxespondingly silt-free and has a greater capacity to scour and erode downstream areas.
The disruption can adversely affect fish, agriculture, and ocean estuaries by inhibiting the
natural dispersal of nu trien ts .Furtherm ore , the greater surface area of reservoirs can lead
to staggering evaporative losses — 750,000 acre-feet a year from Arizona’s Lake Powell
alone (enough to supply the needs of a city of three m i l l i o n ) . p o r  these reasons, large-
scale hydro projects cannot rightly be considered either renewable or sustainable.
Nuclear Power Generation 
The third member of the conventional power triumvirate (along with coal-fired and 
hydroelectric generation) is power generation through nuclear fission. None of the 109
nuclear power plants that produce 19% of the nation’s electricity are located in M ontana.^
In 1978, an important citizens’ initiative (1-80) was passed prohibiting the location of any 
nuclear facility in the state without the approval of a majority of voters. Two years later, I- 
84 banned the disposal of radioactive waste within the state.
Nuclear power's environmental track record is notorious, and is rivaled only by its 
history of fiscal disaster. Delays on the order of decades and cost overruns in the billions
of dollars have not been uncommon.^^ More importantly, safety problems and accidents
such as those at Browns Ferry (Decatur, Ala.-1975), Three Mile Island (Harrisburg, Penn.- 
1979), Rancho Seco (Sacramento, Cal.-1985), and Chernobyl (Ukiaine-1986) underscore 
the potential for serious mishap.66 The language of 1-80 captures the perennial issues 
associated with nuclear power:
61 Turk, 497.
62 Turk, 371.
63 AP, “Sierra Club director suggests draining Lake Powell,” Missoulian. 2 November 
1996.
64 Smeloff, 151. 1998 EIA data from:
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str/booklet/fuels.html
65 Smeloff, 22, 128.
66 Turk, 403-406. Smeloff, 25-27.
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(1) The people of Montana find that substantial public concern exists 
regarding nuclear reactors and other major nuclear facilities, including the following 
unresolved issues:
(a) the generation of waste from nuclear facilities, which remains a severe 
radiological hazard for many thousands of years and to which no means of 
containment assuring the protection of future generations exists;
(b) the spending of scarce capital to pay the rapidly increasing costs of 
nuclear facilities, preventing the use of that capital to finance renewable energy 
sources which hold more promise for supplying useful energy, providing jobs, and 
holding down energy costs;
(c) the liability of nuclear facilities to sudden catastrophic accidents which 
can affect large areas of the state, thousands of people, and countless future 
generations;
(d) the refusal of utilities, industry, and government to assume normal 
financial responsibility for compensating victims of such nuclear accidents;
(e) the impact of nuclear facilities on the proliferation of nuclear bombs and 
terrorism;
(f) the increasing pattern of abandonment of used nuclear facilities by their 
owners, resulting in radiological dangers to present and future societies as well as 
higher public costs for perpetual management; and
(g) the detrimental effect of the large uranium import program necessary to 
the expansion of nuclear power on American energy independence, defense policy, 
and economic well being.^^
Currently, the nation has 30,000 tons of high-level radioactive waste awaiting 
permanent disposal at a nuclear r e p o s i t o r y .6 8  Critics charge that no storage solution is
perfectly safe, as massive geologic or political change can occur during the hundreds or 
thousands of years required for radioactivity levels to sufficiently taper. Furthermore, while 
deregulation may accelerate the closure of some nuclear plants (which have a finite lifetime 
to begin with — see “Decommissioning” in Chapter 5), the plants themselves must be 
decontaminated, disassembled, or e n t o m b e d .  69
The biological effects of inadvertently released radiation can be devastating. In 
humans, radiation sickness can mean fatigue, nausea, diarrhea, nosebleeds, hair loss, 
compromised bone marrow function with implications for the immune system, infection, 
and bleeding. Radiation exposure can also impart a substantially increased risk of cancer as 
well as reproductive problems including a higher incidence of mental retardation in babies 
and possible mutagenic effects. High doses can cause damage to the brain and heart, and
67 MCA 75-20-1201.
6 8  Smeloff, 138.
69 Turk, 401-403.
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even death.^^ y^e fuel cycle costs of nuclear energy include a greater level of exposure to
radioactivity by workers in uranium mines, refining mills, and processing plants as well as 
reactors. Beyond the potential for contamination of air, water, and land by radioactive 
materials, environmental impacts include greater thermal pollution than from coal-fired
generation and impacts from the mining and transport o f uranium.^l At California’s San
Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS), it was found that along with ocean water, the
plant pumped 58 tons of fish through its cooling system each y e a r .  ^2
Natural Gas Power Generation 
Natural gas-fired power plants have a number of advantages over coal-fired plants. 
Methane bums almost twice as clean as coal in terms of carbon dioxide released per unit of
energy produced, and is devoid of many of the other contaminants found in coal.^3 ^ 5  with
coal, the extraction of natural gas can release methane directly to the atmosphere where it 
acts as a powerful greenhouse gas. While the combustion of natural gas produces no SO2
emissions, it does create N O x . ^4
Because of its distinction as the “cleanest fossil fuel” (generally, natural gas power 
plants produce less pollution of all types per kilowatt-hour than corresponding coal-fired
plants^^), some environmentalists see it as an appropriate “bridge fuel” to help make the
transition away from coal while waiting for renewable resources to become fully
competitive. But they also warn of the high risk of overinvesting in gas given a current glut
in supply and what could be temporarily low prices.^^ Shifting all your eggs from one 
fossil-fuel basket to another is hardly a lasting solution. A diversified resource base, by
70 Turk, 409-415.
71 DiLavore, 356.
72 Smeloff, 96.
73 Nagusky, “Global Climate Change,” Regulatory Assistance Project, 36. National 
Environmental Trust, “Leadership and Equity," 42.
74 NCAC, "Plugging People into Power," 5.
73 Brennan, 114.
76 NCAC 5, 30-31.
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comparison, would dampen the effects of sudden changes in fuel prices or supply and
provide a more level and reliable power stream.^^
In addition to being by definition a finite “fossil” resource, the extraction of natural 
gas can carry a number of unpleasant externalities including surface and groundwater 
contamination, loss of wilderness values, disruption of aboriginal cultures and traditional 
lands, and damage to both aquatic and terrestrial habitat. Montanans are particularly 
sensitive to these “upstream” fuel cycle costs, because of the presence of natural gas 
resources along the prized Rocky Mountain Front. The Missoulian captured the feeling of 
many Montanans regarding natural gas and its connection to deregulation in its August 31, 
1997 editorial:
The abundance and low cost of natural gas is a driving force in the nationwide 
deregulation of the electricity industry. . .  . Gas is cheap because there’s so darned 
much of the stuff produced in America and Canada. . . .  Whatever energy potential 
exists beneath the ground here would be developed for the benefit of distant 
markets. The profits would flow to large, out-of-state energy conglomerates and 
their far-flung stockholders. Montanans would get a smattering of tax dollars and 
all of the mess, all of the problems. The benefits of developing energy resources 
along the Front would last as long as it took to deplete the reserves; the losses 
inflicted would last forever.
Many natural gas fields (such as Fincher Creek just north of Montana in Alberta) 
also contain hydrogen sulfide, a poisonous gas which can be released to the atmosphere 
prior to “sweetening” the “sour gas”. This gas is strongly offensive to the human nose 
(perceived as a rotten egg smell) and is added back in to natural gas supplies in trace 
amounts so that leaks may be detected.
In the final analysis, natural gas may end up acting more as a roadblock than a 
bridge for renewable energy. Just as new and efficient gas turbines (which produce power 
at around three cents per kilowatt-hour) may drive inefficient and highly polluting plants out 
of business (see “Decommissioning” in Chapter 5), they also provide stiff competition for 
fledgling renewable projects, hindering their commercialization.78
Smeloff, 49.
78 Mazza, “How the Northwest Can Lead a Clean Energy Revolution,” An Atmosphere 
Alliance Special Report, 15, 17.
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Fuel Cells
Fuel cells produce both electrical energy and usable heat by chemically combining 
hydrogen and oxygen to form water in a process which is the reverse of electrolysis. When 
used as part of a cogeneration system, fuel cells can achieve energy efficiencies of greater 
than 80% and can sustain high efficiencies even when operating at less than full capacity. If 
the hydrogen is obtained from natural gas, the fuel cell process will produce carbon dioxide, 
but much less than the amount that would be produced by burning the gas to produce 
electricity. Alternatively and ideally, carbon emissions could be eliminated altogether if the 
hydrogen fuel was obtained through electrolysis using solar or wind power. (Obviously it 
would be more efficient to use the solar or wind power directly — but for mobile 
applications such as fuel cell-powered vehicles, or for locations where solar or wind power 
are unsuitable, the hydrogen can be obtained by electrolysis using renewable energy 
s o u r c e s ) . F u e l  cell power plants emit only about 1% of the nitrogen oxides of fossil fuel
pi ants.
Fuel cells are particularly well suited for peak loads and distributed applications 
(smaller generating sources placed closer to end-use customers). In addition to their 
modularity (ability for small units to be built and used economically and incrementally) and 
short construction lead times, fuel cells do an exceptional job of quickly and efficiently 
ramping up and down to track changing energy demands. This is an important feature for 
distributed applications: As you get closer to individual loads, the energy demand curves 
become increasingly variable. The ability to smooth demand curves by serving large 
numbers of customers at once and the inability to economically store power are two of the 
original reasons that utility monopolies with centralized power stations were formed. The 
first need may soon be rendered obsolete by highly responsive fuel cells, and the second 
problem may similarly be met by developments in high-tech storage devices. For example, 
flywheel batteries may be used in which “lightweight materials, advanced magnetic 
bearings, and near perfect vacuums will allow . . .  over 100,000 revolutions per minute, with
79 Mazza, “How the Northwest Can Lead a Clean Energy Revolution,” An Atmosphere 
Alliance Special Report, 6.
80 Smeloff, 185.
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coast down times that last for many months.”^ 1 Finally, fuel cells have the advantage of 
producing high-quality power (energy that flows at a constant reliable rate with few 
fluctuations), and also work well in urban settings because of their quiet operation.
Renewable Energv
Renewable resources, such as wind and solar power, have tremendous advantages 
over conventional power plants, but still represent only 2% of the nation’s electricity
p r o d u c t i o n .^3 y\nd Montana lags behind the national average, with less than 1 % of its 
generating capacity derived from non-hydro r e n e w a b l e s . xhis is a disappointing statistic 
considering the state’s tremendous renewable energy producing potential: fifth in the 
nation in terms of wind capa c i t y .R enewab le s  also make sense from a cultural standpoint,
resonating well with “Montana values ’ and the state’s tradition of self-reliant 
individualism. This sentiment was captured by Russ Wahl, a Cut Bank farmer, who 
encouraged the 1999 Montana legislature to pass a renewable energy incentive bill as a way 
to . . .
. . . encourage more freedom and independence among the various citizens of 
Montana. Currently the generation and transmission of electricity is centralized. 
That centralization places the citizens of this state at the will of a few saboteurs or
the unusual acts of God, which can easily disrupt the lives of many people.
The environmental advantages of renewable energy are legendary, with few or no 
emissions, water requirements, or fuel cycle costs. Their economic benefits are similarly 
impressive, including low operation and maintenance costs, independence from fluctuations 
in global fuel prices and availability, short constmction times, and ability to be built 
incrementally according to need and resources. And yet each of the principal forms of
81 Smeloff, 157.
82 Smeloff, 184-185, 156.
83 Brennan, 124.
84 Alan Davis, DEQ, “Electricity in Montana -  an Overview,’’ T.A.C. Report, November
1997.
85 Chapman, “Expanding Wind Power,” REPP Research Report # 6, 10.
86 Written testimony of Russ Wahl to the Senate Business and Industry Committee on SB 
409, 10 February 1999. See Chapter 6, “SB 409 -  Net Metering.” See also the testimony 
of Mary Hamilton, owner of Solar Plexus in Missoula.
I l l
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
renewable energy (solar, wind, geothermal, biomass, and small hydro) has an environmental 
footprint that needs to be examined, especially when developed as a centralized power 
station.
In general, the impacts of renewable energy projects tend to be more site-specific
and local than those of their fossil fuel counterparts.^^ Wind farms, for example, have
come under attack for both raptor mortality and their impact on the visual quality of the
landscape, since they tend to be located remotely, often in scenic a r e a s . W h i l e  solar and
wind energy projects have no fuel costs, the drawback is that they have less flexibility when
it comes to siting — they simply must locate where the fuel is.^^ And as with other power
plants, transmission to load centers still requires the construction and siting of high-voltage 
power lines. If Montana’s Rocky Mountain Front were to be developed for its vast wind 
potential, the power produced would likely be destined for major population centers such as 
Portland or Seattle, which would require power lines across the relatively pristine Northern 
Rockies ecosystem. Furthermore, some find the thought of large and noisy whirligigs to be 
as aesthetically offensive as drilling rigs.
Another alternative also escapes high fuel costs, but has the added advantage of 
helping to dispose of unwanted waste products. Biomass resources include municipal and 
agricultural waste, landfill gas, and wood waste. Sometimes biomass uses crops grown 
specifically for that purpose, but the process of growing the vegetation can largely balance 
the carbon released later through combustion. It should be pointed out that net CO2
emissions can still result if the full cycle of planting, harvesting, and transporting is
c o n s i d e r e d .9 0  Biomass can be used directly as a fuel to produce electricity, or it can be
gasified first for future burning or for use in a fuel cell.
In addition to its benefits as a relatively clean renewable energy resource, biomass 
has a number of positive environmental externalities associated with it. While it is 
unfortunate that solid waste would qualify as a renewable (endless) fuel stream, biomass
87 NCAC, "Plugging People into Power," 28.
88 Smeloff, 58-59, 63. NCAC, "Plugging People into Power," 28.
89 NCAC, "Plugging People into Power," 28.
90 Holt, “Disclosure and Certification,” REPP Issue Brief #  5, 10.
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energy production can help alleviate the pollution problems of landfills. Although the 
common process of flaring the potent greenhouse gases generated by landfills converts 
them into less potent carbon dioxide and water, it fails to utilize their energy potential. 
Biomass facilities can achieve both functions, and at relatively low cost if landfills are 
required to capture these gases anyway.
Another important byproduct of some biomass operations is the production of 
fertilizer.^ 1 And in California, the biomass power industry assists in the prevention of
catastrophic forest fires by paying people to collect underbrush. Early proposals to 
deregulate the industry in that state were met with opposition, not only from 
environmentalists but from loggers who were concerned that negative impacts to the 
biomass industry would be felt by the forests as well.92
Conservation
By far, the resource choice that does the best job approximating a truly “green” 
energy source is conservation. Conservation refers to any measure or behavior that reduces 
energy demand — using more efficient appliances, increasing insulation values, or 
converting a home from inefficient electrical to more efficient natural gas heat (“fuel 
switching”). In industry parlance, increasing the efficiency of the electricity system by 
supporting conservation activities (or by shifting demand to different “off peak” time 
periods) is called “demand-side management” or DSM. (An example of a “supply-side” 
decision, by comparison, would be increasing the efficiency of the electricity system by 
building a solar array instead of a coal-fired power plant.)
In many ways conservation can be thought of as an energy resource that can be 
invested in to meet a growing demand, just as a new coal-fired power plant might be. Power 
freed up by a “conservation power plant” is functionally equivalent to (and has a number
of advantages over) power produced from new supply-side generating resources.^3 These
“negawatts,” as Amory Lovins calls them, are both inexpensive -  especially if externalities
91 Smeloff, 186.
92 Smeloff, 83-84.
93 NCAC, "Plugging People into Power," 20.
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are considered -  and plentiful, and typically have shorter “payback periods” than
conventional power plants.^4 jn the Pacific Northwest alone, the energy potential of the
untapped conservation resource rivals that of the oil reserves on the North Slope of
Alaska.^5 And conservation has already proven itself an effective and sizable resource,
having saved the Pacific Northwest enough power to meet the needs of a city larger than
Seattle (with 17(X) average Megawatts being developed since 1981).^^ According to the
Northwest Power Planning Council’s 1996 draft power plan, roughly 1500 Megawatts of
cost-effective conservation could be developed in the region over the next 20 years.^^
Unfortunately, however, the “negawatt” analogy breaks down somewhat in a 
surplus situation (you cannot avoid the cost of a new power plant that is not being proposed 
anyway). Such was the case in the early 1990s when surpluses led some to call for the
dismantling of DSM programs in New England.^S Fortunately, the other benefits of
energy efficiency improvements were considered — cleaner air and reduced environmental 
compliance costs, the retention of federal transportation dollars, the creation of jobs, and
more competitive businesses — and the programs were retained.^^
Ultimately, consumers are interested in the services provided by electricity (e.g., hot 
tubs and ice cream) than the electricity itself. Conservation measures can provide these 
services as well and sometimes better than conventional resources, but with fewer kilowatt- 
hours. According to the Northwest Energy Coalition, “the Electric Power Research 
Institute (EPRI), the research arm of the utility industry, estimates that it is technically 
possible to save between 20% and 40% of all the electricity currently used in this country 
with no loss of comfort or service at a marginal cost of 40 per kWh. This is about half the
cost of building a new coal plant.”
94 Smeloff, 17-18.
95 NCAC, "Plugging People into Power," 20. Smeloff, 17-18.
96 http://www.nwenergy.org/conservation/
97 Collins, "Comprehensive Review," 20.
98 Smeloff, 113.
99 Smeloff, 113-115.
100 NCAC, "Plugging People into Power," 22. However, in the electricity supply markets 
of the 1990s, it is also almost twice the cost of incremental supply.
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And not only is conservation affordable, it is modular — meaning that it can be 
purchased in any size blocks. This is an attractive feature in an era of deregulation, when
large capital investments can be risky, especially if they lead to excess capacity,
Furthermore, conservation has very few negative environmental impacts and is the one
resource option that directly involves large numbers of customers. Utility conservation 
programs therefore provide the important (although difficult to quantify) function of raising 
public awareness of energy issues.
Conservation has still other advantages. Money saved by consumers (both 
residential and commercial) can be spent elsewhere in the local economy, and can increase 
the efficiency of businesses and their ability to compete globally. Note that between 1973 
and 1986 U.S. electricity consumption remained nearly constant even though the economy
expanded more than 40%  But the United States economy is still significantly more 
energy-intensive than Japan’s, for instance, using roughly 60% more energy per unit of 
Gross National P r o d u c t .  ^04 addition to creating more jobs than conventional power 
plants, conservation creates a more stable economy as it is less susceptible to boom-and-
bust c y c l e s .  ^05
If multiple utilities work together, even greater savings can be realized through what 
are known as “conservation transfers.” For example, suppose one utility has a large 
untapped conservation resource but no need to develop it because it already has plenty of 
capacity to serve its customers. If a second utility has insufficient capacity and little 
conservation potential, it can purchase “negawatts” from the first utility. In other words, 
one utility can help fund another’s conservation programs in return for the power liberated
through those p r o g r a m s .  1^6
^01 NCAC, "Plugging People into Power," 7.
102 While conservation has no direct emissions, water usage, aesthetic impacts, etc., it does 
involve materials (such as fiberglass) that do pose environmental impacts in acquisition, 
manufacture and transportation.
103 NCAC, "Plugging People into Power," 8.
104 NCAC, "Plugging People into Power," 76.
105 NCAC, "Plugging People into Power," 7.
106 NCAC, "Plugging People into Power," 24.
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A similar idea involves power exchanges between regions with differing seasonal 
supply and demand conditions. In the summer months, for example, extra power produced 
by the spring runoff in the Pacific Northwest is used to meet California’s increased air 
conditioning load. Conversely, by purchasing excess power from California in the winter 
months, the Northwest no longer needs to store additional water behind dams in the 
s u m m e r t i m e .  107 This power exchange already amounts to roughly 1000 MW a year, the
equivalent o f a fairly large coal-fired p la n t .  108 Alternatively, regional transfers could take
place across lines of longitude (i.e., time zones) to meet the slightly staggered peaks of the 
respective utilities to avoid building new capacity. Ironically, while the transmission of 
electricity itself has serious environmental impacts, it is a necessary component o f both 
conservation transfers and regional exchanges.
107 NCAC, "Plugging People into Power," 24-25. Recall that decreased water velocity 
from storage behind dams creates hardship for migrating salmon and other negative 
environmental impacts.
108 NCAC, "Plugging People into Power," 38. MPC has also participated in such 
exchanges, but recently sold all such contracts along with its power generating facilities. 
Missoulian State Bureau, “Assets bought by PP&L Global,” Missoulian. 4 November
1998.
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CHAPTER 5
ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGIES AND RESTRUCTURING
As we have seen, the environmental impacts of the electricity industry are 
considerable, in both scope and magnitude. But how might deregulation alleviate or 
aggravate these impacts? Over the years, a complex framework of strategies has developed 
to address the environmental and social costs of producing and delivering electricity. Some 
of these strategies, such as utility-sponsored, demand-side management (DSM) programs 
and integrated resource planning (IRP), may be jeopardized by the move to competition. 
Other mechanisms, such as incentive-based environmental regulations and the marketing of 
“green power,” may work better in a deregulated environment.
Integrated Resource Planning 
A fundamental energy policy goal of environmentalists has long been to incorporate 
the true costs o f energy production into the price per kilowatt-hour of electricity, per gallon 
of gasoline, or per cubic foot of natural gas. This would not only discourage consumption 
and, in the case of electricity reduce the need for new generating capacity (see cost-induced 
conservation below), it would also facilitate a meaningful comparison of alternatives and 
assist with the commercialization of environmentally preferred resources. Finally, it seems 
only fair that those who benefit from a product should be responsible for paying for it in 
full. Instead, too often the environmental degradation and the other externalized costs of 
electricity have been paid for not by those who benefit -  the electric company, its 
shareholders and customers -  but by society at large. Worse is when these costs are borne 
disproportionately by some members of society, particularly those who are already at a 
disadvantage. Numerous studies have demonstrated that certain characteristics (race, 
income, education, population, and even average age) influence the likelihood that a
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community will be targeted for the construction of a polluting facility. ̂  The practice of
singling out communities lacking in the resources needed to mount effective resistance 
campaigns has led to what Mark Dowie terms “massive inequities in environmental
degradations and injustice in the policies used to correct them.”^ Instances of 
environmental racism can be seen beyond the siting of industrial plants and toxic waste 
dumps, and beyond company board rooms. On average, penalties assessed against 
polluters by governmental agencies are lower in minority areas, and clean-up times lo n g e r .^
In order to more adequately account for externalized costs, state governments have 
implemented “social costing” policies (Montana’s Integrated Resource Planning Law, 
passed in 1993, can be found at MCA 69-3-1201). Under such laws, utilities are compelled 
to consider these costs in their decisions regarding the acquisition of new resources and the
operation of power plants.4 For example, if a utility was deciding between a new coal-fired
power plant or a renewable energy project, the direct costs of building the coal-fired plant 
would be supplemented by an “adder” representing the environmental costs of the air
pollution it would create.^ Passage of the 1980 Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning
and Conservation Act (the “regional act”) signaled a new era in which utilities began to 
prepare “least-cost plans” to factor environmental and social considerations into their
planning process, and to begin choosing resources with the lowest overall long-term costs.^
True integrated resource planning (IRP) would minimize total costs to society by looking at 
alternative fuel options, such as encouraging homeowners to convert from electric to more
efficient natural gas or propane heat (“fuel switching”).^
Social costing policies are heralded by environmentalists as a way to recognize that 
clean air, clean water, and functioning ecosystems all have value. But the drawback of this
1 Dowie, 142-143.
2 Dowie, 141.
3 Dowie, 143.
Brennan, 34.
5 Smeloff, 120-121.
6 NCAC, "Plugging People into Power," 53.
7 NCAC, "Plugging People into Power," 31.
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approach is trying to determine how much value. Choosing a method for evaluating such 
costs can be extremely difficult. For example, costs might be assigned to a negative 
environmental externality like air pollution, based on some kind of estimate of the damage it
causes, or alternatively, based on the costs associated with controlling it.^ In addition to 
being remote and diffuse (and correspondingly difficult to link conclusively to the 
responsible party), social costs tend to be long-term in nature (or “backloaded”)- If not 
ignored altogether, they are often devalued, sometimes according to a highly technical 
“discount rate.” Assuming the guilty party ever actually pays for these costs, this 
“deferred payment plan” makes them more manageable. The ambiguity of cost issues and 
the challenge of assigning responsibility makes them difficult to implement in legislation, 
and equally difficult to enforce in subsequent administrative and court decisions.
But beyond these practical barriers, putting a price tag to things such as clean air, 
human health, and functional ecosystems leads to the ethically tenuous position that their 
value is finite and quantifiable. The Northwest Energy Coalition puts it like this:
I f  s hard to put an accurate number on these costs. The only number we know for 
sure to be wrong is zero. Yet that’s exactly the number that energy planners use if 
they choose to ignore environmental damages. . . .  What is the cost of a salmon 
stock gone extinct, of not being able to see Mt. Rainier because of pollution, of a 
human life?9
Or as Colstrip area rancher Wally McRae puts it, “What is the value of something
that’s not for sale?” ^0 Certainly, some things money truly cannot buy, and there is a
danger associated with assigning a monetary value to them.
One of the goals of least-cost planning is to ensure that resource decisions are made 
in such a way as to minimize the long-term financial, social, and environmental costs. Much 
of the debate surrounding whether particular conservation measures should be invested in as 
an alternative to new power plants centers on the definition of the term “cost-effective.”
“A number of tests of cost-effectiveness have been used that reflect different perspectives — 
participating customers, nonparticipating customers, the utility, all customers combined, and
^ Smeloff, 69-70.
^ NCAC, "Plugging People into Power," 54.
10 Erin P. Billings, “After 20 years, is coal railroad ready to roll?” IR, 9 August 1998.
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society as a whole.” !  ̂ The “total resource cost test,” the most frequently used, considers
only the simple economics of the proposed measure. If the measure will pay for itself over 
its lifetime (saving at least as much money as its implementation costs), it is considered 
cost-effective. By comparison, the societal (or total social cost) test is more comprehensive, 
including external costs and benefits in addition to the direct financial impacts. This 
approach is less popular, in part because of the difficulties (discussed above) of assigning
appropriate values, but also because of institutional and political reluctance.!2 To get a
sense of scale, the 1991 Pacific Northwest Regional Plan considered conservation to be 
cost-effective up to 11 cents per kilowatt-hour, with other resources cost-effective only up to 
7.5 0, reflecting a belief that the externalized costs of conventional resources were at least 
3.50 per kilowatt-hour. !^
Before understanding the effect that deregulation may have on IRP and social 
costing policies, these mechanisms must first be seen in their historical context. It is 
important to realize that for many years, the economic arguments for new power plant 
construction were powerful. At the time, rapid technological developments, low fiiel prices 
and interest rates, and large economies of scale achieved by steadily growing demand all 
made it possible to lower the price of electricity by building new power plants.!'^ In such a
climate there was little incentive to invest in conservation.
This all began to change, however, with the 1973 Arab oil embargo and ensuing 
energy crisis. As prices for oil and natural gas skyrocketed, people began to curb their 
consumption, which fell substantially short of demand forecasts. With increasing 
uncertainty in load growth predictions and increasing volatility in fuel prices and interest 
rates, investments in new power plants became riskier. Meanwhile, declining costs and 
rapid innovations were making renewable energy and demand-side management alternatives 
more and more appealing. Finally, increased public awareness of the environmental 
implications o f traditional power generation created an atmosphere of support for landmark
!!  Smeloff, 61.
!2 Smeloff, 60-61.
!3 NCAC, "Plugging People into Power," 20.
!4 Smeloff, 60.
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legislation such as the 1978 Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA). PURPA 
and other laws helped shift the economics of power generation to favor small alternative 
projects. Resource planning suddenly became much more than deciding when and where
the next big fossil plant would be built. Construction of large centralized power plants 
was taking longer and costing more because of new environmental laws and because of 
operational problems at new coal and nuclear plants — for the first time such construction 
threatened to raise the price of electricity. Expressed differently, for the first time the 
marginal cost (the incremental cost per kilowatt-hour of new capacity) crossed over and 
surpassed the average cost (the cost per kilowatt-hour of obtaining power from the existing 
system). PURPA required utilities to purchase power from these alternative plants (known 
as qualifying facilities) so long as the price was below the utility’s “avoided cost” of 
building a new plant. At the time avoided costs were quite high (especially when set by 
progressive utility commissions mindful of externalities), so many small and 
environmentally preferable power producers (including cogenerators and renewable energy 
plants) were given access to the transmission system and a market for their product. In the 
1990s, however, we have seen a return to lower natural gas prices and lower avoided costs,
conditions antagonistic to renewable energy.
Effects of Restructuring on Integrated Resource Planning 
There is widespread agreement that the restructuring of the electric utility industry
will likely spell the end of integrated resource planning, at least as we know it. Because 
of deregulation, government will have diminished authority to require investor-owned 
utilities to engage in integrated resource planning or to prepare least-cost plans. Even if 
public utility commissions did retain this authority, they could not apply it universally. 
Independent power producers who lie outside the public utility commission’s (PUC) legal 
and geographic jurisdiction would receive an unfair advantage. Instead, resource acquisition
Smeloff, 60, 112. Brennan, 29-30.
16 Brennan, 33, 124. DEQ, "Restructuring the Electric Utility Industry in Montana,” 9.
1^ An exception might be the “market-oriented version of IRP ” passed in Texas in 1995. 
Smeloff, 135-136.
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decisions will be based on each utility’s internal assessment o f market conditions. 
Competition will elevate the importance of short-term price signals and diminish the 
industry’s ability and willingness to account for externalized costs.
Yet some observers feel that the loss of IRP will have little real impact on the 
environment. First, they point out that the principal environmental benefit of IRP was to 
prevent the development of large and unnecessary power plants. But under deregulation, the 
uncertainty o f markets and the absence of guaranteed eost recovery (utilities can no longer 
pass their capital costs along to captive customers) make construction of large central 
stations with long lead times risky and unlikely. New power plant construction will be 
limited primarily to small, cheap, and efficient gas turbines which have a relatively small 
environmental footprint.!^
The other argument is based not so much on what deregulation might do to IRP, but 
on IRP’s track record as an effective environmental tool. The demise of IRP is of little 
concern, the argument goes, because it did not do much to begin with. For whatever reason, 
whether it be the difficulties of quantifying social costs or the lack of political will to do so 
in a meaningful fashion, there is a perception that “current PUC efforts to tilt utility 
investment decisions to be favorable toward the environment have not been widespread or
particularly forceful, so little will be lost.’’^^ But rather than concluding the current system
must be jettisoned, this argument could instead be used as a powerful wake-up call that
social cost “adders” need to be adding more.^^ Others reject the argument outright,
asking how many new, large facilities were planned and build during the IRP period, in 
Montana, the Northwest, or elsewhere.
Cost-Induced Conservation and Rate Designs
Another tool which has been used to achieve environmental and other objectives is 
rate design. Rates can be structured to encourage either conservation or consumption. One 
guiding principle is that rates should reflect the “cost of service” that the utility incurs in
18 DEQ, "Restructuring the Electric Utility Industry in Montana,” 10. 
1^ Brennan, 127.
20 Brennan, 121.
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serving its customers. These costs take two forms. “Variable costs” are proportional to 
the amount o f power being produced. An example would be fuel costs (because to generate 
twice as much power, you need to buy twice as much fuel). “Fixed costs,” on the other 
hand, exist independent of power output. Examples include construction costs, property 
taxes, interest, insurance, and depreciation which are all incurred regardless of the level of 
production. Prices paid by consumers follow a similar pattern. Typically, a customer pays 
both a fixed customer charge and a variable charge. The fixed charge remains constant 
regardless of the amount of energy he or she uses and covers the fixed costs of meter
reading, billing, etc.21 The variable charge is proportional to the amount of energy 
consumed, and is sometimes called the “energy charge.”22 Some costs, such as
distribution, are difficult to categorize. From a conservation standpoint, it is preferable to 
include as many costs as possible in the energy charge rather than the customer charge. To 
understand why, it helps to consider the two extremes. If all costs were treated as part of the 
customer charge, consumers would pay the same amount each month no matter how much 
power they used. This situation removes any economic incentive to conserve. The opposite 
scenario, in which all costs are treated as part of the variable energy charge, maximizes the 
conservation incentive. There is no limit to how low the monthly utility bill could be 
reduced as the customer scales back energy use (or increases the share derived from self- 
generation). Adjusting energy usage in order to save money is known as “cost-induced 
conservation.”
In addition to promoting environmental goals, rates that emphasize variable charges 
benefit those customers who already have small electricity demands. Under a rate structure 
that depended on fixed customer charges, a low-income family living in a trailer park would 
theoretically pay the same electricity bill as the owner of a 10,000-square-foot “trophy 
home” (and would in fact be paying a much greater effective price per unit of energy). 
Incidentally, when M FC’s first “unbundled” residential bills came out in September of
21 The customer charge can be thought of as an “admission fee to the system.” NCAC, 
"Plugging People into Power," 57.
22 The energy commodity itself, or “the juice,” is usually paid for this way, using a price 
per kilowatt-hour. Such charges are sometimes called “mill based” because they charge a 
certain number of “mills,” or tenths of a cent, per unit of energy.
123
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1999, the PSC ensured that all charges were “mill based” (assessed in proportion to the 
amount o f energy used) other than the $4.20 customer charge for distribution service.23
Changing rate structures to more heavily emphasize variable charges over fixed 
charges is one way to encourage cost-induced conservation. Another, less popular, way is 
to raise prices. The most dramatic example in the recent history of this country occurred in 
1973 when the Arab oil embargo tripled oil prices, causing widespread behavioral changes. 
Electricity rates spiked as utilities struggled to cover the fuel costs for their oil-fired power 
plants.24 The strain on consumers was considerable, but not fruitless. For the next thirteen 
years, U.S. energy consumption plateaued while the economy expanded by more than 
40%.^^ However, while it is true that crisis situations and rate increases can raise
awareness and curb consumption, advocating price hikes is not a winning strategy for 
environmentalists — especially if they wish to maintain their alliance with other public
interest constituencies. Cost-induced conservation only works when prices rise, and
when they rise substantially enough to prompt a behavioral change. As we saw in Chapter 
3, the effect that deregulation will have on prices (and therefore on cost-induced 
conservation), locally and nationally, is heavily disputed and remains uncertain. Also 
uncertain is how, on the whole, deregulation will affect the apportionment of costs between 
fixed customer charges and variable energy charges. If a robust market develops offering 
different payment plans, customers might have some flexibility in selecting the relative 
percentages of these charges (but only on the deregulated energy commodity portion of 
their bill).
While in general the environment benefits from higher prices, there are also some 
drawbacks. Fuel-switching from more polluting energy sources to electricity is discouraged 
when electricity prices are high. For example, gasoline-powered lawnmowers and industrial 
motors powered by coal or oil-fired generators are more polluting than their electric
^3 The USBC, for example, was 1.334 mills per kilowatt-hour.
24 Brennan, 26
25 NCAC, "Plugging People into Power," 8.
26 See Appendix D.
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counterparts.27 But in most cases, it is electricity that is the more polluting and inefficient
energy source that needs to be switched from, not to (as is the case with natural gas as 
opposed to electric baseboard heating). This is because electricity is a very high-quality 
(low entropy) form of energy. While versatile, it is best used only by certain applications 
(especially if produced by polluting energy sources). But because electricity is such a high- 
quality, reliable, and universal form of energy, the amount of fuel-switching that might occur 
away from it is probably quite limited — businesses cannot switch their computers over to 
run directly on oil or coal.
Before looking at other examples of how rates can be structured to encourage 
consumption or conservation, it might be beneficial to examine the steps traditionally taken 
by regulators in determining rates. The most basic approach is to divide the utility’s 
estimated costs for the next year (or “revenue requirement”) by the forecasted energy sales 
to get a price per kilowatt-hour. This approach has a number of environmental and 
consumer ramifications. First, it creates a climate in which conservation is a threat to a 
utility’s profits. If energy sales come in lower than expected (for any reason — 
conservation, changing demographics, or a mild Montana winter), the utility loses money.
If, on the other hand, people use more energy than expected, the utility comes out ahead.28
If a utility underrecovers its costs, it will almost certainly propose a rate hike (in 
addition to grumbling about its conservation programs). But if it overcollects, quite 
possibly nothing will happen. According to the Northwest Conservation Act Coalition, 
public utility commissions often wait for the utilities to propose rate changes creating a 
serious bias against consumers. Even if energy sales meet or exceed expectations, 
customers can still face rate hikes in future years if the revenue requirement turns out to be 
greater than originally estimated (due to any number of variables including unexpected
changes in interest rates, inflation, and even accounting practices).
This basic approach to setting rates becomes more complicated when utilities 
separate customers into classes (industrial, commercial, residential, etc.), and calculate a
Brennan, 116.
NCAC, "Plugging People into Power," 56-60.
NCAC, "Plugging People into Power," 56-60.
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separate rate for each. Distinguishing between customer classes allows a utility to more 
accurately approximate the actual “cost of service” it incurred for a particular customer.
For example, industrial rates are lower than residential rates because economies of scale 
make it less expensive to serve large customers, who buy in bulk, and because large 
customers generally do not use or help pay for the distribution system. It is possible that 
with restructuring, cost of service will be calculated on an even more detailed level -  that 
instead of three or four different rate classes, each customer may pay a rate that reflects the 
“cost of service” of his or her individual load (instead of the average for customers in that 
class).30
Such changes in calculating cost of service could be a mixed bag for the 
environment. On the one hand, conservation could suffer. Because economies of scale 
make it cheaper to serve larger loads, the most profligate consumers of electricity would be 
awarded what amount to bulk discount prices (as industrial customers currently are).
Unlike current residential rate structures in Montana, such a system encourages 
consumption. On the other hand, if the pattern of usage is considered (in addition to total 
quantity of usage), such pricing could increase system efficiency. Customers that use
electricity during periods o f peak demand^ 1 would (and should) pay higher rates to reflect
the higher cost of power from peaking units.32 Cost of service pricing might also penalize 
customers whose demands are growing by allocating a greater portion of new power plant 
costs to them.
In the past, the cost-of-service concept has been implemented in the form of 
“blocked” or “stepped” rates. Unlike flat rates under which the energy charge is the same
30 DEQ, "Restructuring the Electric Utility Industry in Montana,” 3.
31 “Periods of peak demand” and other periods in which electricity is more costly to 
produce can refer to certain hours of the day, certain days of the week, or certain months of 
the year. Seasonal rates are also appropriate to reflect seasonal variations in the costs of 
producing power. In the winter months, for example, power might be more expensive, not 
only because of increased demand but because of decreased production from low-cost 
hydro sources, necessitating greater reliance on more expensive coal or nuclear generation. 
Montana Power Company has historically used seasonal rates.
32 Peaking plants are typically the most expensive and are only brought online when 
needed. They also typically have high environmental costs. They are inefficient not only to 
run, but also to start up and shut down. Brennan, 53.
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for each kilowatt-hour consumed, stepped rates price different “blocks” of energy 
differently. At different times in history, such rates have been used to encourage either 
consumption or conservation. Prior to the energy shortages of the early 1970’s, electricity 
prices could still be lowered through the construction o f additional capacity (such as new 
dams in the Pacific Northwest). In order to encourage power consumption from these new 
projects, declining block rates were used. A declining block rate might have a customer 
paying 6 0  for each of the first 500 kilowatt-hours used in a month, but only 40 per kilowatt-
hour t h e r e a f t e r . T h e  opposite rate structure, known as inverted block rates, might have a
customer paying 40 per kilowatt-hour up to 500 kilowatt-hours in a month and 60 per
kilowatt-hour thereafter, which encourages conservation (to a point).^4 More sophisticated
structures, using the same principle but with multiple tiers, have also been used.
Decoupling
As we have seen, utilities can be naturally antagonistic toward conservation 
programs, which is partly a result of the traditional approach to ratemaking discussed above. 
Successful energy conservation programs lower electricity sales and, along with them, utility 
profits. While recovering these costs from its base of customers spares the utility the direct 
costs of administering these programs, it also increases the energy bills sent to customers, 
which can elicit a conservation response. If sales drop, the utility may not be able to cover 
its revenue requirement and will probably pursue a rate hike or cuts in its conservation 
budget. In addition to this indirect effect (cost-induced conservation), these measures 
decrease sales directly by allowing people to use energy more efficiently (through low-flow 
showerheads, compact fluorescent lighting, or fuel-switching to natural gas heat). Partially 
mitigating these losses, however, are the reductions in the utility’s variable costs (such as 
fuel for its plants) that result from lower demand. These reductions should act to lower the 
revenue requirement, or at least lessen the increase.
Pacific Power, for example, has charged residential customers in northwest Montana 
according to a declining block rate.
34 MPC, for example, has charged residential customers according to a seasonally 
differentiated inverted block rate (inverted in the winter, but not in the summer).
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It is important to distinguish between rates and bills. Even with rate increases to 
cover conservation programs, customers may see lower total bills (which is what they 
actually pay and should be more concerned with). The energy charge depends upon two 
things: the amount of energy used and the price per unit energy (the rate). These are 
multiplied to determine the amount of money due (in addition to the customer charge). If 
there is a rate increase o f 1 % to fund conservation programs, but the conservation programs 
allow you to use 3% less energy, the rate increase actually saves you money.^5
In order to remove the financial bias of utilities against conservation, fuel switching, 
and progressive rate designs, environmentalists and state regulators (and some utilities) 
devised an alternative approach to ratemaking which breaks (“decouples”) the link between
utility sales and utility earnings.36 Under decoupling, a utility’s earnings are preestablished
and remain independent of actual sales. The utility no longer has an incentive to encourage 
consumption or discourage conservation. If demand exceeds expectations, the extra income 
is returned to ratepayers in the form of rate cuts. If sales come in below estimates, the utility 
is compensated for its shortfall by a rate hike surcharge in the future.37 This decreases
both shipwreck potential and windfall opportunities making the utility a more stable 
investment. An added advantage is that with a guaranteed income level, any cost reductions 
that a utility makes — say, through efficiency improvements — increases its profits for that 
year. Customers too can benefit from such improvements in the form of rate reductions in 
subsequent years.
Decoupling has proven an effective tool in curbing the natural inclination of utilities 
to promote power sales. But as with other progressive rate structures, it is likely that 
decoupling will fall prey to deregulation. In a competitive environment, rates will be 
determined more by the market than by regulators, and utility revenues will be tied more 
closely than ever to sales. If a company doesn’t cover its costs, it no longer has the luxury
NCAC, "Plugging People into Power," 59.
36 Smeloff, 121,18.
37 Smeloff, 21. Note that this creates a slight negative incentive for conservation from the 
customer’s point o f view. But because the customer enjoys the full benefit of the 
conservation improvement while paying only a tiny share of the increased revenue 
requirement, he or she still comes out ahead. The customer will still be able to see a net 
reduction in his or her power bills, even with a rate increase.
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of imposing a rate hike on its captive customers (and, in fact, a common market price will 
effectively preclude any rate increase by acting as a ceiling for what may be charged). 
Instead, the utility must resort to either cutting costs or increasing sales, by finding new 
customers or encouraging consumption.^^
Conservation / DSM — Public Purpose Funding 
As discussed above, conservation programs are seldom popular with utilities under
traditional regulation and even less so in a deregulated environment.^^ And, of course, in a
deregulated environment, regulators are in less of a position to require them. Some of the 
forces responsible for deregulation have also acted to undercut funding for public purpose 
programs, especially conservation. For a time, conservation represented one of the lowest 
cost resource options available to utilities (even before considering externalities), but a 
recent abundance of cheap natural gas and the emergence of highly efficient combustion 
turbines have imperiled demand-side management (DSM) investments. In other words, 
since the early 1990s when conservation programs reached their greatest levels of support, 
both in Montana and elsewhere, the capital costs of new construction — the “avoided
costs”— have dropped, decreasing the ability of conservation to save utilities money 
And deregulation only made them more risky (although it also makes new power plant 
construction more risky, which is also a cost to be considered)."^ ̂  As we have seen, many 
of these programs became victims of virtual deregulation, suffering drastic cuts even before 
restructuring laws were formalized.
But a number of strategies have been proposed to help salvage these programs in the 
transition to a market-based retail electricity system. The first is the stipulation that the 
universal system benefits charge be collected by the local distribution utility (as a “lines
charge”), as is the case under Montana’s deregulation law.^2 This arrangement has a
38 Smeloff, 99.
39 DEQ, "Restructuring the Electric Utility Industry in Montana,” 9.
"̂ 0 Smeloff, 61. Thompson, Elizabeth B., "Poisoned Power," A Clean Air Network Report, 
25.
Brennan, 101.
42 Smeloff, 101.
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number of benefits over the alternative, in which the charge is collected by energy supply 
companies. First, the distribution company, which will continue to be a regulated monopoly, 
has no vested interest in the sale of kilowatt-hours and therefore no aversion to successful 
conservation programs (but only if the distribution charges are fixed, rather than
variable).43 This arrangement diminishes the historic conflict that made decoupling
necessary. The distribution company (or “disco”) is compensated for the use o f its lines, 
not for the amount of energy consumed. In other words, because distribution costs tend to 
be fixed (although MPC has historically pushed for mill-based distribution rates), and 
because the disco will be able to depend on a captive customer base, the disco’s profits will 
be insulated from declining energy sales. Logistic ally, using a single company (and one 
that has a known track record in Montana) as the “collection agency” for each service area 
is more efficient than using multiple and sometimes unknown or out-of-state companies. 
Because it is insulated from the risks of competition, the distribution company enjoys a 
higher degree of stability and provides a more reliable option over the long term than its 
energy supply counterparts. Finally, it makes sense that as a mandatory charge, the USBC 
would be implemented by a regulated entity.
Some of restructuring’s proponents argue, however, that public purpose programs 
ultimately do not belong under the authority of the distribution utility. Instead, they 
advocate deregulating as many functions as possible, including metering, billing, and energy 
efficiency programs based on a belief that markets will develop to provide these or any other 
desirable service. If people truly value energy efficiency services, the reasoning goes, they 
will be willing to purchase them as a service option from their energy supply company or a
more specialized c o m p a n y  .'^4 An energy supply company would be willing to offer these
programs first because there is a demand for them, and second because DSM programs can 
improve a company’s image — a valuable commodity in a competitive market. Given the 
switching frenzy that has characterized long-distance telephone service, anything that can
help build customer loyalty and lead to long-term contracts is priceless.45 And yet we have
Note that this is true only to the extent that utilities separate their regulated and 
deregulated activities.
DEQ, "Restructuring the Electric Utility Industry in Montana,” 9.
45 Smeloff, 130.
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seen that electric utilities often consider such programs liabilities in a competitive 
environment.
A second strategy, already alluded to, would help preserve public purposes by 
basing the distribution company’s revenues on customers served instead of energy sold. 
While this approach would help remove any remaining internal bias against DSM 
programs, it would also work against cost-induced conservation by relying on fixed rather 
than variable charges. But considering that cost-induced conservation is an indirect effect, 
whereas DSM programs reduce energy usage directly and therefore more efficiently, this is 
an acceptable tradeoff.^6
Finally, conservation programs are likely to fare better if administered or overseen 
by a third-party, independent organization. This arrangement helps ensure the responsible
use of funds and would provide some external accountability .^7
It is important to take a brief look at some of the benefits provided by utility- 
sponsored conservation programs, to appreciate the importance of preserving them in a 
deregulated environment. One important advantage of DSM programs is that they directly 
involve a utility’s customers, who might otherwise be unaware of the savings they might 
achieve, in terms of both energy and money. Aside from being informed and motivated, 
many customers may be unable to afford the upfront costs associated with energy efficiency 
improvements, unless they can recoup those costs in a relatively short payback period of, 
say, a few months.48 Utilities, on the other hand, are used to investments with payback
horizons upwards of 40 years and have historically been able to help their customers over 
this cost barrier (by providing loans, for example). But their ability and willingness to do so 
may be reduced by deregulation, especially considering that the unpaid portions of similar
investments in the past are now being considered stranded costs.'^^
46 Smeloff, 101.
47 Smeloff, 101.
48 Smeloff, 17.
49 NCAC, "Plugging People into Power," 25. Smeloff, 17.
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Renewable Energy — Public Purpose Funding
While investments in renewable energy research, development, and demonstration 
projects do not pose quite the perceived threat to utility profits as have conservation 
programs, support has nevertheless been limited, and is further imperiled by restructuring.
In the past, when resource planning was a public process overseen by regulatory 
commissions and utilities had monopoly franchises, long-term societal goals could be 
pursued. In a competitive environment, however, with energy firms in charge of their own
planning, decisions will be made with more of an eye toward the company’s bottom line.^^
Here again, a non-bypassable, universal system benefits charge, assessed as a lines charge 
and responsibly administered by an independent organization, probably offers the best 
solution.
While MPC has traditionally allocated fewer dollars to renewables than 
conservation, renewables have suffered a less drastic cutback and even received a boost 
under M FC’s transition plan to a record $1 million each year through 2003 (see figure 1, 
page 19). The same year that MFC cut its conservation budget by 67% renewables were 
trimmed too, but by a more modest 32%. Although renewable energy sources are quickly 
becoming competitive with conventional power plants, most applications still require short­
term supports before sufficient economies of scale or technological improvements make 
them fully independent. A number of compelling arguments justify allocating public dollars 
toward renewable energy commercialization. First, the process of ramping up production 
and demand in order to make these technologies cost-effective happens only once, and is 
not unlike the public investments and government markets that were instrumental in getting 
the railroad, aerospace, electronics, computer, and telecommunications industries off the
ground.^ 1 Second, such subsidies would provide important societal benefits that extend 
well beyond the environmental advantages of sustainable non-polluting power.52 Breaking
Brennan, 125.
Note that wind is already the world’s fastest growing energy source, and photovoltaics 
are second. Mazza, “How the Northwest Can Lead a Clean Energy Revolution,” An 
Atmosphere Alliance Special Report, 5, 6.
52 Smeloff, 49, 134.
132
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
our national dependence on imported fossil fuels alone would have myriad b e n e f i t s . Xn
addition, studies have shown that renewable energy carries a greater economic development
potential than do fossil fuels, with more jobs created per dollar invested.^'^ Finally, the
funding levels fietitioned for by environmentalists are modest when placed in comparison to 
other government subsidies. According to the Business Council for a Sustainable Energy 
Future, if renewables were given the same supports and subsidies currently enjoyed by the
fossil fuel industry, they would become competitive ove rn igh t . I n s t ead ,  renewable energy
companies are trying to compete on an uphill playing field -  taxes alone may be as high as
twice those paid by fossil-fuel companies.^^
As discussed above (under Integrated Resource Planning), the late 1970s and early 
1980s created conditions supportive of renewable energy development. But until recently, 
low natural gas prices and low avoided costs have slowed the annual growth of new
renewable energy capacity (9.7% in 1989; 1.2% in 1 9 9 3 ) . Numerous renewable energy
projects have been delayed or abandoned because of uncertainties created by deregulation, 
and also because of the energy surpluses that lasted through the 1990s (which drove prices
down and raised questions concerning the need for new capacity).^8 But as Ed Smeloff
and Peter Asmus correctly forecasted in their book. Reinventing Electric Utilities.
[T]he surplus power market is not going to last forever. Sooner or later older and 
less-efficient power plants will be closed by competitive forces. As supply and 
demand come into balance, the price for power during peak periods of the year will 
rise. This will create opportunities for solar and other renewable technologies to
enter the market.
It is important to remember during the lows in natural gas prices,, are historically very fickle, 
times of low-cost natural and that ultimately, this fossil fuel is by definition in finite supply.
Smeloff, 136.
54 Gelbspan, 97.
55 Gelbspan, 97.
56 Brennan, 125.
57 Brennan, 124.
58 Smeloff, 115, 163, 167.
59 Smeloff, 73-74.
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and it is a fuel with a long history of price volatility. In the meantime, renewables may find 
it difficult to compete.
One possible solution, reminiscent of the approach taken by social-costing policies, 
is to look at costs more comprehensively. According to Resources for the Future, “some 
analysts have suggested that, with proper pricing of transmission, the advantages of 
localized generation will be recognized; changing the mix of generation facilities from large 
generators serving wide areas to smaller, more localized plants will lead to a greater use of
some forms of renewable technologies.”^^ There is a strong case to be made that the
future of energy production will be in distributed generation (dispersed, small-scale units), 
and that renewables will feature prominently in such a world. Smeloff and Asmus 
comment, “There is no doubt that the forces of competition can only accelerate a trend to 
smaller generation facilities, less waste, and fewer large investments in infrastructure,” a 
somewhat ironic development in light of the recent trend in utility mergers.^ ̂  According to
Amory Lovins of the Rocky Mountain Institute, over the long term, what he calls a “soft”
energy path is bound to prevail;
Rather than hierarchical mega-monopolies commanding a brittle copper and 
aluminum web hooked to resource-intensive nuclear and coal plants, there will be 
resilient networks connecting manifold, diverse, and decentralized power plants. 
Many of these plants will be renewable, buffered by elegant small-scale energy 
storage systems; all will be managed by the distributed intelligence o f local adaptive 
controls; and all will support customer devices that far more efficiently transform
electricity into hot showers, cold beer, and other desired s e r v i c e s . ^ 2
Moving away from the centralized power stations of the past not only emphasizes 
more efficient and cleaner technologies, but it reduces the need for costly transmission lines 
(construction, maintenance, operation, etc.) making smaller units competitive even if they 
generate more expensive power. It also eliminates the ancillary concerns of power losses 
(which amount to about 6.2% of the electricity generated in the U.S.), siting, and
electromagnetic fields.63 Ultimately, we may see fuel-cell generators in each individual
household and business, thereby eliminating the need for both power lines and electric 
Brennan, 125.
Smeloff, 4, 158.
62 Smeloff, xii.
63 Smeloff, 155-157.
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companies. A trend toward distributed generation would lower overall emissions, but it 
would also concentrate those emissions near population centers, which would potentially 
magnify their health impacts.^^
Environmental Laws — Command-and-Control vs. Incentive-Based 
As we have seen, it is likely that both integrated resource planning and progressive 
rate structures will be adversely affected by deregulation. Utility-sponsored conservation 
and renewable energy programs have already begun to suffer the effects of virtual 
deregulation and limited universal system benefits support (see Chapter 2, “Another 
Opposition Argument — Stranded Benefits”). But how might deregulation affect our 
pollution control and siting laws? While there is no direct relationship between regulations 
designed to protect the environment and the regulation of utilities, it is likely that 
restructuring will influence the nature, level, and effectiveness of our environmental laws. 
But before exploring how, it will be helpful to first look at the kinds of laws currently used 
to combat pollution generated by electric utilities, particularly atmospheric emissions.
There are two primary legal strategies for controlling or reducing pollution which 
can be likened, more or less, to the proverbial carrot and stick. The first type (the stick) is 
known as command-and-control regulation. Such laws establish limits for individual 
emitters or for ambient concentrations in an “airshed.” Command-and-control laws can 
also be used to mandate the use of specific pollution control technologies, as was the case 
with smokestack scrubbers required for new power plants under the 1977 amendments to
the federal Clean Air Act.^5
In order to be effective, such laws require vigilant monitoring and enforcement. 
Also, limits must be strict enough to provide meaningful protections for human health and 
the environment, and penalties must be substantial enough to provide real disincentives for
even the wealthiest corporations.^^ While the first two criteria -  monitoring and
enforcement — are mostly a matter of political will and resources, the latter two — setting 
Brennan, 119.
Brennan, 115.
66 So-called “right to know” laws can also provide an important disincentive by allowing 
the media and citizens to publicize violations.
135
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
limits and penalties — pose significant and difficult scientific and ethical questions. 
Accurately determining the risks imposed by pollution from a given plant is a tremendously 
contentious and inexact process. Even more problematic is what is done with the results: 
How do we morally justify an additional “one-in-a-million” cancer cases or deaths? The 
debate over command-and-control laws resembles the one concerning externalities. While 
incorporating externalities and legislating pollution control are far preferable to the 
alternatives, both carry implicit assumptions (that finite financial values can be assigned to 
entities of immeasurable worth, and that at some level pollution and its effects can be 
justified by the societal benefits of industry) that should be evaluated in the context of 
environmental ethics.
This concern is intensified when dealing with incentive-based regulations, i.e., 
regulations that attempt to give industry a nonpunitive economic reason (the carrot) for 
reducing pollution. A good example is the tradable emission credits concept included in the 
1990 Clean Air Act amendments. An aggregate national pollution cap is determined (which 
can be reduced over time) and individual companies are granted pollution rights under that 
cap. If the company finds a way to reduce its emissions it no longer needs the credit, which 
it can then sell for a profit. This mechanism can tip the scale to make an investment in
pollution control equipment economical.^^
Yet, creating a legal property right to pollute strikes some as not only disturbing but 
profoundly unethical. Subsequently giving this “right” to companies free of charge rises
to the level of intolerable, adding fiscal insult to ethical i n j u r y A s  Mark Dowie puts it,
“In effect. Congress has created a valuable financial commodity out of the right to emit
toxic gases and, instead of selling it, donated it to the electric utility i n d u s t r y . ” ^ ^  That a
company can augment this handout (in theory, without limit) by purchasing additional 
“rights” sends a message that not only is it acceptable to pollute, but that it is acceptable in
67 Dowie, 109-111.
68 To be fair, command-and-control pollution limits also grant this “right” free-of-charge. 
Both systems can be used to ratchet down the pollution levels. Furthermore, by allowing 
the highest bidder to obtain pollution the permit, the emission credits system tries to assure 
that those activities that produce the most valuable output do the polluting rather than a 
business producing little o f value.
69 Dowie, 111.
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proportion to a company’s financial resources. Furthermore, because the initial allocation 
of these pollution permits depends partly on historic emission rates, dirty plants are 
rewarded and clean plants penalized. This situation is especially troubling in a deregulated 
market in which they have to compete against each other. Finally, while these emission 
reduction credits (ERCs) can be effective in lowering national pollution totals, local areas 
can experience dramatic increases in pollution. Midwest utilities, for example, have been 
able to continue burning high-sulfur coal, increase their emissions, and further aggravate the
downwind acid rain problem by purchasing ERCs.^0 some argue that while the
geographic problem is a real one, it is the result of drawing the “bubble” in which the 
permit can be used too large. In general, pollution allowances have proved to be both 
popular and profitable; taking them away would be politically difficult.
Pollution Taxes and Subsidies 
Another example of incentive-based regulations is pollution taxes. Carbon taxes 
have long been used in western Europe to combat carbon dioxide emissions and to raise
money for environmentally beneficial programs.^ ̂  Norway and Sweden assess taxes at a
rate of at least $20 per ton of C 02  released, which raises the price of electricity from coal-
fired plants by about 2 cents per kilowatt-hour.^^ To a large extent, carbon taxes are fuel-
blind in that they affect all types of fossil fuel burning (although not exactly equally, with 
some fuels being more carbon intensive than others). Hence, they do not cause fuel- 
switching to more polluting alternatives such as gasoline-powered lawn m o w e r s .^ ^
Gasoline, natural gas, and electricity derived from burning fossil fuels would all be more 
expensive (with prices that more accurately reflect their true costs). Here again, consumer 
organizations and environmentalists might be at odds with each other because of the 
tradeoff between increased bills — unless the revenues from the tax are applied to energy
^ 0 Dowie, 109-1II . See alsoGelbspan, 127.
Gelbspan, 126.
72 $20/ton X 1 ton/2000 lbs x 2 lbs C02/kw h = 2 cents / kwh. Nagusky, “Global Climate 
Change,” Regulatory Assistance Project, 37.
73 Brennan, 122.
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efficiency programs — and cost-induced conservation. Low-income groups might also 
object that such taxes impose an unfair burden on the poor, who have a more difficult time 
paying an extra two cents per kilowatt-hour.
The United States has thus far shunned carbon taxes. Instead, the fossil fuel 
industry currently enjoys roughly $20 billion in tax breaks and other benefits annually, 
which accounts for 69% of U.S. energy subsidies. By comparison, subsidies for renewable 
energy only amount to 14%.^4 These statistics are not entirely surprising, nor easily 
reversed considering the economic and political clout of the fossil fuel industry. According 
to Ross Gelbspan, author of The Heat Is On: The High Stakes Battle over Earth’s 
Threatened Climate. “Together, oil and coal constitute the biggest single industry in history. 
Big oil alone does well over a trillion dollars a year in business.”^^
Effects of Restructuring on Environmental Laws
Command-and-control and incentive-based approaches to regulation both have their 
strengths and weaknesses. To a certain extent, these complement each another. 
Undoubtedly, the optimum strategy for controlling and reducing pollution involves some 
combination of both the stick and the carrot, regardless of the stmcture of the industry. But 
with deregulation, the best mix may be somewhat different. There appears to be agreement 
that incentive-based regulations tend to work better in a competitive environment than they 
do in a regulated one. With restructuring, therefore, incentive-based approaches will likely
achieve greater p ro m in e n c e .B e y o n d  the obvious ideological similarities (incentive-based 
regulations can be thought of as market-based themselves), cost-cutting incentives simply 
get better results when a company is facing competition. The same forces that are leading 
utilities to gut conservation programs will also make utilities interested in reducing pollution 
if it allows them to profit by doing so (with the sale of ERCs). As regulated monopolies.
74 Gelbspan, 97-98. Mazza, “How the Northwest Can Lead a Clean Energy Revolution,’’ 
An Atmosphere Alliance Special Report, 5.
75 Gelbspan, 5.
76 Apart from sharing a more similar hands-off philosophy of government, incentives work 
better in a competitive market stmcture because survival pressures are more acute. Brennan, 
114.
138
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
economic incentives can disappear because costs can almost always be passed on to 
customers. A company is more apt to continue polluting and purchasing credits if it can 
rely on a captive customer base to reimburse these costs.^?
In its 1996 legislative briefing packet, the Montana DEQ had the following to say 
about the effects of deregulation on both traditional and incentive-based environmental laws;
Restructuring alone probably will not do great damage to environmental 
quality. Utilities are subject to a wide range of direct environmental regulations, 
including facility siting regulation, air and water quality regulation, and the use of 
tradable S02 allowances. Maintaining the integrity of existing environmental laws 
will ensure that the deregulation of generation and the restructuring of the industry 
does not result in wholesale damage to the environment. Nevertheless, concurrent 
efforts to relax environmental regulation, combined with restructuring, could in the 
future lead to significant loss of regulatory control over environmental degradation. 
This is a particular risk if changes in prices or technology make a polluting 
technology the most attractive generating alternative.
To protect the environment in a restructured industry, we should consider 
greater use of market-based environmental regulation such as tradable emissions 
allowances, and pollution taxes. A commitment to maintain siting and environmental 
regulation, together with restructuring legislation, might alleviate the worry some 
may have about a future return to dirty plants in a competitive industry.
The Washington, D.C.-based Resources for the Future echoed this analysis, 
asserting that “restructuring may have limited implications for the environment” assuming
the “continuing presence of a federal and state structure for environmental r e g u l a t i o n . ” ^ ^  
But environmentalists contend that, unfortunately, such assumptions were not warranted.
The block quote above shows a degree of alignment between DEQ and the 
conservation community leading up to the 1997 session (a somewhat rare phenomenon in 
recent years). As discussed in Chapter 2, environmental groups such as MEIC did not 
oppose the concept o f deregulation itself so much as they opposed the particulars of SB 
390, and for some of the very reasons identified by DEQ. During the 1997 legislature, they 
did in fact witness those “concurrent efforts to relax environmental regulation,” with bills 
such as SB 224, weakening the Major Facility Siting Act (see section immediately
Brennan, 127.
78 DEQ, "Restructuring the Electric Utility Industry in Montana,” 10.
79 Brennan, 127.
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f o l l o w i n g ) .Equally worrisome was the absence of strong public benefits programs,
market-based regulations, or other environmental benefits (such as net metering or 
renewable portfolio standards) as part of SB 390 to replace what was being lost. In short, 
they felt there was no evidence of any real “commitment to maintain siting and 
environmental regulation,” as described by DEQ above.
As a final note, governmental bodies such as DEQ or the PSC will have a more 
difficult time overseeing the operations of energy companies in a deregulated world. 
Diminished authority, limited resources, and the entrance of additional energy supply 
providers could make the job of enforcing those laws that do remain on the books more 
challenging. Such a climate can only increase the likelihood that companies will cut comers 
and possibly even break laws, especially in light of competitive pressures.
New Development and the Maior Facilitv Siting Act 
Changes in the structure of the electricity industry are partly grounded in, and partly 
responsible for changes in the technologies and fuels used to generate electricity. These 
changes, in turn, have implications for the location and size of power plants, and for their
environmental impacts.^ 1 Under deregulation, much of any new development will likely be
in the form of natural gas combustion turbines. Eventually, other small-scale, efficient, and 
modular technologies (including both fuel cells and renewable energy projects) should also 
emerge as favored energy sources. In the meantime, however, some observers have 
predicted that deregulation could lead to an increased reliance on coal. If it does, the eastern 
plains of Montana could again come under considerable pressure from development 
interests.
The controversy over the Tongue River Railroad, originally proposed 20 years ago 
to ship coal between Decker and Miles City, has resurfaced in light of these conditions. 
Some believe that both deregulation and the 1990 Clean Air Act will create a greater demand
80 The 1997 session was considered among the most anti-environment in recent history. 
MEIC’s average approval rating for legislators was 37%, rivaled only by the 1995 session 
at 32%. Down to Earth: A membership publication of the Montana Environmental 
Information Center. June 1995 and June 1997.
81 Brennan, 116.
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for southeastern Montana’s low-sulfur coal (mostly subbituminous and lignite, which 
happen to have relatively low heat c o n t e n t ) . Others argue that the principal beneficiaries
would be Wyoming producers (with higher quality coal) and electricity consumers in the 
Midwest. On the losing end would be the Montana ranchers, who would lose their lands 
for right-of-way purposes, and the natural environment which would suffer the inevitable 
impacts of increased mining activity in the Powder River Basin.83
Beyond such fuel-cycle costs, deregulation could signal an increase in the 
development of generation and transmission facilities in Montana. Montana is already a net 
exporter of low-cost electrical energy with around 40% of made-in-Montana energy
currently shipped out o f state. 84 in a nationally competitive electricity market, these low-
cost and relatively clean energy resources (hydro, natural gas, and low sulfur coal) will be 
highly prized and courted.
In addition to the deregulation bill, the 1997 Montana legislature passed another 
measure, SB 224, which makes the development of these resources easier by weakening the 
Major Facility Siting Act (MFSA). The Siting Act (found in Title 75, Chapter 20 of the 
Montana Code Annotated) was passed in the 1970s (originally in 1973 as the “Utility 
Siting Act” before becoming the MFSA in 1975) as a response to increasing pressures for 
Montana to develop its energy resources. The 1971 Bureau of Reclamation North Central 
Power Study envisioned the construction of twenty-one massive coal-fired power plants in 
eastern Montana, and an additional twenty-one to be located in Wyoming and the 
Dakotas.85 While the power from these projects was destined for population centers
elsewhere, the environmental and social impacts would have remained at home making 
Montana what some termed, the “boiler room of the nation.” The Siting Act developed 
into one of Montana’s bedrock environmental laws, specifying that large-scale energy
82 Tom Howard, “Tongue River plan started with 1980s synfuels legislation, gained steam 
again with passage of 1990’s Clean Air Act,” IR, 9 August 1998. Malone, Montana: A 
History of Two Centuries. 337.
83 Erin P. Billings, “After 20 years, is coal railroad ready to roll?” IR, 9 August 1998.
84 Alan Davis, DEQ, “Electricity in Montana — an Overview,” T.A.C. Report, November 
1997.
83 Malone, Montana: A Historv of Two Centuries, 339.
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projects (for example, power generating facilities greater than 50 Megawatts) could not 
proceed without a “certificate of environmental compatibility and public need.”
Long under attack, the Siting Act was significantly modified in 1997. The 
requirement that proposals for new generation facilities demonstrate “public need” was 
stripped out based on the argument that deregulation rendered it obsolete. In the past, to 
prevent utilities from building unneeded power plants, costs could not enter the rates until 
approved by the PSC. In the early 1980s, for example, the PSC disallowed Montana 
Power’s initial request to include Colstrip Unit 3 in rates on the grounds that the power was
not “used and useful” in providing utility service to Montana c u s t o m e r s . W h i l e  the
PSC would no longer provide that role, the legislature felt confident that market forces 
would accomplish the same objective, and with greater success. Although environmentalists 
agreed that the previous system did not always work flawlessly (see block quote in the 
section on “Efficiency of the Electricity System” below), they felt that simultaneously 
removing the protections offered by both the PSC and the MFSA was a misguided 
approach. SB 224 also created a fast-track review process, removed from consideration 
numerous environmental impacts, and limited the Act’s applicability. Environmentalists 
charged that weakening the Siting Act just as Montana was again facing the prospect of 
major energy development was reckless and irresponsible.
Others, however, felt that the changes made to the Act would have little actual effect, 
arguing that new development (especially large facilities with long payback periods) is 
unlikely at this time. A surplus of power in the Pacific Northwest throughout the 1990s and 
the uncertainty caused by deregulation made building new capacity risky. Energy 
companies are no longer assured recovery of large investments of capital from captive 
ratepayers. And with competition on the horizon, companies are naturally more inclined to 
cut costs than incur new debt. Any new development that might occur would likely be 
small, modular units that automatically escape Siting Act review because of their size, even
before the ehanges enacted in 1997.^^ Finally, there are questions regarding the
transmission system’s ability to carry additional power out of state, and the cost-
Personal telephone conversation with Tim Baker, DEQ, 15 August 2000. 
DEQ, "Restructuring the Electric Utility Industry in Montana,” 10.
142
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
effectiveness of doing so.^^ One DEQ official pointed out that there has been no new 
generation built in the state since the completion of Colstrip 4 in 1986, nor was any 
anticipated in the “foreseeable future.” He conceded that conditions were liable to
change.^9
In January 1999, it appeared that the “foreseeable future” might have arrived, when 
a Las Vegas company announced plans to build four 500-Megawatt power plants near Red
L o d g e . T h e  company also proposed mining 250 million tons of coal in the area for fuel.
The 2000 Megawatts of power would be conveyed out of state to Wisconsin via a new 850-
mile transmission line.^1 In addition to rekindling the debate over the need for a strong
facility siting act, this proposal highlights a number of concerns held by consumer and 
environmental advocates. Deregulation is creating a national marketplace for electricity, and 
with “open access” to the transmission grid, the incidence of long-distance power sales will
inevitably i n c r e a s e . T h i s  could work against Montanans in a number of ways. First,
consumers could lose control over their low-cost power if it is shipped to more lucrative
markets (such as Wisconsin).^^ Second, restructuring also increases the possibility that
the proceeds from the sale of this power will also flow out-of-state (in this case, to Las
Vegas). Meanwhile, the environmental costs -  degraded landscapes and compromised air 
Brennan, 117.
Erin P. Billings, “New state siting act is not expected to have much effect,” IR, 7 June 
1997.
Environmentalists are skeptical that these plants will ever be developed, because of the 
expense and risk. But another proposal to build a 500-Megawatt combined-cycle natural 
gas plant in Butte is taken more seriously. The project would consume over two million 
gallons of water a day from Warm Springs Creek. The summer of 2000 saw energy 
shortages develop in the Pacific Northwest and elsewhere leading to radically increased 
electricity prices, and significant pressure to develop new capacity and to perhaps further 
weaken laws such as the MFSA. Personal telephone conversation with Jim Jensen, MEIC, 
16 August 2000. Jeff Barber, “New Power Plant Proposed for Butte,” Down to Earth: A 
membership publication of the Montana Environmental Information Center, August 2000.
91 Erin P. Billings, “Proposed coal generation plant has yet to apply for permits,” IR, 11 
May 1999.
92 Note that in the long term, distributed generation may counter this trend.
93 This problem could be addressed, if the divestiture were to be accompanied by a payment 
to customers of the market value of that low cost power, or if some other mechanism could 
be devised to help reclaim this value (such as an excise tax on exported power which would 
provide refunds for Montana ratepayers).
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and water quality — and social costs — boom and bust development — of acquiring the fuel, 
generating the power, and sending it across new high-voltage power lines are left behind. 
This phenomenon, where the beneficiaries of a project live in one part of the country while 
those paying for the externalized costs live in another, can be termed “regional 
environmental cost-shifting.”
Such cost-shifting can also occur on a more local scale. The practice of locating 
generating plants and power lines away from population centers decreases the total 
incidence of health impacts, but too often shifts those impacts onto rural populations and
areas with significant ecological, scenic, or recreational value.94
Regional Environmental Cost-Shifting 
In addition to deregulation’s effects on the probability and nature of new power 
plant and power line construction, restructuring is already having effects on the operation of 
the existing fleet of power plants, with significant environmental ramifications. Because 
there are some strong disincentives to new power plant construction under deregulation, 
utilities may tend to run existing (old and dirty) plants longer than they otherwise would 
have.95 in other words, the normal process of switching out “dinosaur” plants in favor of
more modern and efficient facilities is disrupted.96 And many of these old and dirty plants
have already increased their production of both power and pollution to take advantage of
open access to the transmission system.^7
Because there remain large discrepancies in the price of electricity in different 
regions of the country, relatively low-cost (but not necessarily low-pollution) generators are
^4 Brennan, 118.
Regulatory Assistance Project, 37.
Simply upgrading what are fundamentally inefficient and archaic power generating 
technologies, however, is of limited long-term environmental benefit. And note too, that the 
opposite argument has been made: That with open access, new suppliers will enter the 
competitive fray with efficient low-cost resources that will gradually replace older plants and 
improve the efficiency of the system. See “Decommissioning,” below. Brennan, 13.
Brennan, 117, 126.
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able to sell power to distant markets for a large profit.^^ Old coal-fired power plants in the
Midwest provide the textbook example, and have been the subject of several studies 
regarding the environmental repercussions of FERC’s order 888. These facilities have both
an incentive to sell power to distant markets and the ability to increase output.^^ On
average, America’s electricity industry runs at only about one-half its maximum operating 
capacity, with some plants running at only ten percent (meaning that in a year’s time, they 
produce only one-tenth the number of kilowatt-hours they could if running f u l l - b o r e ) . ^ 0 0  
Pollution created by power plants in the Ohio River Valley is carried into the Great Lakes 
area. New England, and parts of Canada. Too, wind transports not only pollution but the 
costs associated with mitigating that pollution. This situation is grossly unfair, considering 
that Northeast industries have already invested considerable resources in pollution 
controls.
To more fully determine the environmental implications of restructuring through this 
effect (the increase in output at existing plants), other questions must first be answered. 
What portion of this increased generation is replacing other generation sources, what were 
their environmental impacts, and what portion is meeting new demand? What are the 
relative environmental impacts of the old and new generation sources? In other words, is 
there a net gain or loss? How much of the new demand is attributable to deregulation? 
Depending on their answers to these questions, various studies have predicted as much as 
10,000 extra Megawatts o f coal-fired generation — the equivalent of ten large power plants -
- with an annual increase of half a million tons of nitrogen o x id e s .  1^2 Market-based
approaches similar to the S 02  program have been proposed to help address such increases
98 Note that part of the reason these old and inefficient plants can generate low-cost power 
is because grandfather provisions in the Clean Air Act do not require the same pollution 
controls of them as of newer plants. Thompson, Elizabeth B., "Poisoned Power," A Clean 
Air Network Report, 18, 21-22.
99 Brennan, 117.
100 Because electricity is not easily stored, the generation system was built to accommodate 
the highest conceivable (peak) power demand. Excess capacity can also be attributed to 
inefficiencies o f the regulated monopoly system, where regulators sometimes failed to 
sufficiently scrutinize what turned out to be unneeded power plants. Smeloff, 76.
101 Smeloff, 143.
102 Brennan, 117.
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in NOx. Before generating additional power to sell into outside markets, each plant would 
have to either add sufficient pollution controls to prevent any increase in emissions or 
purchase “emissions offsets” to fund equivalent pollution reduction efforts at nearby 
facilities (see the discussion of incentive-based regulation a b o v e ) .  103
In some ways, the situation in the Midwest is the converse o f the Montana situation 
described above. In the Midwest, profits from the sale of electricity stay behind while the 
environmental impacts are exported. But both can be seen as examples of regional 
environmental cost-shifting.
Efficiency of the Electricity System
As demonstrated by the Midwest example, the emphasis on short-term prices that 
arises in a competitive environment combined with open access to the nation’s transmission 
grid may act to favor increasing production at old and polluting plants over building new, 
more compliant (and more expensive) plants. And yet one of the alleged benefits of 
restructuring is increasing the efficiency of the electricity system. With regard to efficiency 
as with most other areas, the effects of deregulation are somewhat mixed and confusing. It 
is important to remember that the old system was hardly a model o f economy and 
efficiency. When criticizing deregulation, environmentalists need to be careful not to end up 
defending the historic system which resulted in our current network of inefficient
centralized power stations. To understand the “failure of traditional utility planning” one
needs to look no farther than the WPPSS nightmare, and the regional plan, of which it was a
part, that had called for 26 new large coal and nuclear plants in the Pacific N orthw est.!^
In addition to over-enthusiastic projections of demand, other factors contributed to 
the construction (or attempted construction) of numerous large and unnecessary power 
plants. As mentioned above, the electricity industry currently mns at very low capacities. 
This is partly the result of “building for the peaks.” Utilities need enough power to meet 
the maximum demand put on the system, even if it only occurs one day out of the year. 
Furthermore, with traditional power plants, ramping up and down to meet a highly variable
103 Brennan, 126.
104 Smeloff, 119.
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demand curve is uneconomical, inefficient and, of course, polluting. Most machines run at 
optimal efficiency at some steady-state level of output (for the same reason that cars get 
better gas mileage on the highway than in town). 105 strategies such as DSM, load- 
management, regional exchanges, and time-of-use pricing can avoid these losses by 
flattening out the seasonal and daily demand c u r v e s .  106 Unfortunately, DSM may suffer
under deregulation, but the latter two strategies may be facilitated by a single national 
marketplace with more diverse pricing options, including a greater emphasis on cost of 
service.
The overcapacity of our current system also stems from the difficulties associated 
with economically storing power. Distributed generation technologies can more efficiently 
track changes in demand (which become greater as you focus in on a smaller area), and can 
be combined with new storage technologies such as flywheel batteries (which at the
distributed level are not required to store as much power). 10^
A third reason for historic overbuilding is the system of “cost plus regulation”
itself. 108 As we have seen, in a deregulated electricity market the construction of new
capacity, especially of large power plants, is riskier than before. It is to be hoped that this 
situation will limit such construction to those cases where it is truly warranted (i.e., when 
even the most conservative forecasts predict increasing demand). According to Tom Power, 
wholesale competition will.
105 Accelerating an object, be it a turbine or an automobile, requires energy. An object that 
continues moving at a constant velocity or angular velocity experiences no change in kinetic 
energy and consequently requires no energy to be supplied (other than that needed to 
overcome friction). The field of physics describes these effects in terms of conservation of 
linear and angular momentum and Newton’s laws of motion (particularly Newton’s first 
law, which can be thought of as the law of inertia).
106 The model of the large, centralized utility also helps minimize the relative fluctuations in 
demand curves, by averaging over larger geographic areas and a greater number and 
diversity of customer types.
107 Smeloff, 157.
108 Smeloff, 76.
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. .  . solve one of the most serious flaws in the earlier approach to regulating electric 
utilities: the socialization of the risk associated with the building of large coal and 
nuclear generating facilities. By shifting these risks to customers, utility owners 
could largely forget about cost and reliability. The results were the costly electric 
white elephants that litter the American landscape and environment. By making 
electric generation competitive, these risks will shift back to the private investors and 
better investment decisions, both for the customer and for the environment, are likely
to be made. 109
Ideally, assuming a level playing field can be created (see “Uniform Emission 
Standards” below), then the most efficient resources will also be the cheapest to operate and 
will be used to serve “base loads” (the minimum constant demand). Only during periods 
of peak demand would less efficient power plants come on line. 110 Xo more accurately
reflect the higher cost of generation (and to help discourage consumption), prices during 
these times would be more expensive. In reality, the complexities of a truly competitive 
market would probably preclude optimal system efficiency -  especially in Montana, which 
is unlikely to have sophisticated and centralized coordination of power sales and dispatch. 
Therefore, situations will probably occur from time to time in which power from expensive 
and dirty plants is being sold while more efficient resources sit idle. 111
Decommissionin g
Perhaps the most promising environmental benefit of deregulation is the potential 
closure (“decommissioning”) of inefficient plants due to competitive pressure from cleaner 
and cheaper alternatives. According to this theory, once regulation recedes, market forces 
will be allowed to operate, and will select for only the fittest (most efficient) generators. But 
there are at least four principal reasons why this goal might be frustrated, at least in the short 
term. First, the electricity market for Montana’s small customers thus far remains quiet, 
equally devoid o f buyers and sellers alike (see “Pilot Programs” in Chapter 6). Second, as 
already discussed, the risks associated with deregulation may favor increasing production at 
existing plants over building newer, more efficient plants (although the recent change from a 
surplus to a deficit situation in the Pacific Northwest lessens the amount of untapped
^09 Guest editorial by Thomas M. Power, “Put brakes on MPC,” GET, 5 February 1998.
Brennan, 53-54.
 ̂11 Brennan, 55.
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capacity at existing plants). Third, existing plants enjoy competitive advantages in the form 
of fossil fuel subsidies (see “Pollution Taxes and Subsidies” above) and more lenient 
emission standards (see “Uniform Emission Standards” below). And fourth, there is a 
compelling case that the recovery of stranded costs itself amounts to a subsidy which 
threatens to undermine the chances of cleaner alternatives entering the market. Then again, 
above-market contracts with independent renewable power generators mandated by PURPA 
will also likely be phased out under deregulation.
The environmental implications of decommissioning (supposing it is accelerated by 
restructuring) depend on a number of factors, including the type of power plant being 
retired and the type that ends up replacing it. For example, while environmentalists desire 
“a transition strategy that allows for the orderly phaseout of uneconomic nuclear reactors 
and replacement of this capacity with a mix of renewable energy and DSM measures,”
replacement energy will more likely come from new natural gas plants. Such a 
conversion would signify a net increase in the nation’s C 02 emissions in violation of the 
1992 Convention on Global Climate Change. The nuclear power industry has 
capitalized on this situation both as a marketing ploy and as an argument that it deserves 
special subsidies as a carbonless form of energy production. ̂  But environmentalists 
respond that artificially supporting nuclear power not only defies the premise of 
deregulation, but also amounts to a shifting of environmental risks and externalities that is 
especially egregious at a time when support for renewable energy is being slashed. Another 
problem with decommissioning nuclear energy is that it cannot simply be turned off and 
walked away from, because of substantial and ongoing safety and environmental concerns. 
And there is a substantial risk that before causing these plants to shut down, the economic 
forces of competition would lead first to workforce reductions and other cost-cutting
112 Guest editorial by William M. Ryan, “Electricity deregulation by Montanans, for 
Montanans,” GET, 30 April 1998.
113 Smeloff, 155.
114 Smeloff, 153. Some dispute this fact, pointing to the use of Tennessee Valley 
Authority coal in old polluting power plants to process the fuel for nuclear plants.
115 Paul Penn, Southwest Research and Information Center, “Nuclear Power Turns 
‘Green’ in a Deregulated Market,” The W orkbook, Fall 1999.
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measures that could jeopardize safety and reliability. In fact, such cost-cutting (and alleged 
safety violations) has already occurred at nuclear plants in New England, providing
disturbing proof o f the dangers of virtual deregulation.  ̂ This situation strongly suggests 
government intervention, if not outright nationalization of the country’s nuclear power 
plants. But such a strategy should only proceed as a means to safely retire these plants 
rather than to artificially support them over the long term.l
Stranded Costs
When discussing government support for nuclear power plants, the question of 
stranded cost recovery inevitably arises. For much of the nation, the notion of stranded 
costs has become virtually synonymous with nuclear power (this realization at least makes 
new nuclear power projects unlikely under deregulation). Although Montana has no 
nuclear power generation, the issues surrounding stranded cost recovery for out-of-market 
power plants are similar. One of the principal concerns held by environmentalists during 
the debate over SB 390 was that stranded cost recovery would preclude the
decommissioning of power plants too inefficient to compete on their own. ̂  19 Existing
plants owned by incumbent utilities already have an advantage over independent power 
producers in that at least some of their capital costs have been recovered under regulation,
even before stranded costs are awarded. 1^®
116 Smeloff, 151.
11^ Note that when England privatized its national utility, it retained ownership of the 
nuclear power plants because no company would agree to take them. Smeloff, 148, 152, 
154.
118 Smeloff, 97.
119 While stranded cost settlements do not typically provide ongoing fuel or operating 
subsidies to plants, dirty qualifying facilities may have long-term contracts for the purchase 
of their above-market power. Stranded cost recovery for QFs is common, and often 
supported by environmentalists (when the QF is a clean, renewable energy producing 
facility).
120 Brennan, 101.
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Uniform Emission Standards 
One solution that has been proposed as a compromise between utilities and 
environmentalists is to make stranded cost recovery contingent on achieving the more
stringent pollution standards required of new power plants. ̂ ^1 Grandfather exemptions
under the federal Clean Air Act apply to power plants built before 1977 — half o f the
nation’s approximately 1,000 power generating f a c i l i t i e s .  122 ^ s  the Clean Air Network
describes it:
[T]he existing regulatory and legal system has created a patchwork of environmental 
requirements for power plants depending on age, location, and fuel source. As a 
result, the difference in environmental performance between older power plants and 
newer ones is significant. This situation is unfair from a competitive perspective and 
intolerable from an environmental one. Equally rigorous environmental standards 
for all electricity generating sources is the s o lu t io n .  123
Part of the problem was a failure to place a sunset provision on the exemptions because of a 
belief that these plants would be shut down after a service life of 20 to 30 years. But as 
illustrated by the Midwest example, current conditions are acting to prolong their
lifetime. 124 The disparity in emission rates between old and modern fossil fuel plants is 
substantial, with older plants creating as much as twenty times the pollution. 125 Consistent 
standards are not only an indispensable part of free and fair competition, but are also a 
powerful tool for curbing pollution (NOx alone could be reduced by as much as 7 5 %). 126
Decommissioning could offer tremendous environmental benefits, but only if 
policymakers are serious about treating all players in a post-regulated world the same. 
Incidentally, at least one state, Massachusetts, included provisions in its deregulation
121 Smeloff, 142. Brennan, 107.
122 Thompson, Elizabeth B., "Poisoned Power," A Clean Air Network Report, 2, 18.
123 Note that “rigorous” is the key word. A level playing field is of little value if it is 
located in a swamp of mediocrity. Thompson, Elizabeth B., "Poisoned Power," A Clean Air 
Network Report, 21-22.
124 Moore, “Dying Needlessly,” REPP Issue Brief # 6, 14.
125 Smeloff, 116. Brennan, 118. Stadler, Felice, "Turn Up the Heat on Dirty Power," A 
Clean Air Network Report, 21. Thompson, Elizabeth B., "Poisoned Power," A Clean Air 
Network Report, 2, 18. Moore, “Dying Needlessly,” REPP Issue Brief # 6, 14.
126 Thompson, Elizabeth B., "Poisoned Power," A Clean Air Network Report, 2, 20.
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settlement to bring old plants up to modem standards. But in the more likely scenario
that preferential treatment for fossil fuel interests will continue, environmentalists have a 
final, more certain, and much more costly remedy available to them. Rather than waiting for 
market forces to decommission plants, the Conservation Law Foundation took the more 
direct approach of joining in a bid to purchase 18 power plants in order to shut down five of 
New England’s most polluting coal-fired f a c i l i t i e s .  128
Green Power and Green Marketing
As we have seen, waiting for the market to select for the most efficient (and 
environmentally benign) power sources can be a long and frustrating strategy. Although 
most individuals do not have the resources to simply buy out power plants they dislike, they 
may soon have the opportunity to support, in a modest way, environmentally superior 
sources o f energy. If markets do develop for small customers, it is likely that among the 
various options offered will be green power products. “Green power” refers to 
environmentally preferred electricity, especially that derived from low-impact renewable 
energy sources. Purchasing this power is a direct means of supporting the renewable 
energy industry. By ramping up production to meet a growing demand, renewable energy 
producers can achieve economies of scale that help reduce the price of their electricity, 
which makes it that much more competitive. Another, indirect advantage of green power is 
an increased awareness on the part of consumers concerning the environmental implications
of electricity and the importance of renewable e n e r g y .  129
The success of green power under deregulation depends on a number of factors, of 
which the most important is consumer interest. Public polling data consistently shows 
support for environmentally sound power, and a willingness to pay extra for it. In a 1995 
national survey, 15% indicated they would pay more for “electricity generated from cleaner
127 Moore, “Dying Needlessly,” REPP Issue Brief # 6 , 14.
128 National Journal’s Greenwire email service, 12 May 1997. See: 
http://nationaljoumal.com/pubs/greenwire/
129 Rothstein, “Green Marketing in the Massachusetts Electric Company Retail 
Competition Pilot Program, ” NREL Topical Issues Brief, 9. Holt, “Disclosure and 
Certification,” REPP Issue Brief # 5, 4.
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renewable sources,” but only about a quarter of them (26.5%) were interested if the
increase was greater than A  1997 MSU-Billings poll suggests local interest in
environmentally responsible power, with 56% of Montanans expressing a willingness to
pay higher electric rates for emission controls at power plants. 1^1 M FC’s 1995 customer
survey showed, by nearly a 2-to-l margin, a desire for the utility to move more in the
direction of environmental protection than minimizing r a te s .  1^2 Unlike decommissioning,
where market forces will only work to close a polluting plant when energy from alternative 
sources has a lower price, choosing to buy green energy can support renewable power even 
while it remains more expensive than conventional power. Consumers can expect to pay 
around 10% extra on the energy commodity portion of their bill to obtain power with a 
moderate percentage of renewable energy mixed into it. They might also choose to 
purchase an even more expensive “supergreen” product generated entirely by 
environmentally sound energy sources (but complex, multiple-tiered options with varying
percentages may cause confusion for consumers). Green options can also include
energy efficiency services, incentives, or anything which might distinguish a company or a
product as environmentally sound.
An obvious drawback to the “green power at a premium” approach is its 
fundamental economic disincentive. Those who voluntarily choose to “do the right thing” 
are penalized with higher electricity rates, as opposed to mandatory mechanisms such as 
integrated resource planning or universal system benefits charges which also support 
renewable energy. But as with command-and-control versus market-based regulations, the
best arrangement probably involves a combination of both approaches, Shifting cost
130 Smeloff, 162, 199-205.
131 36% were unwilling. “Poll: Environment favored over mining,” IR, 4 December 
1997.
132 PSC, “Request for Comments on Revised Draft Electric Restructuring Rules and 
Natural Gas and Electric Customer Protection and Information Rules,” 20 March 1998.
133 Smeloff, 163. Rothstein, “Green Marketing in the Massachusetts Electric Company 
Retail Competition Pilot Program,” NREL Topical Issues Brief, 8.
134 Holt, “The New Hampshire Retail Competition Pilot Program and the Role of Green 
Marketing,” NREL Topical Issues Brief, 6.
135 Smeloff, 145.
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analysis and resource planning away from formal public venues and toward individual 
businesses and households will inevitably involve the loss of some institutional knowledge
and perhaps degrade the quality of d e c i s io n s .  136 Although customers invariably indicate a
preference for environment-friendly power and a willingness to pay a premium for it, polls
do not always correlate with behavior. 137 Some observers feel that when actually
confronted with more expensive power, consumers will balk, preventing green power 
products from ever establishing a strong presence in the market. Tepid interest would 
postpone the time at which the price of these resources would rival that of conventionally 
generated power. Finally, there is significant debate over how exactly to define green power, 
and how to prevent unscrupulous marketers from fraudulently advertising a product as 
such. These issues are covered at greater length in the next section, “Environmental 
Disclosure and Certification.”
The green power approach is appealing in that, if successful, it could eventually 
phase itself out by helping these resources stand alone. But in order to significantly 
accelerate the commercialization of alternative power sources, sizable numbers of small 
customers must embrace green power options. Thus far, evidence from pilot programs has 
been mixed. In Massachusetts, 31% of residential customers chose a green option 
(although pilot program constraints may have led to artificially low prices for the green 
p r o d u c t s ) .  138 g y  contrast, only 3% of small business customers chose green, a
disappointing result as such customers can potentially play an important role. Nationally, 
this block of consumers has a greater energy demand than the residential sector (but in 
Montana the reverse is true — residential sales exceed commercial sales at 31.9% and 30.0% 
respectively), and yet they are small enough for decisions to be made according to the 
personal beliefs of the owner. 139 (it is difficult to imagine many large consumers basing
136 Holt, “Disclosure and Certification,” REPP Issue Brief #  5, 4.
137 Mazza, “How the Northwest Can Lead a Clean Energy Revolution,” An Atmosphere 
Alliance Special Report, 8.
138 Rothstein, “Green Marketing in the Massachusetts Electric Company Retail 
Competition Pilot Program,” NIŒ L Topical Issues Brief, 4, 8.
139 Holt, “Green Power for Business,” REPP Research Report # 1 , 1 .  Energy 
Information Administration (ElA), “State Energy Data Report 1997: Consumption 
Estimates,” September 1999, 186-188.
154
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
their energy decisions on anything other than price. Businesses may want to buy green to 
improve their image, but in most cases fiscal considerations are probably going to remain 
the bottom line.)
One group that has worked hard to encourage green power is the Renewable 
Northwest Project (RNF) in Portland, Oregon. RNP uses a two-pronged approach which 
they call “policy push, market pull.” While working to secure policies favorable for the 
growing renewable energy industry (working on the supply side), they simultaneously work 
to create consumer interest in clean energy (working on the demand side). RNP Policy 
Expert Peter West observes that cu rren t. . .
. . . low energy prices in the Pacific Northwest are both a curse and a blessing for
RNP. The bad news is that it is very difficult to compete against such low prices.
The good news is that some consumers are willing to pay a little extra for clean
energy because the end result is still a very competitive electric rate.l'^®
As mentioned above, green power, like many of the environmental strategies outlined 
in this chapter, should not be thought of as a specific feature of deregulation. It is entirely 
possible to have any combination of green power and deregulation (one, the other, both, or 
neither). Deregulation does not guarantee that companies offering green products — or any 
other product for that matter — will arrive on the doorstep of electricity customers. Neither 
is there anything preventing a utility from offering a green product under traditional 
regulation and in fact, many do; this is usually called “green pricing,” under which 
consumers pay extra so new renewable energy technologies can be acquired “beyond what
140 Smeloff, 124. It should be noted that by purchasing green power a small customer 
would not actually be supplied with “green electrons” from a wind or solar plant. Instead, 
the customer is paying a company to replenish the power he takes off o f the grid with power 
generated by clean technologies. One way to understand this scenario is to envision a pool 
of water. If a customer is standing at one end of the pool and wishes to purchase a cup of 
water from a seller (offering a “clean” product) on the other end of the pool, he could 
simply dip his cup into his end while the seller dumps hers into the other. He gets his cup 
of water (different from, but equivalent to the one she has to sell), she profits from the 
transaction, the pool level is maintained, its quality improved, and no energy is expended 
delivering the water from one end to the other. Electrons, like water molecules, are 
“fungible” — indistinguishable from one another. Furthermore, the “drift speed” of an 
electron (even in a one-way direct current) is incredibly slow, and in AC circuits, that 
electron reverses direction 60 times every second. So the electrons are not supplied by the 
utility, only set in motion.
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is cost-effective.” 141 g ^ t deregulation will hopefully encourage this effect by giving
people a more direct role in deciding where their energy comes from (in effect, taking 
charge of their own integrated resource planning, pricing of externalities, etc.). Also, open 
access rules have afforded independent producers of renewable power the opportunity to
compete, since they do not generally own their own transmission facilities. 142
As mentioned earlier (in the context of command-and-control versus incentive-based
regulations), some combination of voluntary mechanisms such as green power and
mandatory approaches such as traditional environmental lawmaking is probably the most
effective way to bring about improvements in environmental quality. The Renewable
Energy Policy Project puts it this way:
Neither voluntary decisions made in a free market nor public policy if relied on 
exclusively seem capable of providing adequate environmental protection. . .  . There 
may indeed be ways to market green power to large corporations, but they 
presumably will not purchase clean energy for personal reasons, as may some small 
business owners. For this reason, public policy mechanisms that set minimum 
environmental standards (e.g., the Clean Air Act and renewable portfolio standards)
will remain necessary safety nets for public w e l f a r e .  143 [Emphasis in original.]
In addition to advertisements for green power, consumers will encounter more 
general “green marketing” by companies wishing to distinguish themselves from their 
competitors. Green marketing, as opposed to green power, is any attempt by suppliers to 
characterize themselves as environmentally responsible, without making reference to the 
underlying energy sources behind their products. Examples of green marketing incentives 
seen during the New Hampshire and Massachusetts pilot programs include: donations to 
environmental groups or causes, emission reductions, free energy conservation literature and 
products, a raffle for an electric vehicle, free spruce seedlings, and a free bird feeder. Again, 
while such activities may be genuine attempts to improve environmental quality, they do not
141 Holt, “Disclosure and Certification,” REPP Issue Brief # 5, 3-4. Smeloff, 162-163, 
164. Holt, “Green Power for Business,” REPP Research Report # 1 , 2 .  Mayer, “The 
Grassroots are Greener,” REPP Research Report # 8, 1. REPP Issue Brief # 11, 10.
142 NCAC, "Plugging People into Power," 33.
143 Holt, “Green Power for Business,” REPP Research Report #  1, forward.
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facilitate the commercialization of renewable energy and should not be labeled “green
pow er.”
Environmental Disclosure andCertification
In order for green power to be an effective environmental strategy, it must be 
accompanied by strong labeling provisions and certification rules. Customers need access 
to quality information about the relative environmental impacts of competing products in 
order to make educated choices. More than just a ploy to advance an environmental agenda, 
information disclosure is a critical attribute of fully functional markets. According to the 
Renewable Energy Policy Project, “consumer choice will not lower total social costs — the 
ostensible goal of deregulation — if poor information prevents consumers from including 
the environmental consequences of energy use in their purchasing decisions.” But if 
properly handled, disclosure and certification will “improve market efficiency, benefit the 
environment, and increase individual liberty by allowing consumers to base their decisions
on a broad range of criteria.”
The first issue, then, is one of requiring disclosure of environmentally relevant 
information, beginning with the underlying mix of energy sources (by percentage of 
nuclear, coal, hydro, natural gas, and renewables), and a description of how this mix changes 
under various conditions (periods of peak power demand, routine maintenance, etc.)!"^^ 
Next, companies should provide quantitative emissions data for CO2 , SO2 , NOx, 
particulates, toxics, spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive waste. Most of these pollutants 
are already measured and reported under the Clean Air Act or the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right to Know Act (see “Air Toxics” in Chapter 4). Unfortunately, many 
environmental impacts are not so easily quantified (as discussed above under social 
costing), which is not to say that they should be ignored. Disclosure of information to
144 Holt, “The New Hampshire Retail Competition Pilot Program and the Role of Green 
Marketing,” NREL Topical Issues Brief, 3. Holt, “Disclosure and Certification,” REPP 
Issue Brief # 5 , 13.
145 Holt, “Disclosure and Certification,” REPP Issue Brief # 5, forward.
146 Rothstein, “Green Marketing in the Massachusetts Electric Company Retail 
Competition Pilot Program,” NREL Topical Issues Brief, 2.
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consumers needs to be comprehensive enough to prevent resources from failing through the 
cracks. Hydroelectric power, for instance, has no air emissions but has serious 
environmental repercussions nonetheless. Qualitative information about the principal 
environmental and health concerns of each form of power would help alleviate this problem. 
Obviously, all information needs to be accurate and credible.
But in order to be useful, the information also needs to be presented in an easily 
understandable and consistent format. The second issue, then, is that of labeling. 
Standardized information labels should be required to give consumers the ability to 
comparison-shop with relative ease (this is an instance where federal legislation could be 
helpful in specifying both minimum standards for disclosure and consistent formatting 
guidelines). The labels should be included both in contracts and marketing materials, and 
the information should be updated and reported regularly. While consumers have 
convincingly demonstrated a desire for disclosure (in polls), this is a case where there can
be too much of a good thing. ^47 A balance has to be struck between supplying consumers
with the information they need to make good choices and overloading them with technical 
and potentially confusing data. Note that disclosure and labeling are already time-honored 
traditions in this nation, with perhaps the most familiar example being the Food and Dmg 
Administration’s nutrition labeling.
The next issue is one of definitions and certification. In order for marketing claims 
to be meaningful, there need to be clear standards for what does and does not qualify as 
green. These standards need to be applied (and possibly developed) by a credible, 
independent, and objective entity. The task is really two fold. First, there needs to be 
agreement on what constitutes an environmentally sound energy generation project. This 
process can be complex and controversial, with gray areas such as projects using blended
fuels, some biomass and geothermal operations, and natural gas-powered fuel cells. ^48
Even hydroelectric power can be difficult to categorize. Less-than-scrupulous marketers 
would be all too willing to characterize even the most environmentally devastating dams as
Holt, “Disclosure and Certification,” REPP Issue Brief # 5 , 6 .  Holt, “The New 
Hampshire Retail Competition Pilot Program and the Role of Green Marketing,” NREL 
Topical Issues Brief, 5.
Holt, “Disclosure and Certification,” REPP Issue Brief # 5, 10.
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green due to the absence of air pollution, and the renewable hydrologie cycle, One
environmental group, American Rivers, has developed five criteria for “low-impact 
hydropower.” In order to qualify for this designation, a project must demonstrate that 
“fish are protected, river flows are adequate, water quality is satisfactory, flooded habitat is
replaced, and recreational opportunity is a v a i l a b l e . ”  Certifiers of green power can also
rely on definitions for renewable power that have been developed in states with renewable 
portfolio standards and system benefits programs (and even in federal statutes such as 
PURPA, with its definition of qualifying facility). The Federal Trade Commission has 
definitions of “low-fat” and “organic” to fulfill a comparable need in the food services 
industry.
Once criteria are established for green projects, attention can be turned to green 
products. Because the price of power generated exclusively by renewable energy sources 
would likely be prohibitively high for most customers, most green products will consist of a 
mix of both green and conventional power. In California, in order to be certified by the 
Green-e Renewable Electricity Branding Project (which allows the use of the Green-e logo 
for marketing purposes), a product must contain at least 50% renewable energy and cannot
contain any nuclear power.  ̂ Other approaches to certification include ranking products 
on the market according to environmental criteria (such as on a scale of -5 to +5). 
Consumers could then determine how green a product they want to buy relative to the other 
products on the market. An optional additional step would be to certify only the top 10% 
(say those products with a score of -t-5).1^2 Here again, precedence exists with the Federal
Trade Commission’s EnergyGuide appliance l a b e ls .  Once projects and products have 
been certified, there needs to be ongoing oversight to ensure consumer protection. As one
149 One can imagine fossil fuel-fired plants being advertised as “solar,” as the energy 
released originally came from the sun. Then again, all solar power is really nuclear power, 
with the reactor located a safe 93 million miles away.
150 www.amrivers.org
1^1 Jan Hamrin, “When Shopping for Electricity, Look for the Green-e,” CEERT Clean 
Power Guide. Spring 1998.
1^2 Holt, “Disclosure and Certification,” REPP Issue Brief # 5, 8, 14 .
1^3 Holt, “Disclosure and Certification,” REPP Issue Brief # 5, forward, 5.
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author put it, “Ascertaining ‘greenness’ is one thing; determining whether the green power 
is in fact being generated and fed into the system is another.” In the past, the federal
government has assisted such efforts through uniform food pricing, truth-in-advertising, and 
truth-in-lending laws.
The final tier of certification, beyond projects and products, is providers — 
especially for companies claiming a strong corporate commitment to the environment. 
Unfortunately, trying to certify companies as green is a difficult if not impossible task. One 
of many complicating factors is whether to consider the track record of the generating 
subsidiary alone, or that of the parent company and marketing affiliate as well. A better
approach is to have some mechanism to verify green marketing claims, combined with 
strong penalties and vigilant enforcement.
Pilot programs around the nation have already demonstrated the need for 
substantiation of claims. In New Hampshire, for example, customers were subject to 
misleading marketing tactics by companies touting their environmental credentials. One 
company described, in idyllic terms, the lake it used to produce low-cost hydro power.
They also mentioned that they pumped water back up to the lake during the night, but 
neglected to say where the power for the pumps came from. The company benefited 
because it was off-peak, and therefore inexpensive, power from the grid. Thus, while their 
facility may have been a good example of a hydroelectric battery (called “pumped
storage”), the underlying (and undisclosed) energy sources were not necessarily g r e e n .
Incidentally, companies in the New Hampshire pilot were also criticized for 
categorizing power from existing renewable energy plants as green. Environmentalists 
argued that the “green” distinction should be reserved for new applications that actually 
lead to environmental improvement by displacing dirtier plants. Furthermore, existing 
renewables lack attributes important to customers who have other goals for renewable 
energy usage, including “a fascination with new technology for personal use (such as
photovoltaics), reducing dependence on utility companies, making sure energy resources are 
Holt, “Disclosure and Certification,” REPP Issue Brief # 5, 9, 18.
Holt, “Disclosure and Certification,” REPP Issue Brief # 5 , 11, 16.
1^6 Holt, “The New Hampshire Retail Competition Pilot Program and the Role of Green 
Marketing,” NREL Topical Issues Brief, 7-8.
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available for future generations, protecting themselves against electricity price fluctuations, 
or reducing risk and vulnerability to supply interruptions.” O f course, there are problems 
with limiting green power to resources that do not yet exist, including significant lag time 
between the payment of premiums and the delivery of power from the new resources.
Under deregulation, then, not only do former monopoly utilities need to learn how to 
promote themselves and their products, but public utility commissions need to learn how to 
police those advertisements in what may be a “complex and sometimes chaotic
market . ” It is also important that they prevent utilities from “double-counting” by
marketing “green power” that they were in fact required to generate to meet system benefit
program or renewable portfolio standard r e q u i r e m e n t s .  159 Disclosure and certification are
key tools for exposing greenwashing and preventing green scams. (See “Customer 
Protection and Information Rules” in Chapter 6.)
Other Strategies
During the 1997 legislative session, environmentalists were alarmed by SB 390’s 
weak support of conservation and renewable energy, and by SB 224’s rollback of the Major 
Facility Siting Act. But just as significant as what was in these bills was what was missing 
from them. While in Montana, the struggle was focused largely on maintaining 
environmental protection, other states have used electric deregulation as an opportunity to 
advance the goal of environmental improvement. Two of the more common mechanisms 
that have been implemented as part of restructuring packages are renewable portfolio 
standards and net metering.
Renewable Portfolio Standards 
“Renewable Portfolio Standards” (also known as “resource set-asides”) direct 
that a certain percentage of power sold within a state comes from renewable energy sources.
Under a renewable portfolio standard (RPS), each supplier (including marketers,
^57 Holt, “Disclosure and Certification,” REPP Issue Brief # 5 , 13-14. See also Means, 
“Evaluation of a proposal for green power price insurance,” REPP Special Report.
158 Holt, “Disclosure and Certification,” REPP Issue Brief # 5, 4.
159 Holt, “Disclosure and Certification,” REPP Issue Brief # 5, 5.
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Under a renewable portfolio standard (RPS), each supplier (including marketers, 
aggregators, etc.) must maintain this minimum threshold of clean power in each of its
products in order to operate in the state. As adopted in a number of states, this
minimum percentage ratchets up over time. Another option is to create tradable “renewable 
energy credits” which gives companies currently lacking in renewable generation a degree 
of flexibility. Some observers also suggest that the RPS should be stratified,
designating sub-percentages of support for specific technologies. This mechanism would 
help prevent the cheapest resource (usually wind) from automatically monopolizing the 
renewable portion of each supplier’s p o r t f o l io .
As with green power options, renewable portfolio standards help create a stronger 
market for renewables and encourage a diversity of resources. But because resource
set-asides are mandatory rather than market-based, they can offer greater assistance to the 
producers of green power. Low-cost financing can be obtained because of reliable demand
and predictable in c r e a s e s .  1^4
Once again, renewable portfolio standards can be adopted independent of 
restructuring. As is the case when an RPS is administered by the distribution utility, 
responsibility for the RPS would then fall to the regulated utility. In Montana, the most 
immediate opportunity to implement an RPS appears to be through the default supplier 
rules contemplated by the PSC. Once renewables (or certain renewable technologies) 
become fully commercialized, they will no longer need to be supported by renewable 
portfolio standards.
160 The alternative would be to place the responsibility for meeting the RPS on the 
regulated distribution utility. Smeloff, 198.
161 Creating a market for renewable energy credits is somehow less offensive than the 
buying and selling of pollution credits discussed earlier. Smeloff, 103.
162 Smeloff, 197.
163 According to the original model put forward by the American Wind Energy 
Association, these resources include wind, geothermal, solar electric, solid-fuel biomass, 
landfill gas, and existing solid waste-to-energy facilities. NCAC, "Plugging People into 
Power,” 55. Smeloff, 195.
164 Smeloff, 102.
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Net Metering
Another environmental strategy that has become a popular feature in state 
restructuring laws is “net metering.” Net metering is an accounting technique that provides 
an incentive for homeowners or businesses to become “self-generators” of renewable 
power (by installing solar panels or wind turbines on their homes, for example). Any 
excess energy that a customer produces flows back onto the grid, turning the meter 
backward and lowering his or her power bill. In essence, the utility is required to purchase 
the excess power from the self-generating customer. While not initially included in SB 390, 
Montana did adopt a net metering law in 1999 (see “SB 409 -  Net Metering” in Chapter 
6).
Technically, PURPA already requires utilities to purchase power from small 
independent renewable power generators. But as a practical matter, residential self­
generators were usually prohibited from taking advantage of PURPA because no distinction 
was made between retail users and larger commercial producers. In the absence of specific 
net metering rules or laws, small customers were unable to comply with the enormous
administrative barriers placed in front of them by utilities. And net metering laws such
as Montana’s have an added advantage for the customer in that they require utilities to 
purchase the power at the retail price, instead of the lower wholesale or avoided cost prices 
required by PURPA. Financial losses to utilities are minimal, because of the small number 
of customers with such systems. Utilities also share in the benefit of sidestepping the
administrative complexities of power purchases under PURPA. And in most net-
metered states including Montana, the utility is never required to cut a check to one of its
1^5 Prior to 1995, fifteen states had net metering requirements. Fourteen of them were 
administrative rules adopted to implement PURPA. Since that time, states have been 
implementing net metering through legislation (often as part of deregulation). This is a 
preferable approach because the laws cover the entire state and are more resistant to 
changes. For example, if PURPA is repealed (as some in Congress would like it to be), net 
metering laws will probably be secure, whereas rules may be threatened. At the end of 
2000, there were 30 states with net metering laws (See Appendix B). Thomas J. Starrs, 
“Net metering: An Update on Legal and Regulatory Issues,” presented at the annual 
conference of the American Solar Energy Society, Albuquerque, NM, June 1998.
166 Personal telephone conversation with Peter West, RNP, 17 September 1999.
Factsheet by Thomas J. Starrs, Kelso Starrs & Associates (Vashon, WA), “Net 
Metering: Questions and Answers,” February 1999.
163
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
customers. If the customer produces more excess power than he or she takes from the grid, 
the difference merely appears as a credit on the next month’s bill. At the end of the every 
twelve month period, the customer forfeits any remaining credits.
As with green power, net metering is a voluntary means to support renewable 
energy. Unfortunately, while it can help defray costs, installing photovoltaic cells and wind 
turbines remains an expensive proposition with long payback horizons, especially in states 
like Montana with inexpensive grid power. The advantage over green power is that net 
metering offers direct financial benefits to customers.
Like so many of the strategies above, net metering can be implemented 
independently of restructuring, and has been in effect in several states since the early 1980s 
(Arizona, Idaho, Iowa, Minnesota). Other states have moved forward with net metering only 
recently, often passing or updating their law concurrently with restructuring (Connecticut, 
Delaware, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon), taking 
advantage of the natural conceptual relationship between competitive energy supply markets 
and the ability of customers to sell power to their utility. Still others (like Montana) have 
enacted or updated their net-metering laws following the passage of deregulation legislation
(California, Illinois, Maine, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia).
Other
Renewable portfolio standards and net metering help accelerate the 
commercialization of renewables by creating manufacturing economies of scale, lowering 
transaction costs, and removing market barriers. But what other tools have states employed 
to protect environmental values in the face of industry restructuring?
One intriguing idea is known as “social-cost dispatching.” As we saw earlier, 
integrated resource planning (IRP) will likely suffer under deregulation. IRP is a planning 
tool, and as such it is inherently limited to decisions regarding new capacity only. As 
discussed earlier, “adders” are applied to help account for the true cost of electricity from 
these plants. Social-cost dispatching attempts to duplicate this system in a deregulated
^68 Information taken from Appendix B and Thomas J. Starrs, “Summary of State ‘Net 
Metering’ Programs,” found at http://www.spratley.com/ncp/pvr2/, and updated April 
2000.
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market. But in order to do so, “adders” must be applied to existing as well as new 
generation (otherwise utilities will rely more heavily on old and polluting plants rather than 
absorbing the costs of building new plants made more expensive by the adders). 
Tremendous efficiencies could then be achieved if the lowest-cost (although not necessarily 
the lowest-priced) resources were dispatched preferentially to serve base load. Only during 
periods o f peak demand would the highest cost electricity be sold. While the market is 
expected to do a decent job of preferentially dispatching the lowest-priced electricity, social- 
cost dispatching requires a more sophisticated system of analysis and coordination. All
electricity transactions would need to be routed through a central d i s p a t c h e r .  ^^9 Montana,
at least at this time, has no such entity. Adding yet another layer of complexity (and cost), 
the social costs of the resources could be continuously updated based on conditions. “For 
instance, on windy days, it might make sense to allow expanded operation of cheaper but 
dirtier plants; during heat inversions, when the air is stagnant, more expensive, cleaner plants
could get heavier use.” 1^0 All of this, of course, costs money. Ironically, the relentless
pursuit of the lowest-cost power delivered with maximum efficiency could itself eventually 
drive up rates. And the environment could also lose out if this caused people to turn to 
energy sources with costs still externalized.
Myriad other ideas from around the nation can offer Montanans additional 
environmental strategies. Some of these strategies may be better suited to the regulated 
world that Montana is leaving behind. An example is Minnesota’s “renewable default” 
policy which requires that utilities, prior to building new non-renewable energy capacity,
demonstrate why renewables are not in the public interest. Other strategies are designed
specifically for a deregulated paradigm. One such proposal, offered in California and 
promoted by the national office of the Sierra Club, would exempt customers from 
competitive transition charges (CTCs) if they are willing to purchase a green power product
169 This central dispatcher is sometimes known as a “Poolco.” Poolcos perform a couple 
of different functions. In addition to acting as system operators (balancing loads and 
coordinating power delivery), they also act as a centralized power exchange or spot market. 
Brennan, 51.
Brennan, 121.
Smeloff, 139.
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with some specified minimum renewable energy content. Without such an option, many 
customers may be prevented from paying green power premiums because they cannot 
afford them on top of the CTCs.^^^
172 Smeloff, 172, 198.
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CHAPTER 6 
SB 390 IMPLEMENTATION
Adjournment of the 1997 legislative session provided little respite from the debate 
surrounding SB 390. The implementation of SB 390 would ultimately prove more 
controversial than the original bill, leading to two attempts to reconvene the legislature in 
special session and three proposed ballot measures. A year after its passage, deregulation 
was finally regarded as a significant policy issue, with extensive coverage in the media and 
significant attention from political candidates.
The first scuffle occurred just two months after SB 390 was enacted. On July 1, as 
required by SB 390, Montana Power Company and PacifiCorp filed their transition plans 
before the PSC. This date also marked the deadline for the Governor to appoint eight 
members representing various constituencies to the Transition Advisory Committee, 
including “one representative from the community comprising environmental and
conservation interests.”  ̂ Environmentalists took it as a minor insult that the Governor
delayed his appointment for this one position only, and then declined the recommendation 
of a coalition of state and regional organizations. In the end, however, conservationists were 
pleased with (and well-served by) the appointment of Kathy Hadley, associate director of
the National Center for Appropriate T e c h n o lo g y .2
Additional controversy erupted when MPC began curtailing the power it purchased 
from a number of independent producers under long-term power purchase contracts 
required by PURPA. The company maintained it was legitimately trying to mitigate its 
stranded costs (as required by SB 390), which include above-market contracts with 
“qualifying facilities.” A spokesman for two of the independent power generators called
1 MCA. 69-8-501.
^ Mike Dennison, “Racicot rejects environmentalists’ choice for utility deregulation 
oversight committee.” GET. 12 July 1997.
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the move not only illegal, but a “flagrant attempt to eliminate competition.”^ Additional
curtailments from the 16 IPPs (including the state-owned Broadwater Dam near Toston) 
would continue to make the news well into 1998, raising questions over whether ratepayers 
would ultimately have to pay for the damages if MPC lost in court.
In the fall of 1997, additional events added fuel to the smoldering discontent over 
restructuring. In September, a Department of Energy (DOE) study predicted deregulation 
would lead to substantial rate increases for the residential customers of the Pacific 
Northwest. Ironically, Montana is split between the only two (of thirteen) regions with
forecasted rate increases (the Pacific Northwest and the Upper Midwest).^ A November
announcement that MPC had obtained a $200 million contract to provide power to the 
California Manufacturers Association intensified fears that Montana’s low-cost power 
would be destined for out-of-state markets. It also raised some serious questions. If  some 
of the power was to come from Montana power plants (rather than being purchased on the 
market), shouldn’t Montana ratepayers who had funded their construction share in the 
profits? And how could MPC consider their properties “stranded costs” if they were
continuing to win competitive contracts with them?^
But these minor tremors were nothing compared to M FC’s December 
announcement that it was going to sell all of its electrical generating resources — 13 dams, 4 
coal-fired power plants, and an assortment of power-purchase contracts.
The Sale Announcement
M FC’s decision to sell its power plants left many observers both surprised and
puzzled. The most obvious question was. Why would MFC work so hard to acquire the
right to compete in the open market and then almost immediately abandon power
generation? M FC’s explanations did not seem entirely satisfying. In its press release, the
^ Mike Dennison, “Montana Power averts court showdown,” GET, 6 August 1997.
^ Mike Dennison, “MFC cuts power buys,” OFT. 6 May 1998.
5 AP, “DOE: Electric deregulation will hit Northwest the hardest of any region; Rates 
would rise 25% or more,” IR, 26 September 1997.
^ Mike Dennison, “MFC contract with California raises concerns: officials say power 
won’t come from plants in Montana,” OFT. 7 November 1997.
168
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
company pointed to the advantages of having different companies responsible for 
generating electricity and distributing it. Yet they had resisted divestiture language during 
the legislature (a point which also makes it unlikely that the company had “known all
along” that it was going to sell).^ MPC also said that its “size and geographic presence”
would make it difficult to compete against larger companies more able to absorb risk. In 
addition to the threat of mergers, owners of conventional power plants may soon be 
responsible for significant fish restoration costs and expanded pollution regulations (such
as carbon taxes).^ Also, the low profît margins expected in electricity supply make it a
difficult business for small companies.^ And yet, just months earlier, the company was 
confident of its ability to survive and grow as a provider of electricity. Just before the bill 
was signed into law. Bob Gannon said, “Our vision is to retain 100 percent market share in
Montana. We intend to fight — to earn the right to serve all of our customers.” The
company would argue that the generation business simply became riskier than they had 
originally anticipated. At the same time, the company noticed that many utilities around the
nation were fetching good prices for their properties. 11
Other reasons given by MFC include its desire to apply the proceeds from the sale 
to business opportunities with greater growth potential. A Great Falls Tribune article 
paraphrasing a D A. Davidson stock analyst reported that the “several hundred million 
dollars from the sale . . . will be a considerable financial warchest to finance the company’s 
telecommunications expansion, pay off debts, or buy back stock.” Also, the company
^ Guest editorial by Bob Gannon, “MPC has a right to sell; legislators shouldn’t meddle,” 
GFT. 15 February 1998. Charles S. Johnson, “Montana Power denies hidden agenda,”
IE, 11 March 1998.
^ “Electric deal may leave consumers powerless,” Missoula Independent. 18 December
1997. Missoulian editorial, “Look hard before leaping after Montana Power dams,” 
Missoulian. 25 February 1998.
9 Mike Dennison, “Montana observers weigh impact of power marketer’s failure to lure 
Californians,” GFT. 23 April 1998.
Jim Ludwick, “MPC, competitors gear up for deregulation,” IR, 20 April 1997.
 ̂  ̂ Charles S. Johnson, “Montana Power denies hidden agenda,” IR, 11 March 1998.
^2 Mike Dennison “Critics slam company for quitting sale of electricity,” GFT, 28 August
1998.
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reasoned that a sale would go a long way toward resolving the ongoing and divisive 
stranded cost issue. SB 390 did contemplate a competitive bid as one of several 
allowable valuation techniques for stranded costs.
This last point was thought by many observers to be a key issue. At the time of the 
announcement, the PSC was engaged in a lengthy review of M FC’s transition plan filing, 
which had been submitted the previous July. In the weeks leading up to the sale 
announcement, the plan had been heavily critiqued by a battery of expert witnesses. In 
particular, the company’s proposal for recovering nearly $800 million in stranded costs was 
roundly criticized. Testimony from numerous parties asserted that the company had 
overestimated its stranded costs by hundreds of millions of dollars -  some even asserted 
that the correct figure should be zero, or negative. Among the interveners displeased with 
M FC’s plan was the Racicot administration’s Department of Environmental Quality, which
had stood by MFC in supporting deregulation. 15 From the sum total of the intervener
testimony, it appeared unlikely that the FSC would authorize stranded cost recovery in the 
amount MFC had requested. Instead, the sale, which was expected to fetch between $600 
million (the book value of the plants) and $1 billion, would provide MFC roughly the same
“financial warchest’’ as their $800 million stranded cost proposal. 1^
A second important financial consideration that may have been a contributing factor 
had to do with property taxes. Historically, MFC had been taxed at the 12% centrally 
assessed rate (the state’s highest). MFC believed that deregulation would make it eligible 
for the locally assessed business equipment rate, which is only 6%. However, the state 
Department of Revenue maintained that separating regulated and deregulated activities into 
different divisions (functional separation) did not automatically qualify MFC for a change
Charles S. Johnson, “MFC to sell power plants,” Missoulian, 10 December 1997.
14 MCA 69-8-211. Later MFC would argue rather weakly that this obscure reference 
constituted “fair warning” to the legislature that a sale was in the cards.
15 “Experts say MFC plan won’t help consumers,” GFT. 30 November 1997.
1^ Jim Ludwick, “Montana Fower’s windfall: Utility may invest profits in telephone, gas 
industries,” IR, 5 May 1998.
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in tax status. The state would later end up fighting MPC on this same point with regard
to its natural gas producing properties.!^ In contrast to functional separation, however, a
sale would likely result in a change to the 6% rate, making a sale attractive to both buyer and 
seller, at the expense of the governmental units that would lose an estimated $7 million in 
tax revenues (although the tax impact would be partially mitigated by a one-time capital
gains tax of up to $30 million). Rosebud County alone faced a $1.2 million shortfall, an 
amount representing a third of its total budget. 20
Others suspected more devious motives — that the sale was something of a ruse. If 
the assets were put out to bid and there was little interest, MFC could keep the power plants 
and have a greater chance of convincing the PSC of its stranded costs. But because the 
assets were expected to (and did) bring in a high sale price ($988 million), this theory had
little merit.2 ! In any event, deregulation and the sale of its generating assets both seem to
have benefited M FC’s shareholders. In the year following the enactment of SB 390,
M FC’s stock jumped from $23 to $37 a share (by November 1998 it would climb to $54, 
and by January $85, although much of this growth is attributed to its telecommunications
a c t i v i t i e s ) . 2 2  But not everyone was happy with this arrangement. Representative Jon
Ellingson (D-Missoula) wrote, “While deregulation provides no benefits to consumers, 
none to local governments and taxpayers, and none to utility workers, deregulation does
Montana Department of Revenue, “Taxation Issues Pertaining to the Deregulation and 
Restructuring of the Electric, Natural Gas, and Telecommunications Industries in 
Montana,’’ April 1998, 8.
“Utility industry next to tackle Legislature for tax break,’’ GFT. 6 December 1998.
!9 Jacquie Burchard, “Selling dams may eat into county funds,’’ GFT, 13 December 1997. 
Charles S. Johnson, “Utility taxes will try Legislature,’’ IR, 10 January 1998. Mike 
Dennison, “MFC plant sale may enrich tax roll $30 million,’’ GFT. 26 November 1998.
20 Bob Anez, “Deregulation’s impact on rates cloudy,’’ IR, 14 March 1998.
21 Charles S. Johnson, “MFC inks deal,’’ IR, 3 November 1998. Guest editorial by Bob 
Gannon, “MFC has a right to sell; legislators shouldn’t meddle,’’ GFT, 15 February 1998. 
Mike Dennison, “MFC president expects good price for facilities,’’ GFT, 11 March 1998.
22 Mike Dennison, “Socialism at MFC? Well, sort o f ...,’’ GFT, 17 May 1998. AF, 
“Montana Power has seen its stock surge,’’ Missoulian, 24 November 1998. Mike 
Dennison, “Montana delegation seeks meeting with new owners o f 17 power plants,” GFT, 
4 November 1998.
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provide an enormous and certain benefit to one small but privileged class of citizens: the 
stockholders of Montana P o w e r  "^3
The Sale — Implications
Whatever the reason for M FC’s decision, the announcement served to focus 
attention on Montana energy policy. To be sure, there were some positives. Ralph 
Cavanagh, a nationally regarded energy expert from the San Francisco office of the Natural 
Resources Defense Council (NRDC), hailed it as a great victory for consumers. He 
predicted a high sale price and confidently proclaimed that “the immediate beneficiaries will 
be the citizens of Montana.” Divestiture would help remove “obvious and fundamental
conflicts of i n t e r e s t .”24 gu t despite the sale of its generation assets, MFC still planned to
be a player in the deregulated energy supply business through its subsidiary, MF Trading 
and Marketing. So while the sale did appreciably lessen concerns over affiliate transactions, 
it did not remove them entirely.
Locally, the response was less optimistic. Consumer advocates interpreted the sale 
as disturbing confinnation of a national merger craze causing consolidation of market 
power among electric utilities. They also saw it as further evidence that Montana was losing 
control of its energy resources. Not only would deregulation likely funnel Montana’s 
cheap power into national markets, but now an out-of-state company would likely be calling 
the shots at most of the state’s generating facilities. Environmentalists framed this concern 
in terms of the state’s historical role as a resource colony. Montana’s forfeiture of control
23 Guest editorial by Jon Ellingson, “Power deregulation: Montanans losing their 
livelihood to benefit a few wealthy executives,” Missoulian. 28 April 1998. News of the 
sale of M FC’s distribution business also increased its stock to near-all-time highs. Wendy 
Raney, “MFC will need seed money to underwrite newest venture,” GFT, 29 March 2000.
24 Charles S. Johnson, “Sometime critic applauds proposed divestiture,” IR ,11 December
1997.
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over its natural resources has an almost compulsive quality to it — as if the state, despite 
knowing its history, is somehow condemned to repeat it.25
Questions concerning local control and self-determination resonate strongly with 
Montanans, and with good cause. Montana’s history is laden with instances of powerful 
out-of-state interests determining its course of events. Exactly 100 years prior, another sale 
of a Butte-based company (the Anaconda Copper Mining Company) to a large, out-of-state 
conglomerate (Standard Oil) caused Montanans considerable distress. The parallels with 
this earlier sale are striking. Both were reflective of broader national trends. The authors of 
Montana: A History of Two Centuries tell us, “During the last years of the nineteenth 
century, control of American industry was becoming increasingly concentrated in fewer and 
fewer hands. It is hardly surprising that Anaconda got caught up in this monopolistic 
trend.”26 it was with reference to this earlier sale that Governor R. B. Smith delivered one
of the most colorful quotes in Montana history. In attempting to persuade the 1899 
legislature to prevent the sale from occurring, he declared: “If you do not assert your 
independence now and defeat this measure, it will be too late when the tentacles of this 
octopus have fastened their fangs on the strong limbs of this fair c o m m o n w e a l t h . A s
vivid as this quote was, and as mixed in metaphor, it was hardly overstated. At the time, 
approximately three-quarters of the state’s wage earners were employed by “The 
Company’’ (a term denoting the Anaconda - Montana Power monolith) and its various
businesses.28
The feelings of Governor Smith seem to be shared by some modern-day observers 
of MFC’s sale. For them, whatever its drawbacks, MFC is preferable to a faceless and 
unknown corporation with headquarters located out of state or even overseas — in other
words (in fact those of the late Senator Lee Metcalf), “Better the devil ye know than the
25 Guest editorial by Bob Raney, “W hat’s the rush with deregulating electricity?’’ BG, 29 
April 1998. Guest editorial by Jon Ellingson, “Power deregulation: Montanans losing 
their livelihood to benefit a few wealthy executives,” Missoulian. 28 April 1998. Guest 
editorial by Patrick Dawson, “Amnesia allows MFC deals to flourish,” TheBillings 
Outpost. 12 February 1998.
26 Malone, Montana: A History of Two Centuries, 210-211.
27 Toole, 165-166.
28 Toole, 195. Malone, Montana: A History of Two Centuries, 210, 323. Lopach, 34.
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devil ye don’t.” Others, however, were tempted to celebrate. They were certain that you
could not find a corporate steward as lacking as MPC, which was, after all, the last vestige of
the notorious Anaconda company. An informal debate developed over whether “the new
boss” would be better or worse than “the old boss.” Bruce Fading of Montana Trout
Unlimited captured this ambivalence, predicting that the new owners would be . .  .
. . . hydro mercenaries who won’t be as understanding of how we treasure our 
rivers. The new guys will be bottom line guys. Which is really no different than 
Montana Power, except that MPC, which is largely run by Montanans, has learned
that some accommodation for river values is good for business.^9
Montana Power has itself seemed unable to make up its mind about its role as 
corporate citizen. On the one hand, in the early 1990s MPC had shown encouraging signs 
of progress with its funding of conservation, renewable energy, and low-income assistance 
programs -- so much so that, in 1994, it won the Northwest Energy Coalition’s prestigious 
“Conservation Eagle” Award. Furthermore, MPC is Montana’s largest private employer
and the only investor-owned utility that conducts all of its electricity business in the state.^^
In theory, at least, the company is more sensitive to local political pressure, and more 
accessible and responsive to customers, who know where to call with complaints. The 
company has also been supportive of the arts, and of high school and college activities. To 
top it off, it has a good track record with irrigators, having never issued a “call” on junior 
water right owners in drought years, and with recreationists who have enjoyed access to
M PC’s riverfront properties.
On the other hand, these laudable characteristics cannot entirely be attributed to the 
benevolence and altruism of the company, and in some instances were short-lived. 
Investments in public purposes, for example, grew out of recommendations of the “Least 
Cost Planning Collaborative.” This committee arose out of a court-ordered settlement
resulting from a lawsuit against the sale of power from Colstrip Unit 4 to Los Angeles.^2 
In a regulated environment, utilities also had the luxury of knowing that costs they incurred.
29 KUFM Editorial by Bruce Farling, Montana Trout Unlimited, 12 January 1998. 
Lopach, 20.
31 Mike Dennison, “Irrigators fear water rights could be lost,” GFT, 24 May 1998.
32 Personal telephone conversation with Tim Baker, DEQ, 17 August 2000.
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especially for public purpose programs (but also for athletic events, concerts, conservation
easements, etc.), would by and large be approved for recovery by the PSC.^^ As
monopolies, utilities had no risk that such expenditures would make them “less 
competitive” — a meaningless phrase in a regulated environment. But with a different set of 
incentives at work (those of deregulation), it is certainly plausible that MPC would focus as 
much on the bottom line as any other company. MPC’s recent workforce reductions and 
conservation cutbacks (see Chapter 1) give compelling evidence for this line of thinking.
By 1995, the company had slipped so much in terms of environmental programs that it
instead won the Northwest Energy Coalition’s “Turkey” Award.^^ And any illusions that
MPC would continue as a “Montana only” electricity business were shattered by the news
of its contract with the California Manufacturers A s s o c i a t i o n .^ ^  Finally, some felt that an
out-of-state corporation might not command quite the level of influence at the statehouse 
that MPC historically had. But through the years, foreign companies (particularly mining) 
have enjoyed a warm reception at the Montana legislature, and have amassed numerous 
lobbying victories.
In addition to arguments over local control and self-determination, the sale touched 
off other debates. As most of these power plants happened to be dams, the sale’s impact on 
the state’s rivers became a prominent theme. Issues included the effect that transferring 
water rights would have on other water users and fisheries, the fate o f riverfront property, 
and the question of recreational access.36 Exhibiting the kind of ardor that many 
Montanans feel for their rivers. Representative Bob Raney (D - Livingston) proclaimed:
33 Letter to the editor by Ken Boyer, IR, 1 September 1999. Personal telephone 
conversation with Tim Baker, DEQ, 11 August 1999.
34 Down to Earth: A membership publication of the Montana Environmental Information 
Center. June 1995.
33 M PC’s vigorous support for deregulation at the legislature had already suggested an 
intention to expand at least beyond its historic customer base.
36 Impacts would be aggravated if the dams were used to produce additional peaking power, 
which is more damaging than base load.
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These are our rivers, our water, our economy and our ecology . . .  There isn’t much 
doubt that Montanans will have a significantly reduced role in what happens to our
rivers. What does dereg give us? Corporate r i v e r s . 37
Water Rights
Questions concerning water rights quickly developed into a key point of dissension 
in the wake of M PC’s sale announcement. In addition to M PC’s dams, the legal rights to 
the water used to operate them would be included in the sale. Because they date back to the 
turn of the century, M PC’s water rights are considered “senior” to those held by other
water users (according to the “first in time, first in use” principle of water law).38 This
means that the company can insist that its needs are met before others can fulfill their own. 
While MPC has never issued such a “call” on junior water rights, irrigators worried that 
the buyer might have fewer scruples, especially under a deregulated scenario. Preventing 
upstream river users from fully exercising their water rights maximizes the water available 
for power generation and maximizes profits from the sale of electricity. This effect is 
potentially massive, as M PC’s water rights on the Missouri exceed the average flow of the 
entire river. 39 At stake are a quarter million acres of irrigated land representing potentially
$45 million in agricultural losses.^O The second concern was that in times of need,
downstream water users would have no ability to require MPC, or its successor, to release 
water from its reservoirs. Some suggested figuring out a way to subordinate M PC’s water 
rights, or to include a provision in the sale agreement that would protect junior water rights 
holders from a call. MPC resisted both ideas, and claimed consumers would lose out if 
such stipulations ended up lowering the sale price (as everything above book was supposed 
to flow back to the ratepayers, and everything below book would have been stranded
costs).^^
37 George Ochenski, “Montana’s deregulation dilemma,” High Country News. 27 April 
1998.
38 Jim Gransberry, “W ater rights for sale,” IR, 4 May 1998.
39 Mike Dennison, “Irrigators fear water rights could be lost,” GFT, 24 May 1998.
George Ochenski, “M ontana’s deregulation dilemma,” High Country News, 27 April
1998. Jim Gransberry, “W ater rights for sale,” IR, 4 May 1998.
GFT editorial, “M PC’s dam sale raises a water rights question,” GFT, 13 April 1998.
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MPC tried in general to deflect the water rights arguments and reassure Montanans. 
The company argued that to obtain the water from upstream irrigators, the owner of the 
dams would first need to enforce the water right in court, which would be a lengthy and 
difficult process. MFC also noted that its license (which would be inherited by the buyer) 
specifies certain in-stream flows. Finally, the company stressed that it would sell its dams
as a package, which would help maintain the coordinated release of water.^2
Recreation
Others questioned how the sale would affect recreational opportunities along the 
Missouri River. In addition to the dams and the water rights, the sale included roughly 
16,000 acres of property (although a 3000-acre parcel near Great Falls represented the only 
sizable portion above-water). Opponents to the sale argued that new owners could attempt 
to amend their FERC license to either change the use of the lands or sell them off for 
development. Doing so would probably be more cost-effective than dealing with the 
liability created by public access to their land. Licenses for the dams (which are usually
good for 30 to 50 years) in the Missouri River basin were up for renewal in 1999.^^
MFC disputed this concern, arguing that “recreation is treated with the same 
importance as generating electricity under federal licensing. . .  . There could be no changes 
in the licenses, conditions and requirements — which include public access to recreation — 
without public hearings. . . . Any purchaser of Montana Fower’s dams would have to meet
all the conditions and requirements that we are required to meet.”' '̂  ̂ MFC ultimately
protected the 3,000-acre parcel with a conservation easement which will be used, in part, to
extend the popular River’s Edge Trail by eleven miles.45
42 Mike Dennison, “Irrigators fear water rights could be lost,” GFT. 24 May 1998.
43 Mike Dennison, “What will happen to MFC land?” GFT, 31 May 1998.
Faula Clawson, “Harper proposes committee to protect public access to Montana Fower 
Co. dams,” IR, 30 September 1998.
44 MFC paid advertisement, “Recent News, Fair Questions, Straight Answers,” IR, 11 
June 1998.
45 AF, “Montana Fower announces easement near new center,” Missoulian, 6 July 1998. 
Karen Ivanova, “MFC land will add 11 picturesque miles to trail,” GFT, 8 July 1998. 
Jacquie Burchard, “Donation protects river land from development,” GFT, 5 November
1999.
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The Resistance
With M PC’s sale announcement, deregulation suddenly moved from an abstract 
and complex piece of arcane policy to a real-world issue with tangible and significant 
impacts. Previously silent parties entered the debate and began asking important questions: 
Would the new owners manage the dams with the interests of recreationists, fisheries, and 
junior water rights holders in mind? What would become of the 550 workers at these
facilities?46 How would the state make up an estimated $7 million in lost property taxes
each year? And what about price, reliability, and customer service?
These issues were compelling enough to spark two separate attempts at a special 
session of the legislature. In addition to the governor’s ability to call the legislature to 
Helena, the legislature can convene itself by means of the following process: Upon receipt 
of a petition for a special session signed by at least ten legislators, the Secretary of State 
polls the full legislature. The proposed session must be approved by majority vote within 
30 days in order to occur.
Furthermore, the petition must contain the conditions warranting the call, the
purpose of the session, and the proposed date and time for the session to begin.^^ In this 
instance, the purpose of the proposed one-day session was to reconsider and potentially 
postpone deregulation until some time after the next regular session in 1999.
The first call was initiated primarily as a response to M PC’s sale announcement. In 
addition to the issues discussed above, the sale had created logistical problems. Because SB 
390 was adopted prior to knowledge of the sale, the timeline outlining the transition to 
deregulation was no longer tenable. Slowing the process would have the added benefit of 
allowing public entities such as city and state governments to offer bids for M PC’s
properties.48
Charles S. Johnson, “MPC to sell off properties’’ IR, 10 December 1997.
47 MCA 5-3-105.
48 Eve Byron “City backs special session on dam sale: Second committee formed to 
explore purchase feasibility,’’ IR, 24 February 1998. Bob Anez, “MPC sale tangled in 
deregulation,’’ IR, 20 December 1997. Charles S. Johnson, “Complaint claims MPC sale 
illegal,’’ IR, 7 May 1998. Guest editorial by John Board, “Slow down! Deregulation 
shouldn’t be rushed,” GFT. 1 March 1998.
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In January, Senator Mike Sprague (R-Billings) suggested that the State o f Montana 
consider buying M PC’s dams, to ensure continued access to affordable and reliable power 
and to protect Montana’s water resources. He said, “I would hate to see some out-of-state 
corporation charge into Montana and turn a beautiful place like Bolter Lake into an 
exclusive and overbuilt private enclave.”49 Representative Bill Ryan (D-Great Falls), who
had carried SB 390 in the House, supported the idea, seeing it as a way to “protect our 
streams, protect our low-cost power, replace our tax losses with wholesale revenues and 
have an incredible resource for attracting good clean jobs to M o n t a n a . ’’^ ^
Others were not so enthusiastic. If these properties were too risky for MFC to 
operate, they asked, how likely was it that the state could profit from them? The Missoulian 
observed, “MFC is an aggressive and successful operator that can be presumed to know 
more than most of us when it comes to the electricity business. . .  . [MFC] considers the 
dams undesirable to own — even though they’re bought and paid for. Whoever buys the
dams will have to finance the purchase, adding debt service into the risk equation.’’̂  ̂  One 
legislator pointed out that because of the state’s tax exempt status, state ownership would 
cause an additional $7 million tax shortfall. Furthermore, opponents of the idea felt that 
MFC would likely refuse the state’s offer, or any offer, to buy the dams alone, apart from
the other power plants.^^ Another problem was that the sale’s confidentiality provisions
49 Charles S. Johnson, “Billings senator proposes state buy MFC dams,’’ IR, 10 January 
1998.
50 Guest editorial by Bill Ryan, “State should buy what MFC is selling,” GFT. 11 January 
1998.
51 Missoulian editorial, “Look hard before leaping after Montana Fower dams,” 
Missoulian. 25 February 1998.
52 This objection applied even more strongly to the City of Helena’s idea to bid on Hauser 
and Bolter dams only, which supply about 60% of the electricity in the Helena area. Great 
Falls and Missoula also considered putting in similar bids. Eve Byron, “Should Helena 
buy dams?” IR, 3 February 1998. Mike Dennison, “Great Falls looking into buying dam 
from MFC.” GFT. 11 February 1998.
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conflicted with the state’s open government laws, effectively precluding a bid.^^
Additionally, given its consistent efforts to privatize many government functions, it is no 
surprise that the Racicot administration had ideological objections to Senator Sprague’s 
idea.^4 Finally, in order for the state to offer a bid by the deadline, the legislature would 
have to meet in special session, identify a source of money, and approve the 
appropriation.55 Senator Sprague himself did not end up voting in favor of either special 
session.
Letters published in Montana newspapers asked why the state needed to buy the 
dams at all, which, after all, were paid for by Montana ratepayers. The author of one such 
letter pointed out that MPC owns neither the floor of the Missouri River nor the water used 
to spin the turbines. “It’s my opinion that the only thing they have for sale is a 100-year-
old chunk of concrete on someone else’s (Montana’s) land.’’̂ 6 Representative Raney
echoed this comment, noting that “we are the ones who gave them the private property right 
in the first place and we have a right in that property they are selling. They have a
responsibility to us they are not displaying.’’̂ ^
And yet while Montanans might not adequately be compensated for their investment, 
they could well end up paying for future costs associated with the dams. Stuart Lewin of
Later, in May, the Montana Public Interest Research Group, the Montana Senior Citizens 
Association, and Working for Equality and Economic Liberation would file a complaint 
charging that the sale was being conducted illegally. By excluding some public entities 
from participating, the secrecy requirements could deprive consumers of an in-state owner 
that would manage the resources in their interest. The PSC dismissed the complaint. 
Charles S. Johnson, “Complaint claims MPC sale illegal,” IR, 7 May 1998. Charles S. 
Johnson, “PSC advises against complaint.” IR. 16 May 1998.
54 At least one letter to the editor agreed, proclaiming, “The purpose of government is to 
provide Health, Education and Welfare. Generating electrical power should remain with 
private industry where it belongs.” Letter to the editor by Leo G. Walchuk, “Don’t buy 
dams,” IR, 23 February 1998.
55 Bob Anez, “State purchase of MPC dams gets cool reception from panel,” IR, 17 
January 1998.
56 Letter to the editor by Larry Hannah, “Montanans own dams,” GFT, 27 April 1998. 
Letter to the editor by Paul Tahista, GFT. 7 May 1998. Letter to the editor by Dick 
Johnson, “Who owns dams now?” GFT, 19 May 1998.
57 Michael Babcock, “River users certain of uncertainty in dam sale,” GFT, 19 March 
1998.
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Missouri River Citizens raised concerns about the eventual decommissioning of the dams 
and reclamation. In his opinion:
Dams mine the river. When dams can no longer be operated profitably someone 
will have to pay for decommissioning and river reclamation. In Great Falls the 
problem is exacerbated by toxic sediment washed down from Smelter Hill sitting 
behind the dams waiting to be released to poison river communities downstream.
He went on to suggest that MPC establish a reclamation fund from the sale 
proceeds and that the state repossess MPC’s water rights without compensation. After all,
he reasoned, MPC had been given the water rights for free.^^
By the end of the polling period when legislators’ ballots were due, the Montana 
Democratic Party, the Montana AFL-CIO, Local 44 of the International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers, the Helena City Commission and the Lewis and Clark County 
Commission had all endorsed the call for a special session. This is in addition to the 
“Statement of Support for a Special Session’’ signed by a coalition of conservationists and 
consumer advocates (and found in Appendix E).^^ Sympathetic editorials had also been 
written by several of the state’s major newspapers, with the Great Falls Tribune taking the 
strongest p o s i t i o n . “Considering the outstanding issues and the potential for harm to the 
citizens of Montana,” the Tribune editorialized on the eve of the session’s defeat, “it’s hard 
to escape the conclusion that the governor and the Legislature care more about Montana
Power than about Montana people.”^! Representative David Ewer (D-Helena), who had
58 Guest editorial by Stuart Lewin, “We must slow down utility deregulation,” GFT. 24 
May 1998.
59 GFT Capitol Bureau, “Liberal groups endorse special session,” GFT. 25 February 
1998.
^0 Charles S. Johnson, “Unions urge special session on utility deregulation,” IR, 4 
February 1998. Eve Byron, “City backs special session on dam sale,” IR, 24 February 
1998. Carolynn Farley, “County backs special session: Commission thinks rush toward 
deregulation happened too fast for full public debate,” IR, 27 February 1998. IR State 
Bureau, “Demo Party supporting special session,” IR, 12 February 1998. GFT editorial, 
“Deregulation needs airing,” GFT. 1 February 1998. GFT editorial, “No shortage of 
questions,” GFT. 1 February 1998. BG editorial, “Prepare for sale of dams,” IR, 19 
January 1998. BG editorial, “Legislators face tough choices in session call,” BG, 3 
February 1998. IR editorial, “M PC’s big surprise,” IR, 11 December 1997. IR editorial, 
“Dam-sale questions,” IR, 25 February 1998.
GFT editorial, “Is what’s good for MPC good for Montana?” GFT, 2 March 1998.
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spearheaded the special session attempt, charged that Republicans “have been blindsided by 
their own ideology, that regulation is bad and competition is good. What good is 
competition when your choice is paying higher electrical rates with Company A or higher 
electric rates with Company B?”^^
The first special session attempt ended on March 5, 1998 and yielded a vote of 93 
against and 52 for. While this result fell short of the necessary 76 votes, it nonetheless 
reflected a significant shift in sentiment from the 113-36 vote with which the legislature had 
embraced SB 390. Those questioning deregulation had succeeded in bringing new voices 
into the dialogue, and in garnering significant attention in Montana and elsewhere. National
media coverage included stories in the Washington Post and on National Public Radio.63
A week following the conclusion of the first attempt, the transition advisory 
committee (TAC) hosted a meeting in Helena to address the public’s concerns regarding 
deregulation and the sale. Proponents of deregulation had repeatedly urged opponents to
settle their grievances through the TAC.^^ g^ t union members, environmentalists, low-
income advocates and others staged a walk out of the meeting, claiming that the committee 
had neither the objectivity nor the authority to adequately address their concerns. They 
pointed out that all of the legislative members of the committee had voted for SB 390, and 
that the chairman of the committee had been the primary sponsor. The other members were 
all either appointed by the governor (who had signed SB 390) or were representatives of 
constituencies that had supported SB 390. The protesters also argued that the PSC was the 
appropriate body for such issues because of both its extensive experience and its specific
regulatory a u t h o r i t y .^ 5  g y  contrast, the TAC’s authority is advisory only.
One month later, on April 16, the Governor hosted a “town meeting” that was also 
heavily criticized. The Governor had announced the informational forum just one hour after
BG editorial, “Legislators reject special session, poll shows,” BG, 28 Febmary 1998.
Tom Kenworthy, “In Montana, a Volt Out of the Blue,” Washington Post, 4 March 
1998. “Morning Edition,” National Public Radio. 1 April 1998.
Guest editorial by Fred Thomas, “Beware of ‘stranded costs’ before jumping into the 
MPC dam deal,” GFT. 15 February 1998. Charles S. Johnson, “MPC chairman won’t 
debate Rep. David Ewer,” IR, 13 February 1998.
65 MCA 69-1-102.
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the failure of the first special session attempt (which he opposed) and as a response to “a
heightened amount of interest” in the subj ec t .Representa t ive  David Ewer boycotted the
meeting and suggested that instead of acting as a “talk-show host,” Governor Racicot
should defend his support for deregulation^^ Ewer, who had been the lead opponent to SB
390 in the 1997 legislature, challenged Racicot to a debate as a more appropriate forum. 
Racicot declined.
The Great Falls Tribune also criticized the town meeting, arguing that “the time to 
fully discuss a proposal this significant is before signing it into law . . . unless all you’re 
attempting to accomplish is public relations.”68 Others objected to the forum’s inadequate 
noticing, inconvenient scheduling (during work hours on a Thursday), and a format which 
allowed for questions but not comments from the p u b l i c . O n  the day of the forum, 
panelist and MEIC energy consultant Ken Toole (an energy consultant for MEIC), asked 
the audience how many were there on their own time as ordinary citizens (as opposed to 
paid professionals). Only eight or nine of approximately 60 raised their hands. Toole 
responded, “We don’t think the public is getting a chance to voice its concerns. A daytime
meeting in Helena doesn’t cut it.”^®
The second call for a special session was initiated a week later, on April 23. In their 
letter to the Secretary of State, the petitioning legislators mentioned ongoing issues 
concerning the sale’s effect on taxes, jobs, and water rights. But they also argued that this 
was not simply a rehash, that compelling new evidence had come to light:
Mike Dennison, “Racicot wants to hear from public on deregulation,” GFT, 7 March 
1998.
George Ochenski, “Montana’s deregulation dilemma,” High Countrv News, 27 April 
1998.
GFT editorial, “Deregulation forum: Better late than never,” GFT, 10 March 1998. 
“Backers file two versions o f proposed water measure,” GFT, 17 April 1998.
“Did public really get a voice?” GFT. 17 April 1998.
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The risks and uncertainties grow daily. Some recent examples: In February, a 
consulting engineer estimated that there is a 95% chance Montana electric rates will 
rise if Montana Power Co. (MPC) sells its generation assets to outside 
corporations. On April 16, the Governor -- who supported SB 390 and signed it 
into law — acknowledged the need to protect the public from the effects of 
deregulation by supporting the idea of legislation to aggregate small consumers. In 
March, the Governor’s own staff testified that M PC’s plan for implementing 
deregulation would, left unchecked, likely result in an anti-competitive advantage for 
the company.^ 1
Nevertheless, M PC’s Perry Cole denounced the call as an act of harassment, and tedious.
“W e’ve already seen this movie,’’ he q u i p p e d . ^ 2
The second attempt came a day after the Wall Street Journal reported that Enron 
Corporation had ceased offering power to residential customers in California. Proponents 
of the session saw this development as yet further evidence to bolster their case. Elsewhere, 
deregulation was failing. Three weeks after California had opened its electricity market, less
than one percent of the customers had left their incumbent utility.73 Ewer questioned how
it was possible for deregulation to work in Montana, if the nation’s largest energy marketer 
was unable to succeed in the nation’s largest market (and one with high electricity prices). 
Senator Fred Thomas (R-Stevensville), who had been the chief sponsor of SB 390, 
conceded that robust markets for small customers can be slow in coming. “If I can pick 
between Enron, Montana Power and my local co-op, probably 99 times out of 100 I ’m 
going to go with my local entity.’’ But he also said, “That’s not the reason we did Senate 
Bill 390. We didn’t do it to develop vast competition for consumers. We did it to protect 
consumers from large fixed costs from large industrial users, ” a quote which many
considered a surprising admission.^^
The second call, ending May 28, 1998, indicated an additional erosion of legislative 
confidence in deregulation, with 83 votes cast against the session and 58 for it. Although
Letter from legislators to Cooney asking for a special session, 23 April 1998.
AP, “Engineer; Electric rates likely to go up with MPC plants sale,’’ IR, 20 February 1998. 
Charles S. Johnson, “Alliances will lower costs,’’ IR, 17 April 1998. Charles S. Johnson, 
“Expert: MPC plan may reduce value of plants, ”IR, 18 March 1998.
AP, “Deregulation foes again push for special session, ” BG, 23 April 1998.
Kathryn Kranhold, “Enron Scales Back California Power Sales,’’ The Wall Street 
Journal. 22 April 1998.
Charles S. Johnson, “Power marketer pulls out of California,’’ IR, 24 April 1998.
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special session supporters were disappointed, they were not alone. Since the legislature 
acquired the ability to call itself into special session in 1972, as part of the new Constitution, 
no attempt to do so has been successful. Of the seven tries, these two votes represented the 
second and third closest.^^ While the second attempt garnered more votes than the 
previous call, it also lost the support of a few legislators and at least one major
newspaper.^6
With the legislature having made itself clear with three recorded votes on 
deregulation — “three strikes” as some saw it — citizen groups felt it was time to step up to 
the plate themselves. Three separate initiatives were drafted dealing with deregulation and 
M PC’s sale: 1-138 to repeal SB 390, and 1-139 and 1-140 to compel the State of Montana 
(using its power of eminent domain) to acquire the water rights associated with M PC’s 
dams. While all three successfully negotiated the review process and were certified for 
circulation, none of them ultimately obtained the necessary 19,862 signatures to qualify for
the b a l l o t . A c c o r d i n g  to its authors, 1-138 was intended to ensure that deregulation of 
Montana’s electric utilities would only proceed if accompanied by clear environmental 
benefits, strong consumer protections, and ample opportunities for public input. It was not 
so much a condemnation of deregulation itself as it was a rejection of SB 390. It was also 
an invitation to try again, but using a better process.
These initiatives became the source of a minor scandal, in which MPC and initiative
supporters alike were criticized.^^ MPC had approached the groups pushing the initiative, 
tentatively offering to increase its support of universal system benefits programs if they
Personal telephone conversation with Shannon Stevens, Montana Secretary of State’s 
office, 10 June 1998. Two years later. Ewer attempted to expand a special session called by 
Governor Racicot to include consideration of issues resulting from M PC’s announced sale 
of its transmission and distribution business. Ewer picked up another three votes (61), but 
still fell short of the necessary 76. IR State Bureau, “Effort to add MPC sale jurisdiction 
fails to get votes,” IR, 9 May 2000.
GFT editorial, “Deregulating: Proceed with caution,” GFT. 27 April 1998.
Charles S. Johnson, “Four initiatives qualify for November ballot,” IR, 18 July 1998.
GFT editorial, “Well, well: Look who’s trying to buy off opposition,” GFT. 5 June 
1998. GFT editorial page -  Trib Talk, “Initiative opinions shared by callers,” GFT. 9 June
1998.
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would agree to drop the initiatives.^^ Eventually, the talks broke down before any
agreement was reached. As it turned out, the initiatives failed to qualify anyway.^^ M PC’s 
Bob Gannon wrote in a paid advertisement, “Our company had supported a level o f 3 
percent during the legislative session, and the funding we had discussed would have
reflected that level. ’̂ l But by failing to follow through with the proposed increases, even
though the initiative threat had disappeared, the company demonstrated that its commitment 
to that level of funding was rather limited.
The other two initiatives dealt more specifically with M PC’s sale. “The worst 
case,’’ according to M EIC’s Ken Toole, would be if the new owner “wrings every electron 
out of the generators” in order to maximize profits. As discussed above, such a strategy 
would negatively impact other river users (including ranchers, farmers, anglers, boaters, and
cities) by potentially depriving them of sufficient water.^^ Proponents maintained that
condemning the water rights and then leasing them back to the owners of the dams would 
offer the state two principal benefits. First, through the lease agreements, Montanans would 
have a measure of control over the operation of the dams so that fisheries, irrigators, and 
recreationists could be protected. Second, the leases would provide a revenue stream to 
compensate Montanans for the use of their rivers — an important benefit if those waters 
were being used as a “free fuel” source to produce cheap power for out-of-state
Specifically, MPC offered to voluntarily increase its funding to the 3% level the groups 
had lobbied for at the legislature. The difference (from the 2.4%) amounted to an extra 
$7.5 million annually, which was to come from shareholders, not ratepayers.
80 Two of the groups -  MEIC and MontPIRG -  had decided to focus their resources on 
another measure, 1-137, to prohibit cyanide-process mining in Montana. 1-137 was 
approved by voters in November, and became law. AP, “Dereg petition falls short,” 
Missoulian. 23 June 1998.
81 MPC paid advertisement, “Recent News, Fair Questions, Straight Answers,” IR, 11 
June 1998.
82 Bob Anez, “Groups want state to buy dams’ water rights,” GFT, 4 April 1998.
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markets.^3 The money could be reinvested in the rivers, to maintain traditional uses and
“to mitigate damage caused by dam operation if dam operators fail to do so.”^^
Yet some environmentalists vigorously opposed the idea. Because the water rights 
associated with the dams are non -consumptive, a corporation’s decision to call in junior 
water rights would actually benefit in-stream flows and aquatic life. Furthermore, they felt 
that given the recent political climate in Montana, putting the legislature in charge of a 
significant quantity of water offered little hope for better stewardship. Another major 
problem with the water rights initiatives was that they had the potential to seriously depress 
the sale price. As MPC had already pledged to flow any profits from the sale above book 
value back to ratepayers in the form of reduced stranded cost payments, anything that
decreased the sale price could hurt consumers. Finally, in order to cover the loan used to 
purchase the water rights (estimated to cost up to $300 million), the lease price would have 
to be relatively high, which would drive up rates for Montanans as well as outsiders — 
unless, of course, the state managed to take back the water rights, “which ultimately belong
to it in the first place,” for free.^^ For these and other reasons (such as the limited 
resources that led to the demise of the repealer initiative), the water rights initiatives were 
ultimately abandoned.
Deregulation Stalls 
According to SB 390, July 1, 1998 was supposed to be the most significant 
benchmark in the path toward deregulation in Montana — the “date certain” on which at
83 The Montana Constitution clearly specifies that “all surface, underground, flood, and 
atmospheric waters within the boundaries of the state are the property of the state for the use 
of its people.”) The Constitution of the State of Montana, Article IX, Section 2, Subsection 
3.
84 Guest editorial by Stuart Lewin, “We must slow down utility deregulation,” GFT, 24 
May 1998.
85 Guest editorial by Bob Gannon, “MPC has a right to sell; legislators shouldn’t 
meddle,” GFT, 15 February 1998.
Charles S. Johnson, “MPC; Sale will benefit consumers,” IR, 10 January 1998.
86 Jim Gransberry, “W ater rights for sale,” IR, 4 May 1998. GFT editorial, “M FC’s dam 
sale raises a water rights question,” GFT. 13 April 1998. Bob Anez, “Groups want state to 
buy dam s’ water rights,” GFT. 4 April 1998. Guest editorial by Stuart Lewin, “We must 
slow down utility deregulation,” GFT. 24 May 1998.
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least some customers were to begin choosing alternative electricity suppliers. In addition to 
the state’s large industrial customers, which were now allowed off the system, pilot 
programs for small customers were supposed to begin, and all customers were to begin 
receiving “unbundled” bills itemizing each component separately. Because of the 
importance of this date, efforts to postpone, “unwind,” or derail deregulation all took place 
in the first half of 1998. Opponents began to accept the law and focus on ways to improve 
the situation. Bob Anderson of the PSC said, “The bottom line is that our job is to 
implement the (deregulation law) regardless of our views on its merits. It’s our Job to 
protect small customers from the risk (of deregulation). Maybe someday they’ll really get
meaningful choice (of electricity suppliers) and be better o f f ”&7
As it turned out, July 1 came and went and very little happened. Small customers 
were not in fact able to select an alternate supplier on that day (due to both an absence of 
competitors and undeveloped pilot programs), and only one large customer signed a 
contract that day. Again, large industrial customers are defined as those customers with
loads greater than 1000 average kilowatts (or 1 average M e g a w a t t ) . A  list of M FC’s 16 
industrial customers follows:
87 Mike Dennison, “Complex hearings could change how you pay for power,” GFT, 28 
April 1998.
88 Kilowatts and Megawatts are both units of power, which is the rate at which energy is 
produced or consumed (kilo- means l,000x, and Mega- means l,000,000x). Energy, 
therefore, is power times time. Kilowatt-hours and Megawatt-hours are units of energy. A 
company that uses energy at an average rate of 1 Megawatt, would use 8,760 Megawatt- 
hours of energy in a year.
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MPC Contract Industrial Customers - 1995
Stone Container
load (MWH) -r 8760 hours = 
416412.7
power
48
RP Chem 399790.7 46
Montana Resources 330816.5 38
Exxon Refinery 220057.1 25
Conoco Refinery 202465.5 23
Cenex Refinery 118803.8 14
Montana Tunnels 82494.3 9.4
ASARCO 75391.3 8.6
Golden Sunlight Mine 74850.6 8.5
Stimson Lumber 57452 6.6
Louisiana Pacific 54090 6.2
Stillwater Mine 53300 6.1
Western Energy 49743.9 5.7
Holnam, Inc. 44780.7 5.1
Ash Grove Cement 39555.2 4.5
Montana Refinery 29455.6 3.4
Total 2249459.9 257
Average 140591.2 16
Median 75121 8.689
It is interesting to note that in 1995, these sixteen customers used more power than all of 
M FC’s 220,000 residential customers (who collectively use 215 average Megawatts). Even 
more interesting is that the Columbia Falls Aluminum Company (formerly a direct customer 
of BPA, but now a Flathead Electric Cooperative customer) uses a staggering 345 
Megawatts, more than the combined load of M FC’s sixteen biggest c u s t o m e r s . ^ 0
Alternatively, a company could still qualify for the July 1 “date certain” if it had 
multiple accounts, each greater than 300 kilowatts, that added up to a Megawatt.^!
Examples include supermarket and hospital chains, state agencies, and local governments. 
Altogether, MFC had roughly 75 customers (although many more individual accounts) —
representing about 40% of its load — that met this standard.92 Although most of these
PSC data cited by Ewer, “Deregulating Public Utility Electric Generation in Montana:
A Position Paper.” Missing is M FC’s contract to serve the roughly 100-MW ASiMI plant 
in Butte, which is currently under construction.
^  Don Schwennesen, “Deregulation doubts: Utility companies scurrying to learn the 
rules, consumers bracing for skyrocketing rates,” Missoulian. 2 October 1996.
MCA 69-8-201.
92 Charles S. Johnson, “MPC to raise rates,” IR, 2 July 1997. Mike Dennison, 
“Deregulation makes quiet debut,” GFT. 2 July 1998.
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large industrial and institutional customers had met with competitive energy suppliers, only 
Stone Container (a pulp and paper mill near Frenchtown which had been M FC’s largest 
account) switched to a deregulated supplier, albeit MFC’s own trading and marketing
affiliate.93 In August, the Holnam cement plant near Trident became the first of M FC’s
large accounts to completely leave the company, selecting the Illinois-based Illinova Energy
Fartners.94
But competition was not being held back by lack of customer interest alone. On the 
supply side, it seemed to be sputtering as well. Shortly after SB 390 became law, Dave 
Wheelihan of the Montana Electric Cooperatives’ Association had told the Legislative 
Consumer Committee that 70% of Montana’s 26 cooperatives were planning to open their
service territories to competition.95 Despite this initial show of enthusiasm, only two co­
ops, Glacier Electric and Flathead Electric, informed the FSC by the May 1998 deadline that 
they would not be opting out of competition.96 in order to compete, these co-ops were 
required by law to set up for-profit subsidiaries to handle the energy supply business.97
Flathead formed Energy Northwest, Inc., and Glacier formed Glacier Energy, Inc. Two 
years after acquiring the opportunity to choose, none of Glacier’s customers had switched
93 John Stucke and Charles S. Johnson, “State’s largest power users researching costs 
before switching,’’ IR, 5 July 1998.
94 AF, “Cement plant plans to leave MFC for Illinois company,’’ GFT. 12 August 1998. 
Momentum would later pick up for large customers. By June 1999, it was reported that 
four or five marketers had signed on 300 of MFC’s large customer electric accounts
representing 25% of the utility’s load. About half of these accounts were large industrial 
customers. GFT editorial, “Small power users must be protected in deregulation,’’ GFT. 8 
June 1999
95 Charles S. Johnson, “MFC, cooperatives optimistic, ready for utility deregulation, ” IR, 
24 May 1997.
96 MCA 69-8-311.
97 MCA 69-8-309.
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(Flathead’s small customers had to wait until 2000 to qualify for choice).98 Whereas the
co-ops are inclined to interpret this phenomenon in self-congratulatory terms, it also points 
to a general absence of suppliers, especially for small customers — the bread and butter of 
rural electric cooperatives.
MPC Exits Electric Trading and Marketing
In August 1998, MFC dropped another surprise announcement: that the company 
was withdrawing from the energy commodity business altogether. The MP Trading and 
Marketing subsidiary was closing its doors to new electricity business, although it would 
continue dealing in natural gas. Existing contracts, such as those with Stone Container and 
ASiMI, would either be served or sold to other energy providers. The contract with the 
California Manufacturers Association would possibly be reconsidered as well. Also put at 
risk were MP Trading and Marketing’s 30 electricity employees. As with the sale 
announcement, MPC explained its decision in terms of the company’s small size (thanks in 
part to the sale itself), and a high risk market.
One letter to the editor found a certain irony in the language used by M FC’s Bob 
Gannon as reported in a Montana Standard article.99 in explaining the decision, Gannon 
was paraphrased as saying, “The electric business is too risky for the relatively small utility. 
Electric commodity trading and marketing is highly volatile and immature. The market 
created unacceptable risks.’’ Suddenly, MFC had adopted the rhetoric of deregulation’s 
opponents. The letter then asks, “Could someone explain to me why, with almost the 
lowest power rates in the country, Montanans are breaking speed records trying to put
98 Flathead recently acquired 1 MW of “environmentally preferred power” from BPA to 
run from October 1999 to September 2001. As the co-op’s small customers will not have 
choice until 2000, this appears to be a case of “green pricing” as well as “green power.” 
(See “Green Power” in Chapter 5.) Customers will choose what percent of their energy 
they wish to come from these sources and will pay a premium on that portion, which might 
be as high as 33% extra. Michael Jamison, “Flathead provider offers planet-friendly 
power,” Missoulian. 8 July 1999. MCA 69-8-309. Mike Dennison, “Rural co-ops adopt 
‘wait and see’ attitude,” GFT. 6 June 1999. Mike Dennison, “Fear o f high prices 
prevalent early in power restructuring, ” GFT, 18 May 2000.
99 John Stucke, “MFC quitting electricity,” IR, 27 August 1998.
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individual people and small coops in the position that relative big boys like MPC are 
running from, by deregulation.”
This announcement removed a potential competitor from the playing field, and 
narrowed what was already a slim pool of providers. But it had some positive aspects as 
well: All remaining questions concerning affiliate transactions were put to rest. And in the 
long run, it might help draw energy suppliers otherwise too intimidated by M FC’s 
incumbent advantage. 100
A guest editorial appearing in November commented, “W hat’s surprising is not that 
energy supply companies are unwilling to serve Montana’s small customers, but that MFC 
is among them. With M FC’s decision last August to abandon the energy supply business, 
and with no licensed suppliers in the state, the situation has further degraded into what 
might be termed a ‘nonopoly,’ utterly devoid of the supposed benefits o f d e r e g u l a t i o n . ”  101
The Great Falls Tribune suggested that readers “put the blame on the Legislature and the 
administration of Gov. Marc Racicot” when power bills rise; “They’re the ones who 
rushed into this, not knowing where it would l e a d . ”  102
Some began to wonder what was next for MFC. Legislative Consumer Committee 
Chairman Joe Quilici (D-Butte) asked, “Since the restructuring act, we’ve seen one shoe 
drop and then the other shoe drop. W e’re wondering if you’re gonna drop anything else.
You’re not getting out of distribution and transmission, right?” 103 MFC insisted that it
would remain true to its name, as both a Montana company and as a power company. It 
pledged to remain in Butte and to continue performing its regulated electricity transmission, 
distribution, metering, and billing functions (in addition to its telecommunications, natural
100 Mike Dennison, “Critics slam company for quitting sale of electricity,” GFT, 28 
August 1998.
101 Guest editorial by Fatrick Judge, “We need consumers’ buying co-op,” IR, 25 
November 1998. With a total absence of energy supply companies, the question of who 
would serve as the default supplier for small customers became more pressing. See “The 
Small Customer Buying Cooperative” below. Drummond, "The Small Customer Buying 
Cooperative," 44.
102 GFT editorial, “Deregulation out of control,” IR 7 September 1998.
103 Charles S. Johnson, “MFC exec defends strategy changes,” IR, 12 September 1998.
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gas, and coal-mining ac tiv ities).!^  In fact, according to its November 1997 bill insert,
M FC’s new logo signifies, in part, the “company’s commitment to M o n t a n a . ’’ ! 05 ^  large 
paid advertisement in Montana’s daily newspapers in March 1998 reiterated the
promise.! 06
Pilot Programs
July 1 was also supposed to be the date pilot programs began for the state’s smaller 
customers. Pilot programs, as contemplated by SB 390, were intended to facilitate an 
orderly transition for these customers from regulation to competition over a four-year
period.!07 The year before, MPC had laid out its proposed “load transition schedule’’ in
its transition plan filing. The schedule was as follows (but note that the company would fall 
significantly short o f these targets):
Date Residential Commercial Percent
July 1,1998 6,800 1500 3
July 1, 2000 22,000 5000 10
July 1,2001 110,000 25000 50
July 1, 2002 220,000 50000 100!08
In some other states, pilots were treated more as an experiment than as a firm transition.
The pilots were a trial run that would supply information about deregulation before the state 
committed to it. While Montana’s pilots are also supposed to gather information, this 
information is intended more for correcting the process than evaluating deregulation itself. 
In March 1998, MPC announced that pilots would begin on November 2, glossing over the
!04 In the end, these promises were not kept. In March 2000 the company announced it 
would sell its remaining regulated electricity assets. Guest editorial by Dean Conklin, 
“Service, rather than supply,” IS , 14 September 1998. See also, Mike Dennison, “Critics 
slam company for quitting sale of electricity,” GFT. 28 August 1998.
105 M ontana Power Company, “Take a look at our new look!” Montana Energy. 
November 1997.
106 Montana Power Company Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer Bob 
Gannon, “Montana Power: w e’re staying in Montana,” IR, 24 March 1998.
!07 MCA 69-8-104
!08 p  R Corcoran of Montana Power Company, “Docket No. D97.7.90: Electric 
Restructuring Transition Plan Filing,” 1 July 1997, pp. PRC 31-32.
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delay by promising an accelerated transition schedule under which all customers would have 
choice by April 2000. The revised schedule set out the following maximum targets:
Date Residential Commercial Fercent
November 1998 11,000 2,500 5
June 1999 22,000 5,000 10
July 1999 44,000 10,000 20
August 1999 66,000 15,000 30
September 1999 88,000 20,000 40
October 1999 110,000 25,000 50
November 1999 132,000 30,000 60
December 1999 154,000 35,000 70
January 2000 176,000 40,000 80
February 2000 198,000 45,000 90
March 2000 220,000 50,000 100109
This schedule was contained in MFC’s revised transition plan filing, and was approved by 
the PSC in June 1 9 9 8 . 1 Here again, the schedule was never adhered to.
In September 1998, MFC sent out to its customers a brochure entitled, “Exploring 
the New Frontier of Energy Choices.” The brochure described the changes expected to 
occur under deregulation and gave customers a chance to be an “early explorer of this new 
energy frontier.” The brochure also had a reply card that customers could fill out to 
“receive details on how you may choose a supplier as soon as this November.” In 
November, MFC reported “a good response to the recent mailing.” But some customers 
found that responding to the card failed to bring any response. The company in fact had 
very little to report regarding the development of choice. MFC’s November bill insert 
reported, “As of mid-October, the list of licensed suppliers was fairly sparse, but that’s 
expected to change over time.” ! 1  ̂ The statement was more honest than telling customers, 
“A variety of electric and natural gas suppliers are registered with the FSC to do business 
in the state o f Montana,” as the company had the previous March.  ̂ xhe latter statement 
was incorrect in terms of the residential customers to whom it was sent.
109 Charles S. Johnson, “MFC offers electricity provider choice early, “ IR, 25 March
1998.
110 Charles S. Johnson, “FSC approves MFC transition order,” IR, 19 June 1998.
111 Montana Fower Co., “Customer choice update,” Montana Energv. November 1998.
112 Montana Fower Co., “Electric and natural gas restructuring questions answered,” 
March 1998.
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In October, Energy West (formed out of the Great Falls Gas Co. in partnership with 
the Washington Water Power subsidiary, Avista Energy) announced it would become the 
first competitive electricity supplier to serve small customers in Montana (in M FC’s and 
Flathead Electric Cooperative’s service t e r r i t o r i e s ) .   ̂13 M FC’s Deb Young put the news in 
perspective, conceding that it was still “going to take awhile for markets to develop”  
Indeed, by the end of November there was still little evidence of a pilot program. 114 y^e
FSC’s web page contained only a short statement saying, “Sorry, we currently have no 
suppliers available for display providing electric power to residential and small business
customers ”11^ It was not until the first of the year (1999) that Energy West Resources
had its license in place and was ready to serve residential customers. And it was not until 
June that the first residential customer actually signed. Several different products were 
offered, including options for locally generated power, for bill consolidation (ability to pay 
for electricity, cable television, water, etc. all at once), and for “green” power. While the 
FSC had issued a rule requiring suppliers to substantiate their claims, there were no specific
disclosure guidelines or standards defining “green” power. 116 Energy West defined 
“green” as having no coal or nuclear energy sources behind it. Instead, their power was 
derived from hydro, solar, and wind. As of September 1, however, they had filed no 
information with the FSC to substantiate this claim (although they may still have had no 
customers in that category.)! 1^ A spokesperson for the company described the difficulties 
of trying to compete against the regulated rate, which is both low and secure (being 
protected by the rate moratorium and the buyback provision discussed below). He called 
the situation “quasi-competition” because of the artificially low rate that people were
113 James E. Larcombe, “Falls company makes power move,” GFT, 24 June 1997.
114 Karl Fuckett, “Gas utility plugs into electricity,” GFT. 2 October 1998.
116 http://www.psc.mt.gov/scripts/elecLicense/EleclicenseSearchresidential.asp 
116 FSC Docket No. L-98.10.5-RUL, RULE IX, “CLAIMS MADE IN MARKETING 
ELECTRICITY OR NATURAL GAS, ” 23 November 1998.
11^ Karl Fuckett, “Gas utility plugs into electricity,” GFT, 2 October 1998.
118 Personal telephone conversation with Will Rosquist, FSC, 1 September 1999.
195
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
allowed to return to if dissatisfied with their choice. Energy West attempted to mitigate this
effect by offering only products with year-long contracts. ̂   ̂̂
In April, Energy West began providing power to 23 Montana cities for their 
municipal operations. The power, obtained on the wholesale market from Idaho, was
slightly cheaper than the regulated rate. 120 gm  more than a year after M FC’s pilot was
supposed to begin, only a handful of its small customers had chosen to change to their only 
alternative. Energy West. One problem faced by suppliers was the difficulty in purchasing 
power in anything less than 15-Megawatt blocks (which is enough power for 15,000 
homes). Energy West negotiated this hurdle by “piggybacking” its small customers onto 
its commercial accounts, serving them with excess power originally purchased for its bigger 
customers. 121 (As an update, by May of 2000, midway through the transition period, only
around 2000 of M FC’s 280,000 small customers had switched which is less than 1%. 
Again, the argument was made that Montana’s low prices were responsible. In other words, 
whereas competition was once promised to bring about lower prices, it is now described as 
only being able to exist in an environment where prices are higher, which is of dubious 
benefit to consumers. 122 )
Unbundling
Another delay making it difficult for homeowners and other small consumers to 
select an alternative electricity supplier had to do with the format of bills. In order for 
customers to make informed choices, they first need to know what portion of their bill is 
currently designated for energy supply. SB 390 required bills to be “unbundled,” which 
means they must be itemized to reveal the various component charges. At a minimum, 
electricity bills must list:
119 Fersonal telephone conversation with Jim Morin, Energy West, 2 September 1999.
120 Mike Dennison, “Great Falls, Havre, other cities save on new electricity contract,” 
GFT. 16 April 1999.
121 Mike Dennison, “Energy ‘choice’ working for business and suppliers: Residential 
customers waiting, but it’s still not certain they won’t pay more,” GFT, 6 June 1999.
122 Mike Dennison, “Fear o f high prices prevalent early in power restructuring,” GFT. 18 
May 2000.
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(a) distribution and transmission charges;
(b) electricity supply charges;
(c) competitive transition charges; and
(d) universal system benefits c h a r g e .  1^3
M FC’s July 1999 bill insert contained a sample bill for an average residential customer
using 750 kilowatt-hours of electricity each month. Such a customer was paying a $48.21
bill, including a $4.20 customer charge and $44.01 in undifferentiated charges for
everything else. The equivalent unbundled bill was as follows;
supply $20.07
transmission $5.58
distribution service charge $4.20 
distribution energy charge $17.36
USBC $1.00
Total $4 8 .2 1  124
The insert pointed out that competition could potentially create savings in energy supply 
charges (which represent 42% of the bill). However, because the cost of delivering power 
depends upon where it is coming from, transmission charges can also be affected by the 
choice of supplier. The unbundling of bills was supposed to occur prior to the launching of 
pilot programs in July 1998. MFC’s insert promised unbundled bills beginning in August
1 9 9 9 .125 The August bill insert apologized that “because of some unresolved issues, the
implementation of our new billing system was delayed.’’126 The September bill was in fact
unbundled.
Transition Flan Filing 
Other delays plagued the implementation of Montana’s deregulation law. One 
criticism that had been launched in the wake of MFC’s generation sale was that it would 
disrupt the FSC’s review of M FC’s transition plan. 127 SB 390 specified that before
123 MCA 69-8-409.
124 Competitive transition charges may also be included in bills once the FSC issues its 
final order on M FC’s transition plan. See the next section below.
125 Elizabeth Wing Spooner, “’Unbundled’ billing helps you see where your payment 
goes: August billing statement ‘unbundles’ services,’’ Montana Energy, July 1999.
126 Elizabeth Wing Spooner, “Unbundled bill update,” Montana Energy, Aug./Sept. 1999.
127 Bob Anez, “MFC sale tangled in deregulation,” IR, 20 December 1997. IE  state 
bureau, “Demo Farty supporting special session,” IR, 12 February 1998.
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offering its customers choice, a utility must submit to the PSC a plan outlining the details o f 
its proposed transition to a competitive electricity m a r k e t .  128 Despite the high level of
specificity contained in SB 390, many questions regarding deregulation remained. The 
transition plan process afforded an opportunity to resolve them. For example, should the 
distribution utility or the energy supply company be in charge of metering and billing, or 
should these functions themselves be deregulated? Is the four-year rate moratorium 
provided by SB 390 (MCA 69-8-211) a cap (allowing rates to go down, but just not up) or 
a freeze (which keeps rates constant even if market prices go d o w n ) ?  129 w ho  should be 
the designated default supplier for customers who either have no choice, or have “chosen 
not to choose” by the end of the transition period? 120
Each utility planning on entering the competitive arena must submit such a filing.
But because of the sale, the PSC was unable to complete the review of MFC’s filing 
(conducted as a contested case proceeding under the Montana Administrative Procedure 
Act) before the effective date of deregulation, July 1, 1998. The PSC decided to split the 
filing into two tiers. Tier 1 issues were those deemed necessary to be in place before July 1, 
when large customers began choosing suppliers (including a method to track stranded costs 
until a final determination is made as to their amount), as well as issues related to small 
customer pilot programs. Issues left unaddressed by Tier 1, and issues that could not be 
resolved until the sale was completed (such as the final determination of stranded costs)
128 MCA 69-8-202.
129 MCA 69-8-203.
120 Mike Dennison, “Complex hearings could change how you pay for power,” GFT, 28 
April 1998.
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were relegated to Tier 2.131 The PSC issued its order on Tier 1 on June 23, 1998 and was 
expected to rule on Tier 2 by August 2 0 0 0 .132
The commission also held a hearing addressing the universal system benefits (USB)
issues in October 1998. On December 23, it issued a rate tariff order allowing the universal
system benefits charge (USBC) to begin being collected on January 1, 1999 as required by
SB 390. The PSC issued another order allocating the USB funds on February 2, 1999, and
yet another on May 11, giving further specificity to the low income allocations. These
allocations, which pertain to 1999 only, are shown in the following table:
Public Purpose Category Allocation Amount Allocation Percent
Conservation $4,303,838 50%
(Large Customer Rebate — 2,500,000)
(Local Conservation -  1,803,838)
Market Transformation $1,132,209 13%
(NEEA -  370,000)
(Montana -  762,209)
Low-Income $1,785,818 21%
(Bill Assistance -  885,818)
(Weatherization — 480,000)
(Renewable Projects —100,000)
(Energy Share — 220,000)
(Outreach —100,000)
Renewable Resources $1,112,750 13%
Research & Development $225,000 3%
Total $8,559,615 1 0 0 % 133
These percentages track fairly closely to those originally proposed by MPC in its 
1997 transition plan filing (see figure 1, page 19).
131 That large customers were allowed to leave the system even before a final determination 
of stranded costs was made gave some vindication to those who had argued for a simple, 
exit fee approach.
132 Personal telephone conversation with Will Rosquist, PSC staff, 27 August 1999. The 
procedural schedule was subsequently suspended due to a dispute between MPC and the 
PSC over the determination of stranded costs from qualifying facility contracts. Tier 2 
issues are on hold pending a ruling on this matter by the Montana Supreme Court. A 
hearing is scheduled for October 24, 2000. Personal telephone conversation with Will 
Rosquist, PSC staff, 21 August 2000. Mike Dennison, ‘“ stranded costs’ dispute headed to 
high court,” GFT. 24 June 2000. At the time of this writing, the determination of 
PacifiCorp’s stranded costs was a matter of continuing controversy. The PSC felt the 
company owed its customers $55 million in negative stranded costs, whereas the company 
felt it was entitled to $18 - $56 million in positive stranded costs. IR State Bureau, “PSC: 
PacifiCorp owes consumers money,” IR, 4 August 1999.
133 n e e  A is the National Energy Efficiency Alliance. PSC, Order No. 5986g, 2 February 
1999. PSC, Order No. 59861, 11 May 1999.
199
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Customer Protection and Information Disclosure Rules 
The PSC took a similar approach with respect to its rulemaking responsibilities
under SB 3 9 0 . ̂  34 After a number of hearings, the commission split its draft rules into two 
parts. The six “Electricity Supplier Licensing and Reporting” rules (38.5.8001 - 
38.5.8006, Administrative Rules of Montana!  effective July 17, 1998, were issued nearly in 
time for the official start date of deregulation, while the seven draft customer protection and
information disclosure rules were postponed. 135 While consumer advocates objected to
this delay out of principle, as a practical matter, small customers were still a long way from 
needing protections from competitive energy suppliers. However, environmentalists were 
particularly disturbed by the omission of the rule regarding, “Disclosure of Source of 
Energy and Emissions,” which had survived three rounds of comments before inexplicably 
vanishing. The mle was held out by environmentalists as a glimmer of hope for securing a 
fundamental environmental benefit from restructuring — the ability of customers to support 
renewable energy by purchasing “green” power.
Unlike some states, Montana’s deregulation law has no specific guidelines for the 
disclosure of environmental information. The PSC does, however, have general rulemaking
authority under SB 390.^36 The “legislative findings and policy” section o f the law
asserts that “the public interest requires the continued protection of customers through . .  .
provision of information to consumers regarding electricity supply s e r v i c e .”  137
Furthermore, the Collaborative on Customer Education and Pilot Programs (convened by 
MPC as part of its transition plan filing) called for “meaningful, complete, and accurate 
disclosure and labeling by a supplier of its generation sources and environmental impacts as
required by the M P S C  ”138
134 MCA title 69, chapter 8, part 4.
135 ARM 38.5.8006 was later replaced with rule 38.5.6004. Montana Administrative 
Register. 1233 - 1258 & 1929, Issue 11, 3 June 1999.
136 MCA 69-8-403.
137 MCA 69-8-102.
138 Gerald Mueller (Facilitator), letter from the Collaborative on Customer Education and 
Pilot Programs to Dave Fisher, Chairman, Montana Public Service Commission, 30 
December 1997.
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In addition to arguing that the commission had overstepped both the bounds of its 
authority and the intent of SB 390, opponents to the draft rule (mostly utilities) attacked it as 
unnecessary, burdensome, and impractical. Furthermore, they warned it could drive away 
companies and stifle competition. The commission wrote a strong response in defense of 
its rule;
Economic theory, sound public policy and . .  . (SB 390) strongly support the draft 
disclosure and labeling requirements. According to economic theory, complete 
consumer information is a fundamental prerequisite for properly functioning 
competitive markets and efficient consumption decisions . . .  consumers want and 
need the type of information the draft disclosure and labeling requirements would 
provide . . .  To suggest that disclosure and labeling are inconsistent with the intent 
of SB 390 is to suggest that the legislature intended to create a market environment 
in which small consumers are ill equipped to participate and do not have complete 
information necessary for meaningful supply choices and protection from market
abuses.
Utilities also claimed that tracking the sources of their electricity is simply 
unfeasible. Supporters of disclosure refuted this argument by pointing to successful 
experiences in other states and the ability of companies to keep track of other kinds of 
financial t r a n s a c t i o n s .  ^40 d e Q  argued that disclosure information should only be required
of companies that make claims regarding the environmental characteristics of their power. 
Environmentalists disagreed, arguing that “limiting disclosure requirements to companies 
purporting to sell green power is like limiting nutrition labeling to products claiming to be
nutritious.” 141
Universal disclosure requirements would benefit consumers not only in a 
restructured world, but also in a regulated one (with or without utility “green pricing” 
programs). On this point, the PSC observed that “electricity consumption decisions involve 
more than choosing a supplier; relevant decisions also include when and how much to 
consume, which appliances to buy and whether to use products that are substitutes for
139 Some cynical observers might suggest that that was indeed the intent of the legislature. 
PSC, “Request for Comments on Revised Draft Electric Restructuring Rules and Natural 
Gas and Electric Customer Protection and Information Rules,” 20 March 1998.
140 Adam Serchuk and Alan Miller, “A Message from the Renewable Energy Policy 
Project,’’forward to REPP Issue Brief # 5, 15 January 1997.
141 “Knowledge is Power for Utility Customers,” Down to Earth: A membership 
publication of the Montana Environmental Information Center. February 1998.
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electricity, including demand-side management m e a s u r e s . ”  1*̂ 2 Like many other
environmental strategies, disclosure can be applied and has value independent of
competition, but may achieve greater significance in a market-based system.
The Montana Power Company Energy Services Division (MPES) took up a strong
stance against the PSC’s draft rule. First, MPES disputed the contention that sound
economic theory demands disclosure and labeling (especially for all suppliers), asserting
instead that this kind of information would be delivered by the market (as any other
commodity) to those willing to pay for it. On the other hand, MPES argued:
There is no reason to provide information to those that do not value it, unless the 
provision of that information is costless. Producing and verifying this information 
is not costless.. . the choice of cleaner power need not be accompanied by 
increasing the costs for all; this is a matter of consumer choice, not a religious 
crusade. No more so than in any other area, this is not the place to demand a single 
faith; those willing to pay for the information can pay; those not willing to pay, need 
not pay. Nothing is lost in leaving the outcome up to the market. 143
Second, MPES felt that this rule betrayed a bias in the Commission, a “total 
willingness to continue to prefer a command system to market solutions” in spite of SB 
390’s “stated preference for markets and consumer choice over administrative 
commands.” MPES, which clearly shared this latter preference, proceeded to elaborate on 
its philosophy of markets: “The strength of the workings of the market is that it can cater 
to several different behavioral niches, whereas a centralized command structure usually 
results in a one-size-fits-all approach...one information standard for all consumers whether 
they want it or n o t . ”  144
The PSC’s position was that “because markets generally do a poor job of providing 
consumers with standardized or uniform information, establishing disclosure and labeling
rules is an appropriate role for the public sector.” 145 Environmentalists wondered how the
142 PSC, “Request for Comments on Revised Draft Electric Restructuring Rules and 
Natural Gas and Electric Customer Protection and Information Rules,” 20 March 1998.
143 Montana Power Energy Services Division, “Comments on Revised Draft Rules,” PSC 
Docket No. L-97.8.6.-RUL, 9 April 1998.
144 Montana Power Energy Services Division, “Comments on Revised Draft Rules,” PSC 
Docket no. L-97.8.6.-RUL, 9 April 1998.
145 PSC, “Request for Comments on Revised Draft Electric Restructuring Rules and 
Natural Gas and Electric Customer Protection and Information Rules, ” 20 March 1998.
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company reconciled its explanation with the general failure of markets to deal with 
externalities. Despite the “workings o f the market,” the social and environmental costs of 
the electric utility industry have been paid for by society at large “whether they want it or 
not.” Environmentalists resented such fervent opposition from an entity which, as a 
regulated distribution utility, would not even be affected by this rule.
Although the original disclosure rule appears to have been all but abandoned, the 
commission has been working with other states in the Northwest region to develop 
consistent standards and requirements. ̂ ^6 of November 2000, the disclosure rules have 
yet to be issued.
The Sale Conclusion
As noted, the effective date for deregulation and the first day of the transition period, 
July 1, 1998, proved to be something of a flop. But as it turned out, the first of July was a 
significant day for Montana’s co-ops, as they learned that their bid to become the next 
owners of M FC’s power plants had been rejected. Dave Wheelihan, general manager of the 
Montana Electric Cooperatives’ Association, expressed dismay, “Obviously w e’re 
surprised and a little disappointed that (MFC) didn’t want to negotiate with the only
Montana-based distribution system in the s t a t e .”  ^47 w ith the co-ops out of the picture, the
chances for M FC’s successor to be “someone local to love and hate” (in the words o f 
Commissioner Anderson) became vanishingly small.
In November 1998, speculation came to an end, when Fennsylvania Fower and Light 
Global, based in Fairfax, Virginia, became Montana’s newest corporate neighbor and the 
owner of 16 Montana power plants. The sale price of roughly $988 million (about 1.5 
times book) was regarded somewhat favorably. Bob Anderson of the FSC expressed 
measured enthusiasm, “I’m a little underwhelmed with the price. It’s a decent price, a
146 Personal telephone conversation with Will Rosquist, FSC, 27 August 1999.
Mike Dennison, “State co-ops out of bidding for plants,” GFT, 7 July 1998. 
GFT editorial, “Unfamiliar ownership likely,” GFT, 11 July 1998.
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reasonable price, but not a great price.” It would, however, allow MPC to recover the
$550 million book value of the plants as well as an estimated $50 million in transaction
costs. 149 The remainder would be applied to M FC’s stranded costs, which the company
had estimated to be over $800 million. Sale proceeds could potentially eliminate all $150 
million in stranded “regulatory assets” (such as M FC’s past investments in customer 
conservation projects). Additionally, the proceeds would help reduce some of the $500 
million in above-market qualifying facility contracts (which, to MFC’s dismay, were not
transferred in the s a l e ) .  1^0 Finally, the last category of stranded costs — MFC’s proposal
for $160 million in out-of-market power coming from its generation plants — was largely 
mooted by the sale, as MFC only retained a fraction of its former assets (such as the 3 MW 
Milltown dam which FF&L refused to bid on, presumably because of its low generating
capacity and large environmental liability). Transferred in the sale were the following
properties:
148 Mike Dennison, “MFC sells for $1 billion,” GFT. 3 November 1998. The sale price 
was later reported as $759 million, with the possibility of an additional $97 - $117 million 
for the Colstrip interests. Charles S. Johnson, “MFC to sell all remaining energy assets,” 
IE, 29 March 2000.
149 This figure, which includes $10 million in legal fees, was also challenged. One 
intervener pointed out that it would take a lawyer 20 years of full-time work at $250 an hour 
to rack up that amount. Charles S. Johnson, “Hearing expert witnesses question MFC 
plan.” Montana Standard. 18 March 1998.
150 Mike Dennison, “MFC sells for $1 billion,” GFT. 3 November 1998.
Charles S. Johnson, “Montana Fower must now determine ‘stranded costs’,” 
M issoulian, 4 November 1998. While there was still no final determination of stranded 
costs by the FSC, at the time of this writing MFC was proposing $425 million to be 
recovered from its customers. AF, “Montana Fower says co-ops, other customers owe 
‘stranded costs,” ’ GFT. 5 May 2000. Sherry Devlin, “FF&L excludes troubled Milltown 
Dam, ” IR, 3 November 1998.
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Coal Fired Properties 
J.E. Corette 
Colstrip Unit 1 
Colstrip Unit 2 
Colstrip Unit 3 * 
Colstrip Unit 4*
Capacity 
163 MW 
333 MW 
333 MW 
805 MW 
805 MW
Location
Billings
Colstrip
Colstrip
Colstrip
Colstrip
* Transferred in the sale was M FC’s partial interest
Hydro Properties 
Thompson Falls Dam 
Kerr Dam
Madison River Dam 
(and Hebgen storage) 
Hauser Dam 
Holier Dam 
Black Eagle Dam 
Rainbow Dam 
Cochrane Dam 
Ryan Dam 
Morony Dam 
Mystic Dam
Date Built 
1968
1975
1976 
1984 
1986
86 MW Clark Fork River 1915
189 MW Flathead River 1938
9 MW Madison River 1906
17 MW Missouri River 1907
50 MW Missouri River 1918
18 MW Missouri River 1927
35 MW Missouri River 1910
54 MW Missouri River 1958
60 MW Missouri River 1915
48 MW Missouri River 1930
11 MW East Rosebud 1925
While MFC only had partial interests in Colstrip units 1 and 2, FF&L acquired full 
ownership through other transactions. FF&L also took over several of M FC’s power 
purchase and supply contracts, but did not buy the 3-MW Milltown Dam on the Clark Fork
River or 15 qualifying facility contracts totaling 101 M W . 1^2
While little was known about the four-year-old FF&L Global, its older and larger 
sister company, FF&L, Inc. (based in Allentown and serving 1.2 million Fennsylvania 
customers) had a longer track record. Environmentalists were wary, because of FF&L’s 
ownership of some of the nation’s most polluting coal-fired plants as well as some nuclear 
power plants. They also had nearly $100,000 in environmental penalties in 1997 (which is,
however, less than M FC’s fines in 1993 and 1 9 9 4 ).153 pp& L has operations in ten
foreign countries, and has a five year goal of owning 20,000 Megawatts of generating
capacity. 154
152 Missoulian State Bureau, “Assets bought by FF&L Global,’’ M issoulian. 4 November 
1998. “Montana Fower: A $988 million deal,’’ GFT, 3 November 1998.
153 AF, “MFC buyer has no clear track record,” GFT. 9 November 1998.
154 http://www.pplweb.com/
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One aspect o f the sale important to local consumers was M FC’s buyback provision, 
guaranteeing access to power from the plants through the 4-year transition period at a cost 
of 2.1 cents per kilowatt hour. This provision had been controversial, as some felt that it 
would depress the sale price to the detriment of consumers (leaving them with more 
stranded costs). MFC had argued the opposite, that the buyback would enhance the value
by giving the new owners a guaranteed market to sell in to .  1^5 Furthermore, the company
argued that with the direct buyback, consumers would save money over what they might get
on the market. This way, there would be no middle men power marketers to take a cut.
But because of the rate moratorium, it was really the company, not the consumer, that was at 
risk. Without a guaranteed source of relatively low-cost power, the company may have had 
a difficult time meeting the rate moratorium and could have lost millions of dollars selling 
power more cheaply than they could buy it.^^^
Of greater concern to Montana’s consumers was FF&L’s stated desire to sign 
lucrative contracts with out-of-state industrial customers, and to sell power to Montana 
residences only indirectly, through a retailer. One environmentalist lamented, “Montana’s 
low-cost power and the profits from its sale will flow out-of-state, while the environmental 
and social impacts stay at home — an undesirable consequence of deregulation only 
heightened by the s a l e . ’’ 1^8
As for workers, the sale agreement included protection for employees against 
layoffs. FF&L, itself a “union shop’’ whose workers belong to the International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (as do M FC’s employees), promised to continue
providing the same benefits package. The company offered similar assurances
155 Mike Dennison, “Top adviser to Racicot warns MFC sale could hurt consumers,’’ 
GFT. 19 March 1998.
156 Charles S. Johnson, “MFC defends proposal, questions critics’ claims,’’ BG, 21 April 
1998.
157 M FC’s initial interest and support of the Small Customer Buying Cooperative idea 
discussed below, may have had something to do with this phenomenon.
158 Guest editorial by Fatrick Judge, “We need consumers’ buying co-op,’’ IR, 25 
November 1998.
159 Erin F. Billings and Diana Setterberg, “New company foresees no work force 
changes,’’ IR, 3 November 1998.
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regarding its newly acquired riverfront properties, claiming to “have every intention of 
managing those properties as they have been managed.” Other benefits for Montanans
of the high sale price potentially included a higher tax valuation on these properties and a 
better credit rating for MPC (which could save consumers money by lowering the 
com pany’s cost of doing b u s i n e s s ) .  1^1
The Independent Record was pleased that the sale brought in 1.5 times book value, 
but was also concerned about the long-term implications of deregulation: “Given the 
uncertainty, w e’re glad to note that plans by the City of Helena to try to become a supplier 
of electricity to area residents still are in the works. The city might not be able to play with 
the boys who throw billion-dollar power-generation deals around, but at least we know its 
interests would involve the welfare of local consumers rather than the zillion shareholders of 
some huge outside c o m p a n y . ”
Conflicting reactions came from two elected officials. David Ewer felt that the 
relatively high sale price underscored the value of what Montanans were losing: “Today 
Montanans no longer control their electric power supply. Today over 300,000 Montanans 
face an uncertain future for obtaining electricity. Republicans let this happen.” Fellow 
Democrat Danny Oberg of the PSC, however, had a different take: “Today is one of those 
milestone days in history. The era of the utility monopoly is gasping its last breaths and we 
stand at what I believe is an open door ushering in refreshing air of market prices and
competition for the hearts and pocketbooks of consumers.”
The sale conclusion inspired the following eulogy, excerpted from a letter to the 
editor in the Missoulian:
160 Staff, “Land management should stay the same,” IR, 3 November 1998.
Gazette State Bureau, “Many fear sale means higher rates in future,” BG, 4 November
1998. Mike Dennison, “MPC sells for $1 billion,” GFT, 3 November 1998.
IR editorial, “MPC sale good, for now,” IR, 4 November 1998.
163 Mike Dennison, “MPC sells for $1 billion,” GFT. 3 November 1998. Charles S. 
Johnson, “MPC inks deal,” IR, 3 November 1998.
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Can you believe it? The Montana Power Co. has cashed in its chips. Took 
the money and ran. There was a time when that event would have triggered a parade 
with a brass band. But the only responses you seem to hear, if you hear any at all, 
are along the lines of, “Now what are they up to?” or “I guess they know 
something we don’t know,” or maybe “Good riddance!”
So they’re both gone now, the Anaconda Co. and MPC, the twin titans who 
ruled supreme for — what? — a century; vanished without a trace.
Well, that’s not entirely true. They left their trash. There’s Milltown and 
Butte. Have you seen that gargantuan open pit in the heart o f Butte? It’s like 
something out of Dante’s Inferno. It’ll be there forever. Can you imagine a 
company with the power and arrogance to order a city to move over, we’re gonna 
dig us a hole here? Who could have imagined 40 years ago that those two blood 
brothers could have been eliminated by anything short of armed rebellion? But 
there you have it -  they’re gone, swept away by the winds of c h a n g e .  1 ^ 4
MPC, meanwhile, reminded Montanans of its continued presence, and its continued 
commitment to remain a Montana company of the same name.l^^
The Small Customer Buying Cooperative 
Background
One of the key questions debated in the PSC’s review of M PC’s transition plan 
was that of default supplier. SB 390 specifies, “If a customer has not chosen an electricity 
supplier by the end of the transition period, a public utility shall propose a method . . .  for 
assigning that customer to an electricity supplier.” Because the PSC has the authority
to approve, modify, or deny the plan, some parties argued that the PSC should force MPC 
to continue to serve as the default supplier, whether or not it wanted to exit the energy
supply business. Others felt that forcing the default supplier role on a reluctant 
company would have negative repercussions for customers. Transferring the role to PP&L 
Global could involve a serious rate increase, owing to its need to recover the price it paid for
Letter to the editor by Robert D. Robinson, “Good riddance to twin titans,” 
Missoulian. 19 November 1998.
Mike Dennison, “Critics slam company for quitting sale o f electricity,” GFT. 28 
August 1998.
166 MCA 69-8-203.
167 MCA 69-8-202. Drummond, "The Small Customer Buying Cooperative," 34-35.
208
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
M FC’s facilities, which was one-and-a-half times bookJ^^  Another proposal was to solicit
bids from companies to serve in the default supplier role. But as one observer pointed out, 
it is certainly possible that few if any companies would be interested. And if they were, 
“there is no guarantee that these customers will actually be served at least cost, only that 
they will be served by the least cost supplier among those who bid.’’^^^
Another idea, and the one MFC proposed in its 1997 filing, was for proportional 
allocation. For example, if three competitive electricity companies had picked up customers 
during the transition period, the remaining customers would be assigned to those three 
companies in proportion to the market share they had captured. MFC argued that this 
would encourage companies to aggressively court customers. Customers, however, would 
not necessarily appreciate being shuttled off to an unknown company. Detractors of the 
idea also feared that this arrangement would give MFC’s marketing arm an enormous 
advantage. They felt that, because of “name recognition, ‘customer inertia’ and M FC’s 
potential control of the customer education process,’’ the company’s energy supply arm 
would pick up an artificially high percentage of customers that switch during the transition 
period. And at the end of the transition period, this percentage would mean that
hundreds of thousands of customers would automatically be transferred to MF Trading and 
Marketingm giving it a near monopoly (and an unregulated one at that). But the news that 
MFC was exiting the energy supply business went a long way toward resolving this issue. 
Still, if few suppliers were to show up during the transition period (which seems fairly 
likely), a similar concentration of power could result with other companies. In fact, as we 
saw above, more than two years into the transition period Montana has only two licensed 
alternative suppliers for residential customers. According to this system, if no other 
competitors were to arrive, all of MFC’s former customers would be transferred to this
single entity.  ̂̂  ̂  Another problem was that low-income customers “could face a widely
Charles S. Johnson, “Fower to Montana: New co-op hopes to supply electricity to 
state after MFC bows out in 2002,’’ IR, 24 October 1999.
Drummond, "The Small Customer Buying Cooperative," 33.
Drummond, "The Small Customer Buying Cooperative," 32.
If this were indeed the case, the FSC would presumably extend the transition period for 
up to two years. At that time, if there was still no competition, the legislature would 
presumably take action.
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disparate array of prices and policies, depending upon which competitor they were assigned 
to . . . causing considerable i n e q u i t y . ”  1^2
Another drawback of M FC’s proposal (and of deregulation itself) would occur if a 
limited number of suppliers did materialize for this customer class. Once customers left 
MFC, they would forever be “disaggregated,” left to fend for themselves with little market 
clout. The challenge, then, was to find a way for small customers to continue negotiating 
from a position of strength, using their collective load to make them a viable presence in the 
market. Joining together with other customers to increase buying power is known as 
aggregation. This is an altogether different situation than everyone choosing the same 
supplier out of an absence of alternatives (in which case customers are acting independently, 
have no bargaining power, and are together only as a matter of circumstance).
One solution to this problem, recently adopted by Oregon in its deregulation law, is 
called the “portfolio model,” or “dereg lite.” In many ways the portfolio model is a 
compromise between a regulated monopoly system and a fully deregulated direct access 
model. While small customers continue to buy electrical energy through their utility, they 
have a short menu of options to choose from (such as market-based, green, and locally- 
produced power). Supply can still be deregulated, but the utility goes to market on behalf of 
its customers, which remain aggregated. Because it has such a large load, it can negotiate 
better prices. Customers are spared the confusion of sorting out multiple offers from 
multiple companies and do not have to wonder whether their supplier is a reputable firm. 
Instead, consumers delegate these tasks to the utility, with its considerable expertise. This 
model recognizes that while the market may well be mature enough to support direct access 
for large customers, benefits may be hard to find for smaller customers. Here again, a 
legislative solution is not required, only a willing utility. In Washington, which has no 
deregulation law, this model has been in place at the Grant County Fublic Utility District 
since the fall o f 1997. Clark Fublic Utilities, another public utility district, has a pilot
program with similar e l e m e n t s .  ^^3
Drummond, "The Small Customer Buying Cooperative," 33.
173 Guest editorial by Steve Johnson, “Electric Fower: Will competition cut rates?” 
Seattle Fost-Intelligencer. 31 May 1998.
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But Montana would decide to try a somewhat different solution, to “do what we 
here in the rural West have always done when confronted with our own lack of market 
power . . . form a co-op.” For some time now, Montana’s cooperatives have described 
themselves as the “original aggregators.” While the analogy is somewhat less than perfect, 
the co-ops have performed a similar function — collectively serving customers who 
otherwise would have difficulty finding an electricity provider. While co-ops are
nothing new, applying the model to the former customers of an investor-owned utility is.
Out of this notion grew a proposal for a “Small Customer Buying Cooperative” 
(SCBC) to act as the default provider for customers who either have no choice (or no good 
choices) or who “choose not to choose.” At the end of the transition period, these 
customers would automatically be transferred to the SCBC. Like any other co-op, the
SCBC would be a non-profit, cost-based, consumer-owned entity. Decision-making
would be highly democratic, conducted by a board of directors elected by the co-op’s 
customer-members. Like other “public power” entities, the co-op would have access to
low-cost capital.
But this cooperative would differ from others in several important respects. First, it 
would be comprised only of small customers (remember that the state’s largest energy user 
— the Columbia Falls Aluminum Company — is a member of the Flathead Electric 
Cooperative). Second, it would deal only in the energy commodity business, leaving 
transmission and distribution to M FC’s regulated poles and wires business. Third, it would 
be predominantly comprised of city-dwellers.
Discussions concerning the co-op grew out of comments given by NRDC’s Ralph 
Cavanagh at the governor’s April 16 town meeting (discussed earlier). According to
Guest editorial by Ken Toole, “Co-op may be best chance for consumers,” IR, 13 
January 1999. The cooperative form has been successful in supplying a wide range of low- 
cost products and services from electricity, gas, propane, and telephone service to banking, 
insurance, housing, food, and agricultural services. Druinmond, "The Small Customer 
Buying Cooperative," 13-14.
175 Guest opinion by Gary Wiens, “Joining forces to buy electricity not exactly a new 
idea,” GFT, 30 April 1998.
176 AP, “Co-op idea sees power in numbers,” Missoulian, 13 October 1998.
177 Dmmmond, "The Small Customer Buying Cooperative," 20.
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Cavanagh, “what we’re going to get, if we do this right, is the most potent residential
buying enterprise in the nation.” While similar co-ops have formed in California and
New York, it was thought that a co-op consisting of M FC’s former customers would be the
largest in the nation. But for some time there had been growing support for the notion
that Montana’s small customers were going to have to work together if they wanted to share 
in the benefits of deregulation. In its own transition plan filed just two months after SB 390 
became law, MFC testified, “ [A]s customer choice is implemented, aggregation of smaller 
customers is likely to be needed to produce increased buying power to achieve sufficient
electricity supply savings.” In the months following, various proposals for joining
customers together were circulated, by both the private sector (marketers and brokers) and 
the public sector (counties and cities). Such efforts, including the specific proposal for the
SCBC, were well received by most observers. In April 1998, a Great Falls Tribune 
editorial found it “clear that some sort of aggregation of demand stands the best chance of 
helping consumers,” and in October, the Tribune wrote that the SCBC would be a “natural
fit” for the “great big sparsely populated area” known as M o n t a n a .
An informal committee developed to explore the idea further. Involved in the talks 
were NRDC, MEIC, the Human Resource Development Council, the Northwest Fower
Flanning Council, DEQ, BFA, and others. The co-ops were intrigued as well. Shortly 
after the governor’s meeting, a MECA official wrote.
Mike Dennison, “Is buyers’ co-op the answer for small consumers? Open market 
leaves many questions,” GET. 7 June 1999.
179 Personal conversation with Bill Drummond, Western Montana G & T, September
1999.
l^H F. R. Corcoran, “Docket No. D97.7.90: Electric Restructuring Transition Flan 
Filing,” 1 July 1997, p. FRC 22.
181 g FT editorial, “Giving consumers collective clout,” 21 November 1997. BG editorial, 
“Montanans must band together to buy electrical power,” BG, 21 April 1998.
182 g e t  editorial, “Montanans will need buying power to buy power,” GET, 22 April
1998. GFT editorial, “Statewide electric co-op for city folks a good idea,” GFT, 15 
October 1998. GFT editorial, “Small power users must be protected in deregulation,” 
GFT. 8 June 1999.
Charles S. Johnson, “Groups consider forming big co-op to buy power for small 
customers,” IR, 10 May 1998.
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Montana’s electric cooperatives would be more than happy to work with any city in 
helping form a cooperative to serve their residents’ electricity needs. And if there 
exist any regulatory or statutory impediments to forming electric power purchasing 
co-ops within cities, then let’s get rid of them.
Nothing should stand in the way of letting Montana’s residential and small 
commercial customers benefit from the same opportunities already enjoyed by their
rural Montana counterparts.
While these comments pertain more to the formation of municipal utility cooperatives than 
“one big buying co-op,” they clearly reveal excitement about the possibility o f expanding 
the cooperative movement into urban areas.
MPC and the administration also showed tentative interest in the SCBC. Both felt 
that while it may have an important role to play as a temporary safety net, the SCBC should 
be constrained in a number of ways to prevent it from interfering with an emerging market. 
If the SCBC were too attractive, they reasoned, it would become a “supercompetitor,”
killing competition in its cradle. Public interest advocates resented the idea that MPC
had pushed its deregulation plan on Montana and that it would then try to hem in
subsequent citizen efforts to protect themselves. Some further resented having to figure out
a way to “reaggregate” what, prior to deregulation, had always been aggregated. MEIC’s
Ken Toole responded as follows:
In theory they are right. If no one shows up to sell us power each of us can just 
offer to pay more and more. Eventually, when the price is high enough, suppliers 
will decide it’s profitable to serve small customers in Montana. Whoopee!! That’s 
competition !, t l 8 6
In other words, competition is an implausible prospect to begin with, and consumers can 
either be subject to an unregulated monopoly or part of a publicly-owned, democratic body 
working on their behalf. As a non-profit, customer-owned and directed entity, the SCBC 
posed no threat of monopolist behavior. Supporters therefore had no problem with its 
having 100% market share. Furthermore, if the SCBC could come into existence with few
Guest opinion by Gary Wiens, “Joining forces to buy electricity not exactly a new 
idea,” GET, 30 April 1998.
185 Ap “Co-op idea sees power in numbers,” M issoulian, 13 October 1998. Mike 
Dennison, “Is buyers’ co-op the answer for small consumers? Open market leaves many 
questions,” GFT, 7 June 1999.
Guest editorial by Ken Toole, “Co-op may be best chance for consumers,” IR, 13 
January 1999.
213
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
external constraints, it could have more members, a larger load, and greater opportunities for
achieving energy supply cost savings. According to Bill Drummond, author of a feasibility
study for the SCBC:
Economies of scale refer to the reduction in average costs or increase in average 
benefits experienced by all existing SCBC customers when a new customer is added 
to the system. The higher the fixed costs associated with the SCBC, the greater the 
economies of scale. Although minimizing the SCBC’s fixed costs appears prudent, 
some fixed costs are inevitable.. . .  The more SCBC customers and kilowatt-hours
over which these fixed costs can be spread, the lower the average cost.^^^
For a time it looked as if the company itself would have a strong economic stake in 
the SCBC. Under SB 390, the utility has the responsibility to continue providing electricity 
supply service for the duration of the transition period. And in doing so, it must meet the 
terms of the rate moratorium. Had the sale of its generating assets not included a buyback 
provision, the company could have been forced to buy power on the market more expensive 
than the rate moratorium, potentially causing millions of dollars of losses for the
company. 188
The 1999 Legislature 
These discussions and efforts culminated in the passage of SB 406, the “Electricity 
Buying Cooperative Act,” during the 1999 legislature. The bill authorized the creation of 
buying cooperatives for the residential and small commercial customers of investor-owned 
distribution utilities (with average monthly power demands of less than 100 kilowatts). The 
introduction to the bill stated that in addition to the consumer benefits of greater economies 
of scale and enhanced administrative efficiency, buying cooperatives could also provide new 
opportunities to power marketers which would help facilitate wholesale competition.
Finally, it was hoped that such cooperatives would qualify as BPA preference customers 
(for the portions o f their loads that lie west of the Continental Divide — about 1/3 of M FC’s
load) with superior access to Columbia River power at the lowest possible rate. 189
187 Drummond, "The Small Customer Buying Cooperative," 21.
188 Guest editorial by Tom Power, “Deregulation leads to pack of unintended 
consequences.” GFT. 14 June 1998.
189 Drummond, "The Small Customer Buying Cooperative," 38.
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The final buying cooperative legislation was something of a compromise between 
the two camps described above. 1^0 On the one hand, public interest advocates were pleased 
that a buying cooperative;
• could exist in p e r p e t u i t y ,
• could sell excess power on the wholesale market in order to balance loads,
• would be exempt from excise and income t a x e s ,  ^93
• could offer alternate electricity supply products such as green power, a n d   ̂94
• would be open to “those customers not being served by a competitive
supplier.” 195
This last provision is important, in that it leaves the door open to those who “choose 
not to choose” as well as those who have no choice. This would allow the co-op to offer 
benefits to a much larger base of customers, and would enable it to access more affordable 
electricity because of its larger load.
On the other hand, the buying cooperative was prohibited from:
• offering more than two choices, a standard product and a green product,
• enrolling customers in a contractual term of service,
• offering discounts below its PSC-approved rates, 196
190 jh e  “Electricity Buying Cooperative Act” is found at MCA 35-19-101.
191 The law does direct the TAC to review the “need for continued default supplier 
service” and make recommendations to the 2001 legislature. Unlike with SB 390’s USB 
provisions, however, there is no automatic sunset. If competitive markets do indeed develop, 
default supplier status (and PSC regulation) could be lifted from the co-op and it could 
compete with other suppliers.
192 MCA 35-19-201.
193 And because the co-op cannot own generation or transmission facilities, it would have 
little taxable property. MCA 35-19-108.
194 MCA 69-8-416. As with Oregon’s portfolio model, offering a number of products 
would give customers at least some “choice.” This would expand the SCBC’s appeal and 
broaden its customer base. With a greater number and diversity of customers, the SCBC 
would be a stronger entity — some would argue too strong. But supporters o f the SCBC 
worried about its ability to survive if composed entirely of customers with little means, small 
loads, and poor credit histories. Drummond, "The Small Customer Buying Cooperative,"
1 1 .
193 MCA 69-8-201.
196 MCA 69-8-416.
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• selling anything other than electrical energy including DSM s e r v i c e s ,  1^7
• competing for or serving customers that reside out of state, and
• owning any generation or distribution facilities.
Once incorporated, an electricity buying cooperative would still have to apply for 
and receive a default supplier license and be designated as such by the PSC. In its role as 
default supplier, the co-op would be subject to regulation by the commission. In this way, 
“the SCBC would be a hybrid between the existing unregulated electric cooperatives and a
fully regulated IOU.” 199 Furthermore, the commission can revoke the default status which
would revert back to the distribution utility unless reassigned to another entity. The buying 
cooperative also has an obligation to serve all eligible customers who wish to belong until
the commission declares the existence of workable competition for small customers.^OO
While the law directed the commission to issue default supplier licensing rules by 
December 1, 1999, that process is on hold pending the outcome of M FC’s distribution 
system sale. In August 1999, the Montana Electricity Buying Cooperative (MEBC) filed its 
papers of incorporation, desiring to become the default provider for M FC’s service
territory.201
BFA ’s “Standards of Service” Rules 
One of the first potential snags encountered by would-be buying co-ops following 
the passage of SB 406 was the hoped-for access to BFA power. Shortly after the session, 
the bill’s primary sponsor and Senate Minority Leader Steve Doherty (D-Great Falls) 
described BPA power as “an incredibly valuable resource, because it’s cheap and
197 The co-op would be allowed to form a subsidiary to offer such services.
MCA 35-19-202. This provision was meant to allay MFC’s fears that the co-op could 
someday pose a threat to its distribution business. But it also gives the co-op greater 
flexibility in obtaining power from the market and finding the best deals. Besides 
minimizing fixed costs, being free of power plant ownership also lowers the risk of 
acquiring stranded assets of its own. Dmmmond, "The Small Customer Buying 
Cooperative," 16.
Drummond, "The Small Customer Buying Cooperative," 42.
200 MCA 69-8-403.
201 AF, “Power co-op incorporates,” IR, 28 August 1999.
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reliable.”202 Unfortunately, it also happened to be in fierce demand. According to Gail
Kuntz, BPA’s Montana liaison, “virtually every type of BPA customer is looking for more
benefits than the federal system can provide from its limited supply.“203 As it turns out,
many of the potential competitors are other Montanans. In addition to existing co-ops, 
some local governments are interested in obtaining power and potentially serving as default 
suppliers in their own jurisdictions (as evidenced by Helena’s new municipal electric
utility).204 The 1997 legislature passed another bill, HB 211, allowing them to do so if 
their customers belong to an lOU and if the PSC grants its approval.205 Despite some
rivalry between proposals for a single default supplier (the buying co-op idea) and multiple 
default suppliers (as forwarded by the Montana League of Cities and Towns), the legislature
left the door open to both approaches.206
M EIC’s Graden Oehlerich commented, “There’s a limited pool of cheap preference 
power, and those that have it are protective of their right to it. Right now, we have an idea 
and a fledgling organization.. . .  BPA should serve a co-op like this. But will it come from
other publics’ part of the pie? Some have had a hard time with this.”207 Kuntz predicted
that the new co-op would likely get significantly less than the 110 average Megawatts it
202 Mike Dennison, “MPC, others trying to reserve cheap BPA power for small 
customers,” GFT. 7 June 1998. With competition and the entrance of unknown power 
marketers, reliability will become increasingly valued. In a climate open to “fly-by-night” 
operations, BPA will appear extremely attractive. Rob Chaney, “Missoula starts process to 
be ‘default provider’ of electricity,” Missoulian, 11 June 1999.
203 Guest editorial by Gail Kuntz, “BPA will mitigate, but can’t prevent rate increases for 
MPC customers,” M issoulian. 1 August 1999.
204 GFT editorial, “Giving consumers collective clout,” 21 November 1997. BG editorial, 
“Montanans must band together to buy electrical power,” BG. 21 April 1998.
205 MCA 69-8-203.
206 Mike Dennison, “Legislation offers M PC’s minor-Ieague customers electricity 
alternatives.” GFT. 18 February 1999.
207 Angela Becker-Dippman, “Efforts Underway to Form Montana Small Customer 
Buying Co-op,” Clearing Up (Energy NewsData Corporation), No. 886, 12 July 1999, 8.
217
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
d e s i r e d . ^ 0 8  But Montanans pointed out that the amount requested was only about 1% of 
BPA’s production. Surely, they argued, this was a reasonable request from a state that 
produces more BPA power than it consumes.^09
Beyond simple competition, buying co-ops (and municipals) face another important 
obstacle to accessing this power. Endeavoring to prevent a flood of marketers qualifying 
for preference power, BPA issued rules which require power line ownership as a condition 
for access. Unfortunately, these rules eliminate legitimate public power entities as well. 
M PC’s vice-president for energy services wrote in an guest editorial, “We believe that 
providing preference power to a PSC-selected default supplier — whether a buyers’ co­
operative or a municipality, whether it owns distribution wires or not — is entirely consistent 
with the letter and the spirit of the laws governing B P A .. . . BPA has chosen to use its 
guidelines, which are in conflict with its laws, to control the allocation of a limited supply of 
power.’’ Although MPC had no direct interest, the company said it was willing to fight for 
that power (by urging BPA to change its rules) as a show of support for its distribution
system customers.210 in the past, the company had been antagonistic toward some 
aggregation efforts, making such a stance a welcome change.^ ̂  Governor Racicot also 
supported the co-op’s attempt to secure BPA preference power.212
Plenty of details remain in the effort to create such a co-op in Montana. Central to 
the strategy is enlisting the unequivocal support of other Montana co-ops, which remain 
somewhat ambivalent. Some, for example, would prefer existing co-ops to actively sign up 
such customers before the end of the transition period in order to encourage a competitive
208 MPC’s 231,000 residential customers have a total energy load of 248 average 
Megawatts (aMW). Additionally, 33,000 small commercial customers (with loads under 25 
kilowatts) add another 30 aMW. Dmmmond, "The Small Customer Buying Cooperative," 
9. Guest editorial by Gail Kuntz, “BPA will mitigate, but can’t prevent rate increases for 
MPC customers,’’ M issoulian. 1 August 1999.
209 Mike Dennison, “Is buyers’ co-op the answer for small consumers? Open market 
leaves many questions,” GFT. 7 June 1999.
210 Guest editorial by Jack Haffey, “Deregulation not to blame in BPA exclusion of co­
op,” GFT. 8 August 1999.
211 GFT editorial, “Giving consumers collective clout,” GFT, 21 November 1997.
212 Johnson, Charles S., “Power to Montana: New co-op hopes to supply electricity to 
state after MPC bows out in 2002,” IR, 24 October 1999.
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market and reduce the need for a default supplier.213 g u t proponents of the buying
cooperative have a powerful argument: “Just as cooperatives were established in the 1930s 
to bring power to areas investor-owned utilities refused to serve, buying cooperatives are a 
mechanism to provide service at cost to those abandoned by their current lOU supplier.
The economic and political strength of having virtually every residential and small 
commercial electric consumer in Montana served by a cooperative would be
rem arkable.”214
Things, however, could begin to move rapidly, especially if MPC were to exit the 
default supplier business prior to the end of the transition period. The company (or its 
successor) could give the co-op a tremendous boost by transferring its customers and 
power supply contracts (including, presumably, the PP&L power buyback) prior to 2002. 
The earlier the co-op is certain of its load, the easier it will be to purchase power. If this 
were to happen, the co-op would presumably need to meet the rate moratorium.
The 56th Montana Legislative Assembly - Other Bills
HB 337 — Universal System Benefits 
In addition to the“Electricity Buying Cooperative Act,” the 1999 legislature passed 
several other bills pertaining to electric utility deregulation. HB 337 made changes to SB 
390’s universal system benefits provisions and added sections specifying the administration 
of those funds. One important change allowed the funding amount of 2.4% to track annual 
utility revenues. SB 390 had established and frozen the funding level at 2.4% of 1995 
revenues. Environmentalists were pleased that as utility profits rise, USB funds will rise 
proportionally. The drawback, of course, is that if utility profits decline, so will USB funds. 
But as RNP’s Rachel Shimshak notes, this would probably be a sign that people are 
conserving on their own, so either way you have a win-win situation.215 The bill also
213 Mike Dennison, “State electricity co-op directors want to study new rural options,” 
GFT. 16 July 1999.
214 Personal conversation with Bill Drummond, Western Montana G & T, 23 August
2000 .
215 Personal telephone conversation with Rachel Shimshak, RNP, 7 September 1999.
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established two universal system benefits funds that would be paid into when large 
customers and utilities fail to spend their full obligation internally. The bill designated the 
state Department o f Public Health and Human Services as the fund administrator for low- 
income bill assistance moneys, and the Department of Environmental Quality as the 
responsible party for the other fund (which would be used for all other public
p u r p o s e s ) . 2 1 6  Challenges to credits claimed by utilities and large customers would be
reviewed by the Department of Revenue, which has the power to disallow them. Credits,
however, are presumed valid until challenged and do not require p r e a p p r o v a l .2 1 7
SB 409 — Net Metering 
“Renewables are the means to get us off of fossil fuels and net metering gives us 
the incentive . . .  the power is clean, dispersed, and dependable.” Such was the testimony of 
Mary Hamilton, owner of the Missoula retail store “Solar Plexus,” in the hearings on SB 
409, the bill which became Montana’s net metering law in 1999. As described in Chapter 5, 
net metering is an incentive for grid-connected homeowners and businesses to become 
“self-generators” of renewable power. Any excess power that a customer produces (using 
solar, wind, or small hydro energy sources) flows back to the grid, offsetting the amount of 
energy purchased from the utility. Montana’s law, sponsored by Senator Jon Ellingson (D- 
Missoula), limits the generating capacity to 50 kilowatts. At the end of the billing period 
(usually a month), if the customer has put more power onto the grid than he or she has 
taken from it, he or she will receive a credit on the next bill which will offset new usage. At 
the end of each calendar year, all unused credits are forfeited. For states like Montana, the 
ability to carry credits for a full year is valuable in that it allows customers to offset their 
high winter energy bills with the excess they produce in summer months. As some have 
described it, net metering gives customers the opportunity to use the electrical grid as a 
battery — “storing” the power during months of plenty, and then drawing on it during 
times of scarcity. Placing additional power on the grid during off-peak summer months
^16 MCA 69-8-412.
217 MCA 69-8-414.
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may not be the ideal situation from the utility’s perspective, but the effect will likely be a 
small one for some time to come.218
While net metering can eliminate a customer’s variable energy charge, he or she is 
still responsible for the fixed monthly customer charge (see Chapter 5 for a discussion of 
these terms). It is estimated that net metering can save up to $15 per month for a residential 
solar generator, and $70 per month for a wind turbine on a farm.219 Montana’s law is also
attractive because of its simplicity. The bill allows for continued use of the standard 
kilowatt-hour meters already installed in the homes and businesses o f most small 
customers. Such meters are already reversible; they already accurately measure both 
positive and negative energy flows by spinning forward or backward respectively. The 
bill’s fiscal note attested that there would be no significant financial impacts for state or 
local government. SB 409 was codified as part of the deregulation law and took effect on 
July 1, 1999.
HB 174 — Revise Taxation of Utilities 
The 1999 legislature also passed a bill addressing what the Great Falls Tribune 
called “Electricity deregulation’s unintended consequence number 174 — having to rewrite
the way the state taxes electric companies.’’̂ 20 particular, the bill changed the tax 
classification of electrical generating properties from the 12% rate to 6%. The bill was 
supported by PP&L Global which argued that the 12% rate, the highest in Montana, would 
make it difficult for them to compete with out-of-state generators that pay lower taxes. 
Together, centrally assessed electric, gas, and telephone utilities typically produce about
25% of the state’s property tax r e v e n u e . ^ ^ l  the past, under regulation, utilities were able
218 And by moving into a regional power market, through deregulation, the system is 
shifting from a winter-peaking one to a summer-peaking one, because of the massive 
California air-conditioning load.
219 AP, “Lawmaker proposes credit for those generating power at their own home,’’ IR, 11 
February 1998.
220 g e t  editorial, “PP&L treated fairly in bill; now it’s Montanans’ turn,’’ GFT, 2 April
1999.
221 Tribune Capitol Bureau, “Utility industry next to tackle Legislature for tax break,” 
GFT, 6 December 1998.
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to pass that tax through to the consumer. But with deregulation, consumers could simply 
opt to buy power from an out-of-state company not taxed as heavily.
Legislative action was needed because of confusion over whether or not the 
reclassification would happen automatically with the sale (that is, whether the properties 
would automatically cease to be considered centrally assessed). And, o f course, legislation 
was also needed to help replace lost funds. As discussed earlier in this chapter (under “The 
Sale Announcement”), property tax reclassification could deliver significant blows to 
certain Montana counties. But because PP&L purchased M PC’s properties for 1.6 times 
book value, the actual tax loss would have been more like 20% than 50%, because the
properties would have a higher valuation.^22 jf, its final form, after a long, complicated, and
contentious legislative battle, HB 174 included a wholesale electric transactions (WET) tax 
that was expected to make up about $3.5 million of the $5 million to $6 million annual 
shortfall.223 Finally, a one-time capital gains tax on M PC’s income from the sale could be
as high as $30 million. MPC officials warn, however, that they are looking at ways to 
reduce or eliminate their capital gains tax liability. The WET tax was expected to affect the 
average residential consumer by only a few dollars per year. Exempt from the WET are co­
op customers and the ASiMI plant (which would have paid approximately $88,000 per
year).224
Conclusion
In many ways, the course of deregulation has been set in Montana. Efforts to 
reconsider the dramatic changes enacted by SB 390 have failed to accomplish their primary 
goal in stopping or slowing the move to deregulate. There is, however, a considerably 
higher awareness of the issues surrounding deregulation. Politically, the issue has moved to
center stage in Montana, figuring prominently in primary and general election campaigns
222 “PP&L Montana: Treat us like any other business,” GFT, 2 April 1999.
223 Mike Dennison, “Electricity consumers get a break: House committee endorses 
compromise utility-tax revision,” GFT. 27 March 1999. See also Mike Dennison, “Buyer 
of MPC plants gives dinner for panel nearing key tax vote,” GFT, 10 March 1999, and IR 
editorial, “Lobbying strays too far,” IR, 11 March 1999.
224 Mike Dennison, “Electricity consumers get a break: House committee endorses 
compromise utility-tax revision,” GFT, 27 March 1999.
222
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and providing a nucleus around which a broad publk-interest alliance is coalescing. Senior 
citizens, low-income citizens, environmentalists, consumer advocates, labor, farmers, small 
business, and women’s groups have all raised their voices.225 w hile  the 1999 legislature 
ironed out some of deregulation’s wrinkles, answering many of the questions that had been 
lingering since 1997, much work remains before small customers and the environment will 
realize benefits. Important decisions remain to be made: the PSC is yet to issue its default 
supplier rules, environmental disclosure rules, and final ruling on the Tier 2 transition plan 
issues. While citizen activists can play an important role in such forums, there is little they 
can do to influence the ultimate level of competition afforded small customers. Only time 
will reveal the eventual landscape of power providers and products available to ordinary 
Montanans.
225 Montana Food Distributors Association, “Should we unplug S.B. 390?” Ih eM o n tan a  
Food Distributor. May 1998, 9.
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION
From the beginning, the process of restructuring Montana’s electric utility industry 
has been complex, chaotic, and controversial. Unexpected developments have demonstrated 
time and again that predicting the course of deregulation under the Big Sky is a highly 
speculative venture. And yet many of the basic issues originally identified by opponents to 
SB 390 remain of critical concern. Certainly the importance of the process, grounded in 
both the magnitude of the changes being implemented and the economic and environmental 
significance of the industry itself, cannot be disputed. Transforming the historic system of 
regulated monopoly electric utilities into a competitive energy supply market is a daunting 
prospect. Montana’s electricity customers and the state’s natural and political landscapes 
are bound to be affected noticeably.
SB 390 was passed by the Montana legislature in 1997 amid substantial opposition 
from consumer, environmental, low-income, senior citizen, and other public interest groups. 
The intent, ostensibly, was to provide all electricity customers freedom to choose the 
electricity suppliers and products that best meet their needs. Increased efficiencies and 
competitive pressures would provide savings to consumers and spur innovation. The bill 
was also promoted as a way of protecting small customers from inheriting the large 
industrial customers’ share of the system’s unpaid (stranded) fixed costs. But opponents 
argued that these benefits depended largely on the development of viable markets for 
Montana’s small residential and commercial customers, a prospect which they saw as 
unlikely given the state’s sparse population and rural character. Montanans already enjoyed 
low-cost electricity, and there was little evidence to support the contention that consumers 
were “clamoring for choice.” Instead, opponents charged that SB 390 had more to do with 
the stranded cost packages utilities stood to profit from, and access to low cost power for
224
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large industrial customers. ̂  Ironically, three years later, even those goals have gone largely
unfulfilled. Just months after the passage of the deregulation bill, it became clear that MPC 
likely would not receive the kind of stranded cost package (nor the tax savings) it wanted, a 
development which may have played a role in precipitating the sale of M PC’s generation 
assets. And by 2000, it was clear that even the large industrial customers would universally 
benefit from the competitive markets they had so enthusiastically pursued.
The Sale of Montana Power Companv 
In general, little about deregulation has unfolded according to plan. In addition to 
the absence of markets offering affordable prices and innovative services, major unforeseen 
developments have slowed things considerably. Montana Power Company shocked the 
state with its decisions to sell its generating facilities (December 1997), to abandon power 
marketing (August 1998), and to sell its distribution system and other energy holdings 
(March 2000).^ The power plant sale was a major turning point, in that it vividly illustrated
many of the implications of deregulation. The level of awareness and concern increased 
rapidly as each new potential impact came to light. Deregulation was no longer some 
theoretical, arcane concept, but a major policy shift with real world consequences. Property 
taxes, employment, water rights, recreation, and the future of Montana’s low cost power 
were all discussed. The subsequent sale of the transmission and distribution business 
rekindled some of the same questions: How would the proceeds of the sale (which includes
properties of $1 billion book value) be divided between shareholders and ratepayers
1 Unlike for other customers, it appeared that large industrials would indeed recognize price 
savings because of real competition for their attractive loads. Lower cost power is available 
in the other Northwest states, and large customers were thought to be in a position to 
command it.
2 In a related development, MPC sold its non-regulated oil and natural gas properties to 
PanCanadian Petroleum Limited of Calgary in late August 2000. Mike Dennison, “MPC 
to sell properties to Canada oil giant: Petroleum and gas wells going for $475 million,’’ 
GFT. 29 August 2000.
3 M PC’s Bob Gannon argued that at the completion of the sale, there will be “no 
customers of Montana Power left to distribute any proceeds to.” Charles S. Johnson, 
“State says customers should share in profits,” IR, 30 March 2000. IR editorial, “M PC’s 
dose of Catch 22,” IR, 31 March 2000. IR editorial page “Question of the W eek” 
responses, “MPC profits: No middle ground,” IE, 10 April 2000. Jan Falstad, “MPC 
chief: Money from sale should go to investors,” IR, 11 April 2000.
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W hat would happen to the employment and tax base of Butte, Montana, a community 
forever recovering from its historic boom-and-bust mining economy?*^ What sort of 
commitment to Montana would the new owners have?^ What sort of jurisdiction would the
PSC have to oversee the sale?^ Consumer advocates, including Attorney General Joe
Mazurek, were concerned that MFC would sell its assets above book, keep all the proceeds, 
and leave Montana electric customers to face rate increases to cover the new owner’s 
greater-than-book investment.^
The Great Falls Tribune gave the company the following epitaph:
Well, the days of “what’s good for Montana Power is good for Montana’’ 
are over — if they ever existed. The company built by Montana ratepayers probably 
won’t even exist in a year or two.
When you remove the warm cloak of summer symphony concerts, high 
school sports telecasts and conservation easements, you are left with a corporate 
giant that is cashing in its legacy — and its relationship with its customers — to chase 
the telecommunications rainbow.^
Summer 2000 Power Market Crisis 
Another unforeseen development occurred in the Summer of 2000, when large 
customers that had gone to market-based rates (with the expectation of saving money) saw
^ Karl Puckett, “Employees uncertain; MPC promises fairness,’’ GFT. 29 March 2000. 
Barbara Laboe, “Butte jobs hinge on MPC deal: Butte lost 30% of its job base in the 80’s 
mining crash; could the city handle another 844 job losses if MPC moves out?’’ IR, 3 April 
2000.
^ IR State Bureau, “Baucus to meet with MPC chair,’’ IR, 31 March 2000.
^ In many other ways, the distribution sale mirrored the generation sale, with a similar list of 
potential bidders, a call for consideration by the legislature in a special session, etc. Charles 
S. Johnson, “Ready for a fight: PSC commissioners say they have some jurisdiction over 
MPC sale; power company says no way,’’ IR, 5 April 2000. Diane Cochrane, “Butte to bid 
on MPC, ” IR, 8 April 20(30. Mike Dennison, “Is consumer protected in MPC sale?”
GFT. 23 April 2000. Mike Dennison, “PSC wants voice on MPC sale at special session,” 
GFT. 25 April 2000. Roberta Forsell Stauffer, “Legislators call for adding MPC to 
session,” IR, 26 April 2000. Charles S. Johnson, “PSC says it has say in MPC sale,” IR, 
28 April 20(30. Mike Dennison, “PSC: Law change needed to monitor MPC sale,” GFT, 
28 April 2000. Mike Dennison, “State’s lack of control over MPC sale rare: All other 
states in region monitor utility property deals,” GFT. 2 May 2000. Charles S. Johnson, 
“Officials: Montana Power sale may wind up in court,” IR, 21 May 2000.
^ IR State Bureau, “Politicians: Use session to talk about Montana power sale issues,” IR, 
5 April 2000. BG editorial, “Lots at stake with MPC move,” BG, 3 April 2000.
^ GFT editorial, “Can we head off more unintended consequences?” GFT, 7 May 2000.
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prices suddenly double, triple, or go even higher (20-fold in the case of Montana Resources, 
the Butte mining company that was forced to close its doors and lay off 322 workers).^ 
Record wholesale prices in excess of $1000 a Megawatt-hour were paid in the Pacific 
Northwest (up from the usual $20) The manager for a Great Falls hospital that took a 
serious hit in its electricity bills considered it, “one of those cases where it truly is, be 
careful what you wish for." ̂  1
Proponents of deregulation maintained that current high prices were part o f a normal 
and temporary fluctuation, and that in the end customers would save money. The price 
volatility, according to Governor Racicot, could quite possibly be just a “shaking out” of 
the new market. M PC’s Pat Corcoran went further, perceiving the “vibrant activity in the 
electricity market” as evidence that the new system was working. 12 Corcoran argued that 
such prices would encourage new players to get involved in power production, thereby
9 Mike Dennison, “Regulation still means low rates for most: Customers in Idaho, 
W ashington paying less,” GFT. 10 July 2000. AP, “Butte mining operation shuts down: 
Company cites rising electricity price,” IR, 30 June 2000. John Stucke, “Last worker 
walks out of Butte copper mine,” IR, 11 July 2000. John Stucke, “Power surges: Industry 
feels early pains of electric deregulation,” Missoulian. 9 July 2000. The closure of 
Montana Resources also meant that water treatment activities were halted, doubling the rate 
at which contaminated water enters the Berkeley Pit. AP, “More contaminated water flows 
into pit with closure o f Montana Resources,” IR, 15 July 2000.
AP, “Utilities scrambling for power: Last week’s power shortage that hindered the 
Northwest calling attention to region’s potential for major blackout,” IR, 3 July 2000.
11 Mike Dennison, “Energy costs hit hard, for some: Gamble sours for those who bet 
early on deregulation,” G Q , 9 July 2000. It should be noted, however, that according to 
Don Quander of the Large Customer Group, “Not a single company thinks the solution is 
restructuring deregulation.” Deregulation proponents argue that the high prices are not 
permanent and point to other contributing factors such as hot weather; drought; power 
plants temporarily out of commission; growing demand from increased population, use of 
electronic devices, and regional power exchanges; and unscrupulous power marketers 
gaming the system. Strategies that have been used to insulate businesses from such adverse 
effects include long-term power contracts, and “hedging” the risks by putting together 
power portfolios of variable risk. John Stucke, “Power surges: Industry feels early pains 
o f electric deregulation,” Missoulian. 9 July 2000. Mike Dennison, “State’s industries 
bemoan jum p in power prices: Racicot hopes market will shake out,” GFT. 6 July 2000.
12 Mike Dennison, “State’s industries bemoan jump in power prices: Racicot hopes 
market will shake out,” GFT. 6 July 2000. John Stucke, “Power surges: Industry feels 
early pains o f electric deregulation,” Missoulian. 9 July 2000.
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increasing competition and benefiting c o n s u m e r s . 13 Ron Perry of Commercial Energy in
Cut Bank echoed this sentiment in an opinion editorial: “All deregulation does is provide 
the proper price signal to the marketplace that there is a severe need for building additional 
generation capacity.” He went on to suggest that Montana should “offer financial or 
legislative support to develop additional generating capacity so that we could mitigate some 
of these price fluctuations.” 14
Apologists thus attempted to steer attention away from Montana’s deregulation law 
and its role in exposing customers to the volatility of regional markets. Instead they 
criticized environmentalists for having obstmcted power plant development. An even more 
unlikely scapegoat turned out to be a fish — the Columbia River salmon which use water 
that might otherwise have boosted BPA’s power production. Jim Morin of the Great Falls- 
based Energy West Resources asked, “Are people being put out of work because a bunch 
of fish aren’t coming down the river? If BPA could ramp back up (its power production),
this (shortage) could be diminished significantly.” 13 BPA was also criticized for selling
much-needed power to California, partly as a result of the regional exchange discussed at 
the end of Chapter 4, and partly because of increased demand placed by Californians as a 
result of their experiment with deregulation.
Naturally, environmentalists had a different view of the situation. That the Pacific 
Northwest has not built major new power plants in the past 10 years despite population 
growth and increasing energy demand was seen by them as a tribute to the success of
conservation efforts. 1 ̂  They argued that additional “conservation power plants” can and
should be built in the region and that doing so is a preferable strategy to rampant fossil fuel 
plant development. Next in line in priority (as recognized by the 1980 Pacific Northwest
^3 Mike Dennison, “MPC pushed deregulation — So, what does it say now?” GFT, 9 July 
2000.
14 Guest editorial by Ronald L. Perry, president of Commercial Energy in Cut Bank, 
“Deregulation not always easy, but it will prove to be right,” GFT. 9 July 2000.
13 Mike Dennison, “As regional prices spike, some point fingers at BPA, ” GFT, 10 July
2000 .
1^ AP, “Utilities scrambling for power,” IR, 3 July 2000. Nationally, in recent years 
electricity demand has been growing about 2% to 3% annually. AP, “Competition-driven 
industry could make electrical power unreliable, observers worry,” GFT. 6 July 2000.
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Power Planning and Conservation Act) should be new renewable energy projects.
According to one article, the alternatives are not all that attractive, environmentally or 
economically;
. . .  private companies have been slow to build new power plants because they can’t 
be sure market prices will justify the costs. New hydropower projects are out 
because of environmental impact. Nuclear plants are too expensive and risky.
The technology of choice is the “combustion turbine,” an oversized jet 
engine fueled by natural gas that generates electricity instead of thrust. But there are 
only two turbine manufacturers and both have more orders than they can fill right 
away. And environmentalists complain that the turbines bum fossil fuel and emit 
carbon dioxide. . . .  As many as a dozen gas-fired turbines are planned across the 
region. Some have been stalled by community opposition, others by fluctuating 
power prices.
Montana should resist renewed pressure to become the “boiler room of the nation,” 
whereby the state would export its low cost energy resources to the benefit of out-of-state 
markets and to the profit of out-of-state energy companies while retaining the social and 
environmental impacts locally.
Impacts on Small Customers and the Environment 
Serious questions remain concerning the impact of high wholesale prices on 
Montana’s small customers when the rate freeze expires at the end of the transition period 
in July 2 0 0 2 . The first half o f the rate moratorium expired on June 30, 2000, and MPC 
did promptly request rate increases — one for increased costs associated with energy 
delivery, and one for increasing power-supply costs (which may be allowable under the rate
moratorium only because of a rate cut the previous year). 1^ The environmental impact of
rate increases is mixed, and extends beyond the potential development of new power plants 
and the potential threat to fish-friendly management practices. On one hand, cost-induced
1^ AP, “Utilities scrambling for power,” IR, 3 July 2000.
18 Mike Dennison, “Fear of high prices prevalent early in power restructuring,” GFT, 18 
May 2000. Defenders of deregulation remind us that such rate increases would only impact 
the energy supply portion (about 25% they say) of the bill. For example, a family that pays 
$50 a month would pay $62.50 if rates doubled, not $100. Opinion editorial by Senator 
Fred Thomas and Representative Joe Quilici, “TAC leadership answers some questions 
about deregulation,” GFT. 24 August 2000.
1^ Charles S. Johnson, “MPC requests rate hike,” IR, 12 August 2000. AP, “MPC 
submits another rate increase request,” GFT, 26 August 2000.
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conservation may increase household energy efficiency and increase the cost-effectiveness 
of conservation and renewable energy as resource options. Yet on the other hand, 
customers will be less willing and able to fund such programs (although the programs 
themselves would require less assistance). Other potential impacts abound. At a town 
meeting on electric deregulation in Butte, irrigators warned that dramatically increased 
power costs would likely lead them to abandon farming in favor of subdividing their land.
In Trident, the Holnam cement plant (which was the second industrial load to sign a 
competitive electricity supply contract) recently proposed burning tires (to the horror of 
environmentalists) — a move which was likely motivated, at least partly, by a desire to reduce 
its skyrocketing energy costs.
In addition to being exposed to high and volatile market rates, deregulation may 
affect small customers in more insidious ways. Without workable competition, and without 
the protections of the PSC, homeowners and small businesses could face uncontrolled rate 
increases, diminished customer service, compromised environmental programs, and 
decreased safety and reliability. The summer of 2000 did more than illustrate the risk of 
price increases, by underscoring reliability as a serious concern. California and the 
Northeast also faced fairly severe power shortages which prompted Congressional action 
toward creating a new organization to oversee and ensure the reliability o f the nation’s
power grids (replacing the current system of voluntary compliance).^0 Closer to home, the
Northwest Power Planning Council predicted higher-than-normal odds for blackouts in the
region over the next four years.^I
The Future
The story is far from over. In a sense, it has yet to begin. Competition and 
customer choice remain essentially unavailable for virtually all of Montana’s small 
customers, residential and commercial alike. More than three years after the passage of SB 
390, residential and small commercial customers have yet to experience, to any meaningful
20 A.P “Hot spell could pull plug on nation’s electricity: Feds worry power industry not 
keeping up with country’s electric needs,” IR, 6 July 2000.
21 AP, “Utilities scrambling for power: Last week’s power shortage that hindered the 
Northwest calling attention to region’s potential for major blackout,” IR, 3 July 2000.
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extent, the principle benefits they were promised by the architects of deregulation. At the 
end of October 2 0 0 0 ,  the PSC web page listed only two alternative electricity suppliers 
licensed to serve these customers (Energy West Resources and Glacier Energy, Inc.), 
although apparently Commercial Energy and the City of Missoula have also successfully 
negotiated the licensing process. At the time of this writing. Energy West was the only 
entity to have signed any customers. But in another surprise development, that company 
returned all its small customers to the regulated system with the rationale that it simply 
could not provide them with affordable p o w e r .2 2  While more than half o f M PC’s large
industrial load (although not necessarily half of the number of large industrial customers) 
has gone to other suppliers, competition at the wholesale level has not developed as expected 
either. According to Jim Stromberg of CFAC, “For the entire West Coast, we do not have 
a competitive (wholesale) market. It’s a very thinly traded market with just a couple of big
p l a y e r s . ’’2 3
As the 2001 legislative session approaches, it appears that issues surrounding 
Montana’s electric utility deregulation law will remain center stage. It is likely that a select 
committee will form to handle the raft of bills certain to materialize pertaining to the issue. 
Already, draft requests have been submitted ranging from an all-out repeal to various 
mechanisms aimed at reclaiming for Montanans some benefit of Montana’s native low-cost 
generation for the residents of the state. It is not unlikely that the legislature will in this or 
future sessions radically rework the model of how utilities should be structured to best 
deliver benefits to the vast majority of Montana’s electrical customers. Other bills 
pertaining to related issues are already in the hopper. Multiple draft requests have been 
made to further loosen permitting requirements of new electrical generating facilities. 
Environmentalists are concerned that panic-driven development and rampant speculation will 
again lead us into a cycle of overbuilding with all its attendant inefficiencies. Some 
observers suggest an attitude of caution, whereby we carefully scrutinize deficits and look 
for creative and conservative remedies (load shaping, demand side management, etc.) where
22 Mike Dennison, “Company gives deregulated gas customers a break: Energy West 
puts hundreds back on cost-control system,’’ GFT, 6 October 2000.
23 Mike Dennison, “Fear of high prices prevalent early in power restructuring,’’ GFT, 18 
May 2000.
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shortages truly exist.^4 Many of the conditions which led to the constricted electricity
market in the Summer of 2000 are temporary in nature, and do not necessarily warrant a 
rush to build new capacity.
With the 2000 elections, Montanans opted to retain Republican control o f the 
governor’s office and the legislature. And for the first time in a quarter century. 
Republicans took control of the Public Service Commission. While the two commissioners 
who had dissented from the PSC’s endorsement of SB 390 in 1997 remain, the other three 
members are all former legislators who had voted for SB 390.
Nevertheless, progressive energy activists in Montana hope to build upon the 
successes of the 1999 legislature, and have reason to believe they may do so. Support for 
deregulation is far more tenuous than four years ago. Conservatives and liberals alike 
aeknowledge that deregulation has not yet produced the kind of benefits originally 
envisioned, and that in fact it has created a number of unforeseen and undesirable outcomes. 
At a minimum, the schedule by which small customers are moved into a “competitive” 
environment will be slowed. The PSC is poised to exercise its power to extend the deadline 
by which small customers must choose an alternate supplier by two years. The legislature 
may well make further extensions. Also encouraging is the recent recommendation by the 
transition advisory committee to extend the universal system benefits program by two years. 
Furthermore, the PSC appears very close to issuing strong rules requiring environmental 
disclosure and labeling of power supply products. Finally, the Montana Electricity Buying 
Cooperative continues to gather momentum in its effort to become the default supplier for 
M PC’s residential and small business customers.
At the close of the millennium, Montana’s energy future remains hazy. But what is 
clear is that advocates for progressive energy policy will continue to play an important role 
in shaping discussions and moving the debate toward the interests of Montana’s citizens 
and natural environment. The struggle over energy issues remains a defining one for the
24 Such an approach seems especially appropriate in Montana, where we export 
approximately 40% of the power we generate. Alan Davis, DEQ, “Electricity in Montana — 
an Overview,” T A C. Report. November 1997. Current deficits are a characteristic of 
regional markets, rather than Montana. Montana is simply participating in those markets to 
a greater degree as a result of the move toward competitive electricity markets. Personal 
telephone conversation with Pat Dawson, 24 November 2000.
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State, but it is one in which public interest advocates have a solid place, a proven record, and 
reason for optimism.
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APPENDIX A 
MEIC FACTSHEET
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SENATE BILL 390 - ELECTRIC DEREGULATION
Who benefits - Residential customers or industry? (by MEIC)
Some Opponents to SB 390
Montana Senior Citizens Association
Montana Public Interest Research Group
Montana People’s Action
Montana Low-income Coalition
Montana Alliance for Progressive Policy
Montana Environmental Information Center
Northern Plains Resource Council
Montana Association of Churches
Montana Trial Lawyers Association
Natural Resources Defense Council
Montana W omen’s Lobby
Montana Farmers Union
Montana Retail Association
Montana Audubon
Montana Chapter of the Sierra Club
Northwest Conservation Act Coalition
Renewable Northwest Project
Working for Equality and Economic Liberation
Some Supporters o f SB 390 
Montana Power Co.
Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. 
Montana Chamber of Commerce 
Montana’s Electric Cooperatives 
Large Customer Group 
Montana Wood Products Association 
Montana Taxpayers Association 
Columbia Falls Aluminum Company 
Montana Refining Company 
Washington Corporation 
ASARCO
Stone Container Corporation 
Conoco
Bonneville Power Administration 
Washington Water Power 
Puget Sound Energy 
Portland General Electric 
D.A. Davidson, Inc.
Although other supporters included the Montana Public Service Commission ( 3 - 2  
vote), the Montana Consumer Council, the Human Resource Development Council 
Association, Montana Energy Share, and the Montana Department of Environmental 
Quality, there were no member-based, public-interest groups who supported the legislation.
Montana Power Co.’s Lobbving Resources - 55th Legislative Session
Total contributions to 87 legislative candidates in 1996: $7,875 (more than any other PAC)
Registered lobbyists: 18 (more than any other non-governmental entity)
Lobbying expenditures: $132,490 (more than any other entity)
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APPENDIX B
STATE ELECTRICITY PRICES, DEREGULATION STATUS, 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES 
(System Benefits Charge, Net Metering, Renewable Portfolio Standard,
& Environmental Disclosure)
1995 Price data was found on-line at:
http://www.eia.doe.gOv/cneaf/electricity/esr/t 12.txt
2000 Deregulation status was found on-line at:
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str/regmap.html
2000 State Environmental Policies Status found on-line at:
http://www.ucsusa.org/energy/update.statepolicy.html
(note: environmental policies not necessarily enacted as part of dereg law)
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50 s t a t e s  + DC 1995 re s iden tia l  p r ice  (cen ts /kW h ) co m p ,  d e re g  legisla tion SBC NM BPS Dl
W ash ing to n 5 X
Idaho 5 .3 X
O rego n 5 . 5 1 9 9 9  X X X
K en tu ck y 5 . 6
T e n n e s s e e 5 . 9
M ontana 6 .1 1 9 9 7  X X
W yom ing 6 .1
North D ako ta 6 . 2 X
N e b ra s k a 6 .4
W e s t  Virginia 6 .5 2 0 0 0
A la t jam a 6 . 7
Indiana 6 .7 X
O klahom a 6 .8 1 9 9 7 X
Utah 6 .9
M is s i s s ip p i 7
W isco n s in 7 X X X
N evad a 7.1 1 9 9 7 X X X
S o u th  D akota 7.1
M in n eso ta 7 . 2 X X X
Louisiana 7 :3
M is so u r i 7 . 3
C o lo rad o 7 .4 X
S o u th  C aro lina 7 .5
District of C o lu m bia 7 .6 2 0 0 0
T e x a s 7 .7 1 9 9 9 X X X
F lo r ida 7 .8
G eo rg ia 7 . 8
V irg in ia 7 . 8 1 9 9 8 ^ X
K an sa s 7 . 9
A r k a n s a s 8 1 9 9 9
North C aro l ina 8 1
Iow a 8 . 2 X X
Michigan 8 . 3 2 0 0 0
M a ry la n d 8 . 4 1 9 9 9 X X
Ohio 8 . 6 1 9 9 9 X X
N ew  Mexico 8 .9 1 9 9 9  X X X
A riz o n a 9-1 1 9 9 8 X
D e la w a re 9 .1 1 9 9 9 X
P e n n s y lv a n ia 9 . 7 1 9 9 6  X X X
Illinois 1 0 .4 1 9 9 7  X X X
V erm o n t 1 0 .5 X
A la sk a 1 1 .2
M a s s a c h u s e t t s 1 1 .3 1 9 9 7  X X X X
R hod e  Island 1 1 .5 1 9 9 6  X X X
C ali fo rn ia 1 1 .6 1 9 9 6  X X X
C o n n ec t icu t 1 2 1 9 9 8  X X X X
N ew  J e r s e y 1 2 1 9 9 9  X X X X
Maine 1 2 .5 1 9 9 7 X X X
Hawaii 1 3 .3
N ew  H am psh ire 1 3 .5 1 9 9 6 X
N ew  York 1 3 . 9  reg u la to ry o rde r ,  19 9 6  X X X*
U.S. A v erag e 8 . 6  Totals: 25  1 3 3 0 1 0 1 4
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APPENDIX C 
DEREGULATION TIMELINE
1879 Edison invents light bulb
1882 Edison’s Pearl Street Station is generating power
1907 States begin to regulate electric utilities
1912 Montana Power Company formed by Anaconda Company executives
1935 Regulation broadened - Public Utilities Holding Company Act & Federal
Power Act
1939 Co-ops form in MT under the Rural Electric and Telephone Cooperative Act
1978 Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act & other federal decisions begin to
restructure the industry by allowing new players in the generation market
1980 Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act
1992 Energy Policy Act (EPAct) requires fair and open access to transmission
1995
Jul 17 PSC begins inquiry into the Restructuring of M T’s Electric Utility Industry
1996
Jan 31- 2 / 1  PSC roundtable discussions on restructuring
Apr 24 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issues Orders 888 & 889
implementing EPAct and opening access to transmission grids
May 21 PSC issues its “Electric Restructuring Principles’’
Nov 6 At a Missoula hearing on the Comprehensive Review of the Northwest
Energy System, 104 of 130 present urge strong support for public purposes
Dec 12 Final report of the Comprehensive Review of the Northwest Energy System
1997
Feb Competitive rates for ASiMI approved by PSC
Feb 26 Transmittal deadline - 55th MT Legislature
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M ar 8 SB 390 (Electric Utility Restructuring and Customer Choice Act) introduced
Apr 18 SB 390 passed by legislature - total vote: 113 - 36
Apr 21 Gov. Racicot signs SB 224, weakening the Major Facility Siting Act
May 2 SB 390 signed by Governor Racicot and takes effect
■Jul 1 MPC and PacifiCorp submit transition plans to the PSC
Racicot misses deadline to appoint an environmental member to the TAC
Aug 13 PSC orders MPC to revise its transition plan
Sep 25 DOE report predicts price increases for the Pacific Northwest under dereg
Nov 7 MPC announces $200 million/yr. power contract with Calif. Manufacturers
Nov 21-23 MSU-Billings poll finds 56% of Montanans willing to pay higher electric 
rates to fund improved emission controls at power plants; 36% unwilling
Dec 9 MPC announces intention to sell all of its generation assets
Dec 16-18 Lee Newspapers poll: 46% of Montanans favor deregulation, 32% oppose
1998
Jan 30 First special session call initiated
Feb 18 Black & Veatch says MPC sale to outside firms 95% likely to increase rates
Feb 26 MEIC wins lawsuit opening special session ballots up for public inspection
Mar 5 1st call for a special legislative session on electric deregulation fails: 52 - 93
Mar 13 MEIC, labor, seniors, low-income stage “walk out” of TAC meeting
Apr 16 Gov.’s forum on restmcturing - less than 10 of 60 attendees are lay citizens
Discussions begin concerning Small Customer Buying Cooperative
Apr 23 Second special session call initiated
Apr 29 Helena hearing on MPC transition plan - Dereg opponents rally to the
theme: “Don’t Let the Fat Cats Treat Us Like Lab Rats!”
May 1 Co-op “opt out” deadline - only Flathead & Glacier (of 26) “opt in”
May 5 MontPIRG, MT Senior Citizens Association, and Working for Equality &
Economic Liberation challenge legality of M PC’s sale process
May 6 Missoula hearing on MPC plan - 1760 signatures for “an equitable,
affordable & clean energy future” presented by MEIC
MontPIRG questions legality of MPC ads under 1-125
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May 7 Commissioner of Political Practices, Ed Argenbright, rules MPC ads legal
Consultant predicts rate increases for Montana under deregulation
May 15 PSC dismisses MontPIRG complaint
May 20 1-138 to repeal electric deregulation certified for signature collection
May 21 1-139 & 1-140 to acquire M PC’s water rights certified
May 28 2nd call for a special session on electric deregulation fails: 58 - 83
Jun 1 Helena creates municipal utility
June 3 Talks between MPC & public interest community break down
Jun 3-7 MT Democratic Party poll: 52% think dereg. will hurt Montana, 26% help
Jun 19 Initiatives 138, 139, & 140 addressing deregulation issues fail to qualify
Jun 22 Non-binding bids submitted for MPC’s generation facilities
Jun 24 PSC issues final order on the “tier one’’ portions of M PC’s transition plan
Jul 1 Large customers allowed to choose their energy supply companies
Stone Container Corp. chooses Montana Power Trading and Marketing Co. 
Rate moratorium begins
Unbundling of bills supposed to occur, but does not
PSC supposed to issue final order, but does not (process slowed by sale)
Four year “Transition Period’’ begins
Pilot programs supposed to begin, but do not
Jul 2 MPC narrows list of potential buyers to roughly 6 — MT co-ops are rejected
Jul 9 PacifiCorp announces intent to sell operations in MT & CA
Aug 8 MPC inaugural Summer Symphony
Aug 10 Holnam Inc. cement plant chooses Illinois-based Illinova
Aug 26 MPC withdraws from power marketing altogether
Sep 21-23 Lee Newspapers poll: 42% favor deregulation, 21% oppose
25% expect bill’s to decrease, 15% increase, & 49% to stay about the same 
29% disapprove of M PC’s sale, 27% approve
Nov. 2 PP&L is announced as the successful bidder for M PC’s generation assets
1999
Jan 1 Universal System Benefits Program begins
Composite Power announces plans to build four mine-mouth 500 MW coal- 
fired generation plants south of Red Lodge
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Apr 16 SB 409 authorizing net metering signed by Governor Racicot
May 5 SB 406 authorizing the formation of small customer buying cooperatives
signed by Governor Racicot
Jun 17 FERC approves MPC sale to PP&L
Aug 5 Montana Electricity Buying Cooperative incorporates
Dec 22 BPA denies MEBC preference power rates
2000
MPC subsidiary Continental Energy Services proposes the “The Silverbow 
Generation Project” which involves plans to build a 230 MW natural gas 
combustion turbine plant in Butte (later increased to 500 MW)
M ar 23 MEBC petitions 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals to review BPA decision
M ar 28 MPC announces sale of remaining energy-related assets
Jun 29 Montana Resources shuts down due to high market prices for electricity
Jun 30 Rate moratorium on power bills ends (distribution rates no longer capped)
Jul 1 Rate freeze on power supply portion of customers’ bills begins
Sep 21 Approximate date that Energy West notified their new residential and small
business electricity and gas customers that it was returning them to the 
regulated system because of high prices
Oct 2 MPC announces the sale of its distribution system to Northwestern Corp.
of Sioux Falls, South Dakota, for $ 1.1 billion
2002
May 1 PSC decision on whether transition period is extended for small customers
Jul 1 Transition period ends - all lOU customers supposed to have choice
Rate freeze ends
lOUs can no longer collect generation-related stranded costs 
Montana-Dakotas Utility (MDU) transition plan filing due 
Co-op customers must have choice unless the co-op has “opted out” or 
there is no competition
2003
Jul 1 Universal System Benefits Program funding terminates, unless renewed
2004
Jul 1 End of extended transition period for investor-owned utility customers
MDU transition plan filing deadline (if extended)
2006
Jun 30 All MDU customers must have choice
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APPENDIX D
EXPLORING THE CONSERVATION-CONSUMER ALLIANCE 1
During the electric deregulation debate, MEIC has been an advocate not only for 
environmental concerns, but also for consumer interests. In response to Montana Power 
Co.’s “Sweetheart Deal for Industry” (SB 390, the bill which became M ontana’s electric 
deregulation law), MEIC unveiled its “C.A.R.E. plan for Montana.” C.A.R.E. is M EIC’s 
vision of a Clean, Affordable, Reliable, and Efficient energy future. While “clean” and 
“efficient” are values any environmentalist can appreciate, why does MEIC “care” about 
affordable and reliable power? Why has MEIC suddenly donned the cap of consumer 
advocate?
Some would contend that by playing this role MEIC has performed a disservice to 
the environment. Shouldn’t we be working for more expensive power to get people to use 
less of it?
The explanation involves an acknowledgment that environmental issues seldom exist 
independent of broader issues of social justice. Whether we should be for or against more 
expensive power depends on two questions — “more expensive power for whom?” and 
“more expensive power for what?”
Under Montana’s deregulation law, large industrial customers will obtain cheaper 
electricity, while small customers are likely to pay more. Montana Power Co.’s 16 contract 
industrial customers (like Exxon, Stone Container, ASARCO, and Golden Sunlight mine) 
use more power than its 230,000 residential customers. One gluttonous business 
(Columbia Falls Aluminum Company) uses more power than those 16 industrial customers 
combined! Driving up prices for residential customers while large industrial users go on a 
shopping spree is a poor strategy for saving energy.
 ̂ Patrick Judge, “Exploring the Conservation-Consumer Alliance,” Inside MEIC: A 
Special Publication for our Patrons and Pledges. Spring 1998. Reprinted with permission 
from MEIC.
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In some instances, MEIC does argue for more expensive power. MEIC supports 
incorporating the full cost of generating and transporting electricity into its price. The 
“total social cost” of the electricity industry includes not only construction, maintenance, 
fuel, and employment costs, but also the currently “externalized” costs of environmental 
degradation and impacts to public health. These costs should be paid for by electricity 
customers in proportion to the amount they use.
MEIC also argues for increased rates to fund conservation, renewable energy, and 
low-income programs. While additional funding for these programs may lead to increased 
rates, it also leads to decreased bills, and bills are what people pay. For example, although 
conservation programs increase the price of energy (slightly), these same programs allow 
you to buy sufficiently less of it so that you save money on your bills. Likewise, although 
renewable energy may cost a little extra up-front, in the long ran it out-competes 
conventional power both in terms of operating costs (free fuel!) and externalized costs. 
Combined with low-income assistance, these investments provide an effective and socially- 
conscious way of achieving environmental goals.
Consumer and environmental objectives can be pursued hand-in-hand. Responsible 
consumer advocacy involves more than just looking out for consumers’ pocketbooks — it 
demands that we motivate people to use their purchasing power for environmentally and 
socially constructive ends. This will be our challenge as Montana moves closer to a 
deregulated electricity industry.
[ 2 4 3 ]
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APPENDIX E
STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR A SPECIAL SESSION 
TO RECONSIDER ELECTRIC DEREGULATION IN MONTANA
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Statement of Support for a Special Session 
to Reconsider Electric Deregulation in Montana
The 1997 Montana Legislature passed Senate Bill 390, the “Electric Utility Industry 
Restructuring and Customer Choice Act.” Governor Marc Racicot signed the bill into law. 
As evidenced by Montana Power Co.’s recent announcement that its generation assets are 
for sale, the law has far reaching implications for consumers and the environment, and 
deserves further consideration.
• Montana was the first state with low-cost power to deregulate its electric utilities, 
and remains the lowest cost state to have done so. With the sixth cheapest residential 
energy prices, it is unlikely that Montanans will see any savings. The U.S. Department of 
Energy predicts deregulation will result in a 28% price increase by the year 2000 for 
residents of the Pacific Northwest. A typical household can expect to pay an extra $200 
each year. No other state in the Northwest has taken this risky step.
• SB 390 fails to ensure that viable competition exists before exposing customers to 
deregulation. Montana’s low population and rural character may make it unattractive to 
energy providers. Consequently, Montana’s residential customers and main street 
businesses may have little or no “choice” of power companies. Nor will they have the 
protection historically offered by the Public Service Commission.
• Other states that have deregulated their electric utilities are now struggling with 
citizen disapproval and disinterest, meager competition, and delayed access to “choice.” 
Deregulation of other industries, such as telecommunications and airlines, has failed to 
deliver many of the benefits promised to consumers, especially in rural areas.
• SB 390 inadequately funds low-income bill assistance and weatherization, energy 
conservation, and renewable energy. A 1996 regional agreement signed by the governors of 
the four Northwest states recommended that more than 3% of utility retail sales be set aside 
for these programs. Instead, SB 390 allocates a scant 2.4% that terminates after only four 
years. Qualifiers and exemptions further weaken this minimal commitment.
• SB 390 inadequately addresses the environmental and social consequences of the 
electric utility industry. While other states have required a certain percentage of their energy 
to be derived from renewable sources and have implemented incentives for consumer 
generated power as part of their electric restructuring laws, Montana did not.
• SB 390 was introduced late in the session and was pushed through the legislature 
by the utilities and their large industrial customers. Not a single member-based, public 
interest group supported the legislation -  more than a dozen opposed it.
• Montanans deserve a better opportunity to study and prepare for electric 
deregulation before abandoning our present system. A special session is the only way to 
secure that opportunity.
These concerns, voiced since the beginning of the deregulation debate, have never 
been adequately addressed. The impending sale of Montana Power Co.’s power plants 
magnifies many of these concerns and raises additional questions, such as how a change in 
ownership will impact fisheries, water quality, and recreation. Therefore, the undersigned
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organizations and businesses urge the members of the Montana Legislature to vote FOR a 
special session to reconsider and potentially postpone the deregulation of electric utilities in 
Montana.
Montana Environmental Information Center 
Montana Chapter of the Sierra Club 
Missoula Urban Demonstration Project 
W omen’s Opportunity and Resource Development 
Montana Senior Citizens’ Association 
Solar Plexus
W om en’s Voices for the Earth
Montana Audubon
Montana Chapter of Trout Unlimited
Northwest Enerav Coalition
Montana Public Interest Research Group
Working for Equality and Economic Liberation
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PSC Docket No. L-98.10.5-RUL, RULE IX, “CLAIMS MADE IN MARKETING 
ELECTRICITY OR NATURAL GAS,” 23 November 1998.
PSC Electric and Gas Restructuring Staff, “Memorandum to Commissioners,” 19 
December 1996.
PSC, Order No. 5986g, 2 February 1999.
PSC, Order No. 5986i, 11 May 1999.
PSC, “Request for Comments on Revised Draft Electric Restructuring Rules and Natural 
Gas and Electric Customer Protection and Information Rules,” 20 March 1998.
Shimshak, Rachel and Peter West, “Testimony of the Renewable Northwest Project to the 
Montana Senate Taxation Committee,” 13 March, 1997.
Smith, Deborah, NRDC amendments to SB 390 — 3rd reading copy, 10 April 1997.
Wahl, Russ, written testimony supporting SB 409, Senate Business and Industry 
Committee, 10 February 1999.
Wheelihan, Dave, “Testimony of the Montana Electric Cooperative Association before the 
Senate Taxation Committee - SB 390,” 13 March 1997.
Factsheets and Brochures
National Environmental Trust, “Science: Everyone Should Know the Basic Facts About 
Global W arming,” Climate Countdown Factsheet (Washington, D C.).
Glacier National Park, 1999 “Summer Guide to Waterton-Glacier International Peace 
Park,” obtained in 1998.
Starrs, Thomas J., Kelso Starrs & Associates (Vashon, WA), “Net Metering: Questions 
and Answers,” February 1999.
Radio
Judge, Patrick, Montana Environmental Information Center, “The Human Rights Hour with 
Albert Niccolucci,” Carroll College Radio, 14 April 1998.
Farling, Bruce, Montana Trout Unlimited, KUFM Editorial, 15 December 1997.
“Morning Edition,” National Public Radio, 1 April 1998.
Other
Administrative Rules of Montana.
The Constitution of the State of Montana.
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Montana Administrative Register.
Montana Code Annotated (MCA).
Higley, Charles, Critical Mass Energy Project, Public Citizen, news release, “Stop the
Bailout: Don’t Charge Consumers for Utilities’ Past Mistakes,” 7 August 1997. 
See: http://www.citizen.org/CMEP/restructuring/Stop-bailout.html
Rowe, Bob, “Comments on DEQ draft electric paper,” 3 December 1996.
Starrs, Thomas J., “Net metering: An Update on Legal and Regulatory Issues,” presented 
at the annual conference of the American Solar Energy Society, Albuquerque, NM, 
June 1998.
Starrs, Thomas J., “Summary of State ‘Net Metering’ Programs,” 26 April 1999. See; 
http ://w w w.spratley .com/ncp/pvr2/
Websites - First Appearance of each in Paper
Chapter 1
http://www.psc.state.mt.us/gaselec/gaselec.htm 
http://statedocs.msl. state .mt.us/ 
http://eia.doe.gov/oiaf/elepri97/glossary.html 
http://www.citizen.org/CMEP/RAGE/index.html
Chapter 2
http://www.uswest.com/customchoice
http://www.mcn.net/~mtcoop/
Chapter 3
http://www.citizen.org/CMEP/restructuring/Stop-bailout.html 
Chapter 4
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oil_gas/petroleum/info_gIance/prices.html
http://www.nrdc.org/air/energy/rbr/chap2.asp
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str/booklet/fuels.html
http://www.nwenergy.org/outreach/fact/dams_whydams.html
http://www.nwenergy.org/conservation/
Chapter 5
http://nationaljoumal.com/pubs/greenwire/
http://www.spratley.com/ncp/pvr2/
Chapter 6
http://www.psc.mt.gov/scripts/elecLicense/EleclicenseSearchresidential.asp
http://www.pplweb.com/
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RECOMMENDED WEB SITES
Energy Policy
American Local Power Project {Cape and Islands Self Reliance, MA) 
h t tp : / /w w w . lo c a l .o r g /
American Wind Energy Association
h t t p : / /w w w .a w e a .o r g /p o l ic y /
Clean Air Network (a project of the Natural Resources Defense Council) 
h t tp : / /w w w .c le a n a ir .n e t
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), Energy
h t tp : / /w w w .e d f .o r g /p r o g r a m s /e n e r g y /
Minnesotans for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ME3), Sustainable Minnesota 
h t t p : / /w w w .m e 3 .o r g /
National Environmental Trust (NET) 
h t tp : / /w w w .e n v iro n e t .o rg
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), Air/Energy Program 
h t tp : / /w w w .n rd c .o rg /a i r /e n e rg y /d e fa u l t .a s p
Northwest Energy Coalition (NW EC) - formerly Northwest Conservation Act Coalition (NCAC) 
h t tp : / /w w w .n w e n e rg y .o rg /n w e c
Public Citizen, Critical Mass Energy Project 
h t tp : / /w w w .c i t iz e n .o r g /C M E P /
Ratepayers for Affordable, Green Electricity (RAGE) 
h t tp : / /w w w .c it iz e n .o rg /C M E P /R A G E
Renewable Energy Policy Project (REPP) 
h t t p : / /w w w .r e p p .o r g /
Renewable Northwest Project (RNP)  
h t t p : / /w w w .r n p .o r g /
Rocky Mountain Institute (RMI)  
h t t p : / /w w w . r m i .o r g /
Safe Energy Communication Council (SECC) 
h t tp : / /w w w .s a fe e n e rg y .o rg /
TURN: The Utilities Reform Network (California) 
h t tp : / /w w w . t u r n .o r g /
Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), Energy Program
http : / /w w w .u csu sa .o rg /en erg y /O re ne w ab le .h tm l
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Energv-efHciencv. Renewable Energv. and Conservation
Alliance to Save Energy (ASE) 
h t t p : / /w w w .a s e .o r g /
American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy (ACEEE) 
h t tp : / /a c e e e .o r g /
American Solar Energy Society (ASES) 
h t tp : / /w w w .a s e s .o r g /
Center for Energy Efficiency & Renewable Technologies (CEERT)  
h t tp : / /w w w .c le a n p o w e r .o rg /
Center for Renewable Energy and Sustainable Technology (CREST), Solstice 
h t t p : / / c r e s t .o r g /
Consumer Federation of America Foundation 
http : / /w w w .b u y e n e rg y e ff ic ie n t .o rg
Northeast Sustainable Energy Association 
h t tp : / /w w w .n e s e a .o r g /
Northwest Energy Efficiency Alliance 
h t tp : / /w w w .n w a l l ia n c e .o rg /
Residential Energy Efficiency Database
h ttp : / /w w w .its -c a n a d a .c o m /re e d / in d e x .h tm
U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Network (EREN)  
h t tp : / /w w w .e r e n .d o e .g o v /  h t tp : / /w w w .su s ta in ab le .d o e .g o v /
U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Star U.S. ERA, Energy Star
h t tp : / /w w w .e n e rg y s ta r .g o v  h t tp : / /w w w .e p a .g o v /e n e rg y s ta r
U.S. Department of Energy, National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL)
h t t p : / /w w w .n r e l .g o v /
Montana
Montana Electric Cooperatives’ Association, MECA (Great Falls) 
h t t p : / /w w w .m c n .n e t / - m t c o o p /
Montana Environmental Information Center, MEIC (Helena) 
h t tp : / /w w w .m e ic .o rg
Montana Legislative Branch (Helena) 
h t tp : / / le g .s ta te .m t .u s /
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Montana Power Company, MPC (Butte) 
h t tp : / /w w w .m tp o w e r .c o m /
Montana Online Documents
http : / /s ta ted ocs .m s l.s ta te .m t.us /
Montana Public Service Commission, PSC (Helena) 
h t tp : / /p s c .s ta te .m t .u s /
National Center for Appropriate Technology, NCAT (Butte) 
h t tp : / /w w w .n c a t .o rg
http://www.m ontanagreenpower.com /index.htm l
Planetary Systems, Retail (Ennis)
h ttp ://w w w .p lanetarysys tem s.com
The Solar Harvest (Helena)
h t tp : / /w w w .s o la rh a rv e s t .o rg
Sunelco - The Sun Electric Company, Retail (Hamilton) 
http :/ /w w w .sunelco .com
Other
American Rivers
h t tp : / /w w w .a m r iv e rs .o rg
Climate Solutions (formerly Atmosphere Alliance) 
h ttp : / /w w w .c lim a teso lu t io n s .o rg /
Northwest Power Planning Council (NPPC) 
h t tp : / /w w w .n w p p c .o rg /
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) 
h t tp : / /w w w .e n e rg y .g o v /
U.S. Department of Energy, Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) 
h t tp : / /w w w .b p a .g o v /
U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
h t tp : / /w w w .e ia .d o e .g o v /
U.S. Department of Energy, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
h t tp : / /w w w .fe r c . fe d .u s /
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Office of Air and Radiation 
h t tp : / /w w w .e p a .g o v /o a r /
U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) 
h t tp : / /w w w .u s g c rp .g o v /
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